BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURERS AND U.S. IMPORTERS DOING BUSINESS: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF ARGUING SEQUENCES IN NEGOTIATION

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ABSTRACT

BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURERS AND U.S. IMPORTERS DOING BUSINESS: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF ARGUING SEQUENCES IN NEGOTIATION

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This study describes the discourse production and processing of arguing sequences in a naturally occurring business negotiation between Brazilian manufacturers and U.S. importers. Initial chapters discuss this data source and the microethnographic processing of it, and then review, with transcript data illustrations, the literatures grounding this as an interactional sociolinguistic microanalysis of negotiation talk in interaction.

Analyses in the core chapters describe negotiational arguing sequences. These sequences develop within a limited topical scope, and out of a third-position sequential environment. When parties misalign with a bargaining position, they account for that action. When the recipients do not honor that accounting practice, arguing ensues. How the accounting practice withstands opposition determines the type of closing of a sequence.

Further microanalysis reveals that participants orient to negotiational arguing sequences as interactional units which often have recognizable openings and closings. Their main constitutive actions — accounts and challenges — are examined. Analyses of example occurrences of different types of arguing sequences show the range of variation of the phenomenon across the corpus.

Participants in negotiation talk co-construct these sequences of concerted arguing actions primarily through conversational turns which are topically connected among themselves as well as to previous bargaining sequences. Unlike its non-negotiational equivalents, such arguing is topic-restrictive and interactionally bounded, resulting from the negotiating participants' institutionally mandated joint efforts to locally establish some degree of common ground regarding issues on which the parties have

displayed explicitly opposing views. This is required to allow alignment between the parties, preferably so that a bargaining reply can be proffered, and so that the parties may rely on each other as committed to particular courses of action in their post-negotiational future.

Despite the participants' different linguistic background and societal membership, and despite the complexity of their interactional task, no significant miscommunication was observed in their co-construction of negotiational arguing, in contrast with what has typically been found in intra-societal interethnic encounters. This study thus postulates that the interdependent institutional goal-orientation of participants engaged in inter-societal negotiation may minimize serious cross-cultural miscommunication.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation describes the discourse production and processing of negotiational arguing sequences. Participants in negotiation talk co-construct these sequences of concerted actions primarily through conversational turns which are topically connected among themselves as well as to some previous bargaining sequence, forming bounded interactional units. Arguing sequences result from the negotiating participants' joint efforts to locally establish some degree of common ground regarding issues on which the parties have displayed explicitly opposing views. Solving this organizational problem is required so that alignment between the parties becomes possible, preferably so that a bargaining reply can eventually be proffered, and so that, in turn, the parties may rely on each other as committed to a particular course of action in the post-negotiational future of their business dealings. The data source for this study is a naturally occurring business negotiation[1] between a party of Brazilian manufacturers and a party of U.S. importers. This is a talk-intensive series of business encounters spanning four days of meetings.

Organization of this Study

This dissertation is organized in nine chapters. Chapters 2-4 describe the data source and review the relevant literatures, grounding this study as an interactional sociolinguistic ethnographic microanalysis of negotiation talk-in-interaction. Chapters 5-8 present analyses of negotiational arguing sequences in the corpus. Chapter nine concludes the study.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the particular social situation in which the participants produced the talk-in-interaction that I observed and recorded. It describes the ethnographic part of this study, from

[1] Lakos (1989) defines negotiation as "a form of social interaction through which individuals, organizations and governments try to arrange their conflicting interests" (p. 1). This pre-analytical description highlights what is of interest in the data available for this study to ease exposition; it is not an *a priori* analytical categorization of the phenomena to be studied. Chapter 4 examines the concept of negotiation in the light of the data source.

the difficulties in field entry to a synopsis of main activities and topical developments in the series of encounters — the business event — which originated this dissertation's primary data on negotiation talk. A later section discusses the methodology used to transform the primary data source (i.e., the audiovisual recordings) into the final research data described in subsequent chapters.

In chapter 2, reporting the natural history of this inquiry as well as the macro context of the interaction under microanalysis serves two other ends, in addition to framing the data corpus in time and space. First, given the paucity of studies of naturally occurring negotiation talk in general, and of social interaction in Brazilian business settings in particular, describing the event and the data collection procedures is informative in and of itself.

Second, as the discussion of the natural history of this inquiry later in this chapter and the next indicates, a major motivation for the present microethnographic research is to describe how human social interaction occurs in real-world everyday events in which socio-culturally dissimilar participants come together to discuss weighty matters for their lives. The ethnographic report in chapter 2 thus shows connections between micro and macro aspects of interactional context, suggesting that micro analysis can often be quite macro. These connections tie in to substantive analytic issues regarding human communicative action, discussed in chapter 3, in that they particularize the participants' doings in the negotiation talk analyzed here as the local and embodied enactment, in social interaction, of historical and societal experience (Giddens, 1984). Moreover, these linkages also relate to the end-goal- or task-relatedness of institutional forms of talk, a discussion that recurs in the analysis of negotiational arguing throughout this dissertation.

Though the theoretical basis here is that of Gumperzian interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz, 1982a; Tannen, 1992), related bodies of literature that embrace converging theoretical stances concerning the social and cultural organization of human communicative action also inform this study. Such stances stress the need to analyze talk in interaction in terms of reflexive co-presence in real time, and they conceive of discourse as "an interactional achievement" (Schegloff, 1982). In this sense, this dissertation attempts a comprehensive theoretical and methodological association of microethnographic, interactional sociolinguistic and conversation analytic insights to describe the co-construction of negotiation talk in social interaction. Chapter 3 sketches the interactional sociolinguistic perspective on *face-to-face interaction* by discussing the social and cultural organization of communicative action. In this same chapter, I also examine how interactional sociolinguists have described *communication in cross-cultural interactions* such as the negotiation analyzed here, and propose that miscommunication is not a pre-ordained by-product of intercultural contact. Rather, participants co-construct it in the micropolitics of their interaction.

Chapter 4 examines the voluminous research literature on negotiation and negotiation discourse to tease out the minute section of it which is relevant to those of us who are interested in studying negotiation as a talk-interactional activity. I then review the handful of studies which have indeed described negotiation talk as a social interactional activity, with illustrative analyses of transcript data from the present negotiation talk corpus. I also discuss the proposition that institutional genres of talk like negotiation may offer participants a specific structural organization as well as special constraints and possibilities which differ from those of other forms of talk.

This discussion indicates that participants in negotiation talk orient to an institutional mandate that shapes the resources and constraints in their interaction. Moreover, it offers empirical evidence that the participants in the event examined here co-construct their interaction as *a negotiation*. All of this suggests that negotiation talk is a form of institutional discourse having particular structural idiosyncrasies in contrast to ordinary conversation.

The main discourse-analytic objective in this study is to investigate how participants in a cross-cultural international business negotiation deal with explicit misalignment to co-construct the core of their activity together, which is the achievement of a mutually acceptable set of future commercial commitments. Following Maynard (1984), I maintain that negotiation talk proceeds through bargaining sequences. When parties misalign with a bargaining position, they initiate accounting practices, which may be honored or not. When the accounting practice is not honored, that is, when misalignment meets misalignment, negotiational arguing sequences begin to be co-constructed to establish the agreed status of the accounting practice, so that the negotiation may proceed. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 answer key questions which motivated this research as to how this takes place interactionally.

Drawing on recent findings about the structures of social action in negotiation talk discussed in the previous chapter, chapter 5 shows that an *overall structural organization* (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 43) can indeed be demonstrated to exist in arguing sequences in business negotiation talk. This chapter thus introduces and illustrates negotiational arguing sequences as a phenomenon found across the data corpus by analyzing and explicating a transcript containing one occurrence. This sequence is shown to develop within the topical scope of a bargaining sequence, and out of a third-position sequential environment. Initially, one of the parties (A) produces a first-position turn containing or alluding to a bargaining sequence opener. This is met with a second-position turn (produced by the other party, B) containing a display of non-alignment with the first-position action, and an account for such non-alignment. When recipients (A) do not honor the accounting practice in second position, but take issue with the conversational materials offered by members of the other party (B) to account for the misaligning actions, the construction of a negotiational arguing sequence is underway.

Chapter 6 deals with the analytic segmentation of the continuous flow of interaction, and answers questions as to how participants co-construct and orient to arguing actions *as interactional units*. In the analysis of how they manage to open and close a negotiational arguing sequence, participants are shown to orient to negotiational arguing sequences as having openings and closings. These explorations show that they construct demonstrably relevant boundaries around these sequences.

Indeed, I first turned my attention to negotiational arguing as an interactional phenomenon worth investigating as I confronted the extended, continuous exchanges of claims to misaligned bargaining positions in a segment which would turn out to be the longest and most complex occurrence of an arguing sequence in the corpus. Microanalysis of the closing of this sequence in chapter 6 evidences that the participants produce sequence boundaries in collective, concerted action both through their spoken and unspoken observable behavior.

Chapter 7 expands the discussion of the structural composition of the actions through which participants co-construct negotiational arguing in the negotiation talk corpus. The main constitutive types of actions in negotiational arguing sequences — accounts and challenges — are discussed as two sides of the same coin. The second major section of this chapter presents the main thesis of this dissertation by means of a comprehensive description of the action structures in negotiational arguing. The discussion of these structures introduces a typology of the arguing sequences in the data source.

Chapter 8 presents the typology of the decision-making process and closings in the more than thirty negotiational arguing sequences found in the corpus, showing their range of variation. Transcript excerpts containing different types of arguing sequences featured in the typology are explicated in detail. This chapter advances the previously reported finding that the negotiating participants orient to the accounting practice in second position as the central issue being addressed in the co-construction of a negotiational arguing sequence. The analyses here show that the type of closing of a sequence is determined by whether or not the accounting practices initiated in second position withstood opposition.

Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation. It points out some of the limitations of this study and discusses the main findings and their implications. Appendix A offers a detailed narrative account of the developments in the four days of meetings composing the business negotiation event, providing extensive contextual information for the interested reader to locate any particular transcript within the sequential flow of the interaction. Transcription conventions appear in appendix B, along with the complete and uninterrupted transcripts of the main data segments explicated in throughout the dissertation.

Cross-Cultural Negotiation Talk in Interaction

In addition to its central concern with the organization of arguing sequences in negotiation talk, this is an interactional sociolinguistic microethnographic examination of cross-cultural communication and conflict talk, focusing on the organization of the social interaction through which participants construct their business deal. Before reporting on this research and its findings, however, I want to bring up an aspect of the natural history of this inquiry (Erickson, 1990b) having to do with expectations I had before I engaged in this empirical investigation, and which were contradicted by it. My initial hypothesis that miscommunication would surface in the analysis of arguing in cross-cultural negotiation was not confirmed, and is therefore not addressed centrally throughout the analyses of the negotiational arguing sequences in chapter 2 and 4-8. This is an important issue in this study, however, and it is discussed here as well as in chapters 3 and 9.

Given the complexities of co-producing arguing in negotiation interaction, especially when the language of interaction is not native to one of the parties, there was reason to believe that variation in the participants' conventions for language use and interactional conduct would become apparent through the microanalysis of their arguing. I had previously described (Garcez, 1991, 1993) differences in the way these same Brazilian manufacturers and U.S. importers organized verbal information in point-making in this negotiation, and had examined how these diverging communicative conventions developed into interactional trouble. It thus seemed that the complexity of arguing activities would exacerbate any mismatches in their communicative conventions, and this would result in communicative difficulties and miscommunication. Accordingly, the close examination of the overall structural organization of arguing in the recorded business negotiation would reveal the tension between the participants' intention to maximize interactional gains through strategic moves on the one hand, and their sociolinguistic and cultural differences in the conduct of talk-in-interaction on the other.

So my prediction was that further investigation of arguing sequences in the data source would allow me to refine my earlier analyses and reveal additional stylistic clashes in the participants' sociolinguistic performance in talk-in-interaction. Contrary to that expectation, however, I could not find evidence indicating that the participants' sociocultural conventions had prevented them from co-constructing these crucial sequences in negotiational discourse. Later, I would learn that Firth (1991) also reported similar findings based on his analyses of international business negotiations conducted over the telephone.

Though this is dealt with at length in chapter 3, I would like to introduce here, as the comprehensive frame of this study, the idea that the study of international business negotiations, that is, interactions between culturally dissimilar interactants who are members of different societies, and whose talk is geared to the accomplishment of fairly discrete, interdependent end-goals, may offer particular insights into cross-cultural communication more generally as a phenomenon.

Cross-Cultural Encounters and the Global Economy

In the 20th century, the socio-culturally homogeneous community went from norm to exception, and the world population became increasingly urban, as most human societies went from rural to industrial and post-industrial, from traditional to modern and post-modern or chaotic. With this, contact among members of different cultural groups also became common in most urban industrialized societies, and the communicative problems generated in these continuous contacts became clearly noticeable. The detailed sociolinguistic study of cross-cultural communication was born out of the need to understand the pattern of miscommunication between majority and minority groups in multi-ethnic developed nations like the U.S., the U.K., and Germany (Dittmar & Stutterheim, 1985; Erickson & Shultz, 1982; Gumperz, 1982a, 1982c). I will refer to this as intra-societal cross-cultural communication.

Thus far, academic effort to understand the dynamics of cross-cultural communication has been mostly devoted to descriptions of intra-societal cross-cultural encounters so that we now have a considerable literature on various such interactions. Given the seriousness of the problem these studies address, and the overwhelming evidence that they have presented, we may be led to think of interethnic encounters within one societal system as representative of all cross-cultural encounters in general. However, cross-cultural communication involves other types of encounters as well.

The world in the late 20th century, perhaps more than ever before, has become transnational to the extent that the global economy is no longer just a metaphor, as this study will show. In this new, global economy, frequent and variegated cross-cultural contacts occur in intensive, bracketed, goal-directed encounters among individuals belonging to different nation-state constituencies who have allegiances in different legal and political systems. Whereas until recently goal-directed encounters between members of different societies were restricted in number and in types of situation to the more traditional areas of diplomacy and big business, today these intermittent interactions are more and more common in small business, science, education, tourism, etc. However, detailed examination of how agents interact in these types of inter-societal encounters has been carried out only in limited ways.

The research reported here aims to contribute to furthering our understanding of cross-cultural communication in interactions where individuals who are speakers of different native-languages, and members of different societies, use English as the linguistic medium in their goal-directed encounters in the new global economy. As such, it intends to shed light on the dynamics of a crucial activity — arguing — in a specific form of institutional talk-in-interaction — business negotiation. It also attempts to contribute to our understanding of related phenomena in the realms of conflict talk and the organization of talk-in-interaction more generally.

The Study of Negotiation as Social Interaction

Negotiations have been investigated from various disciplinary angles, but few studies have described the details of talk-in-interaction in the process of negotiation. Of these, only a small fraction have dealt with naturally occurring interaction (i.e., non-staged or simulated), used audiovisual records as primary data, or focused on cross-cultural negotiations between ordinary citizens (i.e., those not invested with national representational authority). This study hopes to integrate, in microethnographic perspective, what we know about negotiation talk to the detailed analysis of an actual negotiation event.

Few comprehensive studies of naturally occurring conflict talk have been carried out so far, especially when it comes to the discourse of cross-cultural negotiations. Grimshaw (1992) points out that this neglect is due to at least three reasons: few records are collected and those which are collected do not become available for research scrutiny; negotiators are skeptical that anything new to them can be uncovered by examination of negotiations at the level of talk in interaction; and, following from this, they are unaware of the analytic power of discourse analysis. Indeed, Grimshaw (1990) writes that "the most critical data problem for students of conflict talk is that researchers haven't been able to gain access to conflict talk in which matters of more than personal moment are disputed" (p. 12). Furthermore, he argues that

> Until we are able to obtain data on conflict talk in negotiations between large collectives up to and including nation states we will not be able to determine the extent to which findings on conflict talk (and conflict as a social process more generally) can be claimed to hold across levels of varying social complexity and, critically, importance of stakes. (p. 13)

Because of its microethnographic and inductive analytic stance, this study also attends to Brenneis' (1988) similar call for more data-driven claims about conflict talk. In criticizing the fact that, despite the growing literature on language and disputing, studies "rarely include verbatim records of what is said," Brenneis points out that it is critical that we have detailed records and annotations on textual and contextual features in addition to just narrative description, since "understanding the role of dispute language requires attention not only to what is said but also to how it is said and to how various speakers' performances are linked" (p. 222). The present study of naturally occurring, non-personal negotiation talk among adults from different socio-cultural backgrounds is a step in the direction of attending to these points about ways of advancing our understanding of conflict talk.

On this note, this research also sheds light on the interactional performance of Brazilian negotiators who are also foreign-language speakers of English. Very limited research work has been done on Brazilian spoken business discourse, and most of it has been largely anecdotal and only marginally concerned with talk in interaction (Amado & Brasil, 1991; Harrison, 1983. The need to learn more about Brazilian negotiation behavior is highlighted in the conclusion by Graham (Graham, 1983a), the only researcher to my knowledge to have studied it systematically, to the effect that

> Indeed, the findings of this study suggest that Americans and Japanese will have difficulty bargaining with Brazilian business people. ... One of the important areas of future research in this area will be the examination of American/Brazilian bargaining interactions. Who makes adjustments, and what things change? (p. 93)

Thus this study, through its focus on the co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences by culturally-dissimilar members of relatively discrete societal systems, should offer some contributions in thinking about the organization of human communicative action as co-constructed, and of cross-cultural interaction in terms of *interculture* as well as interlanguage (Ochs, 1993, p. 302). Indeed, Ochs (1993) has called for the development of a social constructivist paradigm in applied linguistics, one that would help us conceptualize and

> examine the building of multiple, yet perfectly compatible identities - identities that are subtle and perhaps have no label, blended identities, even blurred identities. It is just this sort of construction that every language and culture acquirer must learn to accomplish, because there are no simple social or linguistic formulae that spit out how to compose suitable identities for the occasion. (p. 298)

This dissertation is an attempt to heed that call by examining negotiational arguing as the result of carefully concerted action by participants whose multiple identities surface, blend and blur to get business done.

CHAPTER 2

THE COUROFATOS/AMAGE BUSINESS NEGOTIATION EVENT

What follows is a synoptic description of the series of encounters, the business event, which originated this dissertation's primary data on negotiation talk. The initial section introduces relevant aspects concerning the ethnographic part of this research — from the development of a research interest in this kind of interaction to field entry, including how participants were contacted, who they are, what the companies involved are like, what kind of partnership they have, what happened in their previous meeting, and other such issues. A second section presents a synoptic view of the main activities and topical developments in the event in a linear manner so as to provide a gestalt perspective of it. Finally, the chapter closes with information about how the event was recorded and a discussion of the methodology used to transform the primary data source (i.e., the audiovisual recordings) into the final research data that later chapters describe.

Introduction to a Research Interest

As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) point out, "research never starts from scratch, it always relies on common-sense knowledge to one degree or another" (p. 64). Accordingly, my attempts to observe and record interactions like the one to be analyzed here stemmed from a much earlier motivation at the time I was a language-major undergraduate and an English-as-a-foreign-language (EFL) student-teacher. It had to do with what I perceived as a discrepancy between what EFL professionals around me emphasized as goal priorities for students, and what individuals who used EFL in their professional lives seemed to regard as the qualities of highly competent EFL speakers.

My professors, trainers and employers as an EFL teacher taught me to have grammatical accuracy and native-like linguistic proficiency as the goals of EFL teaching and learning. However, a different message often came across in conversations with colleagues, friends and acquaintances who used EFL at work, mainly in industry, as well as in observations in my own professional experience in an export-import department of a manufacturing company in Brazil and in free-lance interpreting and translating for industry. Many of these "practitioners" lacked grammatical accuracy or native-like pronunciation, and yet they were successful in carrying out their EFL-based professional duties. Moreover, they often expressed an interest in further developing their EFL skills, but complained about the quality and relevance of the EFL instruction they were able to get at advanced levels, especially in university programs such as Business Administration and Foreign Trade.

After my introduction to the sociolinguistics research literature at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, my initial puzzlement took the shape of an interest in investigating what happened when Brazilians used their EFL skills in a professional capacity, and under intense sociolinguistic and interactional demands. In other words, I wondered what it was like for them to have to engage in and sustain complex verbal interaction in English in order to settle matters of consequential professional importance.

It seemed clear that English-medium business events in which Brazilians interacted with foreign nationals happened routinely in my native *Vale do Sinos* (Sinos River Valley). Geographically a river valley located in the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, and originally settled by German immigrants in the 1800s, the *Vale do Sinos* is a manufacturing "supercluster" (Schmitz, 1995) within the main industrial center in Southern Brazil.[1] Schmitz (1995) describes it as "an impressive concentration of local firms" somewhat unique in developing nations (p. 9). Shoes and other leather products are the main industry, representing a significant contribution to the total output of Brazilian foreign trade. According to Teruchkin (1990), "the state of Rio Grande do Sul contributes with 80% of the number of pairs of shoes exported by the country" (p. 628), and these figures have remained relatively stable (Making shoes in Brazil..., 1995). Shoes and other leather goods meant 27.22% of the state's total export output in 1988, a very significant figure in a state where the export/GNP ratio (17.35%) was almost twice as high the mean rate for the whole of the Brazilian economy (9.66%). Between 75 to 80% of the state's shoe and leather goods exports go to the U.S. (Teruchkin, 1990, p. 628), so many exporters in the region have business connections

[1] For socio-economic history and description of *Vale do Sinos* development, see Schmitz (1995) and Korzeniewicz (1992).

with the United States, and many companies in the area hire executives whose activities include face-to-face contact with foreign business people, mostly in English.

Therefore, in mid-1990, I started searching for opportunities to participate in and observe such an event by spreading the word through relatives and friends that I was interested in talking to people who used English extensively at work. My interest at the time was broadly defined in terms of any face-to-face interaction conducted in English between Brazilians and non-Brazilians. Even if this was referred to as "negotiations," my concern was to observe Brazilians making use of complex EFL skills in any type of business meeting. Soon a few contacts were made that confirmed my impressions: There were quite a few local people using EFL in extensive contacts with foreign business people.

Preliminary Field Work

Even though the initial prospective contacts sounded optimistic, when I approached about ten of those previously acquainted potential sources a second time to introduce my interest in observing their workplaces in companies in the region, I was suddenly perceived as an intruder. This was especially true with respect to those in the shoe-export business, who reported extensive use of English in the workplace. As Agar (1980, p. 59) describes, people kept seeing some sort of "malevolent intent" (p. 59) behind my request of entry. It seemed that, while in the first approach people had constructed me as a student who was writing a paper or a journalist writing a story, the second time around they constructed me as a corporate spy, or a potential nuisance at best. One of these contacts had been an EFL teacher herself for many years, and had always known me and my family personally. After confirming that her staff indeed conducted business in English, extensively and routinely, she closed any possibilities of entry on the grounds that these were busy people, doing serious work and talking about sensitive issues. They could not, therefore, have a stranger around disturbing them for no good reason.

This and other conversations to request entry were discouraging not only because of the negative responses, but also because the rejections were phrased in terms that clearly constructed me as a dilettante or as dishonest. As I recounted these difficulties, people whose workplaces did not include predictable events of the kind I was looking for, but who were sympathetic to my cause, would subtly let me know that contacts in the shoe-export business were improbable avenues to entry in the field. They regarded shoe-export negotiations as "too delicate" or "too dirty" to be recorded or even witnessed by strangers. In any case, all of this confirmed my sense that something non-trivial was typically at stake during talks in such business encounters, and that they were vastly unknown to uninitiated outsiders, such as EFL professionals, who would later be expected to train the insiders to be effective ESP (English for Specific Purposes) speakers.[2]

With the benefit of hindsight and a few readings, I can now see that such difficulties are typical in securing access to field sites in ethnographic research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, chap. 3). Moreover, the rejections and justifications I heard were to be expected as they echo the principal reasons noted by (Grimshaw, 1992) for why negotiators show a "nearly consensual reluctance" (p. 102) to keep, or allow the keeping of, records of talk in negotiating sessions. Grimshaw lists five such reasons, namely that negotiators believe that records or analysis of their talk will not reveal anything they do not already know, that these records present endangerment of trust, increase self-consciousness, and raise fears of leaks and of litigation and judicial reinterpretation (pp. 102-104).

This explains the paucity of studies of naturally occurring negotiation talk in actual negotiation events dealing with issues of real conflict-potential, a problem which has recently received attention in the negotiation discourse research literature (Ehlich & Wagner, 1995; Firth, 1991, 1995a; Garcez, 1993, 1996; Gibbons, Bradac & Busch, 1992; Grimshaw, 1990, 1992; see also chapter 4, pp. 97-100 below). My own difficulties getting entry to the field illustrate this, and corroborate Ehlich and Wagner's (1995) view that *business negotiation* is one of the most difficult "fields of verbal interaction" for an analyst to gain access to due to "all those little facets of — to put it in a paradoxical way — 'professional privacy' which are involved" (p. 2).

This state of affairs also echoes Erickson's (1990b) point about "a perplexing situation" which qualitative researchers may find themselves in: "He or she needs to have done an ethnography of the setting in order to anticipate the range of risks and other burdens that will be involved for those studied"

[2] Incidentally, Lampi (1986) reports that her study of the language of business negotiations was motivated by requests from her Finnish EFL students for specific training so that they could become more effective EFL negotiators.

(139). In fact, Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) write that "the discovery of obstacles to access, and perhaps of effective means of overcoming them, themselves provide insights into the social organization of the setting" (p. 54). Having learned this the hard way, I started considering issues of site entry and ethics more carefully in my subsequent attempts.

After contacting a number of companies in industries other than strictly shoes, in late September, 1990, I was given the chance to speak with Roberto Madeira,[3] the export manager of Courofatos, a leather-goods factory. At last, someone listened to me long enough so I could start the actual process of securing entry to a site (Erickson & Wilson, 1982, p. 44).

Interestingly enough, Roberto had given up his job in the shoe-export business before he took his position at Courofatos. I got a chance to speak to him under quite informal circumstances. His father-in-law, who used to work with two of my brothers, was told about my project by yet another one of my brothers, with whom he used to play tennis. After a couple of weeks, I was told that Roberto would be willing to hear me. My brother took me to Roberto's father-in-law's on a Sunday afternoon, and we were introduced. Thus through "the mobilization of existing social networks, based on acquaintanceship, kinship, occupational membership and so on," "informal sponsorship" seemed in sight (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 60).

In what turned out to be a long conversation, Roberto allowed me to make clear what my intentions were. He did not seem to believe I presented any threat to his business. In fact, in this initial contact, Roberto confirmed many of previous impressions regarding the macro context of international business interactions taking place locally. He told me he conducted much of his business in English and that this often included long meetings or negotiations. He also referred to communicative difficulties in his interactions with his international business associates, and then volunteered information about his frustration in getting useful training to deal with the challenges of his professional life as far as EFL and cross-cultural communication were concerned. He told me that, in spite of having had compulsory EFL classes throughout his college life as he earned a degree in Foreign Trade, he had learned *on the job* everything he knew about communicative behavior in professional meetings with foreign business people.

[3] Naturally, all proper names in this report are pseudonyms.

Profiting from his openness, I was able to show this gatekeeper that something beneficial to his profession could result if he allowed me to study how negotiations occurred in his business. I had used the "successful strategy" referred to by Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz (1982) of "enlisting the cooperation of participants who have become convinced that they can gain insights into their ... processes" (p. 10). Roberto agreed to have me in his workplace to observe or record whenever such interactions were scheduled.

Pending approval by Roberto's boss and permission from other participants, the initial plan was for me to sit in during a number of encounters, and then record one. However, an opportunity to record a meeting came sooner than expected: Roberto telephoned me to say there was going to be a meeting in two weeks, to which I was invited. He volunteered to fax the North-American participants of the meeting, telling them about my interest in attending and recording their meetings. Given the previous difficulties, I decided to take up Roberto's offer immediately before he changed his mind.

Following his instructions, I joined Roberto on his way to pick up the two importers at the airport. I sat down to talk to the importers at the airport lobby while Roberto cleared up problems with their delayed luggage. The importers read a letter of introduction stating my research purposes, printed on official university letterhead and signed by the head of the graduate program I was in. They asked further questions about my intentions, and then granted me permission to tape the event, on a few conditions.

They were obviously reticent at first and Harry, one of the importers and CEO of the U.S. importing company, said maybe *Roberto* would not like me to record the meetings. I assured them that the recording could be stopped and the materials erased, if they so wished, at any point during their interactions, and that the recordings would remain confidential, with all mentions allowing personal identification to be changed in eventual reports. This was in keeping with Agar's (1980) reminder that "people must be informed of your role — who are you and what do you want" (p. 55). It also followed Erickson and Wilson's (1982) instructions for microethnographic audiovisual recording according to which "specific agreements to protect the interests of the parties involved need to be worked out in terms of the particulars of the setting" (p. 44). Confidentiality was thus offered and agreed upon as part of the larger issue that Erickson and Wilson allude to, concerning "the fundamental ethical requirement of the researcher to prevent harm to those being studied" (p. 44).

Starting as soon as we arrived from the airport, a series of meetings took place during the next four consecutive days, Wednesday through Saturday, in late October, 1990. This resulted in a number of audio and video tapes totaling almost 14 hours of interaction. The four main participants and I spent most of our waking hours together during those four days, and these activities are described synoptically below (and in narrative detail in appendix A, p. 331).

The Business Event

Throughout this dissertation, the phrase "the Amage/Courofatos event" is used in reference to what in fact is a series of business encounters interspersed with social and practical activities during four consecutive days. The term event is thus used here more in a descriptive than in an analytic sense to differentiate the magnitude of speech-situational categories (Hymes, 1974). I take the event to encompass all meetings or encounters from the moment the importers arrived until they left the Courofatos offices, just like an academic conference is an event composed of a number of encounters. Following Gumperz' (1982a) notion of *speech event*, that is, those

> units of verbal behavior bounded in time and space, ... vary[ing] in the degree to which they are isolable, ...[in which] all verbal behavior is governed by social norms specifying participant roles, rights and duties vis-a-vis each other, permissible topics, appropriate ways of speaking and ways of introducing information (p. 165),

the interaction among the importers and manufacturers at Courofatos is seen here as a *business negotiation event*.[4] Before presenting the main topical developments and activities in the Amage/Courofatos business negotiation event, below I describe a few discrete aspects of its setting, guided by Hymes' (1974) SPEAKING mnemonic for components of ethnographies of speaking.

The Location

The meetings took place at the Courofatos offices. Courofatos is a medium-size, family-owned manufacturing company with around 500 employees. The plant and the offices are located in the urban area of a city of 150,000, within a larger metropolitan area of 2.5 million. Courofatos makes leather goods both for

[4] The crucial analytic distinction between negotiation *event* vs. *activity* is discussed in chapter 4, pp. 85-86.

the domestic and the export markets on a 60/40 per cent ratio. Its exports markets include the U.S., Western Europe, Latin America, Australia and Japan. Mr. Amati, Sr. owns a 60% share of the company.

The Participants

Two participants compose the U.S. importer party in the meetings: Harry Kaplan and Charles Bernstein. Both are native speakers of American English. They live and work in the New York metropolitan area, and report no special contact with Brazilian culture and society other than through their business connections, which extend the world over.

Harry Kaplan is the chairman of the board of Amage, a business enterprise in the luggage and leather-goods import-export business in the U.S.. He is about 50 years old, was born, and has lived most of his life in and around New York City. He has been doing business with Brazilians for about 10 years. His knowledge of Portuguese is minimal, and his exposure to Latin American culture is as significant as his exposure to the cultures of the various other countries where his business interests take him, such as Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Taiwan, China, Korea, India, Mexico. Harry reported he could speak Hebrew and some Romanian.

An extrovert with strong opinions, Harry seemed to have a positive attitude toward Brazil and its people at large. "They're the warmest people in the world — everybody says that and it's true." However, he was also quite critical of the country, sometimes revealing a judgmental edge of criticism based on stereotypes of the kind "Latin Americans are too relaxed" (i.e., lazy), or "the problem with this country is their rotten ethics." He said more than once that Brazilians are the most difficult people to do business with. "They seem not to want to sell, to get business done. They're not aggressive!"

Harry and Charles have a long-standing relationship. In fact, Harry used to work in the wood import business before he took over Charles Bernstein's leather goods factory, and turned it into an import and merchandise business. Charles was retained as president of the company.

Charles Bernstein is about 65 years old. He was born in Massachusetts, as his accent "obviously shows," according to Harry, but has been living in the New York metropolitan area for a long time. Charles speaks slowly and softly. Like his partner, his exposure to foreign cultures has always been that of an accidental tourist. He says he has a "tin ear" for languages, and knows that even when trying to say "thank you" in Portuguese he may not be understood. Despite the fact that the last word in making decisions is usually Harry's, Charles expertise from more than 20 years as a leather-goods manufacturer makes him an authority on most technical matters discussed in the encounters, such as ways to overcome production problems. Incidentally, Charles' personal move from manufacturing to importing is typical of what happened in the footwear industry in the U.S.. Imports rose from 20% to 80% between 1960 and 1990, and yet "this rise in imports occurred in a relatively silent way because the U.S. manufacturers themselves became importers" (Schmitz, 1995, p. 14).

The two main participants on the Brazilian side are Eduardo Amati, 33, and Roberto Madeira, 28. Both are native speakers of Brazilian Portuguese.

Eduardo Amati is the financial director of Courofatos, the Brazilian manufacturing company. He is also the son of the president of the company. Eduardo was born and raised in the same city where Courofatos is located, went to the local schools, and started studying Economics at the local university, though he never graduated. He learned English in secondary school and during his six-month stay in Germany, where he shared a room with a Dutch man who preferred to speak English. His English is nearly fluent, despite the frequent grammar mistakes and his evident Brazilian Portuguese accent. Eduardo has a good sense of humor and seems to be well liked by everyone at Courofatos. Charles and Harry also seem to like him as a business associate.

Eduardo is one of the poles of what Roberto referred to as "a generation clash in the company." Eduardo's brother also used to work with their father, but left some time ago to work elsewhere, apparently because of significant disagreements regarding Mr. Amati, Sr.'s administration of the company. Eduardo's views also differ in some respects from his father's. This sort of attrition is typical of Brazilian companies, which are generally family-owned (Semler, 1988, a recent business best-seller author, stresses the urgency of unlocking family relations from Brazilian corporate management). Eduardo seems to feel he is standing between a rock and a hard place in terms of how hard to fight for the implementation of changes in his family's business. During a dinner party at the factory's cafeteria in which quite a few skilled workers were present, Eduardo told me he believed he could understand the workers' position when they negotiated with him because he believed their position was similar to his when he had to negotiate with the U.S. importers.

Roberto Madeira is the export manager at Courofatos. He has been working there for five years. Though originally from the mid-western Brazilian state of Goiás, Roberto has been living locally for ten years (since 1980). He married locally, and graduated from a local university with a major in Foreign Trade. He learned English abroad when he spent six months in Canada and six months in the U.S.. His command of the English language is near-native, so he is quite comfortable using it. Regarding the "generation clash" within the company, Roberto told me he tries to ease conflict wherever it arises.[5] Concerning his American business associates, Roberto told me he is fond of both, and that he has been learning a lot from them. He said their main communication problem is that "Americans are very objective, and if you don't have quick solutions they quit talking."

These four participants are unanimous in saying that their personal relationship is optimal. They consider one another friends, and that could be seen in the way they interacted at different moments in the office and during breaks. In these instances, they acted very informally: feet on tables, sleeping in the office, joking and playing tricks on each other, using swear words. Roberto said that this was the result of "too many hours" spent together after more than one and a half years of intensive business contact.

As an observer, I was the fifth participant throughout the encounters. Though strictly speaking I had been a complete stranger to all other participants before I displayed my intention to study their interaction, I was able to claim some *comembership* (Erickson & Shultz, 1982) with each one of them by showing that, for one reason or the other, we had things in common. From the simple fact that my brothers had introduced me to Roberto and to the owners of the Brazilian company, it was immediately clear to them that I was a member of the local community. In our informal conversations, Roberto, Eduardo and his father probed me for information about myself, and it became quite obvious that my network of relationships included some people in theirs.

[5] Roberto's attitude regarding conflict as "something to be avoided" is reminiscent of "the cordial man" described by classic Brazilian sociology (Hollanda, 1936/1995). According to this literature, cordiality is a major distinctive feature of the Brazilian national character.

It was especially during the "dead" times between business activities, and during the meals we shared, that I was able to both build rapport with and collect ethnographic information from the participants. Agar writes (1980) that "the ethnographer can ... make a difference, if she is not completely new to the group. If she can behave in a way that indicates prior insider status elsewhere, it will change people's interpretation of her role" (p. 60).

Establishing some degree of comembership with the two U.S. importers early on became possible when they asked how I had learned English, and I told them that I had lived for a year as an exchange student with a Jewish family in a New York suburb close to where Charles lived. This remark became especially relevant during the first lunch break at a local restaurant, when, after they requested more information about my experience living as an exchange student with a Jewish family, I recited a Hebrew prayer, and thus positively surprised the importers, who until then were acting cautiously towards me. This produced a considerable amount of small talk and a change of attitude towards me from that moment on. After that exchange, Harry and Charles started referring to Brazilians as "they" when speaking to me, sometimes in less than complimentary terms, as if I were not one of "them." By "looking interested and suggesting a couple of turns toward the other side of the ballroom to check the view from there," as Agar (1980) put it, I was able to present myself to the importers as less than "a complete other."

The fact I had once had a job as an export-assistant in a *Vale do Sinos* industry also helped me to show the participants that, although I was not a peer, I was not a complete outsider to their business either. Soon all of the participants came to see me as somehow belonging in there for the time being. "Eventually people come to accept you for what you are — a strange person who asks many dumb questions" (Agar, 1980, p. 60); that is, an "acceptable incompetent" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).

In addition to the participants introduced above, others occasionally took part in the interaction for brief periods of time, for all sorts of reasons not directly related to the four negotiators' business at hand. These included outside visitors, Courofatos' office and model-shop staff, Roberto's assistant in the export department, who was involved in his daily routine as well as in running errands for the importers; Courofatos' domestic sales manager, whose desk is in the room where most of the event took place; and Flávio Amati, Eduardo's father and president of the Brazilian company for some 20 years.

Mr. Amati's presence played havoc with the other participants and the interaction. On the one hand, both his son and his employee, Roberto, felt they had to explain what was going on, and consult him on the matter being decided every time he came into the room. The importers, on the other hand, especially Harry, seemed to worry that his presence might spoil what they had accomplished. During the crucial final meeting on Saturday morning, Mr. Amati came into the office wearing a jogging outfit and sat next to the negotiating table to read the newspaper, interjecting a few comments now and then until Harry jokingly suggested that Mr. Amati should go jogging (i.e., leave the room). Mr. Amati's English is minimal, but his presence was significant for the participants in the negotiation.

The Courofatos-Amage Association

Despite their amicable relationship, what really brings these parties together is their professional business interests (which in turn generates the *institutional mandate* for their interaction, which will be discussed in detail later; see pp. 101-103). They have been meeting frequently for a year and half (i.e., since May 1989). Starting January, 1990, Amage — the U.S. importing company — had been importing attache cases and portfolios from Courofatos. These products were then introduced in the U.S. market under a special trademark in a completely different marketing and merchandising scheme from the other lines, and specifically mentioning Brazil as the source of the products. Their first year of business was profitable, but quantities were not large. Now the importing company wants to add a number of new items to the collection and increase volume substantially during the upcoming year.

Over the course of the first 10 months of business prior to the present event, they had met five times, alternating the location of the meetings between Brazil and the U.S.. The main problem both parties had during these first 10 months of business (January-October 1990) was Courofatos' price increases. This was unacceptable for Amage, for they maintained that, "in the American market," one cannot increase prices in the middle of a year. On the other hand, the Courofatos manufacturers argued, they could not keep prices as originally quoted due to the tremendous changes brought into the Brazilian economy by the new government that had taken office on March 15, 1990 (especially in terms of the exchange rates for foreign currencies).[6] Only after a series of negotiation rounds, held at Amage's headquarters around a month prior to the recorded encounters, were they able to come to terms and agree on a 10% increase. In the present talks, Harry reminds the manufacturers that had been the first time — "in the history of me doing business" — that anyone had ever gotten a mid-term price increase from him.

According to information collected in private informal conversations with both Roberto and Eduardo, the need to honor the initial prices, which from the manufacturers' perspective became unprofitable, turned into a serious problem for Courofatos, not only for the prices themselves in absolute terms, but also for what they meant in terms of comparative reference for new styles being introduced the following year. In addition, they believed that committing Courofatos' limited production capacity to fill Amage orders would jeopardize the Brazilian manufacturing company's independence and prevent the manufacturers from using that capacity to meet more profitable domestic demand at that particular economic time.

This ultimately became the predicament running in the undercurrent of most of the present negotiation. On the one hand, Roberto and Eduardo are concerned that the new bulk of orders on new items for a new collection might upset the balance between domestic and export production, which they feel must remain as is. They do not want to allocate more than 50% of their capacity to a single importer (i.e., Amage) for fear of becoming too dependent on it. This fear, which may sound unreasonable to the importers ("they don't get excited with big volumes"), is grounded on crucial aspects of Brazilian reality: the instability of the Brazilian domestic economy and its run-away inflationary cycles, and the volatility of exchange rates caused by the unpredictable ebb and flow of the Brazilian governments' economic policies.

On the other hand, however, the manufacturers are clearly interested in maintaining their business association with Amage for its potential as a constant buyer. In addition, the cooperation between the two parties has gone beyond a mere buying-selling relationship. Because Amage is truly interested in the products manufactured at Courofatos for their quality of craftsmanship, the importers have tried to create a

[6] The day after taking office, former Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello introduced one of the most unorthodox anti-inflationary and economic reform plans ever to be attempted. Among other things, it changed the currency, froze (i.e., temporarily confiscated) all assets above US$ 1,200.00 from all savings and checking accounts for 18 months, and radically altered import regulations. This of course required tremendous readjustments in any type of business deal based on previous rules.

number of "fringe benefits" for Courofatos. For example, they allowed the Brazilian company to use, for their domestic promotion in Brazil, some of the advertising materials produced for the merchandising of the products in the U.S.. Harry stressed, both to me and during talks, he felt it was extremely important to have as good a relationship as possible with his suppliers. The manufacturers also perceive these various collaborative efforts between the two companies as advantageous.

The manufacturers' predicament was never acknowledged in so many words by Roberto or Eduardo during their talks with the importers, even if Harry at one point formulated the manufacturers' position quite explicitly.

The Background to This Set of Meetings

Ethnographers of negotiation events have attested to the extreme topical complexity within and across meetings, some of which can go on for hours or days (Douglas, 1962). The same can be said of the negotiation event at Courofatos, which involved several layers of relationship between the parties *in addition to* that of seller/buyer of existing products (cf. commodity traders in Firth, 1991). Not only are the products in this case developed together by the importers and the manufacturers; but the importer-as-buyer/manufacturer-as-seller relationship is sometimes suspended, or even inverted, during certain parts of the meetings. In fact, Wagner (1995b, pp. 27-28) using an invented example, discusses this type of business negotiation arrangement — where party "A has goal X, B has goal Z. X is controlled by B, Z by A" — as "the most genuine kind of negotiation" (p. 12).

In spite of that, the main concern of these meetings is still a sale of merchandise. The importers had selected eight styles of items they wanted to merchandise as a new collection for the upcoming year. Two new styles were small items: a small organizer, which Amage would give away as a bonus gift, and a writing portfolio. Such items are not part of the usual line of products manufactured by Courofatos. They are important but secondary to the other six larger items. These other six styles had been originally sampled and costed by a potential new Amage supplier in Czechoslovakia. They were referred to as:

- "the seegar case" (item #69536);
- "the Ron St. portfolio" (item #69528, comparable to existing item #1719);

- "the tote bag" (item #69524);
- "the flap case" (item #69534);
- "the toomy bag" (item #69535);
- "the canvas bag" (soon dropped from consideration).

The U.S. importers had thus sent the Czechoslovakian samples to Courofatos in advance for duplication, so that the Brazilian manufacturers could estimate technical feasibility and costing before the meetings. The importers would use the prices quoted by the Czechoslovakians as target prices in Brazil. And yet, the importers insist they must have the items made in Brazil, otherwise their *Brazilian* line would not be consistent in terms of leather and craftsmanship.

However, the samples came in without a proper invoice, and a Brazilian customs authority at the airport refused to release them. This delayed the duplication of the samples for two weeks. When the importers arrived for the meetings, they expected to see samples immediately and to start discussing the new line, when in fact there were no samples to be looked at, and no prices to be negotiated. Upon their arrival, the importers also brought in a request for two additional attache styles to be developed, which further compromised the manufacturers' capacity to produce samples and costing of the new prospective items in time for expeditious discussions.

The Encounters

Business talks started as soon as the two U.S. importers arrived at the Courofatos offices on Wednesday, October 17, around 5 p.m., and lasted until they rushed back to the airport on Saturday, October 20, around 11:40 a.m., to make the 12:30 p.m. flight to Rio, and then on to Czechoslovakia.

The main reason for the importers' visit is to discuss the new collection of items for the following year mentioned above. Many activities and topics are related to this main goal, such as the numerous trips to the model shop to inspect samples being made, discussions about technical modifications on the new items, leather supply, and shipping possibilities.

Other issues not directly related to the main item in the agenda are also discussed at length. These have to do with the more encompassing business relation between these importers and manufacturers. Such issues include the shipment schedule of back orders on the existing collection; the assessment of samples and costs of raw materials made in Taiwan, which Courofatos could potentially start importing through Harry and Charles' contacts there; and a potential secondary deal in which the U.S. importing company, Amage, would act as an agent for Courofatos to import, from Romania and China, a few attractive styles which they could not produce as cheaply in Brazil.

For the most part, I must add, the discussions were intermittent rather than continuous. During regular business hours at the office, there were many interruptions: telephone calls, office people coming in and out, visits from outsiders who wanted either to talk to Roberto or to ask favors from the importers, tea and refreshments being served, and so on. These developments are excluded from the synoptic account of the event presented below.

The participants also took time to volunteer information about what was taking place. In fact, these unsolicited descriptions — "telling the researcher how it is" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983) — often provided a crucial emic sense of what was going on. Interactions late at night and in the last session on Saturday morning, however, had very little outside interference and were solidly devoted to negotiating a deal for the new collection.

The event included talks outside the Courofatos office, both in and around the production areas as well as in the restaurants where the participants had lunch. However, even though the data source for this research comes from direct observation of all these settings, the audiovisual records which constitute the primary data source for this dissertation are restricted to the talks that happened in two rooms at the Courofatos office. Below is an attempt to reproduce the configuration of this main setting:

Figure 1. Floor plan of Courofatos offices where meetings took place



Initial sessions took place in the smaller export-department room. When Eduardo joined the talks, all four participants organized themselves around the table in the adjoining domestic sales department room. Thus participants could really be face to face, and the negotiation teams could be clearly separated from each other. It was also at this stage that the participants took their seats in the arrangement shown above, which would remain fixed from then on until the end of the talks (except for one brief moment, and even then this was soon "corrected" by Harry when he requested to exchange seats with Charles, thus re-configuring the standard disposition).

What follows is a synopsis of the main developments. A detailed narrative account of these developments can be found in appendix A (pp. 331-351). The following shows the overall topical agenda of the meetings:

Wednesday, October 17 - 5:00 p.m./6:30 p.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, and several occasional visitors, including Eduardo.

- generic technical questions on old collection
- prospects for new collection
- request for (and choosing of) two additional attache models to be sampled for inclusion in new line
- visit to model shop to inspect new collection sampling
- business prospects regarding old and new collection volumes

Thursday, October 18 - 7:45 a.m./12:00 a.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, and several occasional visitors, including Eduardo and Mr. Amati

- adjustments and corrections to be made on two new collection small item samples (writing portfolio and small organizer)
- review of shipment schedule of old collection back orders
- final agreement on corrections to be made on two small items
- visit to model shop to inspect new collection sampling
- examination and review of Taiwanese raw materials for alternative supplier possibilities
- complaints about delay in sampling
- visit to model shop to inspect new collection sampling
- lunch at restaurant in town
- return at 1:20 - no new samples or costing available; talks over for the day; importers go to hotel

Friday, October 19 - 7:40 a.m./12:00 a.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, Eduardo (joins at 8:10), and several occasional visitors, including Mr. Amati

- review of shipment and production schedules of old collection orders
- discussion of ways to solve current *leather supply shortage*

As will become apparent to the reader in subsequent developments in the meetings, *leather supply* is a major issue for the manufacturers. This is also typical of the footwear industry in the *Vale do Sinos*. Korzeniewicz (1992) discusses results from "a survey of Brazilian shoe producers [which] underscores the importance of adequate supplies of quality leather for a shoe industry engaged in substantial exports" (p.

318). According to this survey, manufacturers perceive cost, quality and lack of guaranteed deliveries as the main obstacles to exporting. All three elements surface quite clearly as problematic for the Brazilian manufacturers.

- move from export department room to domestic sales room (see floor plan above)
- discussion of Amage's Romanian collection sale deal
- examination of three main new collection samples (items #69536, #69524 and #69535) — prices quoted and assessed
- comparison between Czechoslovakian target prices and Courofatos' price quotations; *FOB* vs. *C&F* prices

C&F prices include cost and freight; *FOB prices* (i.e., free on board) do not include shipment, insurance or other additional costs. A recurrent topic in the talks was the comparison between these two types of prices in relation to the Czechoslovakian target prices, since ocean freight is more expensive from Brazil to New York than from Europe to New York. In addition, the existing line is shipped via air cargo to New York, and the new line should be surface-shipped to reduce costs. At this point the Brazilian manufacturers have not yet found a dependable ocean shipping company offering competitive rates.

- introduction of conditional *price quotations based on Argentinian leather*

Much of the leather supply to the *Vale do Sinos* is imported from Argentina. Korzeniewicz (1992) describes the integration of *Argentinian leather* production, shoe production in the *Vale do Sinos* in Brazil, and North American footwear consumption as the prime example of a "global commodity network." In the Amage/Courofatos negotiation, it is evident that attempts are being made to follow this same trend set by the local footwear industry.

- discussion of ways to secure constant dependable leather supply, including Amage payment advances for bulk orders of leather
- adjustments and corrections to be made on new collection prototypes in order to reduce costs and price
- further complaints about delay in sampling and costing; small talk
- lunch at restaurant in town

Friday, October 19 - 1:10 p.m./8:10 p.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, Eduardo, and several occasional visitors

- visit to model shop to inspect new collection sampling corrections
- examination of new sample (item #69534; costing not yet ready)
- procedural discussions (i.e., price or technical modifications first?)
- discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian and Brazilian leather
- 2:15 p.m./4:20 p.m. - interruption (Charles and Harry take a nap in the office)
- examination of new portfolio sample (item #69528); discussion of potential corrections to reduce cost
- bargaining and arguing over 69528 price
- brief examination of canvas bag sample (no costing available); item is dropped from consideration
- further discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian vs. Brazilian leather
- 69535 and 69524 Courofatos' price quotations revised
- manufacturer-elicitation of volume projections for the following year in terms of pieces per style and color, both for the existing line items and for prospective items in the new line being negotiated
- examination of two new attache samples
- bargaining, arguing and revision of target prices for attaches
- complaints about price and further discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian and Brazilian leather
- bargaining and arguing over 69528 price
- further discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian vs. Brazilian leather
- (failed) attempt to contact local tannery executive regarding new collection leather supply deal
- 8:10 p.m./11:30 p.m. - dinner at factory cantina

Friday, October 19 - 11:37 p.m./12:50 a.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, and Eduardo

- re-appraisal and review of offers and quotations to date
- further discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian vs. Brazilian leather, especially regarding "trouble" items 69528 and 69536
- discussion of ocean shipping freight possibilities
- arguing over 69528 price

Saturday, October 20 - 7:30 a.m./11:30 a.m.

Participants: Charles, Harry, Roberto, Eduardo, and Mr. Amati

- clarification of key issues from previous session:

  - further discussion and speculation on Czechoslovakian target prices and double quotations in Argentinian vs. Brazilian leather regarding price and production of item 69528;

  - ocean shipping freight possibilities

- arguing over 69528 price

- importers demand immediate final commitment one way or another

- Eduardo's logrolling[7] proposal for entire new collection: one global order of a pre-set volume of pieces per item for four items

- discussion and settlement of ground rules for excess orders

- bargaining and arguing over prices, technical modifications, and volume of orders of the two small new collection items (writing portfolio and small organizer); writing portfolio settled

- technical corrections on new collection major items

- final bargaining over price of small organizer

- confirmation of final prices and procedures regarding the deal

At the end of these talks, the importers were able to walk away with a program of orders for the following year. This included four new additions to their Brazilian line, out of the six proposed, at prices roughly 15% above their displayed targets, in an estimated order of 20,000 pieces throughout the year. They also managed to find two attache case styles with which to beat a competitor in another section of the market — for 10% above their original target — in a projected yearly order of 10,000 pieces. Finally, they also placed an order for 15,000 pieces of two small items — bought for "too much" — (target prices had not been originally displayed). The bulk of these initial orders would reach roughly one million dollars FOB.

Courofatos would sell the items at prices well below its first quotations, but within a controllable bulk of orders. The main concern with not jeopardizing the company's balance of domestic/export

[7] Firth (1995d) describes *logrolling* as "a common tactic" which "involves combining otherwise separate issues and negotiating them simultaneously" to avoid a deadlock situations in the face of either party's displayed "unwillingness to adjust their buying or selling price proposals" (p. 212). In this case all four items would be combined in an average price within a contained volume of orders.

production ratio had been secured. The business connection was thus kept within the safety boundaries the manufacturers had set for themselves.

The following table summarizes the price figures across the negotiation:

Table 1. Price figures across the Amage/Courofatos negotiation event

ITEM	Amage Target	R/E quote I	H/C offer I	R/E quote II	H/C offer II
69536 - seegar	40.30 (CS)	55.94/53.00		/50.90	43.75
69528[8] - Ron St.	30.75 (CS) 31.00/32.75 (HE)	47.30/44.85	35.00	/42.85	33.50
69524 - tote (wallet only) (w/o wallet)	30.75 (CS)	36.90/34.10 3.20/2.96 33.70/31.14		34.77/32.67	31.50 28.54
69535 - toomy	37.25 (CS)	46.25/43.90		45.23/42.98	
69534 - flap	45.50 (CS)	58.50/52.05	48.50		
narrow attache	38-40 (HE)		43.00		
wide attache	40-42 (HE)		45.00		
small organizer		3.50	2.50		2.75
writing portfolio			14.00	16.50	15.50>15.80

CS=Czechoslovakia; He=Harry's estimate. R/E double quotes refer to whether Brazilian or Argentinian leather is used. Underlined figures indicate final prices for initial orders.

The Primary Data Source

The remainder of this chapter discusses how the observations and recordings of the business negotiation event synoptically described above — the primary data sources for this study — were collected and transformed for sociolinguistic microanalysis of interaction.

The Recording

The recording of the event was done with the use of a video camera and two audio recorders. Though Erickson's (1992a) procedures for video recording of face-to-face interaction were generally followed as closely as possible, a number of unexpected difficulties arose.

First of all, a trial run of the equipment at the setting was not possible because Roberto decided to change the plans for picking up the importers at the airport at the last minute. Instead of meeting him at the office and then leaving from there, which would allow me a couple of hours to install the equipment, I was

[8] The participants devote a great deal of interactional time to the comparison between this item and existing item #1719, which originally cost $28.52 and was then raised to $31.37 (cf. HE figures in Amage Target table cell).

picked up earlier than arranged, and did not get to the office until late in the afternoon together with Roberto and the importers (i.e., when the event had already started). Given these problems, setting up the video camera for recording was going to be too obtrusive, and could jeopardize careful observation during those initial moments. So the camera was just left on a desk for everyone to see it, but the first encounter (Wednesday, Oct. 17) was not videotaped. Audio recording, on the other hand, is less obtrusive, and two small recorders were used. The sessions following the first were recorded primarily on video, with supporting audio recording serving to fill in the gaps for unintended interruptions in video taping.

Erickson and Wilson's (1982) simplest shooting procedures were followed closely during the recording:

> Set the camera for a wide angle shot and make a 'take' that begins slightly before and ends slightly after the event being documented. A variant of this is possible in which minimal camera editing occurs (moving the camera, changing the angle and breadth of the shot) provided (1) that the camera is left on the entire time that the major phases or episodes of action occurred, and (2) that the shot was wide enough to include within the frame all the participants engaged in interaction in the event. (p. 43)

The resulting footage thus fits Erickson and Wilson's main criterion for a tape to be used as a primary data source: "that it contain as complete a record as possible of the continuous action as it occurs in real time" (p. 43).

During the second day of recording, participants started making fewer and fewer side comments on the fact that there was a camera on (with its blinking red light facing them) in the room. At some point during this second day of business talks, they showed no sign of noticing my movements in the room. As Erickson and Wilson (1982) point out:

> With experience your movements in operating the equipment become synchronized with the rhythms of ebb and flow in the action you are shooting. As that happens your movements as an operator no longer draw attention to yourself and the equipment. You have become part of the scene and its naturally occurring timing. (p. 46)

Trips to the factory or meals were not video recorded. The recordings are limited to the interaction that took place in the main office. Yet they constitute what Ehlich and Wagner (1995) call "rare data:" a complete videotaped record of a naturally occurring business negotiation which permits situated analysis beyond the strictly *spoken* activities in negotiation talk-in-interaction. What I report in this chapter confirms Ehlich and Wagner's observation that "the obstacles for getting such data from real life contexts prove to be much greater and much more difficult to overcome than those which hinder the access to authentic audiotaped data" (pp. 2-3). However, it also evident that ethnographic methods can help us surmount the obstacles and access the data we need.

Processing the Primary Data

"Ethnographic research in sociolinguistics ... is labor intensive during data analysis as well as during data collection" (Erickson, 1988, p. 1089). After the collection of these data in audio and video tapes, a much longer phase in the research started. A considerable amount of work on the primary data was done in the first semester of 1991 for my master's thesis presented at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil (Garcez, 1991). Two journal articles were also based on that work (Garcez, 1992, 1993). Additional work on the materials from the meetings described above was also carried out during course work at the University of Pennsylvania, some of which is incorporated in this dissertation.

For the present project, however, I conducted a much more detailed and extensive examination of the materials, following Erickson's (1992a,) five stages in the transformation of the primary data source collected during fieldwork into final analytic data. A great deal of analytic work was required to approximate the understandings that the negotiators displayed during the developments presented in the previous section above (and narrated in detail in appendix A, pp. 331-351). From the technical leather-goods and business jargon, to the many indexical references to samples and the constant ebb and flow of changing prices, reference numbers and styles, there were many intricate elements that the participants tacitly understood but never stated in so many words. In various degrees, these understandings can be opaque to the non-member. A number of viewing sessions were necessary for the processing of the data collected during those four days of meetings. This involves careful re-visitation of the apparently inexhaustible audiovisual data. The researcher gets a continuously closer understanding of the participants' actions as they become gradually less opaque with each viewing.

Research Design

The research presented here asked questions about the real-time, moment by moment co-construction of communicative interaction by culturally dissimilar participants with different linguistic resources and partially conflicting goals. It thus required a research design that permitted probing into the minute details of communicative action in a relatively wide range of issues through the analysis of audiovisual recordings of interaction. Moreover, this study aimed at producing a description of action that privileges the participants' own perspective, so an interpretive qualitative stance was called for (Erickson, 1990b).

Research design for this project followed closely the methodological procedures of data analysis in ethnographic microanalysis of interaction outlined by Erickson (Erickson, 1988, 1992a; Erickson & Shultz, 1981) and of interactional sociolinguistics more generally, as described in Gumperz (1982a) and in Schiffrin (1994, chapter 4). In this type of analytic work "one begins by considering whole events, continues by decomposing them into smaller fragments analytically, and concludes by *recomposing* them into wholes" (Erickson, 1992a, p. 217). The aims of this "sociolinguistic microanalysis of machine recordings" are threefold:

> (1) to provide a detailed record of behavior in typical events, (2) to discover in those detailed records discrepancies from the typical patterns that emerged from the broad gauge descriptive evidence found ... and (3) to discover underlying principles of organization in the conduct of speaking. (Erickson, 1988, p. 1089)

The selection of the segments transcribed also follows Erickson's guidelines. Gumperz (1982a) summarizes the nature of these segments as follows: "The passages in question may vary in length but must be self-contained episodes for which we have either internal or ethnographic evidence of what the goals are in terms of which participants evaluate component utterances" (p. 134). Considerable attention is given in chapter 6 to the basis for the segmentation of the continuous stream of interaction into analytic data in the form of transcripts.

Erickson (1992a) describes ethnographic microanalysis of interactional data as involving five stages going from the whole event down to the interactional minutiae and back to a reconstruction of the whole event, "to a level of sequentially connected social action, as regarded in a kind of narrative understanding that is akin to that held by the actors in the events themselves" (p. 217). I now turn to the five stages as they pertain to the research being reported here.

Stage 1: Reviewing the Whole Event

Initially the whole set of data sources was reviewed so that a global ethnographic picture of the event as synoptically described above could be reinstated. Five careful complete listening/viewing sessions of all the audiovisual data and notes were necessary for that. A detailed chart mapping topical development throughout the meetings was the result of that initial review. Appendix A (pp. 331-351) offers a detailed account of the developments in the event, expanding the synoptic description above and providing a complete macro-sequential context for all transcript segments that appear in this dissertation.

During the final part in the process of producing and revising the topical map of the event, rough segments of the audiovisual record were flagged for their ethnographic or conversation analytic content, with a special focus on the incipient identification of arguing segments.

Stage 2: Identifying Major Constituent Parts of the Event

This stage was directly relevant to providing answers about the overall structure of negotiation talk. An initial concern was to identify emic relevance marks of what counted as business discourse and negotiation talk (Schegloff, 1992a). This involved finding empirical evidence in support of the researcher's intuitions about the nature of the activity the participants were engaged in. This is motivated, as Drew and Heritage (1992) put it, by a concern "to show that analytically relevant characterizations of social interaction are grounded in empirical observations that show that the *participants themselves* are demonstrably oriented to the identities or attributes in question" (p. 20). The following chapters, especially chapters 4 and 6, contain analyses of the Amage/Courofatos negotiation which illustrate the findings of other students of institutional discourse and of negotiation talk. These analyses provide a firm emic and comparative basis for referring to such interaction as containing *negotiation talk*.

A second substantive concern at this stage was the identification and tentative description of what counts as an arguing sequence within the negotiation so that further analysis could concentrate on segments labeled as such. I report the result of work at this stage in chapters 5 and 6.

Stage 3: Identifying Aspects of the Organization Within Major Parts of the Event

At this point, the various segments I initially identified as containing arguing sequences were revisited and analyzed at the gross level of propositional content (topic) and major sequential activity boundaries. As Erickson (1992a) points out, "the emphasis here is on the dialectical, ecological relationships of mutual influence among participants in the event, not on the actions of individual persons considered in isolation from the actions of others" (p. 219). Arguing sequences identified in stage 2 could then be scrutinized for their major structural issues and component actions. Considerable re-viewing of these segments permitted incipient analytic findings to be refined for closer inspection in the next stage.

Stage 4: Focus on Actions of Individuals

This stage most directly addressed the specific set of research questions regarding the co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences. I prepared detailed transcripts of the participants' actions and analyzed them with those specific issues in mind. To a simplified version of the transcription convention model devised by Jefferson (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, pp. ix-xvi), I added a few features describing the participants' nonverbal behavior when pertinent to the analysis (see transcript conventions in appendix B, pp. 352-358). Aspects of potential interest identified in stage 1 were then more closely inspected, as well as some issues generated by the literature reviewed. Examples of such issues are the methods participants use for performing the main actions constitutive of arguing sequences (i.e., challenges and accounts), and their use of gaze direction in closing a sequence. Chapter 6, 7 and 8 report on the findings of this research phase.

Stage 5: Comparative Analysis of Instances Across the Research Corpus

Here I further investigated the pervasiveness of the interactional features found to be operative, for confirmation so that the research questions could be contemplated again. Also, discrepant cases and conspicuously absent features were examined as heuristic sites for the integration of the findings in order for a global picture of the interactional patterns to be put in perspective. Chapter 8 reports on research conducted during this final phase.

A Note on Segmentation

Embedded within this research design is also the basic rationale for selecting the particular strips of tape for microethnographic examination. The main audiovisual records of the interaction make up a total of 13 hours and 45 minutes. While all of this primary data source was potentially relevant for analysis in stages 1 and 2, once the emic relevance of the salient features (e.g. business negotiation, negotiational arguing) of the particular talk to be examined could be confidently and sufficiently demonstrated (see chapter 4), and once segments containing negotiational arguing sequences could be teased apart from other speech activities in stage 3 above (see chapters 5 and 6), the bulk of the substantive analytic enterprise was limited to those segments of recorded interaction which feature the co-construction of arguing sequences. From stage 4 on, only the strips of tape that come to be defined as containing arguing sequences were focused on in microethnographic detail.

The following chapter discusses the interactional sociolinguistic model of human communication and miscommunication. The next chapter after that will then review the literature on negotiation talk according to the interactional sociolinguistic perspective, with illustrations of key findings through the analysis of transcript data from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation talk corpus.

CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF HUMAN COMMUNICATIVE INTER-ACTION

The present study of arguing in cross-cultural negotiation draws most of its discourse analytic theoretical assumptions from the work of students of language and social interaction, especially from the work of interactional sociolinguists. This chapter thus sketches the interactional sociolinguistic perspective on human face-to-face interaction. I start out discussing how interactional sociolinguists have come to conceptualize what Erickson and Shultz (1982) aptly call "the social organization of communicative action" (p. 70). This is followed by a review of some key concepts in Gumperz' theory of contextualization. Next I examine how interactional sociolinguists have described communication in cross-cultural interactions like the Courofatos/Amage negotiation, and propose that miscommunication is not pre-ordained but always locally co-constructed.

The Interactional Sociolinguistic Model of Human Communicative Action

Interactional Sociolinguistics and the Study of Language in Society

Interactional sociolinguistics is interested in the interpenetration of social and linguistic meanings in the conduct of human interaction. It focuses on the analysis of the production and interpretation of naturally occurring utterances in situated social context. With diverse origins in anthropology, linguistics, and sociology, this brand of sociolinguistics investigates language, culture and society by drawing its basic insights from the work of Goffman on the role of language in the interactional order, and from the work of Gumperz on the role of culture in the contextualization of language. It also shares several of its goals and assumptions with the ethnomethodological conversation analytic tradition in sociology.

Tannen (1992) writes that "a central concern of interactional sociolinguistics is the interactive nature of conversation" (p. 11), and that it "is frequently concerned with culturally identified interactional strategies" (p. 9). Gumperz (1982a), in what is perhaps the most comprehensive description of the approach, defines it as "a speaker oriented approach to conversation" which "focuses directly on the strategies that govern the actor's use of lexical, grammatical, sociolinguistic and other knowledge in the production and interpretation of messages in context" (p. 35).

Tannen (1992) adds that "interactional sociolinguistics is a branch of linguistics that promises to help solve real-world problems involving communication" (p. 12), such as the miscommunication that is endemic to cross-cultural encounters in modern multi-ethnic societies. Interactional sociolinguists may have varying degrees of optimism in this respect, but their work is indeed often moved by an attempt to comprehend the interactional organization of present-day, real-life social situations which are commonplace and crucially important, or difficult, for the participants. These include deceivingly simple situations such as dinnertable conversation among family (Erickson, 1982), or friends (Tannen, 1984a).

Interactional sociolinguists are also interested in forms of discourse typically found in institutional settings in contemporary complex societies, where interaction between members of different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds is likely to take place. These include classrooms (Gumperz, 1986; McDermott & Gospodinoff, 1981), counseling offices (Erickson & Shultz, 1982; Fiksdal, 1990), hospitals (Ribeiro, 1994; Tannen, 1993b), courtrooms (Gumperz, 1982b), etc. Such research is motivated, initially at least, by some professional or philosophical commitment to the institutional setting and its participants.

In their methodological pursuit of such comprehensive point of view on social interaction, interactional sociolinguists and microethnographers of interaction strive to examine micro social processes and also to establish their connection to more encompassing processes which ultimately constitute society and history (Giddens, 1984). Thus unlike many other students of interaction, interactional sociolinguists commit themselves to retaining *a comprehensive perspective of the particular interactional situation examined*, even when inspecting some minute feature of interaction. As a result, theirs is a significant contributions to the description of societal-historical processes constituted in the situated reflexive practice of social agents.

In addition to their broader social-scientific concern with providing empirical support for analytical assertions, and with demonstrating the emic relevance of their findings, interactional sociolinguists also have an interest in facilitating the re-integration of their assertions to the practical, real-world contingencies of the interactants in the settings investigated. Therefore, they make efforts to ground research findings comprehensively in terms of the *particular* overall situation examined, and to provide elements for their interpretive findings to be re-examined by others who may wish to contemplate related settings or different analytic angles.

Thus the previous chapter's emphasis on providing a gestalt of the event, and on describing the process of segmenting and re-constituting the event as whole. While the central concern here is with *how* interaction takes place, this entails attention to many contextual elements. Let us now examine what these elements are, and how interactional sociolinguistics understands them to enter into the process of human communication in social interaction.

Reflexive Co-Presence in Real Time

In order to understand the use of language in human interaction, interactional sociolinguists argue, one must first of all realize that ordinary spoken communication differs in marked ways from the widespread notion of communication as the intermittent work of isolated senders and receivers of messages sharing an isomorphic coding-and-decoding system. This may be descriptive of unidirectional communicative channels such as the telegraph or ham radio, but as far as conversation is concerned, it accounts solely for "talking through a keyhole," as Erickson points out.

As Goffman's (1981a) deconstruction of the notions of speaker and hearer poignantly shows, talk in interaction involves constant, not intermittent, work by all participants in a focused encounter as they constantly send and receive messages in a multi-directional channel. In addition, the assumption of a shared isomorphic code and interpretive scheme as the basis for communication is empirically unjustified based on solid sociolinguistic evidence. Gumperz (1982a) thus argues that

> Communication is a social activity requiring the coordinated efforts of two or more individuals. Mere talk to produce sentences, no matter how well formed or elegant the outcome, does not in itself constitute communication. Only when a move has elicited a response can we say

> communication is taking place. To participate in such verbal exchanges, that is, to create and sustain conversational involvement, we require knowledge and abilities which go considerably beyond the grammatical competence we need to decode short isolated messages. (p. 1)

The result of this complex view of what happens during conversation is that talk in interaction must be viewed accordingly as *embodied interaction organized in real time*. In other words, "the social organization of communicative action" (Erickson & Shultz, 1982, p. 70) — those "aspects of organization that are likely to be found universally among humans as they interact face-to-face" (p. 69) — does not involve conversationalists as abstract entities belonging to pre-ordained groups, following maxims to produce utterances and then waiting for a response. Rather, it involves conversationalists contained in physical bodies, occupying space in simultaneously constraining and enabling social situations, who must reflexively make sense of the others' actions as they act, without the benefit of a completely compatible interpretive system. In addition, these interactants must do a lot of work beyond coding and decoding messages through linguistic symbols. They must process a great deal of contextual information as well.

<u>Action Situated in Space</u>

Before examining conversational processing, let us first look at what it takes for discourse production to be possible. As Gumperz (1982a) explains:

> The conversationalist's problem is not simply one of making sense of a given chunk of discourse. What is to be interpreted must first be created through interaction, before interpretation can begin, and to that end speakers must enlist others' cooperation and actively seek to create conversational involvement. (p. 206)

Interactional involvement is created in, and partly shaped by, what Goffman (1972) calls the *social situation*, that is, "an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are 'present', and similarly find them accessible to him" (p. 63). These environments are highly dynamic and are constantly being re-created as they both frame the talk which happens within them, and are affected by the talk and the physical setting (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). A shift in situational frame takes place whenever one finds oneself in a new version of such environment of mutual monitoring possibilities. This in turn affects the production and interpretation of talk in interaction. Thus, more than merely situated in space, talk-in-interaction is *situational* (Goffman, 1981a, p. 84), that is, it occurs within particular constrains of what participants agree is the situation they are in.

In addition to the physical setting proper, much of this situational environment is regulated by the physical unspoken actions of individuals. As Wrong (1961) admonishes, "we must start with the recognition that in the beginning there is the body" (p. 191). This means that social scientists interested in issues of organization in routine interaction must not neglect the physical bodies with which people influence one another. We cannot afford to attend solely or isolatedly to the production of verbal discourse as the independently primary channel of social interaction among humans. The overall social situation in which conversational discourse is produced is the function of particular ecologies where "people constitute environments for each other" (Erickson & Shultz, 1982).

Goffman (1963) writes that talk, or the exchange of turns at talk in cooperation to sustain a single focus of attention, typically occurs in *focused interaction*, "the kind of interaction that occurs when persons gather close together" (p. 24) in a *social encounter*, resulting in the formation of "a little system of mutually ratified and ritually governed face-to-face action" (Goffman, 1972, p. 65). Among others, Kendon (1990) has shown how nonverbal behavior is an integral part of the social organization which enables such communicative action. His concept of the *f-formation* — the preferred form for human interaction which "arises whenever two or more people sustain a spatial and orientational relationship in which the space between them is one to which they have equal, direct and exclusive access" (p. 209) — characterizes the fact that communicative action is fundamentally organized in a particularly preferred embodied way, and that diversions from it, or alterations of it, are themselves communicative.

In addition to providing evidence that human focused interaction occurs in regulated embodied ways, Kendon's concept is useful in defining the different segment boundaries during interaction within an encounter. In the performance of arguing sequences in the Courofatos/Amage negotiation reported in later chapters, for example, we may have one single f-formation, but its shape is altered, significantly at times, as the primary discourse topics evolve, by various maneuvers on the part of participants. Moreover, radical alterations are interactionally significant in the co-construction of transitions out of the sequence and into new activities.

The marked significance of gaze and gaze aversion in the accomplishment of the interdigitation of performances is also a telling example of why nonverbal behavior must necessarily be seen as integral to the social organization of communicative action. Kendon's (1990) work on the functions of gaze direction in dyadic conversations shows that "direction of gaze serves in part as a signal by which interactants regulate their basic orientations to one another" (p. 52). As pointed out by Goodwin (1981) and Erickson (1986b), it is exactly through the monitoring of the effects of her/his performance on the listener that the speaker can see how effectively s/he is interacting, and where s/he must change according to the continuously emerging context. Attending to a reliable feature of the participants' unspoken activities such as gaze provides a strong empirical and emic basis for the segmentation of the verbal discourse structure of talk. The analysis reported in chapter 6 illustrates this by showing that the primary participants use gaze as a significant element in their accomplishment of closing a complex arguing sequence, thus indicating, I will argue, their joint orientation to negotiational arguing sequences as bounded interactional units.

Action Situated in Real Time

Interactional sociolinguistics has also profited from a number of interdisciplinary sources in developing a burgeoning awareness of the importance of *real time* in the analysis of talk-in-interaction. As work in ethnomethodology insists, in interaction we must always ask *why that now?* Therefore, for example, "rather than routinely observing the generalized phenomenon of synchronization of gestures, a more detailed analysis ... attending to precisely where in a sequence of activity synchronous expressions emerge, and at what point they dissolve" (West & Zimmerman, 1982, p. 529, original emphasis) is crucial to capturing the details of communicative action.

Through a convergence of interdisciplinary findings, especially those made by microethnographers, who provided detailed evidence of the dynamically emergent context in everyday interaction as it unfolds in real time (Erickson, 1986b; Erickson & Shultz, 1981, 1982; Fiksdal, 1990; Goodwin, 1981, 1984), face-to-face interaction has come to be seen as organized in relation to concerns with the timing and sequencing of both spoken and unspoken behaviors. In this regard, Erickson and Shultz' (1982) discussion of these issues in terms of *reciprocity* and *complementarity* is exemplary:

> Reciprocity refers to the interdependence of actions taken successively across moments in time. One party takes action in account of what another has just done, and then in the next moment another party takes action in account of what was done the moment before. Complementarity refers to the interdependence of actions taken simultaneously in the same moment. As the listener's attention wavers, so may, in the same instant, the speaker hesitate in speaking. (p. 71)

Systematic observation of the real-time organization of an interaction reveals important aspects of what is going on in different moments of social encounters, aspects which cannot clearly be observed if one is to simply look at what happens irrespective of the time-span in which it happens. Examining interaction as it happens in time as well as in space allows us to see, for example, how much can be accomplished in extremely limited amounts of time, or how little significant behavioral action may take place in long stretches of time in which not doing anything significant constitutes the appropriate behavior (Pike, 1967). This may allow for the identification of the various layers in the organization of interaction by the outside analyst since such segmentation is also used by participants to coordinate their joint action.

Therefore, despite the fuzzy quality of the boundaries between interactional segments, the integrated observation of all aspects of behavior as it is performed in real time reveals a hierarchy of levels of activity that is many times corroborated by elements such as the f-formations in relation to the various segments of primary discourse topics. Looking at interaction this way, we often get the interactional nesting, or Russian-doll effect (cf. Pike, 1967, p. 79) of activities, which may be crucial in the human ability to make sense of the torrential flow of complex information in communicative action.

In sum, the social organization that allows humans to communicate is founded on the situated reflexive coordination of multi-channel verbal and nonverbal action in real time. Once participants have found ways to create and sustain conversational involvement and are engaged in focused interaction, the interactional sociolinguistic model of communicative action describes how participants process each other's communicative action in conversation.

The Contextualization of Communicative Action

According to Tannen (1992), in addition to processing discourse as it occurs, participants "also make active predictions about what will come next, based on the line of interpretation suggested by on-going talk as measured against prior interactive experience" (p. 10). This is at the heart of Gumperz' (1982a) notion of *conversational inference*, "the situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange assess others' intentions, and on which they base their responses" (p. 153). Gumperz argues that communicative action involves not only meaning — the semantic information which is relatively independent of the context of use (i.e., it is independent of the situational framing in which an action is produced or a word is uttered) — but also "interpretation, that is, the situated assessment of intent" or action (p. 207). In a similar vein, Schegloff (1995) also points to a crucial distinction in the analysis of conversational data between information (or truth, meaning, understanding) on the one hand, and *action*, on the other. For example, Schegloff calls attention to turns which contain no information if abstracted away from their sequential place of occurrence — such as silence where an offer of help could be expected — but which are interactionally consequential insofar as they are *recognizable as actions*.

The distinction between the meaning of utterances and the interpretation of situated action is important because, as Gumperz (1982a) stresses, talking about inferential processes implies that conclusions about reference are not limited to a clear sense of rule, as at the purely grammatical level of utterance interpretation. Rather, inferential constraints are variable both across speech communities as well as across situational frames as they are mediated by indexical conventions which Gumperz has termed *contextualization cues*.

At a gross level, contextualization cues can function similarly to the ways idioms are deployed in conversational discourse to express an attitude accumulated by a large body of collective experience and encapsulated in a few words fixed together as a formula (Gumperz, 1982a).[1] Gumperz (1982a) himself defines contextualization conventions and the contextualization process by explaining that

> the channeling of interpretation is effected by conversational implicatures based on conventionalized co-occurrence expectations between content and surface style. That is, constellations of surface features of message form are the means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and *how* each sentence relates to what precedes or follows. (p. 131)

[1] Indeed, Drew and Holt (1988) show that, despite the "standard view on idioms as 'lazy' solution to linguistic selection" (p. 399), idiomatic usage in complaint sequences "where recipients of the complaints had not affiliated, or had withheld affiliation with the complainants" (p. 398) typically *summarizes tacit agreement* on "conflict or lack of alignment between complainant and recipient" (p. 398), much in the fashion of other contextualization cues.

The crucial aspect of this process is its indexical quality. Contextualization cues are usually not within the interactants' range of awareness and cannot be referred to out of their context of production (i.e., they cannot be interpreted apart from concrete situations). Moreover, their communicative effectiveness "depends on the participants' tacit awareness of their meaningfulness" (pp. 131-132), which in turn depends on their shared, culturally learned conventions for noticing and interpreting those cues.

Building on Bateson's (1972) notions of frame and metamessage, Tannen (1985) argues that such indirectness is a characteristic feature of communication in that much of what gets communicated is in fact not explicitly referred to but suggested and interpreted equivocally by *how* a message is sent. Elsewhere, Tannen (1992) explains that the hierarchical process in conversational inference leads conversationalists to rely on contextualization cues to signal and interpret "not only what they mean to say but also what speech activity they are engaged in, that is, what they think they are doing at each point in the interaction" (p. 10).

Thus Gumperz (1982a) elaborates on the notion of conversational inference in further detail by describing it as a hierarchically ordered "chain of judgements focusing on both content and on relational assessments of how utterance strings are to be integrated into what we know about our culture and our immediate situation" so that "more general higher level relational assessments serve as part of the input to more specific ones" (p. 207). In recent restatements of his theoretical views, Gumperz (1992a, 1992b) has described three distinct analytical levels through which "contextualization cues enter into the inferential process" (1992a, pp. 232-233).

"First, there is the perceptual plane at which communicative signals, both auditory and visual, are received and categorized" (p. 232). This includes, but is not limited to, the traditional phonemic and morphosyntactical levels of speech processing as described in formal linguistic theory. The chunking of what is perceived into information units through prosody and conversational management must be accomplished before the interpreting process proper can begin. This first perceptual level provides information on possible turn construction units, on the foregrounding or backgrounding of items of information, and on distinctions between new versus shared or known information, as well as between "main points and qualifying information or side sequences" (p. 232).

The second level encompasses "local assessments," or "situated interpretations of communicative intent" (Gumperz, 1992a, p. 232), involving sequencing relations and speech-act implicatures through which participants judge "the illocutionary force of a stretch of talk - as ... a question, a request, reply, interruption, etc." (Gumperz, 1992b, pp. 307-308).

The third level involves the process Goffman called *framing*, as well as the participants' construction of what Gumperz calls *speech activity*. At this level, "what is expected in the interaction at any one stage" is signaled (1992a, p. 233).[2] Since these inferential levels are hierarchically organized, differences in contextualization conventions, which he stresses are neither rare nor "confined to interethnic situations," may lead participants to make inferences at the first and second levels which may prevent interlocutors from "recognizing each other's perspective at the third level of activity" (p. 246), and that is when we typically find communicative trouble.

At the stage of processing contextualization conventions, we therefore enter what Erickson and Shultz (1982) call the "cultural patterning in the conduct of communication," which "involves aspects of organization that are not found universally but are distinctive among particular cultural groups and speech communities" (pp. 69-70). Conversational processing at this stage becomes highly elusive to the participants, since the often ethereal character of contextualization cues and conventions puts them outside the conversationalists' conscious awareness or voluntary control.

A corollary of Gumperz' theory of contextualization of language in conversational inference is that the quality of an interaction depends on the degree to which participants share contextualization conventions to interpret the relevant cues. These conventions are referred to by Erickson and Shultz (1982) as *the cultural organization of communicative action*. They explain that "cultural organization refers to the shared standards or communicative traditions governing the use of communicative means, verbal and nonverbal in accomplishing communicative ends in social interaction" (p. 99).

These are usually the "ways of speaking" into which participants were socialized within their speech communities, which Tannen (1981) has called *conversational style* (i.e., "the ways it seems natural to

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[2] The collection of papers in Tannen (1993a) examine data from a variety of settings to show how framing organizes discourse and is organized by it.

express and interpret meaning in conversation"). These are "learned through communicative experience, ... influenced by family communicative habits," and are also "indicator[s] of ethnicity ... [and] resistant to change" (p. 236). Gumperz, Aulakh and Kaltman (1982) also use the term style to refer to "the verbal realization of differences in communicative intent through shifts in the balance of the signalling load carried by these channels [i.e. lexicalization, syntax and prosody]" (p. 28).

Therefore, it is within the cultural organization of interaction that we will find the problems of communication which are common in interactions between culturally dissimilar individuals. Tannen (1984a) formulates these problems in terms of conflicts in styles, while Gumperz (1982a) tends to refer to them as mismatches in the interpretation of contextualization cues.

The Co-Constructed Nature of Communicative Interaction

The following long quotation from Gumperz' major work summarizes the sociolinguistic model of communicative action both in terms of its social organization as well as in terms of its cultural patterning:

> The signaling of speech activities is not a matter of unilateral action, but rather of speaker-listener coordination involving rhythmic interchange of both verbal and nonverbal signs. ... a successful interaction begins with each speaker talking in a certain mode, using certain contextualization cues. Participants, then, by the verbal style in which they respond and the listenership cues they produce, implicitly signal their agreement or disagreement; thus they 'tune into' the other's way of speaking. ... once a conversational rhythm has been established, both participants can reasonably assume ... they have agreed on what activity is being enacted and how it is to be conducted. At this point, a principle of strategic consistency takes over ... Speakers continue ... assigning negotiated meanings to contextualization cues, until there is a perceptible break in rhythm, a shift of content and cues, or until a mismatch between content and cues suggests that something has gone wrong. (Gumperz, 1982a, p. 167)

Participants must *coordinate* their actions in time and space according to universal human social organizational constraints and within particular cultural conventions. Its fundamentally *concerted nature* makes human face-to-face interaction always a joint achievement of all present to the situation.

Recently, these notions have coalesced with others from a number of social-scientific traditions under the multi-disciplinary concept of *co-construction*[3] — "*the joint creation of a form, interpretation,*

[3] For programmatic definitions and empirical analyses, see the special issue of *Research on Language and Social Interaction* (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995a). A recent special issue of *Studies in Second Language Acquisition* (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1995) points to the appeal of the concept to students of native/non-native speaker discourse (Tyler, 1995).

stance, action, activity, identity, institution, skill, ideology, emotion, or other culturally meaningful reality" (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995b, p. 171, original emphasis). The concept entails a series of crucial statements about interaction to which this research adheres. Among them is the understanding that human construction of meaning fundamentally develops as the result of the "distributed responsibility" among interlocutors in social inter-action as it unfolds sequentially in time and space. Moreover, interlocutors are understood as capable of individual agency which is constrained, but not pre-determined, by the cultural, societal, economic, and linguistic systems they find themselves immersed in and which they are constantly and actively re-shaping.

As Jacoby and Ochs emphasize, "to acknowledge that everything is co-constructed is to affirm that participants to interaction are not passive robots living out preprogrammed linguistic 'rules,' discourse 'conventions,' or cultural prescriptions for social identity" (pp. 177-178). This does not mean, however, that "co-construction is not historically and culturally situated" (p. 178). In other words, an inevitable tension of checks and balances between socio-cultural determination and individual agency exists in the co-construction of human interaction, and analysts must take this into account.

As the previous discussion makes evident, the interactional sociolinguistic perspective on human interaction supports the view that communication is co-constructed by individuals with particular socio-cultural allegiances who are, nevertheless, agents in the world. Less clear in this respect, however, is the interactional sociolinguistic implicit model of cross-cultural (mis)communication.

Resulting from an interest in "culturally identified interactional strategies" (Tannen, 1992, p. 9), the interactional sociolinguistic perspective on cross-cultural communication offers a fine, integrated view of conversational interaction among socio-culturally dissimilar participants. Yet, it can be improved to accommodate a truly co-constructed view of interaction. In the following sections, I describe what that perspective entails, and propose some revisions of it in the light of work by microethnographers of education as well as in relation to research on inter-societal cross-cultural communication reported in the following chapters of this dissertation.

Cross-Cultural (Mis)Communication

Having examined the model of social and cultural organization of human communicative action put forth by interactional sociolinguists, we are now in a position to outline the interactional sociolinguistic views on cross-cultural communication. In a nutshell, Tannen (1992) explains that, "when [signaling and framing] systems are relatively similar, participants share interpretive norms; so meaning is likely to be understood as intended. But when systems are relatively different, participants have different norms, and intentions are likely to be misjudged" (p. 10).

Erickson and Shultz (1982) describe "uncomfortable moments" in the interactions between counselors and students from different cultural backgrounds and show that they occur, in part, because participants had different patterns of cultural organization for some of the aspects of the social steering of communicative action.[4] They thus argue that

> When persons meet who have learned different communicative traditions regarding intelligibility, effectiveness, and appropriateness, troubles can result in the social organization of their interaction. The conversational partners may "miss" one another repeatedly in their attempts at social steering in conversation ... [or they] may misunderstand one another at the level of explicit and implicit *message content* of their talk. (p. 100, original emphasis)

Accordingly, this may develop into the occurrence of the phenomenon that Bateson (1972) called *complementary schismogenesis*. Tannen (1986b) defines it as "a process by which two people exhibit more and more extreme forms of the behaviors that trigger in the other increasing manifestations of an incongruent behavior, in an ever-worsening spiral" (p. 121). This explains, at least in part, Tannen (1986a) argues, why constant cross-cultural interactants will keep on miscommunicating indefinitely.

> When they have dealings with people of the other group, have tried sincerely to be fair and have ended up frustrated, each blames the other. People are not likely to assume that both are genuinely trying but are misunderstanding each other.

In sum, it is expected that participants in cross-cultural encounters will inevitably miscommunicate, at least to some extent, and that this process eventually escalates to communication breakdowns, even if it is to the participants' best interest to stop it.

[4] Erickson and Shultz (1982) also found that other factors determined whether or not these differences developed into miscommunication (see discussion below).

Viewed as revealing of "processes that underlie all communication but often go unnoticed when it proceeds successfully" (Tannen, 1985, p. 203), cross-cultural communication phenomena have been used as "a heuristic site" (Tannen, 1992, p. 10). If this approach has advanced our understanding of sociolinguistic issues, it has done so by presupposing cultural uniformity to exist among individuals from the same socio-cultural background, and miscommunication to be the likely, *natural* result of encounters among individuals of different backgrounds.

In a series of articles defining cross-cultural communication and sketching the main issues involved in its study, for example, Tannen (1984b, 1985, 1986a) equates cross-cultural communication to "communication which has broken down" and to "the starred sentences in [the formal study of] syntax" (Tannen, 1986a, p. 143). Cross-cultural interactions which develop without communicative breakdowns in spite of the sociolinguistic differences which may exist among participants are therefore seen as exceptional.

Tannen does point out that cross-cultural communication can be felicitous when "differing [communicative] goals are not mutually exclusive" (p. 149), referring specifically to Adger (1986), whose analysis of disputes involving a Black American boy and a Vietnamese boy in a first-grade class shows their conversations to be successful because, in spite of systematic and fundamental cultural and stylistic differences, "the contrasts in their arguing styles are complementary" (p. 224). In other words, the suggestion is that successful cross-cultural communication occurs when sociolinguistic differences in the participants' communicative repertoire do not clash. Otherwise, what usually happens is misunderstanding, leading to "the tragedy of cross-cultural communication," that is, unrepaired, continuous and escalating miscommunication that ultimately results in the formation of ethnic stereotypes (Tannen, 1985, p. 210).

Tannen (1985) uses a strong metaphor to describe this process. She writes that "cross-cultural communication is like trying to follow a route on which someone has turned the signposts around. The familiar signposts are there, but when you follow them, they take you in the wrong direction" (p. 212). This image is powerfully iconic of the mechanisms involved in cross-cultural (mis)communication in a strict microanalytic sense as I have witnessed, experienced, and studied them (Garcez, 1991). However, I would argue that it may obfuscate some aspects of intercultural communication more generally. Not all signs have been turned around, nor do they all take you in the wrong direction. Moreover, while most drivers don't keep on going once they realize they are headed the wrong way, some may have reasons for wanting to get lost. We thus need a more complex image than this. While on the one hand, as the following chapters demonstrate, significant societal and cultural dissimilarities among interactants may not impede their co-construction of an interaction towards a common interdependent end-goal, on the other hand, as microethnographic research reviewed below shows, minor mismatches may be sufficient to produce communication breakdowns.

While it illuminates the micro-processes through which cross-cultural discrepancies interfere in the construction of discourse face to face, seeing cross-cultural communication as naturally bound to develop into miscommunication may portray participants in cross-cultural encounters as innocent "cultural dopes" (Garfinkel, 1967), or "cultural marionettes" (Erickson, 1990a, p. 30) trapped inside their own cultural norm. If participants in situations of intercultural contact have little choice but to act, and to judge the actions of others, according to their own conventions until communication breaks down or until they cease to interact, then we are assuming — wrongly, I believe — the special constraints of intercultural communication to be operating "like forces in nature, as if to 'have no choice' were equivalent to being driven irresistibly and uncomprehendingly by mechanical pressures" (Giddens, 1984, p. 15). Such thinking, which neglects the participants' capacity to monitor and redirect their interactional conduct as they encounter communicative trouble, blinds us to the possibility of miscommunication being functionally desirable. Moreover, it can dangerously be used in the generation of neo-stereotyping of cultural groups on "scientific grounds" (i.e., "*they* always do X"), which goes against the very objective of helping eliminate the negative effects of ethnic stereotyping.

Indeed Singh, Lele and Martohardjono (1988) criticize sociolinguistic analyses of intercultural communication for only pointing out the "deficit" in the non-native/non-dominant participants' sociolinguistic performance, and for "overtly accept[ing] the ... ideology of the ruling classes as true" (p. 45). They charge that "if contemporary interethnic interactionists want to be taken as interactional sociolinguists and not as apologists for the system, they must look at power structure as an independent variable" (p. 51). Though some of these authors' acrimonious statements are unwarranted, they have certainly identified the Achilles heel of early interactional sociolinguistic studies of cross-cultural communication.

In the light of contemporary sociological thought, the excessive emphasis on the socialized genesis of the participants' action must be balanced with a micropolitical view of cross-cultural (mis)communication which underscores the participants' *agency*, their capacity for social action in the world (Wrong, 1961).[5] According to Giddens (1984), "agency concerns events of which an individual is perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently" (p. 9). That means that cross-cultural interactants do have ways to overcome their stylistic or culturally-conventional differences to communicate effectively after they run into trouble, for they are human agents and not "social robots" (McDermott & Gospodinoff, 1981, p. 215). Whether they have a motivation to do that or not is a different matter.

Gumperz (1982a, 1986, 1992a) has hinted at this need for a more comprehensive view of the macrocontextual elements involved in cross-cultural communication, especially when it comes to institutional settings like schools and workplaces. According to him, "to understand the role of language in education and in social processes in general, we need to begin with a closer understanding of how linguistic signs interact with social aspects of the communicative processes" (Gumperz, 1986, p. 29). If his emphasis is on the linguistic genesis of intercultural communication problems, Gumperz (1982a) also addresses the fact that "not all problems of interethnic contact are communicative in nature. Economic factors, *differences* in goals and aspirations, as well as other historical and cultural factors may be at issue" (p. 210, emphasis added). As the research reported in the next chapters will show, economic factors, especially *similarities and interdependence* in goals and aspirations, may be crucially at issue to counteract sociocultural mismatches in communicative conventions.

Gumperz' (1982a) work also formulates a more complex concept of culture where cultural norms are less uniformly distributed. He points out that

> Earlier views in which larger social aggregates were seen as made up of independent culture bearing population units have begun to be abandoned in favor of more dynamic views of social

[5] Concepts such as *functional miscommunication* (McDermott & Gospodinoff, 1981), and *comembership* (Erickson & Shultz, 1982) are discussed below as pertinent contributions to this end.

> environments where history, economic forces and interactive processes as such combine either to create or to eliminate social distinctions. (p. 29)

In addition, his view gives more agency to participants in cross-cultural encounters as he argues that "ethnic categories, like ... social categories ... , are coming to be seen as symbolic entities which, subject to constraints imposed by history, can be manipulated by individuals to gain their ends in everyday interaction" (p. 29). Gumperz' view of cross-cultural communication, while emphasizing mismatches in conversational inferencing devices among participants as the main source of communicative difficulties, leaves room for alternative components in specific encounters, as he contends that "language differences play an important, positive role in signalling information as well as in creating and maintaining the subtle boundaries of power, status, role and occupational specialization that make the fabric of our social life" (pp. 6-7).

The Micropolitics of Cross-Cultural (Mis)communication

Anthropologists of education like McDermott and Gospodinoff (1981), Erickson and Shultz (1982; Erickson, 1986a, 1987, 1990a, 1982) have taken a step further towards the introduction of an explicit political element to the analysis of cross-cultural communication. According to their view, analysts of cross-cultural interactions must look beyond cultural differences, and examine what interactional use participants make of these differences. They argue that continuous miscommunication in institutional settings *within multi-ethnic societies* is due to the political exploitation of cultural differences as a form of functional adjustment during contact between *individuals belonging to different groups allocated in inequitable societal tiers*. Through what McDermott and Gospodinoff call *functional miscommunication*, resistance by the subordinate (ethnic) minority is made explicit, and hegemony by the superordinate, culturally dominant group is exerted. I believe these thoughts also shed light on interactions between culturally dissimilar participants who are members of different societies.

Based on their ethnographic microanalysis of intercultural communication in a school setting in the U.S., McDermott and Gospodinoff (1981) claim that constant, irremediable inter-ethnic miscommunication is not an accident, but "an interactional accomplishment" (p. 213) by the participants through a process grounded on "sound political or economic reasons" (p. 214). They point out examples in which members of different groups will make an effort either to gloss over or, in opposite cases, to maximize, their communicative code differences in the light of institutional payoffs, depending on their desire as a group to construct exclusive, conflicting identities or not. According to this view, participants may be actively pursuing what *appears to be* miscommunication, as a mutual short-term interactive goal in the immediate intercultural context.

That is what they found in their microanalysis of the conflicting interaction between a white female teacher and her disruptive Puerto Rican kindergarten student. During reading time with the bottom reading group, an activity which all members of the classroom knew must not be interrupted, the boy tried to get the teacher's attention, unsuccessfully at first, by shouting her first name across the room, and then succeeding by touching her on the buttocks. Though this could be explained as a case of clashing conventions regarding forms of address and bodily contact in summons etiquette, McDermott and Gospodinoff chose to problematize this conclusion, since it did not fit with their ethnographic evidence.

The two participants had been together for nine months; the boy understood his actions to be inappropriate; and the teacher was conscientious and generally patient and adaptable to the children. "The important question here," they write, "asks how it is that this particular boy becomes involved in conflicts of scheduling as well as conflicts of naming and touching. Whatever the reasons, the teacher's reactions appear to be quite sensible" (p. 224). They point out that, while the incident got the boy into a lot of trouble, it also allowed him to get the attention he wanted to the problem about which he had bothered the teacher, for she attended to it once she was done chastising him. The analysts conclude that, even though in the long run there is a high price for the incident, "in the short run, it is to everyone's advantage; the boy gets someone in trouble and the teacher and the children in the bottom group get a brief rest from their intense organizational negotiations" (p. 224).

McDermott and Gospodinoff thus posit that cultural differences between groups of people are in fact *boundaries* of identity, which in and of themselves do not constitute impediments to optimal communication and can be crossed over. The crux of the matter, however, they argue, is these group boundaries can also become insurmountable *borders*, once they are used as convenient interactional tools to communicate conflicting interests and justify conflict over resources. Erickson (1986a) discusses the same type of phenomenon in a science education setting, where small differences between the teacher's and the students' dialects or norms for speaking and listening can be made a big issue of, serving "as an excuse for hostility" in "conditions of intergroup conflict" (p. 123). In McDermott and Gospodinoff's (1981) own words,

> our problem is not ethnicity, but ethnic borders. Our problem is not that people are different, but that the differences are made to make more of a difference than they must, that the differences are politicized into borders that define different kinds of people as antagonists in various realms of everyday life. (p. 216)

In their microanalysis of cross-cultural counseling interviews, Erickson and Shultz (1982) devoted considerable theoretical attention to discrepant cases to their empirical finding that culture difference and interactional trouble were clearly related. They report that, when culturally dissimilar student and counselor managed to activate particular "attributes of shared status" (p. 35), or *comembership* (e.g., their common interest in parochial high school sports), their interactions were significantly less uncomfortable. In their words, "under conditions of high comembership, cultural differences between the counselor and the student in ways of speaking and listening seemed to make less of a difference than they did in encounters in which comembership was low" (p. 212). Culturally dissimilar interactants can indeed find ways around the differences in their systems for conducting interaction and avoid continuous miscommunication. Sometimes they make use of that ability; sometimes they do not.

Clearly, the concepts of functional miscommunication, comembership, and border work must be integrated to our model of cross-cultural communication for they give us a sense of how cultural differences may be micropolitically exploited in the context of face-to-face interaction, portraying interactants as agents with full knowledge of their social selves. Through this lens, cross-cultural miscommunication is not seen as pre-ordained but as co-constructed. Cultural differences are both constraining and enabling of communicative behavior. They can be seen as limitations on our ability to communicate across cultural lines, but also as tools for communication. Functional miscommunication, as an interactionally accomplished form of adaptation, is also successful communication in the sense that participants manage to build on each other's messages and actions.

Functional miscommunication and border work add a complicating but illuminating factor in our attempt to understand why culturally dissimilar interactants do or do not repair their communication problems, and why miscommunication is especially endemic to some types of intercultural encounters like intra-societal gatekeeping interactions. Since it is within gatekeeping institutions that we find access to key societal resources, it is only logical that we should expect human actors to be attuned to the stakes involved in institutional access. Given that interaction is often the gate, politics becomes a salient aspect of the communication process once actors from different positions in the social system have to come face to face to resolve issues of institutional access. Within this framework, political struggle may be high in the participants' motivational agenda (though not necessarily consciously). Having cultural differences with which to signal opposition in the social system may be crucial for staging resistance and domination. In such encounters, participants/agents may thus find their culture-specific interactive norms to be useful intercultural weapons when they are not shared by their out-group interlocutors.

A different dynamics may take place in focused interactions where interactants are members of different societies and are engaged in interactional activities related to a mutually interdependent end-goal that will potentially maximize their separate economic gains, such as international business negotiations. In these cases, it might be easier for participants to realize that the immediately local pay-off of doing "border work" can make the co-construction of their present interactional task more difficult and jeopardize the accomplishment of their end-goals. In addition, it might also be the case that such utilitarian pragmatics is driven by a supra-national cultural system shared by participants whose professional identities have enough in common to override other, potentially conflictive components of their socio-cultural identities which are less commonly shared.

Indeed, Firth (1991) concluded that, for all practical purposes, the international commodity traders whose interaction he analyzed were able to "pass over" misunderstandings or miscommunication, repairing them according to their "assessments of what is necessary" (p. 155). The present investigation of negotiation talk involving culturally dissimilar participants corroborates that finding, at least within the scope of negotiational arguing.

This may shed some light on issues of intra-societal vs. inter-societal intercultural contact in institutional settings. In intermittent encounters between participants from different (e.g., ethnic) groups in a same society, as is typically the case in studies of miscommunication, the participants' socio-economic roles (or their ethnic and religious identities, for that matter) in the larger social system are especially relevant to their action, given that institutions are where the structural properties of social systems are especially solid across time and space (Giddens, 1984). In contrast, contacts between members of different societies, who come together on occasion to work intensively on a fairly discrete project, the participants' categorical identities may be less prominently useful as interactional resources. This may answer why contact between different cultural groups results in endemic miscommunication for some individuals and not for others, why it occurs in some circumstances and not in others, or why sometimes seemingly irrelevant differences can turn into tragic miscommunication whereas at other times enormous discrepancies in sociolinguistic conventions may be of little consequence to the quality of the interaction.

This is what McDermott and Gospodinoff (1981) claim when they argue that "differences are made to make more of a difference than they must" (p. 215). If we search the literature, they point out, it is hard to find interactional sociolinguistic or microethnographic work on successful cross-cultural communication, perhaps because that is considered too ordinary to deserve reporting. It is even harder to find research of any sort on cross-cultural encounters between individuals from power-sharer groups within any one given social system.

Elsewhere, however, we do find contemporary empirical evidence, albeit indirect, to the claim that participants do routinely gloss over major communicative differences when it is to their advantage. For example, second language acquisition research shows that native speakers adjust their linguistic and interactional output when speaking to non-native speakers in what is known as foreigner talk (Ellis, 1985, pp. 132-136). Additional research in "accommodation theory" shows that speakers accommodate, but also diverge, from their interactants' language and interactional style (Ellis, 1985, pp. 255-259). Quantitative sociolinguists have also tapped the potential for audience-designed variation in linguistic style within a single individual's speech (Bell, 1984; Rickford & McNair-Knox, 1994). Of course, the genesis of pidgins and creoles lends further credence to the common sense idea that people will cross-over the widest linguistic and cultural gaps to communicate. All these phenomena seem to lend further support McDermott and Gospodinoff's claim.

Ignorance and Strategic Communicative Competence

Lest we fall at the other extreme in social scientific thought, however, and err by overemphasizing subjectivity, a word of caution is in order regarding extreme versions of the politicization model. Not all serious cross-cultural communication difficulties are due to political exploitation of cultural differences. We should not be led to believe "that most of the marvelously subtle intricacies of interaction are studied or cynically manipulative" (Giddens, 1984, p. 75). Too strong a version of the view that problems of intercultural communication are due to politicization of cultural differences, and cannot be caused by the differences themselves, may lead us to believe that all miscommunication is generated by societal power struggles, or to believe that everybody is multicultural and can easily shift linguistic and interactional styles to communicate at an optimal level.

For one, we must here make some space for the notion of ignorance. Much intercultural friction can be triggered by ignorance of the appropriate etiquette for speaking and behaving in a new situation, as well as by ignorance of the range of appropriate etiquettes which may exist in parallel social systems and in isolated sub-groups within a single social system. As Giddens (1984) points out,

> the fact that all actors move in situated contexts within larger totalities limits the knowledge that they have of other contexts which they do not directly experience. All social actors know a great deal more than they directly live through, as a result of the sedimentation of experience. But agents whose lives are spent in one type of *milieu* may be more or less ignorant of what goes on in others. (pp. 91-92)

This means that various types of sociolinguistic and cultural differences may become sources of miscommunication in situations of sporadic contact between the same individuals from different cultural groups. In addition, the very fact that cultural and sociolinguistic differences are there to be exploited politically also means that we cannot rule out the possibility of moments when these differences generate miscommunication because of other elements when people reach the limit of their ability to shift styles in culturally appropriate ways.

The case, reported by Gumperz (1982b), of the Filipino physician accused of perjury following his service as a witness in a child abuse trial can be seen as an example of cultural differences becoming sources for serious miscommunication once an individual is forced to interact in a context of situation beyond his/her otherwise multicultural competence. This physician was considered a communicatively competent speaker of English both in his professional activities and in the private informal questioning sessions prior to his appearance in court. In his verbal interaction in court, however, he was unable to make himself clear and ended up being prosecuted for perjury. Gumperz argues that "we can explain the intermingling of grammatical oddities with long, native English-like passages by assuming that the former reflect instances of style or code-switching triggered by the interview situation" (p. 173). Even if we believe that border work was at stake in the court interaction leading to the physician's accusation, we must realize that this only became possible due to the physician's inability to fully display his communicative competence within the stressful constraints of the court-room.

In sum, the theoretical contribution made by microethnographers of interaction in educational settings must be seen as fully complementary to the sociolinguistic model of (mis)communication. We must be aware of both the workings of intercultural communication and miscommunication and the micropolitics of intercultural contact to be able to adequately account for what is going on in any given interaction. We cannot dismiss the possibility that miscommunication is occurring due to clashing contextualization conventions alone, nor can we afford to ignore the strong possibility that political battle work is at the center of continuous miscommunication.

In addition, our analyses and our thinking about intercultural communication may have to be expanded further in order to include other factors and possibilities as we explore the uncharted territory of miscommunication in non-native/non-native interaction, or interaction between equal power holders from different cultural backgrounds.

Another factor to be considered, therefore, is the use of strategies to make the most out of one's non-nativeness, or of the non-nativeness of the other.

This phenomenon can be especially transparent when we have individuals from different societies (in addition to their coming from different cultural backgrounds) interacting and actualizing identities, purposes and conflicting positions, not in competition within the same system, but across different societies. In this case, we should be talking about *inter-societal* intercultural communication. Johnstone's (1986) analysis of a television interview with the Ayatollah Khomeini by a female Italian journalist perhaps comes closer to McDermott and Gospodinoff's "functional miscommunication" in an inter-societal intercultural context. In this interaction, cultural differences in rhetorical style were used as signals of irreconcilable philosophical differences between the interviewer and her interviewee, probably receiving approbation from likely viewers in either one of their societies. Johnstone concludes that "what made Fallaci's and Khomeini's miscommunication inevitable was a basic lack of good will, a failure on the parts of two people, both of whom had access to a range of persuasive strategies, to try to figure out what the other was doing" (p. 185).

A much less deliberate but nevertheless resourceful use of cultural differences which may lead to miscommunication in intercultural contact is non-native speaker use of *communication strategies* (i.e., "psycholinguistic plans which exist as part of the language user's communicative competence. They are potentially conscious and serve as substitutes for production plans which the learner is unable to implement," (Ellis, 1985, p. 182). Indeed, second language acquisition researchers have come to accept Canale and Swain's (1980) expanded model of communicative competence to include what the authors termed *strategic competence*, that is, "how to cope in an authentic communicative situation and how to keep the communicative channel open" (p. 20). Since inter-societal intercultural communication is often personed by individuals who are non-native speakers of the language variety being used, the constraints imposed by communicative situation and the pressure to be strategically competent must be taken into consideration if we are to understand intercultural communication as a whole.

Erickson and Rittenberg (1987), for instance, report an example of miscommunication of the sort I am alluding to. They analyze topic control in interactions between foreign medical graduates (FMGs) and their local U.S. patients and find that the FMGs tended to use discourse strategies whereby the "physician maintains strong limits on the topical content, the turn exchange system, and the discourse form used by patients" (p. 406). This practice, while incongruent with the expectations of the North-American patients, allowed the FMGs to minimize their risks of failing at the basic communicative level, reducing the cognitive and interactional burden in their conduct of this complex interaction (Tannen, 1993b). Their strategy, however, is not without a cost, as Erickson and Rittenberg (1987) point out: "The catch is that while this may seem interactionally safe to the FMG, it is, in fact, very risky because rapport with American patients can be damaged by the use of these discourse strategies" (p. 406). Risky as their strategy may be, the FMGs in this case were strategically competent, given that they were making the most out of their limited sociolinguistic knowledge.

We must therefore incorporate the speakers' drive to be strategically competent in the immediate (sequential) conversational context as a potential source of communicative trouble in the long run. In the sense that strategic efforts work for the purposes which motivated them, we should expect them to be used again in spite of their being cause for trouble at other interactive levels. Strategic uses of (non-)nativeness should also be attended to in our conceptualization of cross-cultural communication and miscommunication.

In sum, interactional sociolinguistics has been tremendously successful in drawing from various sources in linguistics, anthropology and sociology to produce a coherent model of the social and cultural organization of human communicative action. Although we still have a long way to go, the model presented above provides a solid theoretical base for the continued improvement of our understanding of human communicative action through a commitment to looking at language and communication as reflexive embodied social interaction conducted in the flow of real time. The contribution of non-linguists to this enterprise has been fundamental in correcting a disciplinary bias towards concentrating excessively on issues related to the linguistic code to the exclusion of other factors in intercultural communication face to face.

In the next chapter I review the research on negotiation discourse in light of the theoretical assumptions laid out above, with illustrations from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation talk data source. In the following chapters, I analyze negotiational arguing sequences in the data corpus.

CHAPTER 4

NEGOTIATION AND NEGOTIATION TALK

This chapter examines the research literature on negotiation. The discussion starts with the ways the term negotiation can be used, and proceeds to a brief critical overview of various strands to studying negotiation, with special attention to studies of negotiation discourse. Most of this literature, I argue, is of little relevance to studying negotiation talk from the interactional sociolinguistic perspective outlined in the previous chapter. The second concern of this chapter is then to review the handful of studies which have indeed described negotiation talk as a social interactional activity. Analyses of transcript data from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation will illustrate some of the research findings reviewed. These analyses provide emic evidence in support of our conception of such data as *negotiation* talk.

The Metaphor of Negotiation

Because persuasion and conflict are so crucial and ubiquitous in human life, negotiation can be referred to in many different ways. This liberty accounts for the existence of a vast literature on negotiation on the one hand, and the minute literature on *naturally occurring negotiation talk-in-interaction*[1] on the other.

Both everyday and social scientific references to negotiation are often metaphorical, that is, the term negotiation is applied to almost any process or situation where there may be differences coupled with some room for reaching a common middle ground (e.g., negotiate a day off; Japan/U.S. trade negotiation). In the social scientific literature, *the metaphorical sense of negotiation* has been applied widely and diversely as a convenient way to impart notions of dynamicity, mutability and situated emergence (e.g., negotiation *of identity* (Riemer, 1994); negotiation *of context* (Kendon, 1992); negotiation *of meaning* (Bly, 1994). Indeed,

[1] *Naturally occurring talk-in-interaction* takes place spontaneously, that is, routinely and without an analyst's elicitation or intervention.

academic studies whose primary topic of investigation is negotiation proper (i.e., in a non-metaphorical sense) also vary considerably in terms of what their object of investigation actually is (Garcez, 1996).

As a result, we may find explicit, objective definitions of negotiation which may be descriptively apt, mutually complementary, and yet they refer to distinct talk-interactional animals. Such is the case if we contrast, for example, definitions of negotiation in works by Polanyi (1979) and Neu (1986), two sociolinguists. The first author examines a single story found in *naturally-occurring, informal, ordinary conversation*. In her data, there is implicit disagreement among three participants as to the point of the story. Polanyi (1979) characterizes that text as negotiation, and defines the term by describing the simplest possible model of what negotiation involves:

> There must be negotiators, something on the table to be negotiated about, proposals and counterproposals put forward backed by supporting evidence, argumentation, or other manifestations of power, and, finally, either resolution of the issue on the table or an impasse reached. (p. 214)

The second author (Neu, 1985) examines 30 *formal business negotiations staged for research purposes*. These purposes are to describe how American Englis h negotiations take place, and to apply that information to the training of EFL negotiators. She lists the following as distinguishing features of a negotiation, adding that, "should any of these features not be present, then the interaction is something other than negotiation" (p. 42):

(1) There are a minimum of 2 parties present.
(2) Both parties have predetermined goals.
(3) Some of the predetermined goals are not shared by both participants.
(4) There is an outcome.
(5) Both parties believe the outcome of the negotiation may be satisfactory.
(6) Both parties are willing to modify their position.
(7) These parties' incompatible positions make modification of position difficult.
(8) Parties understand the purpose of the negotiation. (p. 42)

With minor corrections, we could say that both definitions above are descriptive when looked separately, even compatible when compared, *and* that they fit the activities observed in our corpus (see narrative accounts in chapter 2, pp. 35-38, and appendix A, pp. 331-351). However, these two authors are dealing with extremely different interactional materials. The paradox is possible because the first definition, resulting from a focus on interactional activity, is metaphorical — there is no explicitly foregrounded table, proposal or argumentation such as we find it in the Courofatos/Amage interaction — while the second reflects a strict view of what takes place in *formal* negotiation *events*, as if these were independent objects in the world.

In a comprehensive review of key concepts and issues in the field of negotiation research, Firth (1995c) stresses that this is so because, in addition to its being so commonplace in contemporary life, negotiation can be seen *both* as a "formal, problem-solving *event*," or as "an *activity* of social decision making on substantive matters" (p. 3, emphasis altered). This distinction is important and will be used throughout this dissertation. While the four days of meetings between the Courofatos manufacturers and the Amage importers constitute a series of negotiation encounters composing an *event* devoted to their task of striking a business deal, the particular talk-interactional co-constructions which participants jointly produce in order to accomplish that task will be seen as negotiation *activities*.

Firth points out that while most references to negotiation in the linguistic and social-scientific literature are metaphors based on the *activity* notion, it is negotiation *as event*, with emphasis on its outcomes, rather than as activity or as both, that has received the most attention in research on negotiation across the disciplines. Since the term negotiation is used with little precision and in disparate senses, cross-referencing within this vast literature is hardly possible at all.[2] In the following sections I survey the literature to tease out the minute section which is relevant to this study of non-metaphorical negotiation discourse.

Negotiation Research

Firth (1995c) divides the larger field of negotiation research into five diverse orientations: prescriptive, abstract, experimental, ethnographic, and discourse(-analytic). Naturally, a number of individual studies will not fall neatly within one of these divisions — Maynard (1984) is an example of a study that is both ethnographic and discourse-analytic. Other taxonomies have been suggested,[3] but Firth's breakdown

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[2] For slightly different views on this issue, see Firth (1995c) and Wagner (1995b).
[3] See especially Putnam (1992), the contributions in Bazerman (1991), and, more recently, Ehlich and Wagner (1995).

is an especially valid and useful starting point for an expository attempt to map the field of negotiation studies from a sociolinguistic discourse-analytic perspective.

The first three orientations — *prescriptive, abstract and experimental* — form the most voluminous section of the existing negotiation literature, and the least relevant to the present study of negotiation discourse, due to some important epistemological and heuristic incompatibilities. These three traditions place great emphasis on uncovering the structure of negotiation event *outcomes*. They put great effort into finding new ways of maximizing individual negotiator effectiveness, two motivations of minor concern here. In addition, they lack an analytic interest in the process workings of actual negotiation talk as social action, which is essential for discourse analysis.

Prescriptive studies of negotiation are based on first-hand experience and anecdotal evidence collected mostly by experienced negotiators whose aim is usually to impart concrete practical advice on *how to* negotiate effectively (Fisher & Ury, 1981). In general, these studies are overly generic in scope and unsystematic in their analytic approach (Firth, 1991, 1995c). About such literature, which they label as "practical," Ehlich and Wagner (1995) maintain that it "does not offer any insights into the structural characteristics of business negotiation" (p. 1). The limited academic interest of such work is that, since it caters to and influences trainers and practitioners,[4] it may offer some emic insight on aspects worthy of scholarly investigation (Lampi, 1986).

The *abstract* orientation appears in studies carried out by economists interested in devising rigorous theoretical game and bargaining models that attempt to predict pay-off motivation and outcomes while ignoring actual context and most or all real-world factors. Despite their formal elegance, the ideal character of these investigations can be suggestive at best for those of us interested in examining actual talk-in-interaction.[5] Since so much of the present research interest lies in describing how members go about conducting interaction in real time and space, and given that we have no way of knowing exactly what

[4] In contrast to these studies, negotiation research work carried within other traditions has also been compiled in handbooks for training or personnel development purposes (Asherman & Asherman, 1990; Mulholland, 1991).
[5] Goffman (1969) makes interesting use of game and bargaining theory findings in his discussion of strategic interaction.

people's intentions are, we gain little by simply abstracting away the participants' various pay-off motivations which are not strictly or immediately economic in nature.[6]

Experimental studies of negotiation in turn have been carried out mostly by social psychologists interested in cause and effect relationships between various individual factors, such as negotiator personality features, information status, and tactics versus outcomes. This literature constitutes the bulk of negotiation research. Unfortunately, however, the very nature of these studies as experiments means that the object of analysis is simulated (often laboratory-based) rather than naturally occurring negotiation.

Though they may come up with attractive discrete findings, such studies are based on the questionable assumption that behavior is individually driven as an-inside-the-head phenomenon. In sharp contrast to the views adopted here, they conceive of interaction as the composite result of acts by individuals behaving according to their *intention*. Thus Rubin and Brown (1975) define bargaining[7] as "a process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle what each shall give and take and receive between them" (p. 2). Putnam and Jones (1982) — communication scholars working within a psychological research paradigm — also believe that "each message in a bargaining situation functions concomitantly to convey information about a person's intentions while attempting to influence the other person's expectations and behavior" (p. 263).

In addition to its problematic reliance on an interactant's intention, inferred from the propositional content of his/her utterances, this tradition overlooks the social and sequential aspects of social interaction, which are crucial if we see negotiation talk (or any other speech activity) as a constantly emerging accomplishment. The theoretical and methodological assumptions of the experimental tradition are also largely shared by discourse-centered *communication* scholarship on negotiation, and so I discuss them in further detail when reviewing that literature below.

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[6] For an anthropological discussion of abstract negotiation research, see Gulliver (1979).
[7] Bargaining and negotiation are often referred to as cognates (Firth, 1995c) or used interchangeably in the literature (Maynard, 1984; Putnam & Rollof, 1992). Just as often, however, bargaining is used more narrowly to refer to sections within negotiations where specific proposals and counterproposals are made (Gulliver, 1979).

Ethnographic studies of negotiation, in their turn, have mostly focused on the *event* notion of negotiation and have uncovered patterns of similarities in large units of action, or phases, among different naturally-occurring negotiation encounters turned into case-studies (Douglas, 1962; Gulliver, 1979). However, they have not been as concerned with aspects related to negotiation as an activity conducted through talk-in-interaction. Maynard's (1984) discourse-based ethnographic study of plea bargaining, discussed in detail later in this chapter, is a major advance in relation to "other ethnographic descriptions of negotiations [which have] founder[ed] on language and discourse" (Firth, 1995c, p. 16).

Finally, the fifth orientation to negotiation research in Firth's (1995c) taxonomy — *discourse* — features studies which began appearing only recently. They share a central concern with the interactional aspects of negotiation, and foreground negotiation as an activity rather than as a formal event. However, these studies have been conducted within two distinct traditions resulting in rather different bodies of work. Firth terms such bodies of work *coding schemes* and *transcript-based* studies.

Communication studies follow the experimental or social-psychological tradition. They often concern themselves with the communicative effectiveness of negotiators qua individual communicators whose behaviors an analyst codes and then analyzes quantitatively (thus the label "coding schemes"). *Sociolinguistic studies* follow different but converging qualitative research traditions in anthropology, linguistics and sociology, and share some of the interests of the ethnographic orientation mentioned above. Their objective is to describe negotiation talk as a particular type of social interaction through the analyses of transcripts of negotiation talk.

The following section reviews the two discourse approaches separately and in detail, according to their respective disciplinary roots in communication scholarship and sociolinguistics. Before we examine the literature on negotiation discourse, the table below summarizes the previous discussion on the different domains of general negotiation research.

Table 2. Approaches to the study of negotiation

orientation →	prescriptive	abstract	experimental	ethnographic	discourse analytic	
------------ feature ↓					communication studies	sociolinguistic studies

audience	trainers and practitioners	economics	social psychology, trainers, practitioners	sociology, anthropology, social psychology, trainers, practitioners	communication scholars, social psychology, trainers, practitioners	discourse analysis
focus on sociolinguistic behavior	minor	absent	variable	variable	major	major
focus on outcomes, tactics and effectiveness	major	major	major	minor	major	minor
main research procedure	impressionistic observation	formal: logical experimenta-tion, theoretical model-building	experimental: hypothesis testing	interpretive: participant observation, interviews	experimental: hypothesis-testing; coding schemes	interpretive: conversation and interaction analyses
usual type of data	anecdotes, simulations, interviews	idealized	laboratory simulations	naturally occurring events	event simulations	transcripts of naturally occurring talk

Negotiation Discourse Research: Coding vs. Transcripts

Communication Studies of Negotiation

Communication scholars and social psychologists concentrated their initial research efforts on devising coding schemes to map out negotiation discourse by specifying tactical patterns or sequences of strategies and correlating them to types of gains or outcomes in negotiation (Donohue, 1981). More recently, as Putnam and Roloff (1992) claim, they have started to move away from simply producing coding schemes in "an effort to uncover systems of meaning in the bargaining process" (p. 7). This has resulted in a substantial amount of work,[8] so that a more appropriate term to refer to this literature is *communication studies* of negotiation.

Adopting the psychological assumption that communication is the sum of the work of "atomic individuals who, in negotiation, contribute to a process of tactical move and counter-move" (Firth, 1995c, p. 19), communication studies of negotiation share with the larger experimental tradition a concern for outcomes and effectiveness of negotiation tactics or negotiator characteristics. Approaching talk and interaction from this angle, they tend to process large discourse data sets by coding behavior according to *a priori* definitions of phenomena that the researcher selects for analysis.

[8] See Putnam and Roloff (1992) for description and synthesis of communication scholarship on negotiation.

Putnam and Jones (1982), for example, identify more than a dozen "categories," such as "threats" and "provides reaction." They code occurrences of such categories and assign them to interpretively defined "dimensions" (e.g., offensive, defensive, integrative, etc.). Finally, they run statistical analyses of occurrences of such items in a corpus to establish various correlations between bargainer role and sex-role composition, and category/dimension frequencies. In sum, the researchers match utterances to pre-defined analytical units with little attention to the local, turn-sequential placement of such occurrences, and even less attention to the participants' displayed analytical stances. Without presenting transcript data, they claim inter-coder reliability in assigning labels to utterances as validation for the interpretive procedure which then feeds quantitative analyses.

Clearly, this implies a distinctive theoretical conception of human social interaction, according to which certain pre-packaged individual acts are believed to have the same function, producing equivalent subsequent reactions, independently of their context of production and processing. According to this etic view, the researcher confidently identifies and quantifies the occurrences of an act and then correlates them statistically to some other element such as particular types of bargaining outcome.

In spite of their discourse orientation, communication studies of negotiation are in fact driven by a primary psychological interest in describing bargaining as a system unto itself, not as a form of discourse. Merely two among a series of components of this system, language and interaction are examined as avenues leading to bargainers' *meanings* (cf. chapter 3, p. 58). Thus Putnam and Roloff (1992) write that

> bargainers rely on both the content and the function of messages to provide information about proposals as well as reveal clues about their opponents preferences and interests ... these components [namely verbal and nonverbal messages, information exchange, language, media, symbols, and meaning] provide a lens to tap into other dimensions of bargaining, such as negotiator goals and characteristics, the climate of the interaction, the search for alternative settlements, the evolution or development of the bargaining process, negotiator relationships, and the role of the audiences in the negotiation process. (pp. 4-5)

Such positions conflict with the interactional sociolinguistic perspective taken in the present work in several respects.[9] The assumption that utterances with the equivalent propositional content or form will

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[9] Antaki's (1988, pp. 5-12) discussion of similarly contrasting perspectives to the analysis of "everyday explanation" illuminates some of the history of these epistemic differences.

constitute the same action across their occurrences is, of course, anathema to the interactional sociolinguistic or conversation analytic notions of co-construction and interactional achievement discussed in chapter 3 (Erickson, 1992b; Erickson & Shultz, 1981; Gumperz, 1982a, 1992a; Schegloff, 1995; Tannen, 1993b). As with the three first orientations briefly described above, the primary analytic concern of communication studies is the individual's discrete and independent behaviors, "(strategies, tactics, moves) rather than what is collectively accomplished through interdependent action" (Firth, 1995c, p. 19).

In this framework, meaning and information are seen as the ultimately crucial aspects of verbal behavior; interaction, merely an obvious by-product of multiple individual action. It makes us believe that co-present participants to talk-in-interaction act in isolation through subsequent verbal moves, just as they would if they were exchanging pre-recorded radio messages. According to this model, the same developments would ensue whether negotiators were interacting face-to-face or sending written messages across isolated locations (cf. Firth, 1991). Indeed, Walker (1995) has criticized the narrow social-psychological position of communication studies of negotiation on various grounds, especially for their unrealistic treatment of talk as a window to what is in the speaker's mind, as if speakers created meaning individually and as if they were in total voluntary control of the talk they produce (cf. p. 58 above).

As discussed previously in this dissertation, it is in fact *in interaction* that meaning is jointly created by the participants. Intersubjective *action* is omnirelevant; not discrete objective information. While the *information* contained in verbal behavior may be crucial, it can often be secondary to the construction of discourse. Schegloff (1995) addresses this point most explicitly by showing how an action can be accomplished in conversational discourse through non-informative silence (cf. chapter 3, pp. 58). He has additionally demonstrated this in the conversational treatment of pre-announcements (e.g., “Guess what?”), where responding to the informational content of a question does not necessarily constitute responding to the action accomplished by the interrogative utterance. Communication studies of negotiation fail to take into consideration these aspects of the organization of social interaction.

Also on a methodological note, communication studies of negotiation, especially coding schemes, are only of limited appeal for those of us interested in describing how participants accomplish the construction of social reality through talk. One important problem is that they describe interactional data mostly from simulated events, or even from self-report in interviews.

Even more problematic is their overly etic approach to data analysis. The researcher segments and assigns labels to behaviors observed, without taking into consideration what the participants attended to in those behaviors nor their local interactional context. The quantification of these behaviors is abstracted away from the local contexts in ways that ignore the contingencies of the local production of utterances.

This yields a reduced notion of strategy in talk-in-interaction, for example. In assigning equivalent strategic status both to behavior that a participant designs to be concealed from the recipient, and to behavior s/he designs to be available to the recipient, communication research ignores the fact (among others) that "if a team strategically misrepresents their position and the recipient team is unaware of the deception and responds accordingly, then it is immaterial *to the negotiation process* whether the speaker was behaving strategically or not" (Walker, 1995, p. 136, emphasis added).

In addition, because they generally proceed from pre-determined ideas, communications studies of negotiation discourse often turn to experimental research designs to test hypotheses regarding units of verbal and nonverbal behavior, which is hardly amenable to quantification (Schegloff, 1993). Moreover, the communication scholar's report seldom includes the specific interactional record of the quantified units, making it impossible for researchers of another theoretical persuasion to examine what the local context was like for any single instance. Finally, the proliferation of one-shot coding schemes designed to account for a specific data set exposes their limited analytical power, an issue that communication scholars themselves have criticized (Gibbons, Bradac & Busch, 1992; Putnam & Rollof, 1992).

The work of Graham (1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1990) is an example of social-psychological and communication-based research conducted on business negotiation talk with a specific focus on cross-cultural issues. It informs various constituencies and is widely reproduced in publications for negotiation practitioners and trainers (Asherman & Asherman, 1990), second language specialists (Scarcella, Andersen & Krashen, 1990), as well as the general public (Pfeiffer, 1988). Graham has employed coding schemes and quantitative methods to produce "objective" findings which nevertheless fail to explain *how* the various discourse features examined are produced and received ecologically. For instance, Graham (1990) builds his claims that Japanese negotiators do not say "no" (i.e., do not make direct rejections or refusals) by counting how many times the negotiators uttered the Japanese word for *no*, without considering the fact that, as Miller (1994) points out, the Japanese may reject and refuse by using different phrases which do not necessarily include a negation particle.

The same author has analyzed Brazilians negotiating and, again, by counting discretely isolated occurrences, finds that "Brazilian bargainers interrupted more than twice as often as either the Japanese or American bargainers" and "tended to talk simultaneously for extended periods of time, seemingly 'fighting for the floor'" (Graham, 1985, p. 91). No transcript evidence is provided to support that claim. Moreover, the researcher does not consider the participants' emic views either through their interpretations of one another's actions recognizable in their talk, nor through interviews or playback sessions. In fact, he seems unaware that overlapping talk may not necessarily be seen as interruption (Tannen, 1984), and that some sociolinguistic communities may tolerate and even conventionally feature more than one conversational floor simultaneously (Shultz, Florio & Erickson, 1982). These studies thus suffer from an overly etic explanatory stance where the analyst imposes his/her own categories and is unconcerned with the participant's recognizable views of what is going on in the talk. Accordingly, their results are often a cursory, etic description of *behavior.*

In sum, a number of theoretical stances and methodological procedures in communication research on negotiation discourse clash with the socio-cultural and sociolinguistic conceptions regarding human interaction discussed in chapter 3. This makes that body of research mostly incompatible with an interest in negotiation talk as a form of *social inter-action*.[10]

Sociolinguistic Studies of Negotiation Talk

[10] For a slightly different critique of communication studies of negotiation discourse, see Firth (1995c, pp. 19-23).

The other discourse-oriented tradition in negotiation research is that of *transcript-based analyses* of naturally occurring interaction conducted by a few interactional sociolinguists and conversation analysts interested in bringing out the workings of negotiation discourse in qualitatively grounded ways. These studies do not depart from *a priori* hypotheses to be tested about components of a bargaining system, but set out to describe issues of competent social membership within the specificity of a negotiation-interactional frame. They attempt to show that negotiation activities are interactionally accomplished in a peculiar conversational ecology and that this ecology must be investigated in its own right. It is in this relatively minute portion of the negotiation literature that we find negotiation research concerned with the sociolinguistic conduct of naturally occurring talk in everyday human social interaction.[11]

Within this tradition, Firth (1995c) carefully defines negotiation as "a *discourse-based* and *situated* activity that is interactionally constructed in concrete social settings" (p. 3, original emphasis), and later as "*a communicative attempt to accommodate potential or real differences in interests in order to make mutually acceptable decisions on substantive matters*, matters that ostensibly cannot or will not be decided upon unilaterally, but rather as a conjoint arrangement" (p. 7, original emphasis).

Such activity needs not occur within formal negotiation events or encounters. Moreover, "the activity is not of necessity predicated on pre-existent and mutually recognized competitive or conflictual grounds" (Firth, 1995c, p. 7). In fact, various contributions in Firth's (1995b) collection of sociolinguistic studies of negotiation deal with various forms of negotiation activity in speech events and situations in various workplaces ranging from private medical practices to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

Though it is true that negotiation as a speech activity is not confined to formal negotiation events, sociolinguists interested in negotiation talk have often shied away from examining data from such negotiation events and have turned instead to the analysis of more accessible data which sometimes is

[11] Despite the label I am using here, a few sociolinguistic studies of negotiation do not share these interests (Neu, 1986). Lampi (1986) employs sociolinguistic discourse and interactional concepts in an analysis of a naturally-occurring cross-cultural business negotiation event, though with purposes more in line with that of most communication studies of negotiation discourse. In addition, her analysis is seriously compromised by key ad-hoc references to interactional concepts [e.g., Goffman's (1972) concept of *gathering*, referring to the ecological arrangement of co-present interactional participants, is misused as a label for transcript segments containing overlapping talk that is not easily transcribable].

hardly recognizable by anyone as negotiation in any non-metaphorical sense. Even though they may be examining transcript data, such studies only pretend to be analyzing naturally occurring negotiation, and therefore contribute little to our understanding of negotiation talk as a form of social interaction.

It seems to me that the most representative type of negotiational discourse data we can find, and the one we should study given our limited understanding of what constitutes negotiation discourse, is naturally occurring, conspicuous, participant- and observer-defined interaction that will satisfy any definition of negotiation from metaphorical to event-centered or activity-centered. The Courofatos/Amage data corpus fits that description. Wagner (1995b) discusses what makes a discourse a negotiation, and his remarks about "the most genuine kind of negotiation" (p. 14) apply to the Courofatos/Amage interaction as well. This is a participant-defined "negotiation event" composed in large measure of talk-interactional activities which the participants recognizably co-construct as *negotiation talk*.

Unfortunately, only a few studies have been done on such types of data even by researchers concerned with the social structures of talk-in-interaction (i.e., not with tactics and outcomes). Grimshaw (1990, 1992) has pointed out that studies on conflict talk — and on negotiations more specifically — often use data that is less than ideal from a sociolinguistic point of view because they contain watered down versions of what they wish to describe. Though they claim to be describing negotiation discourse, they often examine simulations, instead of naturally occurring interactions; they focus on low conflict-potential or less representative interactions such as children's disputes; and they deal with limited or incomplete audiovisual records.

Grimshaw blames the lack of more representative negotiation talk data on the extreme difficulty of obtaining access to "actual" negotiations. This is echoed by the editors of *The discourse of business negotiation*, who also point out that "few studies have been published thus far which analyse business negotiation as a specific type of discourse" (Ehlich & Wagner, 1995, p. 2). They mention the tremendous difficulty in obtaining authentic audiovisual records of business negotiation talk-in-interaction as warranting a whole section of the book with analyses of staged negotiations.

However, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Garcez, 1996), if our primary analytic interest is to describe "the fine-grained structure of negotiation" (Boden, 1995, p. 83), then we must look for it in the discourse of naturally occurring and unequivocal negotiations before we start examining interactions where negotiation is not expected (or less obviously apparent) such as in medical consultations or travel agent/customer interaction, or in staged events where the participants' institutional identities, tasks and end-goals may be fuzzy at best. Both the type of data I describe in this study and the analytic focus I place on it emphasize the typical conflict-resolution and institutional aspect of negotiation as an activity occurring within more or less formally defined negotiation encounters in an institutional, workplace setting. In other words, even if my interest is in *how* the participants' discourse-based actions constitute negotiation as a discourse activity, the data source for this dissertation can be described as *a negotiation* both as event and as activity based on the participants' demonstrable actions and stances.

Fortunately, a few researchers working within conversational analytic and interactional sociolinguistic perspectives have recently begun to study similar negotiation talk data. The following sections turn to such literature for insight on what characterizes negotiation talk. Below I review key findings of sociolinguistic negotiation discourse research, and illustrate a few with data from our corpus, thus showing the Amage/Courofatos participants to be co-constructing their interaction recognizably and distinctively *as negotiation*.

Towards a Description of Negotiation Talk

The research concern with describing the peculiarities of negotiation talk has grown, not out of developments in the study of negotiation, but out of talk-in-interaction studies which have come to see *institutionalized forms of talk* as modified versions (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984) of the "the sociological bedrock" which is ordinary conversation (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 1995, p. 187). Accordingly, most published work on negotiation as a genre of institutional talk follows the tradition of ethnomethodological conversation analysis (or is greatly influenced by it), and the following discussion reflects that.

In a review of institutional discourse studies, limited to the courtroom and the clinic, Agar (1985) defines it as "discourse where one person who represents an institution encounters another person seeking its services" (p. 147). This is a somewhat narrow definition which certainly does not do justice to the complexity of institutional discourse, given that we often have two or more institutions represented and joint or mutual interdependence in service providing. Institutional talk here, and as the authors cited below discuss it, has less to do with the fact that the interaction takes place in an institutional setting and more to do with the fact that "the participants' institutional or professional identities are somehow made relevant to the work activities to which they are engaged" (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 4).

In the introductory chapter to their edited collection of articles on *Talk at work*, Drew and Heritage (1992) describe *institutional talk* in these terms:

> 1 Institutional interaction involves an orientation by at least one of the participants to some core goal, task or identity (or set of them) conventionally associated with the institution in question. In short, institutional talk is normally informed by *goal orientations* of a relatively restricted conventional form.
> 2 Institutional interaction may often involve *special and particular constraints* on what one or both of the participants will treat as allowable contributions to the business at hand.
> 3 Institutional talk may be associated with *inferential frameworks* and procedures that are particular to specific institutional contexts. (p. 22)

Note the heavy emphasis placed on the end-goal/task orientations observable in such talk. Linguistic pragmatics has shown that human natural language in use is always goal-directed (Allen, 1983; Grice, 1975/1991). But in addition to that, here we are talking about something beyond the language system. That is, these are not universal goals in terms of language in use, but goals defined in terms of communicative competence, which are specific to the social encounter and the participants' institutional identities.

In negotiation events as the one presented in chapter 2, it is clear that participants share an end-goal orientation — in that case, striking a business deal for the production and merchandising of leather goods — that frames and restricts their conduct. Drew and Heritage (1992) refer to such orientations as "task agendas" (p. 61). It is thus not an accident that most definitions of negotiation refer to its problem-solving task-relatedness. All of this suggests that negotiation encounters have a standard shape[12] and are constructed through a subtly specific form of talk.

In other words, while negotiating participants may consider one another as friends, and may eventually engage in personal small talk, that is still only a marginal aspect of their dealings mostly geared to maximizing the effectiveness of their business relationships. Talking in order to make mutually acceptable decisions to which both parties have to commit is their common task. Contributions which are perceived as not adhering to that constraint are warrantably inferable as inappropriate. Moreover, the accomplishment of this task is a necessary step towards achieving the institutional end-goal each of the parties has to strike a beneficial commercial deal. Thus in our data, while Harry and Charles talk at length about the importance of being on friendly terms with their business associates, they are quick to chastise them if they "try to change the subject" or delay getting back to "serious business talk;" and Roberto and Eduardo demonstrably share those orientations as well.

This crucial aspect of institutional discourse has been described by students of negotiation talk-in-interaction as the *institutional mandate* which guides the participants' actions. Maynard (1984) describes participants in plea bargaining settings as constantly attending to the fact that "results ... must always be produced" (p. 12). He elaborates on that by saying that "organized aspects of the [plea bargaining] discourse are often occupied with meeting the participants' institutional mandate to process cases" (p. 12). In other words, these participants have a tangible end-goal to be achieved through their interaction. They share an understanding that attaining this end-goal is what motivates their engagement in sustained interaction.

Firth (1991) makes a strong case in showing the importance of the interactional mandate to the description of negotiational talk-in-interaction. He is quite specific as to what constitutes the institutional mandate of commodity traders:

> In its simplest terms, the hierarchically-ordered mandate can be seen to orient participants to (1) ongoingly undertake interorganizational trading, and (2) to ensure the cumulative result of such

[12] The overall standard shape of negotiation events, especially in term of its phases, has been described by the ethnographic tradition (Gulliver, 1979).

> trading allows for profitability levels to be maintained, or surpassed within reasonable limits. ... In practical terms, what arises is that the two pronged 'institutional mandate' encompasses a subgoal which the parties strive to accomplish, that goal being the development of and agreement on longer-term projects for alternative and/or extended joint undertakings. (p. 12)

Institutional mandates such as the one described above — which is descriptive of the Amage/Courofatos encounters as well — have particular consequences to the way talk is organized. Institutional genres of talk like (business) negotiation provide participants with special constraints and possibilities which seem to differ from those of ordinary conversation. These may generate specific organizations of the talk-in-interaction into distinct *speech exchange systems*. (Schegloff, 1987) writes that

> A speech exchange system is specified by the form of organized solutions it has to such generic problems as managing the allocation and size of turns among the parties, providing for the organized production of stretches of talk into coherent sequences of action (sometimes organizing successive utterances, sometimes dispersed ones, for example), furnishing orderly means for dealing with troubles of speaking, hearing, and understanding the talk so as to allow the action to proceed there and then, providing orderly procedures for the starting and ending of episodes of concerted interactional activity and the like. (p. 221)

Referring to the work of conversation analysts and interactional sociolinguists, Schegloff (1987) concludes: "In general it appears that other speech exchange systems, and their turn-taking organizations, are the product of transformations or modifications of the one for conversation, which is the primordial organization for talk-in-interaction" (p. 222).

Institutional encounters are often characteristically organized into a "task-related standard shape" (p. 43), even though these often interact with locally managed routines. Comprehensive microethnographic studies of institutional settings, such as counseling offices (Erickson & Shultz, 1982), and court rooms (Maynard, 1984), have shown this in remarkably clear empirical ways. This standard shape can be especially clear in certain genres of institutional talk in extremely formal, highly monitored settings, such as courts (Atkinson & Drew, 1979) and broadcast interview rooms (Clayman, 1993), where a different institutionally motivated speech-exchange system can be postulated with relative ease (Schegloff, 1992).

In less formal settings, however, as Drew and Heritage (1992) point out, "when considered in turn-taking terms at least, the boundaries between these forms of institutional talk [i.e., those occurring in less formal settings, business for example] and ordinary conversation can appear permeable and uncertain" (p. 28). This uncertainty makes these less formalized genres of institutional talk difficult but fertile ground for talk-in-interactional analysis. In fact, not all students of language and social interaction agree on these boundaries Some conversation analysts are skeptical that we have anything to gain from trying to distinguish institutional forms of talk from ordinary conversation in terms of discrete speech exchange systems (Pomerantz, personal communication). While more debate is necessary on this, it seems to me that there are enough peculiarities in institutional forms of talk, perceived by participants and analysts, to warrant their current investigation as such.

In order to investigate the specificity of institutional forms of talk, Drew and Heritage (1992) propose five dimensions of interactional conduct for research: lexical choice; turn design; sequence organization; overall structural organization; and social epistemology and social relations. Students of negotiation talk-in-interaction have indeed been concerned with such dimensions. The present research follows this tradition and focuses on the *sequence and overall organization* of negotiational arguing.

Not surprisingly, the basic overarching question for analysts of negotiation talk is whether or not it is a distinct form of talk. The studies reviewed below indicate it is. Gumperz (1982a) writes "negotiation is *a genre of conversation* [emphasis added] in which participants must cooperate in order to agree on potential outcomes that had not been agreed upon in advance" (p. 165). Some of the findings which support this statement are presented below, with illustrations from the Amage/Courofatos corpus.

Distinctive Features of Negotiation Talk-in-Interaction

Negotiation talk is co-constructed by interactants with particular institutional identities and whose actions are guided by specific realizations of an institutional mandate. Typically, such mandate calls for the accomplishment of a mutually accepted project for interdependent action in the participants' and their institutions' separate (i.e., non-co-present) future. The talk that negotiators produce lends evidence to these observations.

In one of the first works with a central interest in describing negotiation talk in its own right, Francis (1986) provides a generic analysis of transcripts from an industrial negotiation event held in the U.S. in the 1950's and which had been the focus of an earlier ethnographic study (Douglas, 1962). In addition to his methodological interest in applying conversational analysis to the study of negotiation, Francis (1986) wants to substantiate his sense that negotiation is "a collective activity performed in and through talk which is distinct from ordinary conversation" (p. 53). He argues that despite the fact that much of the talk in negotiations is conversational in character, "participants create and sustain the shared availability of the 'facts' that negotiation is 'what we are here for' and that it is 'what is happening'" (p. 54). Francis proposes that some features of (what I term) participation structure and topical development set negotiation talk apart from everyday conversation. These two different interactional aspects of negotiation talk are discussed in turn in the following sections.

Participation Structure

Participation structure (Erickson & Shultz, 1982) and the related concepts of *participant structure* (Philips, 1972) and *participation framework* (Goffman, 1981b) have to do with the rights and duties of participants in relation to one another and their multiple mutual alignments as they interact. Erickson and Shultz (1982) define participation structure as "the total pattern of appropriate ways of acting by all parties engaged in interaction" (p. 18). They emphasize the inherent mutability of participation structures over time, as well as their intimate connection to the local definition of communicative role and social identity. Some specific types of participation structures are significantly favored during certain conversational activities, such as story-telling, where one primary speaker is granted the right to hold the floor indefinitely while the others limit their participation to providing attentive listenership (Goodwin, 1984). Likewise, different cultural traditions also favor some specific participation structures over others during the performance of certain communicative activities (Besnier, 1989; Philips, 1972; Shultz et al., 1982).[13] A similar differentiation in terms of participation structures can be significant in institutional forms of talk as well.

A striking feature of the particular organizational character of negotiation talk is revealed in *who participants talk as* (Francis, 1986) in the structuring of their participation. This facet of "what participants are there for" often makes their institutional and local identities evident in negotiation talk, and, in subtle

[13] See also discussion in Schegloff (1987, pp. 209-214)

ways, it is relevant to their interaction. If this is true for dyadic negotiation encounters (cf. Maynard, 1984, chapter 3; Firth, 1991, chapter 4), it becomes especially clear whenever there are more than two negotiators, and groups of speakers represent a party. They can be seen to behave as a team, that is, they talk as something other then their own single self. A form of multi-person, two-party conversation develops through what Francis calls *team work*.

This is not to say that, in negotiation talk, the category "person" — self and other — is diminished of the fundamental significance it has in any conversation (Sacks, 1992). Rather, it suggests that negotiation talk "superimposes another organizational framework upon the structure of the talk" (Francis, 1986, p. 69), where self and other extend beyond the individual who is animating the talk, to other members of the team that may be co-present, as well as to some constituencies of absent individuals that the negotiating parties represent.

The existence of conversational teams is not in and of itself a distinctive feature of negotiation talk. Collaborative utterances and other aspects of speaking as a team are not uncommon in ordinary conversation (Sacks, 1992), where such occurrences are part of a conspicuous "resource for members for permitting them to show each other that whatever it is they're doing together, they're just doing together to do together" (vol. 1, p. 147). In negotiation talk, however, teams are close to being a normative fixture. In other words, negotiators speak as a team whenever they "do negotiation." In negotiation talk between parties composed of more than a single speaker, *not speaking as a team*, by contrast, maybe a phenomenon of marked consequence.

Useful here is Goffman's (1981a) breakdown of "the production format of an utterance" into *animator* (i.e., "the physical body engaged in acoustic activity," p. 144); *author* (i.e., "someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded," p. 144); and *principal* ("someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, ... not so much ... a body or mind as ... some socially based source of self-identification," pp. 144-145). Goffman warns that the "natural" coalescence of these roles into the notion of *speaker* "has extensive institutionalized exceptions"

(p. 145), negotiation talk being one of them.[14] Team activity, with its patent layers of self, permits subtle but clear shifts in footing — the alignment between participants (Goffman, 1981a) — and these shifts are communicatively important to the negotiating process. Again, this is not to say that ordinary conversation is not laminated; but to underscore that, as an institutional form of talk, negotiation conventionalizes lamination in conspicuous participant-analyzable ways.

Thus in negotiation talk, one could hastily say, the represented party is the principal, the team is the collective author, and the various team members are animators. However, a slightly more complex framework is necessary. Since the author-team is composed of individual animators sharing an extended sense of self, beyond their immediate animator-bodies, we get animators with special conversational rights vis-a-vis other animators/team members. Moreover, individual animators/team members may be physical or legal equivalents of the represented party, and may assume a principal role in certain moments. This happens in the present corpus, for example, when Harry speaks as the CEO and owner of Amage, the importing company he and Charles represent as a team.

Such typical team work is illustrated in the following series of excerpts from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation talk corpus. In the following data, participants not only act as a team. They also make (both their team and individual) participant status recognizably relevant to the conduct of their interaction. The extensive treatment here of how this takes place is due not only to illustrate the phenomenon, but mainly because, since I refer to teams and parties throughout the analyses, these concepts must be demonstrated as relevant to the participants as well.

Consider the transcript below, for example, where Harry and Charles' close team collaboration produces a single arguing position. The reader may remember that the Brazilian manufacturers quoted two sets of prices, the cheaper set being dependent on their ability to buy Argentinian leather, which is currently uncertain. Prior to the excerpt below, Eduardo provided the basis for his reluctance to consider the lower (set of Argentinian-leather) price quotations as definitive (see chapter 2, pp. 36-37). Here the two importers produce a series of tightly connected turns to refute that basis and to accomplish a swift topical

[14] Maynard (1984) shows how these roles are differentiated as effective framing devices in plea bargaining.

move back to the trustworthiness of Harry's position, and of the Czechoslovakian target prices which drive his challenge to all of the manufacturers' price at this point.

4.1/Excerpt 1/DS 15[15]

(0.4)
→ H: first you start negotiating °a contract,° (0.2) but if they say no, (0.4) then you buy enough quantity for the six months.=
→ C: =right.=
→ H: =you know we're gonna give you the quantity, (0.3) to cover
→ yourself for six months, that's not ha:rd,=
→ C: =when we [project,
→ H: [I could do that.=
→ C: =he keeps up to his projections.
(0.6)
→ H: I have not (.) violated one agreement that I've made,
(0.7)
H: but guys, come on (.) °I mean°
(1.5)
H: and believe me I did not low-ball you on these prices. (0.8) ((*pointing to notes*)) these are the true prices.
(1.0)
→ H: in fact these prices >in reality< (0.2) even if you met these prices, (0.5) Czechoslovakia would still be cheaper, because the ocean [freight is cheaper.
→ C: [freight.

This accomplishment is due in great measure to the use of *shifters* — linguistic indexical signs such as pronouns (especially I/me, you/your) and verbal morphemes, whose meaning "cannot be defined without reference to the message" (Jakobson, 1971, p. 131) and whose "reference 'shifts' regularly, depending on the factors of the speech situation" (Silverstein, 1976, p. 24). The importers use shifters and the special rights that *fellow team members* have to share a single floor to advance their party's negotiating position in the excerpt reproduced below once again:

4.1/Excerpt 2/DS 15

H: first you start negotiating °a contract,° (0.2) but if they say no, (0.4) then you buy enough quantity for the six months.=
C: =right.=
H: =you know we're gonna give you the quantity, (0.3) to cover yourself for six months, that's not ha:rd,=

[15] The code before the first line of each transcript excerpt identifies the example number in the chapter, the number of the excerpt for the particular example, and the data segment from where the excerpt is taken. Thus *4.1/Excerpt 1/DS 15* is taken from data segment 15, and is the first excerpt in the discussion of example 1 of chapter 4. For transcript conventions, see appendix B (pp. 352-357). For sequential and contextual information regarding the data segments, see the detailed narrative account of the encounters in appendix A (pp. 331-351).

```
→    C:     =when we [project,
→    H:               [I could do that.=
→    C:     =he keeps up to his projections.
            (0.6)
```

Here Charles latches his turn to Harry's, first to simply corroborate Harry's view ("=right.="); and then again, after Harry latches the second part of his point to Charles' supportive "right," to add authority to the whole point by evoking past history. Notice that this "authority addition" is proffered by Charles in two distinct steps. First we is selected as an indexical pronoun that includes Charles himself as both animator and author, that is, as a team member. Secondly, as his turn is overlapped by a short utterance by Harry, when Charles continues — again latching his turn to Harry's — Charles shifts the previous we into a he (i.e., Harry). This indexes Harry — the legal owner of the importing company — as principal. Harry then takes up the floor by using an exclusive I, in a long turn where he is committing himself "to what the words say" (Goffman, 1981a, p. 144), that is, as the impersonated principal of the words uttered.

Notice that, as he accomplishes the action of challenging the manufacturers' position, Harry subsequently summarizes his (company's) relationship with the Czechoslovakians, first single-handedly as animator/author/principal I, and then, collaboratively with Charles, as animator/team member we:

4.1/Excerpt 3/DS 15

```
     H:     in fact these prices >in reality< (0.2) even if you met
     these prices, (0.5) Czechoslovakia would still be cheaper,
     because the ocean [freight is cheaper.
     C:                          [freight.
     H:     but it's worth it to me.(0.2) t' have the whole collection
     made in one pla:ce, (0.4) rather than °to make some here and         some
there°
            (0.7)
     H:     and I'm going to give them business, (0.5) but it's going to
     be- in a different,
            (0.9)
     C:     different l[ine.
     H:                [different line.
            (1.4)
→    H:     cause I don't wanna give up their- their ability to make
     nice merchandise, (0.3) and they make nice merchandise,
            (0.9)
     C:     yeah, even y- you[r people said that.
                             [YOU (SAID) YOURSELF. ((points to R))=
     E:     =[((nods affirmatively; lipsays yes))
     R:     =[yeah.
     H:     they [they do a nice job.
     R:          [at least the samples look grea:t,
     E:     ((nods yes))
     R:     yeah.
     H:     (they're terrific.)
            (1.0)
```

```
→   H:     ((trying to light a cigarette)) so we don't want to give up
    that that that ((makes fist and holds it up))
    C:     uh: [source
    H:         [that contact. ((tries to light cigarette again))
    C:     yeah. ((starts sipping tea))
           (1.0)
```

The notion of a shifter is remarkably powerful here. Charles' maneuver to introduce a new tack to the challenging point is smooth, despite his secondary role, because he manages to change his footing, and consequently Harry's footing as well, so as to maximize the strength of their team's point. As an animator who is not the principal — but who is in the presence of the one animator who may impersonate the role of principal — Charles shifts from the ambiguous we to the purely referential he. This is an effective staging for Harry to take up the floor, indexically referring to himself simultaneously as animator, author and principal (i.e., as the importing company's CEO) who is both "establishing his position by the words that are spoken" (Goffman, 1981a), and using the context of interaction to anchor the words that are spoken. The swift use of pronouns allows for a coordinated series of changes of footing to build the importer team's unified position in the negotiation.[16]

The next example comes from a point in time immediately prior to the stretch transcribed above. It follows a long spate of talk where the manufacturers do not seek to take the floor. Rather, for four minutes, they listen to Harry and Charles build a case in favor of the importers' Czechoslovakian target prices as an honest and reliable measure of Courofatos' unreasonable prices. Up until then, we therefore hear the participants clearly organized in teams, with the importers speaking collaboratively while the two manufacturers react in identical manner — by remaining consistently silent, making no bids for the floor. The manufacturers can be seen to be refusing to address the importers' assertions. They do not account for their price being what it is, nor do they question the importers' boosting of the Czechoslovakian target prices as realistic and "right." In other words, the manufacturers stick to their position by not offering any materials for the importers to argue with.

In the following excerpts, the participants' team identities work as "constraints and possibilities" for a change in the participation structure and in the development of the negotiation. Consider the transcript

[16] Firth (1991, pp. 106-107) discusses similar issues in dyadic negotiation talk.

below and note especially the use of personal pronouns (<u>we</u>/<u>you</u>) and Charles' addition to Harry's formulations of the problem with the prices.

4.2/Excerpt 1/DS 15

```
→          (1.5)
→    H:    and that's the only reason why we brought the samples here?
      °but the pricing, ((moves torso backwards; looks at notes          and
shows them)) I mean (.) you're not even close.°
→          (2.3)
     H:    I mean you're talking with the exception of one item or two
     items fifteen per cent difference, the others are all over
     twenty per cent (0.5) °makes no sense.°
→          (1.2)
→    C:    tha[t's (with) the ARGENtina °price°
→    H:       [then Eduardo
     H:    then Eduardo is telling me we have to figure ((raises head;
     fixes gaze at R)) in between.
           (0.9)
     H:    <cause you're gonna have to buy some Brazil and some
     Argentinian.
           (0.9)
```

After the third long pause in a series (i.e., 1.5, 2.3 and 1.2 seconds), where the recipient team still makes no move to address the importers' charges that the price quotations "make no sense," both Charles and Harry reclaim the floor to bring up the same issue almost at the same time. In support of Harry's charge that the manufacturers' quoted price makes no sense, Charles asserts that the percentage of difference Harry referred to in the previous turn is based on the lower but uncertain set of prices (use of Argentinian leather). Harry, however, takes that remark a step further and singles out Roberto as an addressed recipient both verbally and nonverbally:

4.2/Excerpt 2/DS 15

```
→    H:    then Eduardo is telling me we have to figure ((raises head;
     fixes gaze at R)) in between.
           (0.9)
     H:    <cause you're gonna have to buy some Brazil and some
     Argentinian.
           (0.9)
     H:    ((looking at notes)) which means that if you're quoting
     fifty-five ninety-four ((55.94)) and fifty-three dollars,
     (0.2) we basically have to do about fifty-four dollars and
     change,=
```

Harry formulates Eduardo's doubts regarding their reliability on the lower price quotations based on imported Argentinian leather, a position which will make the offered end-price even higher in relative terms (and even more in need of revision).

Through the conspicuous reference to Eduardo as a third person, Harry's audience design effects a subtle division in the recipient team. Team members can be expected to know their fellow team members' positions better than members of the opposing team. By claiming to have better knowledge of Eduardo's individual position than does Roberto himself, Harry creates conditional relevance[17] for a clarification to be made about the two manufacturers' different personal views. Constraining the manufacturers to make such a clarification may thus ultimately force them to address the importers' conversational materials.

The emic relevance of this is seen in Eduardo's sequentially significant action, shown in the excerpt below. Eduardo does address the importers' talk — the first manufacturer bid for the floor in four minutes — by accounting for the uncertainty in the problematic price as pointed out in Harry's upgrade:

4.2/Excerpt 3/DS 15

→ E: =yes the problem is=
H: =or [thirty five dollars and change,
E: [i-
H: [or forty four dollars and change.=
E: [if
→ E: =if we travel there, and we we (.) <we make a contract> (.) by six months if it's possible, (0.4) okay (0.3) ((*shoulders arching and drooping*)) but I don't believe that we make a contract by six mo:nths.=

Notice that Eduardo's contribution clearly reveals his upshot of Harry's differential address (from you=manufacturers to you=Roberto) as something that must be dealt with as well. Eduardo starts his utterance with the pronoun we, and then turns it into I when referring to his own personal feelings regarding the prospects of the potential deal with the Argentinian tannery.

In the continuation of this exchange, Harry makes use of Eduardo's utterances to try and advance his own position:

4.2/Excerpt 4/DS 15

E: =if we travel there, and we we (.) <we make a contract> (.) by six months if it's possible, (0.4) okay (0.3) ((*shoulders arching and drooping*)) but I don't believe that we make a contract by six mo:nths.=
→ H: =BUT YOU CAN BUY THE QUANTITIES f[or six months=
E: [yeah,
→ E: =okay:, I will try, but I- uh- (.) we have to go now.

[17] The conversation analytic notion of *conditional relevance* refers to the relation between two utterances whereby, "given a first part of a pair, a second part is immediately relevant and expectable" (Levinson, 1983, p. 306). Thus a summons makes its response a conditionally relevant next action.

H: you can buy the quantities, forgetting about [a contract=
=for six months.
E: ((*stretches arms with hands behind neck*)) [a con:tra:ct

Harry latches an alternative course of action to solve what Eduardo sees as the main problem (i.e., not being able to sign a contract for six months) to revise the price. Eduardo agrees. Note, however, that pronoun choice is treated by the participant as important enough for Eduardo to initiate self-repair. He commits himself personally to the scheme that will guarantee the lower set of prices. However, in starting the contrasting clause in his turn, which includes the action to resolve the issue, Eduardo hesitates, he pauses ("I- uh- (.)"), and then he finally produces the repaired clause unhesitatingly ("we have to go now"), completing the shift back from I to we=manufacturers.

In the transcript excerpts above, the negotiating participants produce and analyze negotiation talk with a special kind of attention to *who they are speaking as* in relation to the issues and to one another, as team members. As the segment continues we see additional evidence of how team work is an important and ubiquitous organizational feature in negotiation talk.

In addition to we and you, there are specific third parties, connected to the each one, and only one, of the negotiating teams, but who never interact directly with the other team. Harry thus uses they to refer to Courofatos' potential leather suppliers in Argentina, over whom he has no sway, as he tries to anticipate *their* actions and suggest what Courofatos should do:

4.3/Excerpt 1/DS 15

(0.4)
→ H: first you start negotiating °a contract,° (0.2) but if they say no, (0.4) then you buy enough quantity for the six months.=
C: =right.=
→ H: =you know we're gonna give you the quantity, (0.3) to cover yourself for six months, that's not ha:rd,=

In the excerpt below, they ("their- their ability to make nice merchandise, (0.3) and they make nice merchandise") is also the index to Amage's alternate manufacturing sources in Czechoslovakia, which the importers must consider vicariously, always through the importers' lenses (i.e., given that they do not have direct contact with the Czechoslovakians):

4.3/Excerpt 2/DS 15

→ H: and I'm going to give them business, (0.5) but it's going to be- in a different,

```
        (0.9)
C:      different l[ine.
H:                 [different line.
        (1.4)
→ H:    cause I don't wanna give up their- their ability to make
nice merchandise, (0.3) and they make nice merchandise,
        (0.9)
```

In this we see that each team also has an immediate constituency behind it, which is often brought up, as when Charles refers to "your people" above, meaning the Courofatos model shop staff in the continuation of the segment:

4.3/Excerpt 3/DS 15

```
H:      cause I don't wanna give up their- their ability to make
nice merchandise, (0.3) and they make nice merchandise,
        (0.9)
→ C:    yeah, even y- you[r people said that.
                         [YOU (SAID) YOURSELF. ((points to R))=
E:      =[((nods affirmatively; lipsays yes))
R:      =[yeah.
```

As the data excerpts above suggest, team work is neither trivial nor is it only generically important. It relates to the institutional mandate, and it has turn-taking consequences which enter into the constitution of negotiation as a form of talk that is different from multi-party ordinary conversation. In fact, Francis (1986) proposes four different types of team work — team passing, team movements, team assists, and team takeovers — through which "the team as a social object is made visible in the talk in ways that are to do with the co-production of the party's case by a number of speakers" (p. 62).

Team passing has to do with the selection of next speaker, especially in second-pair parts such as answers to questions. This happens, for example, when a member of the other party asks a question of a negotiator, the answer to which can best be given by a fellow team-member, so this participant is selected as next speaker. This takes place in the negotiation at Courofatos many times, for example, when Charlie's technical expertise is called for or when Harry's position and primary decision-maker role for the importers' team is foregrounded (i.e., when he impersonates the role of principal).

Team movements are "within-team" exchanges which indirectly address the other team. Common in the Amage/Courofatos data corpus as well, these activities are reminiscent of what Goffman (1981a) describes as *innuendo*, a type of communication "whereby a speaker, ostensibly directing words to an addressed recipient, overlays his remarks with a patent but deniable meaning, a meaning that has a target more so than the recipient ... and is meant to be caught by the target" (p. 134). Their design as tendentiously addressing the other team is easily demonstrable in that they contrast sharply with other within-team communication which is conspicuously designed as private, intra-team communication, that is, as collusive (Goffman, 1981a). When attempting to conceal subordinate communication, Harry and Charles talk softly or whisper, while Roberto and Charles simply code-switch from English to Portuguese. In contrast, when either team is producing team movements, team members speak clearly and sometimes quite loudly, always in English, so that all present can hear it.

An Example of a Resolution-Implicative Team Movement

Team movements can have significant "resolution-implicative" consequences. I borrow Walker's (1995) apt turn of phrase to refer to a quality of certain sequences where "the speaker is understood to be identifying a possible basis for agreement which, if taken up by the recipient team, can then be explored and refined" (p. 110). In the following excerpt from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation, Harry and Charles move from collusive communication to a team movement that gets Eduardo to change his initial non-aligning position towards reviewing the price for an item.

4.4/Excerpt 1/DS 10

```
        (7.5)
H:      see: if it's by ocean then we can talk about ((points to
case on the floor)) this item.
        (1.5)
E:      (but) you have ef oh bee ((FOB )) price from Czechoslovakia by forty
        U S dollars, Harry? how: we can do:? (0.2) the difference is twelve
        dollars!
H:      because there's a difference. (0.3) I want t'have the whole
collection to look the same.
E:      °no°
H:      if you can drop this (.) by seven or eight per cent, I can
even live with it.
E:      ((pointing to case on the floor)) this is a price is is (.)
the price is ve:ry ((sits back with hands over back of head;    looks
down at floor; keeps this posture))
 →      (9.7)
```

After these almost ten seconds of silence following Eduardo's display of his unwillingness to accept Harry's solicit of a 5-8% price reduction, in the transcript excerpt below, Harry turns to Charles and asks a question that is not audible, possibly requesting Charles' opinion about the possibility of offering a higher price for the item:

4.4/Excerpt 2/DS 10

```
→   H:    ((turns head to face C, away from E's line of regard))
→         °°(                   instead of forty-five fifty?)°°
          (1.8)
    C:    [°°well,°°
    H:    [°°(and then the whole collection is         ?)°°
→   C:    °see the whole (.) the whole problem is uh where is it gonna
    go, (.) when we sell it to the store?°
          (0.9)
```

Charles answers the question, also very quietly, and disaffiliates (cf. the disagreement token `well,`). Harry responds with a further disaffiliative remark vis-a-vis Charles' position, which, however, is produced more loudly than the previous talk, initiating a team movement in which Charles then affiliates with Harry. The team movement culminates with Charles' utterance "`we should buy it here, but uh: he's gotta help us to do this`", which clearly addresses Eduardo and draws him into the discussion:

4.4/Excerpt 3/DS 10

```
    C:    °see the whole (.) the whole problem is uh where is it gonna
    go, (.) when we sell it to the store?°
          (0.9)
→   H:    ((turns head to face C, away from E's line of regard))
→         °°(                   instead of forty-five fifty?)°°
          (1.8)
    C:    [°°well,°°
    H:    [°°(and then the whole collection is         ?)°°
    C:    °see the whole (.) the whole problem is uh where is it gonna
    go, (.) when we sell it to the store?°
          (0.9)
    C:    °we gotta (get in the) advertising,°
          (0.9)
    C:    °I mean you got all these fringe benefits that (are built)
    in there and that's how we came up with that other pri:ce,°=
    H:    =but Charlie,=
    C:    =a:[nd
    H:       [if you buy five items from Courofatos,
    C:    yeah,
          (0.4)
    C:    (you're bound) to[::
    H:                     [and wu-
    H:    one item (0.2) from Czechoslova:kia,=
    C:    =no[:,
    H:       [it's not gonna look the same.=
    C:    =no,
          (1.1)
→   C:    we should buy it here, but uh: he['s gotta help us to do=
→   E:                                     [(ah,)
    C:    =this.
→   E:    the problem is only: the[:] the the leather=
    H:                            [well,]
    H:    =it's fifty three dollars from Argentina.
```

```
      C:     yeah.
             (1.4)
      H:     ((turns head to face C directly)) now if we can drop this to
      around (.) forty-seven fifty, forty-eight dollars,=
      C:     =((facing H)) okay.
      H:     ((facing C)) then we're okay.
      C:     ((facing H and nodding yes)) yeah.
 →    E:     forty-eight dollars?
      H:     ((turns head to face E; nods yes))
             (1.5)
      E:     then we can work uh (0.6) something °here° ((gets up))
 →    C/H    ((turn heads to face each other; nod yes))
             (0.2)
      H:     you know,
             (0.4)
      E:     if you- can do,
             ((walks over to where case is on the floor and picks it up))
             (1.6)
```

Notice that even after Eduardo has made his first bid for the floor ("(ah,)") and has spoken a turn ("the problem is only: the[:] the the leather="), Harry and Charles do not fully ratify him until later, after Harry mentions specific figures that would be acceptable to the importers. It is only when Eduardo says "<u>for</u>ty-eight dollars?" that Harry and Charles make eye contact with him and make him a ratified participant to their interaction. Incidentally, once it is clear that Eduardo will re-consider his position, as he gets up from his seat and starts moving to where the sample of the case being discussed lies on the floor, Harry and Charles exchange glances of the kind discussed by Sacks (1992) as involving "a fantastic kind of social integration" where "one takes that they know what it is that you saw, that they saw the same thing, and they know what you're smiling about, and they make the same assessment" (vol. 1, p. 93).

The excerpt above shows not only an example of team movement as a specific type of team work in the organization of social interaction in negotiation talk, it also demonstrates how relevant the negotiating participants' institutional identities can be for the production of their actions.

<u>Other Types of Team Work</u>

Francis' (1986) second and third team-work categories are also telling of the peculiar institutional constraints operating in the regulation of negotiation talk. *Team assists* include corrections, prompts and buttresses performed by fellow team-members. *Team takeovers* are of two types: they can be turns whereby the member of a team provides an additional, alternative second pair-part that reinforces or expands what a fellow team-member has previously said in an equivalent second position slot; or they can be re-formulations of a fellow team-member's utterance, usually with the aim of recasting it in a better light. Evidence for that, Francis argues, can be found in occurrences of *repair* — the conversational device for managing mishearings non-hearings, misunderstandings, etc. (Levinson, 1983; Sacks et al., 1974).

Conversation analysts have shown there is a marked *preference*[18] for self- over other-repair in ordinary conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). Other-initiated repair is dispreferred, and is, therefore, typically performed in modulated or hedged forms often in a series of sequenced turns embedded within the larger sequence in which the repairable item appeared.

This preference system seems to operate differently in some negotiation talk contexts. A fellow-team member often simply other-repairs as curtly as possible. Francis (1986) argues that these fellow-team-member-initiated repairs "are designed to accomplish repair of an error without turning talk *between* the teams into talk *within* a team" (p. 69). In other words, repair is accomplished *without* producing a repair sequence between fellow team-members, which would result from the use of the ordinary methods (and which would be counter-productive to the advancement of the institutional mandate). Again, this reinforces team-identity as an extension of self.

Naturally, to say simply that teams, and what they entail in terms of repair preferences, make for a distinctive quality of negotiation talk is an overstatement. Mandelbaum (1987) has shown that couples "doing their relationship in public" in the co-telling of stories also work as teams and other-correct similarly. However, what distinguishes negotiation talk is that the teams are operational throughout the talk, not only during story-telling. In addition, it seems that the institutional mandate in negotiation talk imbues team-membership with an extension beyond the physical capacities and personal liabilities of individual team

[18] A powerful conversation analytic concept, the notion of preference entails that certain alternative actions expected to occur as second parts in adjacency pairs (e.g., acceptances vs. rejections as responses to invitations) are produced in turns designed differently depending on their preference status. Thus a dispreferred second action such as the rejection of an invitation will require a more complex turn design than an acceptance. As Levinson (1983) warns, preference is <u>not</u> a psychological term and is <u>not</u> connected to the participants' desires. Rather, it is similar to the linguistic concept of markedness in phonology and morphosyntax, according to which some alternative elements are felt to be more usual (unmarked ones) while alternative others are felt to be less usual (marked ones), and thus carry specific or explicit marks indicating their content or function (p. 333).

members. In other words, team membership as a social object implies that commitments and decisions agreed to by a negotiating team member will be honored by the party principal in an arrangement that is not comparable to couples "doing their relationships." This again points to the particular institutional component in negotiation talk as the deciding factor distinguishing it from other forms of talk.

Topical Development and Formulations

The second major aspect distinguishing negotiation talk from ordinary conversation according to Francis (1986) has to do with how topics are tied.

Just as Sacks (1992) described it for ordinary conversation, topical coherence in negotiation talk is typically and preferably accomplished *locally*, that is, through consistency of reference among subsequent utterances. Alternatively, a participant's turn must at least be heard to cohere with the previous turn in *some way* (Erickson, 1982, 1984). As Sacks (Sacks, 1992, Spring 1968) points out, participants in ordinary conversation may sometimes accomplish local topical coherence simply through "touch-offs" with the previous utterance by using the same word used by the previous speaker or a similar sounding word. They are thus maintaining topical coherence by speaking topically, though they in fact are speaking about a different topic. Sacks illustrates his point through the exchange reproduced below, where the pairing of shaving/shaved does the job of allowing B to talk on a different topic while still accomplishing local topic coherence (p. 761):

```
   A:     Hey. Putcher shoes back on, c'mon I c'n smell you all the
   way over here.
   B:     It's good fer // yuh.
   C:     It's yer problem. --(1.0)-- It'll grow hair on yer chest.
   A:     God any more hair on muh chest an' I'd be a fuzz boy.
   B:     'D be a what.
   C:     A // fuzz boy.
   A:     Fuzz boy.
   B:     What's that.
   A:     Fuzz mop.
→  C:     Then you'd have t'start shaving.
→         (1.0)
→  B:     Hey I shaved this morni- I mean last night for you.
```

Topicality in negotiation talk, however, seems to be particularly determined, at least in part, by the institutional context in which such talk typically develops. Francis builds on the work of Sacks to offer an insightful treatment of the particular aspects of topical development in negotiation talk. In negotiation talk, Francis (1986) maintains, topic range is restricted to those "matters on which parties disagree on and which they are in dispute over, or matters which are relevant to their dispute" (p. 55). In addition, because negotiation talk often stretches over a series of meetings and is bracketed by lapses or segments containing other types of talk,[19] managing the introduction and reintroduction of something not locally tied with what has gone immediately before is not always feasible according to the preferred norm of local tying. Francis claims that negotiators solve this talk-organizational problem through what he terms *returns*, utterances "designed to indicate to co-participants that it is occasioned not by its local sequential environment but by some earlier topical items" p. 56).

A conversational device not typically found in ordinary conversation, a return takes the shape of explicit indications of where a speaker's seemingly disjunctive topical contribution ties in with topics discussed earlier. Topic disjunctiveness, or an abrupt departure from the topic at hand, can be found in ordinary conversation, but such occurrences in a conversation seem to be limited only to certain contexts. They are interactionally significant in and of themselves, and must somehow be accounted for (Jefferson, 1984, 1993). Francis does not show evidence of non-occurrences of returns in ordinary conversation. In favor of his argument, however, is the fact that recourse to touch-offs, as illustrated in the exchange reproduced above from Sacks' lectures, seems to be unavailable in negotiation talk, arguably due to the same particular institutional constraint on topic range in negotiations Francis is alluding to somewhat imprecisely.

A parenthetical word of caution is in order here: interactional sociolinguistic research has shown (Erickson & Shultz, 1982; Gumperz, 1982a) that what a participant produces as topically coherent may not necessarily be perceived as such by the recipient in cross-cultural interactions. As I have shown elsewhere (Garcez, 1991, 1993) Harry and Charles had difficulty (and sometimes failed) to perceive points made by the

[19] Boden (1995) looks at four intra-institutional meetings in various settings to show that negotiations need not be confined to discrete events or settings but can be accomplished sequentially and cumulatively over discontinuous time and space; "earlier meetings, past accommodations, and present contingencies merge in the interactional intensity of face-to-face exchange" (p. 83).

Brazilian manufacturers as coherent when the manufacturers resorted to non-local topical tying, given their different conventions for the organization of information during point-making. In other words, returns, or explicit formulations of the relevance of a topically disjunctive utterance in relation to prior talk are not universal nor the only device for accomplishing topical coherence in negotiation talk.

Though Francis seems to be right in his generic claim that the institutional constraints particular to negotiations produce a "problem" for participants to introduce or reintroduce topics recognizably as locally coherent, it is unclear how or if returns stand as a class of actions. In fact, his own definition of returns points to the current conversation analytic notions of *formulation* and *repair*. Nevertheless, in pointing to topicality, Francis touches on aspects of negotiation talk which are indeed particular to it, thus corroborating Maynard's (1984) observations about a normative feature of plea bargaining discourse, according to which there is an "intimate fit between person-descriptions and their conversational environments," so that "the lack of relevance will be noticed and subject to repair or remedy" (p. 138).

Recent work by Walker (1995) on *formulations* — utterances in which a speaker is summarizing the gist of prior talk by the recipient team[20] — seems to address with incisive analytical power those issues raised by Francis. In her analysis of industrial negotiations, Walker (1995) shows that formulations can be deployed as crucial concession-seeking conversational strategies, as "a socially-organized practice for accomplishing implicit offers in negotiations" (p. 138), and are thus "resolution-implicative" (p. 103). In negotiation talk, where there is value in being assured that a concession is a worthwhile action to perform before one actually commits to it, formulations accomplish the delicate tasks of implicitly soliciting a reassessment of the addressed team's position. In a comprehensive description of the environment of formulations, Walker shows that they also do framing work by indicating a transition is under way in relation to both prior and subsequent talk. They enter into the accomplishment of implicit offers and concession-seeking by virtue of being deliberately produced as tendentiously affiliative or disaffiliative interpretations of prior talk. The alternative interpretation will "imply that if the recipient team 'makes' the concession by confirming or disconfirming the formulation, the speaker will thereby accept it" (p. 115).

[20] At least one of Francis' (1986) three examples of returns seems to be a formulation in Walker's sense.

Walker also describes the different design and preference features of "optimistic" and "pessimistic formulations" (p. 115) in negotiation talk. In contrast to ordinary conversation, where formulations are often produced and oriented to as information checks, in negotiation talk this does not happen, since an information-check formulation can be warrantably received by the other party as acceptance of their version of things.

A further distinction can also be clearly demonstrated in the way disaffiliative formulation sequences are received. In ordinary conversation, where a formulation displays B's incorrect understanding of prior talk (typically, "you mean X?"), it gets qualified or disconfirmed by A. Then B's next turn often contains a change-of-information-state token "Oh" (Heritage, 1984; Schiffrin, 1987) and sometimes an apology. Below is the "basic format for repair sequences involving understanding checks" (Heritage, 1984, p. 319):

1. A: Repairable
2. B: Understanding check ((repair initiation))
3. A: Confirmation/disconfirmation ((repair))
4. B: "Oh" receipt

For example:

1. A: John said something about that.
2. B: you mean you think he did it?
3. A: well, I'm not accusing anyone, I'm just saying he mentioned something about that the other day.
4. B: Oh, I see.

In negotiation talk, however, repair or the management of misunderstanding is not the interactional focus of formulation sequences, and "oh" is not found as a receipt. Rather, as Walker (1995) describes it, "the speaker analyzes the recipient's qualifications and disconfirmations as doing concessionary activity and specifically as accepting or rejecting an offer" (p. 126). In addition, whereas in ordinary conversation, formulations often include "you mean...", negotiation formulations seem to be performed overwhelmingly through phrases that point to literal statements (you're saying...); not interpretations of them, a clear indication that the focus of the action being performed is not comprehension check but an invitation for concession work.

The following excerpt from the Courofatos/Amage negotiation illustrates what Walker (1995) calls a "disaffiliative or pessimistic formulation" (p. 115). "Pessimistic" here is used in the sense that they are designed with the expectation that the other team will disconfirm and reformulate it, possibly with some compensatory offer (which does not ensue in the example below).

4.5/Excerpt 1/DS 27

```
→   H:    so really, what- what you're really saying, (0.8) is you
    you're forcing me, to commit to twenty-five hundred pieces
    of each item,
→   E:    or (.) if you you say to me now, okay. this is two thousand
    this is three thousand, o- okay. I make the calculation,=
    =[°(can give you-)°] and, (.) °you know.°
    C:    =[(               ) ]
```

We need to step a few turns back to understand how this came about. Harry's pessimistic formulation of Eduardo's position occurs after many attempts to get an offer from Eduardo. Notice the long pauses between Harry's utterances and the lack of continuers as a result of Eduardo's unwillingness to take the turn:

4.5/Excerpt 2/DS 27

```
    H:    let me ask you a question,
          (3.9)
    H:    right now (0.7) you asked (.) me how many do I think (.) we
    can sell on each. (0.3) I said twenty-five hundred each.
    E:    ((nods yes))
    H:    °kay°
          (0.9)
    H:    what happens in July,
→         (1.9)
    H:    whe:re: (.) I only used (0.3) let's say (.) fifteen hundred
    (0.8)
    H:    of: the 69534,
→         (1.6)
    H:    I used (.) twenty-five hundred (0.2) of the six nine five
    two eight ((69528)) but I wanna order a thousand more
          (0.7)
    H:    what happens?
→         (2.0)
    H:    is there some kind of a formula,
→         (0.9)
    H:    that we can use,
→         (0.9)
    H:    that if I buy less on one, (0.2) and more on another, (0.3)
    we can establish a formula, (0.3) °okay°,
→         (3.5)
```

Here Harry accelerates the speed of his speech and makes a specific offer himself, giving plenty of space for Eduardo to respond, but Eduardo's turns are limited to continuers. Harry then asks another question, binding Eduardo to make a contribution. Eduardo answers without addressing Harry's concern directly, so Harry recycles his request for an offer from Eduardo:

4.5/Excerpt 3/DS 27

```
 →   H:     <in other words what I would be willing to do>
            (1.4)
     H:     is if I exceed, (0.2) the quantities,
            (0.3)
     E:     yeah
            (0.6)
     H:     of these [fo:ur items,] (0.5) <I would immediately give you=
     E:              [((nods yes))]
     H:     =a five per cent increase.>
 →          (1.5)
 →   H:     does that sound fair?
 →          (3.2)        ((E: looks down and purses lips))
     E:     ((pointing to and looking at his notes on table)) (does),
     the only thing that I'm (giv)ing this is that we have to
     make the stock of leather now. (0.5) (and) buy the leather.=
     H:     =yeah but the consumption of leather,=
     E:     =and then you have ten thousand uh (.) pieces for example
     (0.4) and then (.) when finish the the shipment of ten
     thousand pieces, you want (.) uh more (.) one thousand of-
     (.) this
     H:     correct.
     E:     and then you are you you- you [give me more five (          )
     H:                    ((raises hand))   [OR: WEI- WAIT A MINUTE.=
     =WHAT happe:ns:, (0.7) as on the 69534 for example, (0.6)
     instead of twenty-five hundred I only used two tho:usand?
 →          (2.9)
     H:     °what happens?°
     E:     then the- a- all (0.7) change here, °Harry.°
```

Eduardo is still not providing the formula that Harry is requesting, as can be seen in the long silence above, which is followed by another specific question by Harry, and again by Eduardo's unspecified disaffiliative answer.

This sequential context closely resembles Walker's (1995) description of the environment where pessimistic formulations are deployed in negotiation talk: "where the speaker discerns in prior talk an unwillingness on the behalf of the recipient team to make any concessions; in other words, where the speaker may consider their team to be 'under pressure'" (p. 133). The speaker then may "present an explicit version of this interpretation which the recipient team will not find acceptable" in the hopes that they will reformulate their position, "often in a way that is concessionary" (p. 121).

4.5/Excerpt 4/DS 27

```
 →   H:     so really, what- what you're really saying, (0.8) is you
     you're forcing me, to commit to twenty-five hundred pieces
     of each item,
```

→ E: or (.) if you you say to me now, okay. this is two thousand
this is three thousand, o- okay. I make the calculation,=
=[°(can give you-)°] and, (.) °you know.°
→ C: =[( )]
→ H: but Charlie, we're not that smart.
C: I know, well that's the problem. I understand that,=
E: =but this is the only thing that I [think that we can do.

Harry's formulation thus "proffers a confrontational version of the recipient's talk" ("you're forcing me, to commit to twenty-five hundred pieces") in an unmitigated design to maximize its unacceptance (Walker, 1995, p. 133). Notice that the design of turns in the sequence (i.e., of Harry's turn containing the formulation, of Eduardo's disconfirmation, and of Harry and Charles' receipt of it) does not warrant a reading of the exchange as an information check.

In the excerpt above, Eduardo does not disconfirm Harry's formulation categorically — he *is* forcing the importer to commit to a specific order, but he does offer a concession which amounts to *not* forcing Harry to commit to 2,500 pieces per item. Developments around this issue later in the talks indicate that this small concession, a result of the pessimistic formulation shown above, was a step towards the resolution of the issue, confirming Walker's finding that formulations in negotiation talk are resolution-implicative.

The exchange above shows participants to be co-constructing their talk-in-interaction in institutionally-specific ways, that is, as negotiation talk. As both Francis and Walker point out in their respective discussions of returns and formulations in negotiation talk, in explicitly displaying "not simply that they have monitored the talk but also *how* they have monitored it, what they have monitored it *for*, and who they have monitored it *as*" (Francis, 1986, p. 59, original emphasis), participants are building their talk as negotiation work: a goal-directed, topic-restrictive interactional activity.

Let us now turn to crucial sequential features of negotiation talk.

Bargaining Sequences

A form of institutional talk, and thus directed to the accomplishment of tasks leading to the participants' end-goal, negotiation talk is especially shaped by its own inherent potential for conflict. Whether divergence of interests is potential or real and whether conflict materializes or not, negotiation is widely perceived as a communicative activity evolving out of participants' need to accommodate differences with the subsequent goal of making mutually acceptable decisions regarding their interdependence (Firth, 1995c; Grimshaw, 1992; Gulliver, 1979; Putnam & Rollof, 1992; Rubin & Brown, 1975). A major concern for students of negotiation talk in interaction is to describe how negotiators manage differences and deal with conflict.

Maynard's (1984) work on plea bargaining is perhaps the most comprehensive ethnographic/conversation analytic attempt to determine what is at the heart of negotiation discourse as a conflict-resolution, task-driven, talk-interactional activity. In his analysis of 52 plea bargaining interactions, Maynard shows that participants orient to and organize their contributions in what he calls a *bargaining sequence,* which "is manipulated to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome even when lawyers disagree about facts and character (p. 78)." Such sequences consist of "(1) a turn in which speaker exhibits a position and (2) a next turn where recipient displays alignment or non-alignment with the initially exhibited position" (p. 78).

Participants initiate bargaining sequences by means of two different opening devices: proposals or position reports. Maynard (1984) uses *proposal* as an umbrella term for various specific actions such as offers, suggestions, and requests. Position-reports are downgraded versions of the proposal couched in the form of "a private or personal idea, preference or desire" (p. 81) within an utterance that may warrantably be treated by the recipient party as "either a perspectival statement or a proposal" (p. 84). Maynard also warns that "the distinction between proposals and position-reports cannot be made on the basis of the utterances alone, ... but is a contingent achievement of the way the positions are presented and reacted to" (p. 84).

Bargaining sequence openers are introduced in regular "pre-sequence ways," in the form of an *announcement* by the opening party, or sometimes as a *solicit* from the other party. Solicits may fail to yield an opener from the other party, and then the soliciting party themselves may opt for an announcement in order to open the bargaining sequence. In one of the previously discussed data segments, Harry solicits an opener several times (one of which is shown below) and then, since it is not forthcoming, announces a proposal and opens the bargaining sequence himself:

4.6/Excerpt 1/DS 27

→ H: is there some kind of a <u>for</u>mula,
→ (0.9)
→ H: that we can <u>use</u>,
→ (0.9)
→ H: that if I buy <u>less</u> on one, (0.2) and more on another, (0.3)
we can establish a formula, (0.3) °okay°,
(3.5)
→ H: <in other words what <u>I</u> would be willing to do>
(1.4)
H: is if I ex<u>ceed</u>, (0.2) the quantities,
(0.3)
E: yeah
(0.6)
H: of these [fo:ur items,] (0.5) <I would immediately give you=
E: [((*nods yes*))]
H: =a five per cent increase.>
(1.5)
H: does that sound fair?
(3.2) ((*E looks down and purses lips*))

Such pre-sequential acts allow other pertinent discussion to occur before the participants engage in joint decision-making, that is, the bargaining sequence itself. Maynard (1984) argues that the production of an opener "emerges as a collaborative synchronized achievement" (p. 88), and requires "coordinated entry" just like that which is needed for conversational openings (Schegloff, 1972/1986). Maynard (1984) adds:

> The [key] issue is practitioners' dual consent to parley about a dispositional action for a given case at the current moment. A solicit indicates the solicitor's willingness to entertain a proposal, and, in issuing it, the proposer simultaneously agrees to the propriety of its timing. (p. 88)

After the sequence has been opened, a reply is in order. In its simplest form, it can be affiliative or disaffiliative, as in the following example from our corpus, where Roberto opens with a proposal, "a suggestion" as he puts it, to drop an item from consideration, and concentrate on three items out of the five they are looking at:

4.6/Excerpt 1/DS X1

→ R: =((*standing next to C; gazing at H only*)) I suggest- why
don't we concentrate on ((*points to items displayed against wall*))
these (.) <u>three</u> items then,
(0.7)
→ H: ↑fine.

Here Harry aligns with his suggestion to drop the item.

Bargaining sequences, despite their organization in two ordered parts — opener and its reply — differ from adjacency pairs, such as greetings or questions/answers,[21] because they need not be produced adjacently or by different participants. After a bargaining opener has been issued,

> the provision of a reply, which party ends up producing each part, and whether the sequence is completed in simple or elaborated fashion, all remain contingent upon how a variety of other methodical negotiating practices are utilized. Direct and indirect responses, and the talk they initiate and implicate, however, should not be construed as alternatives to a reply. Rather, they are means of *delaying* the occasioned reply while on the way to its performance. (Maynard, 1984, p. 100)

Bargaining sequences may occur successively, and they may also be embedded within larger sequential units. For example, once the Amage importers have made it clear that the prices are too high and that "there's gotta be something that can be done," they negotiate that through a number of bargaining sequences dealing with specific modifications to the original item as sampled and costed in order to reduce the quoted price. The following data illustrates how insertion sequences may occur within bargaining sequences.

4.7/Excerpt 1/DS 9

```
           (3.0)
→   E:     and you need he:re, (.) lining here?
→          (1.2)
→   C:     lining?
    E:     yeah.
           (1.1)
    C:     what would you put in there?
    E:     nothing.
           (0.4)
    C:     oh.
           (0.9)
    E:     nada.
           (2.0)
    C:     yeah how much are we gon[na save with that?
    E:                             [yeah:
    R:     [no, but with LABOR >E E EVERYTHING counts<
    E:     [no (               )]
    E:     okay Charlie, we're speaking i::n three dollars, (.) three
    dollars twenty,
           (0.2)
    C:     ye[a:h.
```

---

[21] Philips (1976) suggests that the adjacency of pair parts such as questions and answers is not universal but culture specific. For participants in this corpus, however, the usual adjacency relations do apply (Marcuschi, 1986; Schegloff, 1972/1986).

```
E:       [it's (the) o:ur difference, (.) [this is
C:                                          [they want to take the=
         =lin[ing out of the inside of] the pocket
E:           [it will be twenty cents thirty cents]
H:       yeah but E- Eduardo, it's more than three dollars twenty
```

Eduardo opens the bargaining sequence with a proposal ("and you need he:re, (.) lining here?"). He suggests the elimination of lining from inside the pocket on a case. Charles' next move is not a reply to the proposal (i.e., acceptance or rejection of it); but a *response* to it. Maynard (1984) defines responses as "next moves by which a recipient of a proposal or position-report speaks to other aspects of the prior move instead of addressing what it directly implicates" (pp. 92-93). They are not alternatives to a reply but a means of delaying its performance (p. 100).

In the excerpt above, after an *indirect response* in the form of a fairly long silence where a reply action was relevant, Charles proffers a typical *direct response* to the proposal, through an insertion-sequence initiator ("lining?"), "in which recipient provides material that formulates some trouble source preventing the production of a reply" (Maynard, 1984, p. 93). This inserted response sequence is elaborated with long pauses, questions regarding the feasibility ("what would you put in there?") and the worth of implementing the change ("how much are we gonna save with that?"). It then closes with a team movement by Charles addressing Harry, and the initiation of another embedded sequence (not shown above). Notice, though, that Charles' reservations are not ratified within his party, nor is there definitive misalignment with Eduardo's suggestion, so that a reply has not been appropriately issued. The initiated sequence is not complete; it is put on hold.

A second inserted sequence develops out of Harry's questioning Eduardo's figure for the difference between quoted and target prices. This insertion sequence is completed (excerpt not shown), but the bargaining sequence initiated previously by Eduardo demonstrably turns out not to have been closed, as we see later. Before it is taken up again, however, Roberto opens yet another inserted bargaining sequence with a different proposal:

4.7/Excerpt 2/DS 9

```
         (2.6)
   R:    what about- (0.3) well, (0.6) in this (0.6) in this pocket
   here,
         (3.2)
→  R:    if we eliminate this: (.) imitation,
```

(2.0)
H: I think you're °gonna destroy the whole case.°
C: this is what's beginning d' happen, it's gonna lose its
shape to an extent also. it won['t have a body to it.=
→ R: [ok- so
R: =so just (.) eliminate this one here,

Here Roberto hesitantly suggests that a piece of imitation suede be eliminated from the pocket of the item, and both importers misalign with his proposal. In response, Roberto relinquishes his proposal ("ok- so"), even before Charles is finished with his misaligning turn, thus closing the inserted bargaining sequence. However, Roberto immediately takes up Eduardo's previously proffered proposal to eliminate the lining from inside the pocket by simply requesting confirmation that it is acceptable, and Harry aligns with it, ignoring Charles' previous misalignment:

4.7/Excerpt 3/DS 9

H: I think you're °gonna destroy the whole case.°
C: this is what's beginning d' happen, it's gonna lose its
shape to an extent also. it won['t have a body to it.=
R: [ok- so
→ R: =so just (.) eliminate this one here,
(0.6)
R: that
→ H: that I would go along with.
(1.3)
E: ( ) this (.) can we do?
(0.5)
C: kay.
R: >SO ELIMINATE,<
(1.6)
R: uh::
(1.4)
H: no li:ning,
(2.8)
R: the smaller:,
(1.1)
R: o[uter zipper po[cket
H: [back of- [back of
H: (full) zipper (compartment).
(1.4)
C: out=
H: =((*lighting cigarette*)) outside
(2.5)
C: that's it.
(18.0)

With Harry's alignment, the outer sequence is then ratified and concluded.

The excerpt above illustrates the enactment of the "specific next activities" occasioned by the recipient party's alignment or misalignment with a displayed disposition expressed by the other party. Misalignment in the case of the embedded sequence results in the return to Eduardo's previous proposal.

Alignment with Eduardo's initial proposal, recycled by Roberto, occasions the confirmation and ratification of agreement on the joint, bargained decision[22] (i.e., eliminate pocket lining).

As is evident in the data analyzed above, Maynard argues that negotiators' goal of reaching mutually acceptable decisions is achieved through bargaining sequences following three different paths or patterns:

1. A: position/B: aligns
2. A or B: position/A or B: relinquishes and aligns
3. compromise

From this seemingly simplistic sequence, Maynard is able to build a model of negotiational interaction that captures much of the overall organization of this goal-oriented type of talk-in-interaction. This system may be considerably elaborated in ways that I discuss in detail when we focus on the nature of arguing sequences in negotiation discourse in chapter 5, for it seems that arguing exchanges are "optional components" of bargaining sequences.

Other students of negotiation discourse have recognized Maynard's model as a cogent empirical account of how negotiating participants co-construct bargaining. Firth (1991, 1995a, 1995d) has further developed Maynard's notion of a bargaining sequence to analyze international commodity trading telephone calls. He offers a comprehensive description of the overall structural organization of such calls and of the various locally-accomplished sequences within it, with special attention to the bargaining sequence. Initially referring to them as "purchasing sequences," Firth (1991) argued that bargaining sequences develop into typical *negotiating activity* when participants are openly misaligned. "Throughout such activity, the parties are jointly oriented to resolving the conflict arising from one party's nonalignment" (p. 70). He noticed that the crucial element in the activity was what he called "account sequences" (p. 131), which are closely related to the arguing sequences to be focused on in later chapters here.

Accountability, Preference and the Institutional Mandate

[22] Notice how all three participants jointly produce the turns in the closing of the sequence, a literal co-construction of talk in interaction.

As the following chapters will show, accounts accomplish significant work in negotiation discourse. Firth (1995a) argues that, while current research on accounts in conversation describes these actions in *retroactive* terms "as linguistic devices that repair, restore, or prevent breakdowns in social interaction" (p. 221), in negotiation they work as creative elements in a *prospective* problem-solving manner as well. Rather than just remedies, they are "working tools" (p. 205) which provide negotiating materials.

Moreover, Firth points to distinctive features in the way recipients process accounts in negotiation talk. In casual conversation, accounts have been found to be actions deployed to foreclose argument. In other words, as they typically follow dispreferred actions, accounts themselves are not ordinarily designed to be contested. In negotiation talk, however, accounts "are the discourse materials of change and for change," thus constituting a bridge towards potential agreement. That is to say, negotiating participants mutually orient to accounts "as inherently and legitimately contestable" (p. 221). They produce and treat accounts as objects to be unpacked and probed into. Accounts in negotiation therefore evoke a different structure of expectation (Tannen, 1993c) than accounts in other forms of talk.

Again, it seems that a crucial element in the constitution of negotiation talk is the goal-orientation of participants imbued with an institutional mandate that gives them not only a role, but specific public allowances of behavior. These are not personal but have to do with the avowed generic drive to get one's job done effectively and expeditiously. In this negotiational frame, interactants often ratify, sustain and deal with explicit conflict, or misalignment, as a legitimate avenue toward the accomplishment of their joint institutional tasks and interdependent end-goals.

In addition, the mandate makes it clear to all participants that there are immediate commitments following from agreements, with liabilities and rewards connected to them. Indeed Charles (1995) writes that "negotiations are oriented towards a non-interactive aim" (p. 156). In other words, negotiators know that when they agree on something, it means that they are expected to act accordingly, usually in concretely objective terms. For example, if they agree that a 10% increase in prices or salaries is fair, they are expected to pay 10% more. In non-negotiational contexts, where participants have not come together necessarily to make joint decisions, agreement may or may not incur in debt, and it is definitely not as binding.

Conversely, disagreement in negotiating activities often means hindrance to a presently proposed outcome. In this sequential context, accounts and challenges are deployed in arguing, since some outcome must be accepted by all if the institutional mandate is to be pursued. Disagreements are dispreferred and costly to perform in most sequential contexts (Pomerantz, 1984a). However, as was said above, whereas accounts following disagreement in conversation are foreclosing of argument, in negotiation talk they are not. As we will see later, negotiating participants routinely challenge accounts for misalignment, and initiate arguing, which is pursued until they can reach mutually acceptable commitments for subsequent action.

Here research work on negotiation discourse intersects with that on disputes and conflict talk to inform us about the crucial difference between disputes in casual conversation and in negotiation talk. Vuchinich (1990) shows that in verbal family conflict, "when consensus breaks down, stable interaction can be in jeopardy" (p. 119). That is to say that in many cases — more than two-thirds of the cases he studied, in fact — primary or secondary participants in these verbal disputes drop or change the subject, or withdraw from the interaction once opposing positions are communicated, without necessarily trying to work on the interpretation of an outcome of any sort. While negotiation talk might also have stand-offs, it will most likely feature them only after the participants have made continued attempts to co-construct some form of alignment[23] (Maynard, 1984).

Wagner (1995a) has specifically contrasted negotiation talk and technical problem solving, by exploring Firth's concept of *negotiating activity* in an analysis of structural stages in technical problem solving sequences. Wagner finds negotiating activity to occur in all three problem solving cases in his corpus, comprised from spoken (telephone) and written data sets involving two international industrial dealings. However, the end-goal for participants in negotiating activity within problem solving is simply reaching a solution, not necessarily mutual alignment. Thus, it appears that technical problem-solvers, unlike commodity traders, will stop negotiating once they have a solution, even if they remain misaligned.

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[23] I use *alignment* and related terms to refer to the participants adjusted positions in interaction. Firth (1991) defines alignment more strictly as "attained when an action obtains a pragmatically and organisationally 'preferred' response" (p. 16). I follow Goffman's (1981a) usage and Stokes and Hewit's (1976) broader definition. Thus when participants have openly agreed that a proposal is not going to be implemented, alignment has been attained.

From this again we can see that, although negotiation talk is heavily problem-solving, it also involves more than just that. Technical problem solvers may remain misaligned once they have reached a solution to their common problem because they can proceed with their lives independently after the problem affecting the parties is no longer an impediment to their work, that is, they can stop cooperating. Negotiation talk more broadly, in turn, tends to involve problem-solving that carries over to future commitment in some form of continued cooperation, what (Firth, 1991) calls "*distal future* considerations" (p. 65). In other words, problem-solving is but an element of negotiation, albeit an essential one, but not an end in itself.

Negotiators' institutional goal-orientation adds mutuality and commitment to problem-solving. It requires going beyond the elimination of particularly hindering obstacles to the co-construction of alignment because parties want to continue operating in cooperation to one extent or another. Otherwise, they must either give up their relationship or appeal to some higher entity that will dictate and regulate the parties' commitments, such as when alignment is not reached in plea bargaining, and the case goes to trial. In business negotiations, the latter option is extremely dispreferred and in many cases unavailable, thus the even more salient role of accounts and bargaining arguments, which will be the focus of the next chapters.

Bilmes (1995) has offered a close analysis of a single exchange in a meeting among four co-workers at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission who need to take a collective stand on a particular case under their responsibility. The exchange features an intricate negotiational argument. Bilmes' analysis demonstrates rather clearly that interactants can co-construct a negotiation in an event not pre-defined as a formal negotiation. This means that, more than an abstraction, the emergent quality of talk-in-interaction also has definite implications to the way agreements, or outcomes more generally, are reached. Moreover, Bilmes challenges the assumption that a compromise or agreement outcome is a necessary function of the various participants' initial positions, and cogently describes a general feature of negotiation talk: a preference for logic-oriented argument over personal argument, even those that are supported in the participants' culture.

In addition, Bilmes (1995) discusses a fine but important aspect to the definition of negotiation talk as a particular type of talk. He points out that Pomerantz' (1984a) widely accepted analysis of agreement responses in ordinary conversation may not apply to other kinds of talk-in-interaction, and to negotiation more specifically.

Boden (1995) evokes Pomerantz' work on dis/agreement preference organization regarding pauses, or delays in responding to a previous turn, to characterize different exchanges in negotiation talk as either *consensual* (p. 90) — "congenial and collaborative as may be seen for the quick, close-ordered fitting of turn, lack of long pauses or intrusive overlap, and general efforts at comprehension and cooperation located at the level of talk" (p. 88) — or as *conflictual* (p. 90), given that "the pauses at lines... underline a distinct sense of discord for member and analyst alike" (p. 91). Bilmes' finding, however, is that "this does not seem to be the case in the context of argument" (p. 73), and that in fact this preference seems to be inverted in disputes (i.e., delay in disagreeing within a dispute may indicate difficulty finding a logical counter and are therefore dispreferred). Kotthoff's (1993) analysis of dissent sequences in German and Anglo-American disputes corroborates Bilmes' position. The Courofatos/Amage corpus offers further evidence to Bilmes' findings, as will be clear in the analyses of the participants' attempts to co-construct alignment in arguing sequences.

Negotiation Talk

In summary, negotiation talk involves interactional activity by conversationalists whose institutional identity is often relevant to their interaction. They speak on restricted topic foci and are oriented towards joint decision-making. These topics routinely cover issues of conflict potential over which participants can expect to be initially misaligned. Negotiation talk is driven by the strong goal-orientation of its participants, a feature it shares with other closely related problem-solving speech activities. Uniquely so, however, negotiation talk is also driven by an orientation towards reaching alignment and establishing interdependent mutual commitment, which in general is expected to be remain in effect beyond the ending of the participants' co-present interaction. As a result of its nature as an institutional, goal-oriented, conflict-potential, interdependent decision-making activity, negotiation talk-in-interaction is characterized by a set of structural features that distinguish it from other forms of talk. These include aspects of participation structure and topical development as well as the sequential organization of some key types of actions.

Incidentally, negotiation talk is an apt term also because negotiating activities are carried out over a series of conversations. Therefore while ordinary conversation can be the studied by examining *one conversation*, negotiation *talk* is more aptly examined in the study of its action sequences. The following chapters therefore examine arguing sequences in negotiation talk from our Courofatos/Amage corpus.

CHAPTER 5

NEGOTIATIONAL ARGUING DISCOURSE

> *Some anthropologists believe that human brain evolution was propelled more by a cognitive arms race among social competitors than by mastery of technology and the physical environment. ... outwitting and second-guessing an organism of approximately equal mental abilities with non-overlapping interests, at best, and malevolent intention, at worst, makes formidable and ever-escalating demands on cognition. ... In all cultures, social interactions are mediated by persuasion and argument. How a choice is framed plays a large role in determining which alternative people choose. Thus there could easily have been [evolutionary] selection for any edge in the ability to frame an offer so that it appears to present maximal benefit and minimal cost to the negotiating partner, and in the ability to see through such attempts and to formulate attractive counterproposals.*
>
> Steven Pinker, *The language instinct*, pp. 368-369.

This chapter introduces and illustrates negotiational arguing sequences as a phenomenon found across the Courofatos/Amage corpus. Initially I discuss a few terminological distinctions in order to clarify what is meant here by the phrase negotiational arguing sequences. Following that, the transcript of a relatively short and straightforward sequence is analyzed and explicated in detail as an example-occurrence of the phenomenon under investigation.

Arguing in Negotiation

Levinson (1983) distinguishes *a conversation* — "something characterizable in terms of local organizations, and especially the operation of the turn-taking-system" (p. 318) — from *conversational activities* (e.g., courtroom interrogation), which may share local organizational features with a conversation, but which are clearly not *a conversation*. Chapter 4 discussed negotiation as a conversational form of talk having some peculiar organizational characteristics of its own which make it recognizable to participants and observers as *a negotiation*; not as a conversation.

As the discussion in chapter 4 indicated, the different overall organization of talk which is specific to a negotiation includes both slight adaptations of conversational activities found in ordinary conversation as well as some distinctive activities which we might want to refer to as *negotiational activities*. Perhaps the most important of these is found in the interactional work conducted within and around the bargaining sequence, as initially described by Maynard (1984) and subsequently examined by other students of negotiation talk (Firth, 1995a, 1995b; Wagner, 1995).

As the basic unit of negotiational discourse, the bargaining sequence is constituted — in its most skeletal form — of an opener and its reply, though it can be expanded in various ways, some of which have been illustrated above. As Maynard has shown, "bargaining sequences are occasioned in regular, organized ways, and they are also sequentially implicative" (p. 90). In other words, they are relevantly connected to the rest of the negotiation and consequential for the talk and action that follows. Maynard specifies that

> The kind of consequences a sequence has for subsequent talk is dependent on whether the recipient of an opener does or does not align with the position exhibited in it. If recipient does not, that results in further proposals that may be accompanied by discussion, argument, appeals and other negotiational work. (p. 90)

Maynard further develops a schematic model of a discourse system of decision-making patterns in plea bargaining sequences. This model, which summarizes the overall possibilities of developments in a bargaining sequence, shows that, although bargaining sequences may briefly and expeditiously result in mutually acceptable decisions (i.e., *dispositions*, in plea-bargaining), they may also continue over many turns, often in what Maynard terms "adversarial justice" (p. 107). Maynard explains that

> negotiational discourse can involve disagreement and extended argument over how and why an offense is perceived in different ways. But, opposing stances taken by prosecution and defense still articulate with bargaining sequences. And these sequences, not adversariness and resolution of disagreement, are what remain basic to the determination of a course of action in the case. (p. 107)

It is just the type of negotiational work Maynard is alluding to above that this chapter examines, that is, those sequences of action following a negotiating recipient's non-alignment with the position(s) exhibited in a bargaining sequence opener (whether in its original, recycled or elliptic[1] versions). It is to this other crucial negotiational activity — arguing — that we now turn as the primary focus of investigation.

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[1] As this and the following chapters discuss it, the topic in Amage/Courofatos corpus negotiational arguing sequences is always somehow tied to the topic of a bargaining sequence. When it is not immediately sequential to, or inserted within a bargaining sequence, arguing develops after a recycled or elliptic version of a previous bargaining sequence opener or reply, in ways similar to what Francis (1986) described as a *return* (cf. chapter 4, pp. 125-126).

This chapter thus shows that, in certain negotiational contexts, participants advance specific topic developments in closely knit, collaboratively organized sequences of turns containing recognizable actions which together address the source of misalignment between the parties and constitute what will be referred to as *negotiational arguing sequences*.

Arguing Sequences: Locating Terminological Distinctions and Meanings

A thorough review of the research literature on arguing is beyond the scope of this dissertation.[2] However, prior to illustration and analysis of a negotiational arguing sequence from our corpus, a few key terms must be discussed to clarify and circumscribe the analytic focus of this investigation.

Much of the work on arguing in talk-in-interaction is only partly relevant to the present discussion, again because, like negotiation, terms such as argument, arguing, argumentation and dispute are sometimes used differently and sometimes interchangeably by different students of language and social interaction when referring to various empirical phenomena. Colloquially, arguing can have at least three related but distinct meanings.[3] The first is one which will not be featured in the present discussion, namely that of "fighting" or "quarreling," that is, engaging in verbal confrontation exposing disharmony or strife as in the excerpts analyzed in Taylor (1995).

The second meaning is that of having a contentious dispute, of the kind typically found in asymmetrical or non-cooperative encounters. I believe it makes good terminological sense to follow Vuchinich (1990) and reserve the more generic term dispute to "episodes of verbal conflict" such as the ones "which occur in normal American family dinners" (p. 118), and which Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) alternatively call "oppositional exchanges" (p. 85). These involve verbal opposition with little or no appeal to grounds and reasons or logical counter-assertions. They may simply accomplish opposition, and are not necessarily designed as claiming rational assertoric grounds to support or challenge a position. Citing

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[2] But see Schiffrin (1985, pp. 35-37) for a concise overview of main approaches, and Pudlinski (November, 1993) for a concise comparative review of conversation analytic and communication scholarship on conversational arguing. Antaki (1994) offers a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.
[3] See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) for a discussion of dictionary definitions of argument and related terms.

Piaget, Jackson and Jacobs (1980) refer to these forms of arguing as "primitive argument," in opposition to "prototypical argument," which involves "offering grounds for supporting or objecting to an utterance" (p. 254). As such, disputes may well be a part of arguing sequences, but they do not in and of themselves constitute one.

Whereas negotiational arguing sequences may contain elements of a fight or a dispute, or primitive arguing, they often do not. On the other hand, in the Courofatos/Amage corpus, we can easily find dispute sequences of the kind analyzed by Vuchinich (1990) and by Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) for ordinary conversation, in segments that can be either inserted or entirely independent of bargaining sequences. Thus while negotiation discourse may involve disputing or quarreling — and negotiational arguing sequences may include or develop into disputing and quarreling — the present analysis will not contemplate such phenomena (except, of course, when they pertain to the discussion of arguing in the strict sense now being formulated).

Therefore only the third meaning of arguing is being considered as *arguing* here: that of misaligned parties advancing and/or maintaining claims to their extant opposing positions by means of issuing challenges and accounts addressing the grounds or evidence which may support those claims to positions. Sociolinguistic analyses contemplating such phenomena include, for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), Coulter (1990), Schiffrin (1985, 1990), Rains (1992) and Bilmes (1995). Schiffrin (1985), for example, describes "oppositional arguments" as "discourse through which one or more speakers support openly disputed positions" (p. 37), and as "an interaction in which an opposition between speakers creates an extended polarization that is negotiated through conversation" (p. 41).

As for the term argument, O'Keefe (1977) has tried to distinguish "argument$_1$" — as in "making an argument," from "argument$_2$" — as in "having an argument," which makes sense but is cumbersome. Thus argument here will be reserved to the first sense, that is, to refer to a participant's line of reasoning throughout at least a good part of an arguing sequence (making an argument). It will definitely not be used in the sense of "a fight," nor in the sense of a single assertion of a discrete position, as in Rains' (1992) description of argumentation as "arguments supporting a thesis ... in conversation when a speaker, spontaneously or in response to a question or challenge, gives reason for an opinion or preference" (p. 254).

An additional term with related meaning is argumentation as logical debate of ideas (cf. Kopperschmidt, 1985; Sillince, 1995). While similar to when it occurs naturally in interaction, verbal academic debate seems to differ from negotiational arguing in some respects. Using argumentation and debate interchangeably, Sillince (1995) notes that "the goal of debaters is to support or attack the main conclusion" (i.e., what the argument is about). This may sound right for intellectual or political debate, where ensuring that one's ideas prevail is the objective task. However, this does not hold true for negotiational arguing due to the institutional mandate discussed in chapter 4. Because it is implicated sequentially (or at least topically) by a bargaining sequence, negotiational arguing is not an end in itself but, rather, a step toward getting something done, or toward the implementation of the institutional mandate of committed joint action in the future (e.g., A will change raw materials, B will accept change; A will deliver, B will pay).

A few authors work with notions of arguing comparable to what I am proposing here. Among the entries for "negotiating actions" in her prescriptive study of negotiation talk, Mulholland (1991) features arguing and defines it in its infinitival form (i.e., to argue): "to present reasons for or against something; to contend with another's reasons, to maintain a view with reasons" (p. 156). According to this author, the crucial factors in defining the activity are:

> (a) that it is a joint activity;
> (b) that it could end in settlement (rather than just in winning and losing);
> (c) that it is about points made and responded to; and,
> (d) that there can be both a personal element in argument, and a distancing from the personal, as shown in the apparently (but not really) hypothetical use of the word 'would' in the phrase 'I would want to argue. (p. 157)

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) use the term argumentation to describe a phenomenon along similar lines as discussed above. From their speech-act theoretical perspective, they define *argumentation* as

> a speech act consisting of a constellation of statements designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion and calculated in a regimented discussion to convince a rational judge [i.e., the recipient] of a particular standpoint in respect of the acceptability or unacceptability of that expressed opinion.[4] (p. 18, emphasis altered)

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[4] I favor the term position when referring to statements which participants claim to be true on universally rational grounds. Following Schiffrin (1990), I reserve the term opinion for expressions of *personal views*, which any individual is always entitled to have. The exceptional character of *opinions* in negotiational arguing contrasts to their commonplace occurrence in conversational arguing.

In closer theoretical terms to the present discussion, Coulter (1990) offers an ethnomethodological analysis of a similar phenomena in conversational data. He refers to them as *argument sequences* and goes on to define them thus: "An argument, as it arises in conversational interaction, characteristically comprises two or more disputants articulating adversary positions (or 'theses') with respect to some topic, including an exchange of assertion and counter-assertion with some attendant expansion" (p. 185).[5] Despite minor terminological discrepancies, Mulholland's (1991), van Eemeren and Grootendort's (1984), and Coulter's (1990) definitions refer to conversational phenomena analogous to the arguing sequences described below in the realm of a naturally-occurring negotiation talk corpus. Only a few studies discuss arguing in negotiation talk, and often in passing.

Arguing is seen by some sociolinguists interested in institutional forms of talk as an intrinsically undesirable activity. For example, in the conclusion to his analysis of telephone commodity trading negotiations, Firth (1995d) refers to "a desire to minimize 'argumentative talk' in order to make possible the exchange of substantive proposals" (p. 218). In another vein, Garcia (1991) shows that formally mediated judicial hearings are set up that way because their interactional organization successfully minimizes or eliminates arguing in dispute-resolution, thus providing a more efficient conflict-resolution environment than if ordinary conversational organization were in place.

Communication scholars see negotiational arguing in a more positive light. Keough (1992), for example, writes that "bargaining arguments serve relational functions as they build trust, promote unity, and manage power relations" (p. 117). Mulholland (1991) asks "Why argue?" — when there is no guarantee that resolution (i.e., alignment in our terms) will be the outcome of it. She points out that the virtues of arguing in negotiation make it worth trying, such that, "it can produce an acknowledgment among the group that differences have to be accepted ... And it can bring to notice aspects of the matter which one or other of the negotiators has not considered previously" making the negotiation "a more comprehensive event" (p. 157).

Even though many are quick to point out that arguing is part and parcel of negotiation and conflict talk, there are few sociolinguistic studies of arguing in naturally occurring negotiation talk. The paucity of

[5] Coulter's text is sometimes ambivalent in its terminology, using *argument* and *argument sequence* interchangeably, referring to *disputants* and alternating the use of *positions* and *theses*.

studies on negotiational arguing seems to be due to the same methodological issues discussed in chapter 4. That is, in staged and other low-commitment encounters (featured in many negotiation talk corpora), the weight of substantive issues for the participants, and the degree of difference and commitment between the parties will be less (than in naturally occurring, high-stakes encounters). This is likely to make for less complex negotiations, with higher frequencies of *non*-argumentative discussion, and, therefore, fewer prominent sustained arguing segments to call the analysts' attention. In addition, the extreme length and interactional complexity of naturally occurring arguing sequences may present a serious deterrent to analysis.

Bilmes' (1981, 1992, 1995) work on intra-organizational negotiational arguing attests to these difficulties in the analysis of negotiational arguing activities. In fact, Bilmes' earlier work (1981) analyzing a single arguing fragment, "considered as a complex but integrated whole" (p. 251), has as its goal, "not ... to derive rules or generalizations, but to reveal the complexities and the underlying structure of this one conversation" (p. 270). More recently, Bilmes (1995) has presented what is probably the closest transcript analysis of an arguing sequence, shedding light on the preference for rational (vs. emotional) claims in arguing, the emergent nature of compromise and, again, the defying complexity of arguing sequences.

Finally, before closing this terminological discussion, some reference to the notion of *sequence* is in order. Analysts of discourse and conversation have shown that participants in talk-in-interaction orient to discrete sequences of action, many of them involving only a few turns, such as pre-invitations, greetings, repair, etc., which function as "rational solutions to particular organizational problems" (Levinson, 1983, p. 323). More complex ones, such as bargaining sequences, may involve a few or many sequenced turns, and often include inserted or side sequences within them. In her seminal work on side sequences, Jefferson (1972) writes that a sequence in talk "refers to events that occur as a 'serial unit,' which belong together and follow one after another" (p. 304) in demonstrably non-random ways. She adds that "one can go through a corpus of transcribed conversations and pick out many 'similar' one-after-anothers, which can be found upon closer observation to be characteristically cases of a 'same' sort of sequence" (p. 304).

During viewing sessions of the complete Courofatos/Amage corpus, as described in chapter 2, it became increasingly clear that the participants constructed similar one-after-anothers in particular negotiational contexts as "doing arguing." Moreover, a great deal of arguing was noted in spite of its overall etic perception as an undesirable activity.

Arguing is certainly not a pleasurable activity in the Courofatos/Amage negotiations, since it is the result of having to deal with rejection or misalignment. However, the present analyses do not support the view that arguing as we see it precludes the exchange of substantive proposals, or that participants see it as an entirely undesirable activity. Rather, participants sometimes orient to the construction of arguing as *necessary* for the accomplishment of their joint task of producing an overall business deal, despite its cost in terms of potential face-threat and time-efficiency towards reaching conflict-resolution locally. In contrast to this, ten Have (1995) found that, in medical consultations, even when the physician offered diagnostic disposals as negotiable, the patients were "reluctant to join in a more active way in the disposal episodes, i.e. to negotiate proposal and debates" (p. 343). The issue here is not whether a decision to argue is always a conscious effort by all participants. As an activity that can only be produced by the two parties jointly, we have evidence of avoidance and pursuit of arguing in the Amage/Courofatos corpus, so that a decision to engage in it seems to make sense to the participants as at least necessary in some local contexts.

In addition, arguing constitutes a crucial environment for topical development in negotiation talk. As Levinson (1983) points out, "topical development cannot be thought of as residing in some independently calculable procedure for ascertaining (for example) shared reference across utterances. Rather, topical coherence is something constructed across turns by the collaboration of participants" (p. 315). That is, in constructing arguing sequences, participants often probe into issues that would otherwise remain dormant as far as their topical relevance. Perhaps this is what Mulholland (1991) is pointing to as one of the virtues of arguing in negotiation when she says "it can bring to notice aspects of the matter which one or other of the negotiators has not considered previously" making the negotiation "a more comprehensive event" (p. 157). It certainly lies at the heart of the notion of co-construction discussed in chapter 3. Contrary to what some authors suggest (Kopperschmidt, 1985; Sillince, 1995), it will become rather evident when we examine the negotiational arguing sequences in our corpus that topical coherence is co-constructed by participants on the basis of the logic of their social actions in conversation, and not (simply) on the basis of the referential logic of sentences in their utterances.

Therefore, by *an arguing sequence*, I mean a continuous and concerted sequence of actions performed through conversational turns topically connected among themselves and, in more or less obvious ways, to some previous bargaining sequence. Its *raison d'être* is the establishment of some degree of common ground regarding an issue (or issues) on which the parties have explicitly different views, in order for alignment between them to become possible, preferably so that a bargaining reply can eventually be proffered. The proffering of a reply does not necessarily happen (as will be seen in chapter 8), but it is what participants have been found to orient to as their immediately local pursuit. That is to say that these sequences are a rational attempt to solve the particular organizational problem faced by the negotiating participants of having to reach alignment so that their bargaining sequence can be closed, and so that, in turn, they may rely on the other party as committed to a particular course of action in the post-negotiational future of their business dealings.

The definition above will be fleshed out in its sequential and interactional context later in this as well as the following chapter, after we examine a sequence empirically. Before that, however, it must finally be noted that negotiational arguing commonly occurs in extended side-sequences (Jefferson, 1972) inserted into bargaining sequences, that is, they somehow constitute "a break in the [bargaining] activity — specifically, a 'break' in contrast to a 'termination'; that is, the on-going activity will resume" (p. 294). However, not too much analytic stress is to be put on this term as used here. Side-sequences or inserted sequences initially described by conversation analysts tended to be composed of but a few turns in a relatively predictable series (for a discussion, see Coulthard, 1985, pp. 73-79). In contrast, negotiational arguing sequences may contain many turns in highly unpredictable series. Whether the bargaining activity is resumed immediately after the termination of an arguing sequence or much later, it is clear that arguing sequences are intimately a part of what negotiation talk is all about because participants share an orientation to arguing as a break in the main activity of bargaining which can be made *legitimately* relevant at almost any time as "doing negotiating." The segment analyzed below is an example of that.

A Negotiational Arguing Sequence Analyzed

What follows is the analysis of a relatively short and straightforward arguing sequence from the Amage/Courofatos corpus.[6] This arguing sequence is embedded within two bargaining sequences of different dimensions. The bulk of the large-scale, more encompassing bargaining sequence has already been constructed at the point where the present segment begins. It covers the bargaining over the prices of two new attache cases that the importers, upon their arrival, had commissioned the manufacturers to sample and cost. After much discussion, the importers have made a counterproposal to which a reply is yet to be proffered. Even though the reply is conditionally relevant to be issued at any moment, it is delayed by various small-scale bargaining sequences addressing procedural and technical issues, one of which develops into and encapsulates the arguing sequence we will look at now. We could perhaps represent this embeddedness thus:

[Bargaining Sequence 1 ... [Bargaining Sequence 1n [Arguing Sequence]] ...]

Right before the moment the excerpt below starts, the manufacturers, including Mr. Amati, had been talking in Portuguese amongst themselves about the importers' previous counterproposal. Mr. Amati, who had been standing, moved closer to the table, leaning on it with his hands, and asked Roberto a question which then prompted the opening of the bargaining sequence. Gazing at Harry, Roberto asks Mr. Amati's question in English, attributing its authorship to Mr. Amati ("he's askin;" see excerpt below). The question amounts to a proposal for the substitution of a raw material (imitation suede instead of pig suede). As Roberto finishes uttering the name of the proposed material ("imitation suede"), Harry starts shaking his head "no," in an unspoken performance of a turn misaligning with the importers' proposal, first in overlap with Roberto's utterance, and then during silence.

5.1/Excerpt 1/DS 17

```
→  R:    he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) use imitation suede,=
→  H:    =(0.5)=((shakes head no vigorously, with eyes closed: #1))=
         =[((#2))]
   R:    =[rather than (0.5) pig suede]=
→  H:    =(1.0)=((#3, #4))
   C:    ((measuring part case console in front of him, other hand
   covering mouth)) °(          get away with it.)°
→        (0.7)
```

[6] The actual time was 6:20 p.m. on Friday, Oct. 19. For further contextual information, see detailed description of event in appendix A (pp. 339-347).

H: ((*hand on chest*)) <u>no</u>thing would give me greater pleasure
than to get away with that <u>damn</u> suede,
(0.9)
H: because it's ↑<u>ve</u>ry ex<u>pen</u>sive,
(1.4)

Harry's nonverbal performance of the dispreferred action of indicating rejection of the proposal is followed by Charles' hardly intelligible response to the proposal, as he is engaged in a side activity ancillary to the issue being discussed.[7] Then a significant silence follows.

Were the manufacturers to fill this gap by acknowledging the importers' misalignment as such, they would construct that misalignment as a reply to their proposal, and thus would close the bargaining sequence. Such alternative exchange would have the following elements:

A: can we change this? (opener - proposal)
B: shakes head no (non-aligning indirect response)
A: okay (acknowledgment of non-alignment as acceptable)

A's acknowledgment of the non-aligning response to his/her proposal retrospectively constructs the non-aligning response as a non-aligning reply, thus terminating the bargaining sequence without resort to arguing.

However, that is not what happens in this data. The conspicuous absence of an explicit receipt token by the importers makes an account for the non-aligning response conditionally relevant, which Harry duly provides next:

5.1/Excerpt 2/DS 17
→ H: ((*hand on chest*)) <u>no</u>thing would give me greater pleasure
than to get away with that <u>damn</u> suede,
(0.9)
→ H: because it's ↑<u>ve</u>ry ex<u>pen</u>sive
(1.4)
→ H: but that's what the American people ↑<u>want</u> right now, (.)
<u>Char</u>lie would love to <u>e</u>ven use a ma<u>te</u>rial,=

Firth (1995a) has shown that accounts are ubiquitous in negotiation discourse and play a major role in rendering "the interaction recognizable *as* negotiation" (p. 205, original emphasis). As we will examine in greater detail in chapter 7, accounts are fundamental actions in the construction of negotiational arguing

[7] Charles is measuring the pen-holders in the attache case console, which he will request to be made wider, thus introducing a new topic as soon as the present bargaining sequence terminates.

sequences. It is an oppositional turn to them that initiates an arguing sequence, so let us take a moment to look carefully at how this one gets constructed.

"If a person negotiating a commodity agreement refuses the other party's offer," Firth writes, "he [or she] will volunteer, or be called upon, to account for the decision's warrantability of reasonableness" (p. 200). Harry does that, once an acknowledgment token fails to come from his recipients.

5.1/Excerpt 3/DS 17

```
→  H:    ((hand on chest)) nothing would give me greater pleasure
    than to get away with that damn suede,
         (0.9)
→  H:    because it's ↑very expensive
         (1.4)
→  H:    but that's what the American people ↑want right now, (.)
    Charlie would love to even use a material,=
→  C:    yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
   R:                                [ssya-
```

First Harry asserts his own personal desire ("*hand on chest* - nothing would give me greater pleasure") to comply with the change proposed, and offers the motivation for his personal desire ("because it's ↑very expensive,"). However, he then describes an opposing ("but") impediment to his acting in accordance with his best personal judgment by invoking market grounds which are beyond his control to change. This is proffered in a lamenting tone, as his pitch goes up. He then adds Charles' personal desire ("Charlie would love to even use a material"), which upgrades the potential substance of Roberto's proposal by raising the category distinctions involved in the modification one further notch (i.e., from pig vs. imitation suede, to suede vs. a material). Charles specifies what the material would be ("yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic").

Notice that the importers here are designing their account so as to display their claim to have thought about the proposed issue beforehand, and even in more extreme terms than presently proposed by the manufacturers. These claims strengthen their misaligning position. Here we freeze our analytic frame to examine the display of the importers' orientation to potential *challenge trajectories* (Firth, 1995a) aimed at the account. Their following turns will display an expectation that "a tendentious and thus strategically motivated" questioning of their account may be a legitimate action for the manufacturers to produce next. The account recipients are expected to "seek to manoeuvre the account-giver into a vulnerable negotiating position" (p. 213), which would therefore persuade them to reconsider their misalignment. The importers therefore construct their present account in a conversational and linguistic pragmatic design that leaves minimal space for rational challenges.

Conversationally, we must attend to the fact that the first utterance in Harry's account ("no thing would give me greater pleasure than to get away with that damn suede,") is proffered in what Pomerantz (1986) describes as an "Extreme Case formulation" of the proportional type. These exaggerations and distortions in description are designed "(1) to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings, (2) to propose the cause of a phenomenon, (3) to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice" (p. 227). Moreover, she argues that "Extreme Case proportional formulations ... are used to indicate that an individual member of that category is not responsible for the state of affairs; that responsibility is to be attributed elsewhere" (p. 228). This applies to the present exchange, and it underscores how the importers can at once account for their misalignment and preempt possible challenges to their "being reasonable."

In linguistic pragmatic terms, the conditional syntax with which the account starts ("H: nothing would give me greater pleasure") and ends ("C: I'd love to use") makes the importers' personal desire, extreme as it may be portrayed, dependent upon market forces, something they warrantably must attend to, and which currently constitute a hindrance which the importers cannot possibly remove themselves. Moreover, these grounds are couched in terms of the specific *American* market, over which the importers can claim knowledgeability exceeding the manufacturers' in great measure, based on both their respective institutional and personal identities as U.S. merchants and non-U.S. manufacturers. That Harry and Charles present their knowledge of "what the American people want right now" pragmatically as newsworthy, and conversationally as an account — and that the Brazilian importers accept it as such — provides internal relevance to these identities.

So at this point the importers have issued claims to their misaligning response to the manufacturers' proposal as grounded by a strong rational account. This would again make an acknowledgment of its propriety conditionally relevant so that the bargaining sequence would terminate. Such interactional freeze-frame reveals the participants' orientation to a misaligning response as potentially projecting an arguing sequence. The importers feel retrospectively constrained to account for their misalignment, and this is done by presenting prospectively careful grounds that demonstrably aim at curtailing the challenge trajectories which may ensue.

In his commodity negotiations corpus, Firth (1995a) finds that accounts "are treated *by both parties* as legitimately and inherently *contestable*, 'probeable' objects" (p. 212, original emphasis). This contrasts with Pomerantz' (1980) cogent analysis of the way accounts foreclose probing in ordinary conversation exchanges involving "fishing" for information. Pomerantz (1980) describes a particular conversational device to elicit information from a recipient by a speaker offering "'my side' descriptions" which "fish for" an account that had better not be requested directly. She writes that, when a "'your side' ... telling is not elaborated on or employed as a perspective in the answering, it can be inferred that a 'withholding' has occurred" (p. 196). The basis for this is the fact that "'my side' tellings display an orientation to and acknowledgment of your right to privacy," where participants treat your "knowables" as relevant but still "your business to tell if you so choose" (p. 198). In negotiation talk, "your business" is often warrantably "my business" as well, and in these contexts accounts are therefore not subject to a privacy-constraint on probing. While it is also true that in many instances across the Amage/Courofatos corpus we find that accounts for misalignment are accepted as sufficient (i.e., they are honored), and arguing does not develop, it is clear that, even then, they are designed with the implicit expectation that they may be contested, or argued against.

In the present segment, of course, we do have the development of an arguing sequence as Roberto questions the account (or probes it, in Firth's terminology), by starting an utterance in overlap with Charles' and then issuing it in the clear:

5.1/Excerpt 4/DS 17

```
     C:    yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
  →  R:                                [ssya-
  →  R:    Seeg[ar uses that]
     H:        [they won't e-]
```

Notice that Harry overlaps with Roberto's utterance, but he is demonstrably not addressing it yet; he is still within the frame of proffering his account, since the pronoun they is a clear anaphoric reference to "the American people" from his prior turn.

Roberto's questioning of the account is accomplished through a partial counter-evidential assertion to the grounds in Harry's account, namely that a famous designer brand currently adopts the very practice that the manufacturers are proposing, and which the importers have not aligned with. The implicit grounds for venturing such an assertion as undermining the account has to do with the fact that Amage, and thus Harry and Charles, are trying to emulate that designer's style in one of the items for their new collection (i.e., the seegar case), which obviously targets "the American people." However, that designer operates in Europe, and this is exactly what Harry brings up to invalidate Roberto's point. Note that, despite an initial inattention to Roberto's utterance as questioning his account, Harry is able to re-process it in retrospect and respond to it in a way that demonstrably constructs Roberto's utterance as a challenge:

5.1/Excerpt 5/DS 17

```
      C:     yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
      R:                                 [ssya-
      R:     Seeg[ar uses that]
      H:         [they won't e-]
      C:     °yeah,°
  →   H:     he's in Europe!
             (1.6)
```

A rather long silence (i.e., "1.6") ensues, which Roberto does not fill to further support his point. Note that in ordinary conversation routines, pauses like that have been shown to be delays typical of dispreferred next actions such as disagreement with assessments (Pomerantz, 1984a). However, Kotthoff (1993) has convincingly shown that this contrasts sharply with activities such as disputing in institutional conversation, and Bilmes (1995) has also found that what is true for other speech activities "does not seem to be the case in the context of argument" in negotiation (p. 73). These authors maintain that this aspect of preference organization seems to be inverted in disputes, where disagreeing is the preferred alternative action. Delays in disagreeing in both conversational disputing and negotiational arguing display a participants' difficulty in finding a logical counter.

Given these observations, the pause ("1.6"), following Harry's high-pitched counter to Roberto's probing of Harry's account, makes that silence observably Roberto's. Roberto can warrantably be interpreted as lacking a rational defense of his point at hand. This seems to be the way Charles analyzes Roberto's silence. When Roberto starts his utterance, which is hardly audible, Charles overlaps with him twice in what seems to be the initiation of a re-cycling of the account, again in a conditional syntactical construction ("IF I GET A"). As Charles projects an intention to comply with the proposed change one day in the future, not as something still under present consideration, he thus assumes that his team's account has withstood the recipient's probing.

However, Roberto's utterance, though delayed (and thus weakened), is no acknowledgment of the importers' account having withstood in final terms:

5.1/Excerpt 6/DS 17

→ R: °(I'n't know),° but [Seegar is a classy:,
C: [IF I GET A
(0.3)
→ R: [uh:: brand.]
H: [((*shakes head no #1, #2*))=
C: [I'm trying to get] the: right uh:=

Roberto's turn is not a backdown closing the bargaining sequence. Rather, it displays non-alignment with the account as final ("I'n't know"), and does manage to re-qualify his questioning of it ("Seegar is a classy: uh:: brand."), by implying that the designer that had been mentioned is respectable, and must deserve some credit even if it operates only in Europe. It is crucial to see that this analysis is contingent on the sequential analysis that Harry himself can be shown to have made as he takes up and immediately disagrees with Roberto's qualified counter to his account.

Having disagreed with Roberto by shaking his head as Roberto finished a turn, Harry acknowledges his receipt of that turn as "further arguing" and thus proceeds to re-cycle his own previous account. He latches a new turn to Charles' incomplete utterance referring to the impeding condition in the account. Harry then pleas with Roberto ("believe me, (.) ↓Roberto,"), and re-cycles the account almost verbatim, therefore claiming that it stands intact against Roberto's "stubbornness."

5.1/Excerpt 7/DS 17

R: °(I'n't know),° but [Seegar is a classy:,
C: [IF I GET A
(0.3)
R: [uh:: brand.]
→ H: [((*shakes head no #1, #2*))=
C: [I'm trying to get] the: right uh:=
→ H: =believe me, (.) ↓Roberto, (.) nothing would give me
greater pleasure than to get rid of the suede,
(0.8)
R: uhm hum

Roberto's delayed "uhm hum," which would normally be seen as a mere continuer, here stands as a pre-backdown token. Harry does continue, reinforcing his account with more a specific description of the obstacle preventing the importers from aligning with the manufacturers' proposal:

5.1/Excerpt 8/DS 17

```
      H:     =believe me, (.) ↓Roberto, (.) nothing would give me
      greater pleasure than to get rid of the suede,
             (0.8)
  →   R:     uhm hum
  →   H:     but to¶day, if you ¶show the A¶merican ¶customer, anything
      but ¶suede, they will ¶not buy it. ((pounding table as if
      slicing pie; alternates gaze from R to Mr. A))
  →          (1.3)
```

Notice that "the American people" from the first proffering of the account is now restricted to a much more precise and compelling category of people: "the A¶merican ¶customer," who "will ¶not buy" the product if the proposed change is implemented. In addition, Harry's whole turn following Roberto's ambiguous continuer is peppered with the same repeated, sonorous gesture which emphasizes stressed syllables, and lends the account an aura of definiteness as irrefutable fact.

5.1/Excerpt 9/DS 17

```
  →   H:     but to¶day, if you ¶show the A¶merican ¶customer, anything
      but ¶suede, they will ¶not buy it. ((pounding table as if
      slicing pie; alternates gaze from R to Mr. A))
  →          (1.3)
  →   H:     yeah, when you have a Lacrosse (.) or a: Lowbew or- (.) they
      can do anything they want, (0.5) because the type of person          that
goes into that store (0.8)=(hand in mid air)) wants the          idea that he bought
that from Lacrosse=
 Mr. A:      =pegou? ((to E in other room))
  →   H:     °that's not our buyer° ((squints and shakes head no))
             (0.8)
      H:     cause [they're-
```

The long ("1.3") silence between Harry's claims to the floor again is interpretable as evidence that Roberto cannot produce a rational counter even if given the chance to self-select as next speaker. Harry then goes on, now addressing the possibility of designer brand features being comparable to his own company's brand names. He denies it applies to Amage's situation, based on an assertion that the designer brands' customers are not the same as Amage's ("the type of person that goes into that store (0.8) wants the idea that he bought that from Lacrosse" vs. "°that's not our buyer°"). Thus Harry alludes to the existence of two different categories, and claims membership in one, for which his account stands; but not in the other, for which Roberto's point is valid.

The entire sequence is interrupted by a break in the interactional frame (Tannen, 1993b), as Mr. Amati rather clumsily tries, and fails, to transfer a phone call for Eduardo to a telephone in another room:

5.1/Excerpt 10/DS 17

```
→ Mr. A:    =pegou? ((to E in other room))
     H:     °that's not our buyer° ((squints and shakes head no))
            (0.8)
→    H:     cause [they're-
→ Mr. A:          [PEGOU (EDUARDO)?
            .
            .     – 14 lines omitted –[8]
            .
     E:     alô?
            (0.4)
```

This break lasts until Eduardo comes in and answers the phone on the negotiating table. During this time, the participants keep their negotiational activities on hold and watch the developments.

Harry then returns his gaze to Roberto and re-initiates the arguing sequence from where it had been left off, no longer taking any interactional notice of Eduardo's doings (given that Eduardo's talk on the phone is irrelevant to the participants as well as to the present analysis at this point, the next excerpt omits most of E's talk on the phone).

5.1/Excerpt 11/DS 17

```
     E:     alô?
            (0.4)
  →  E:     olha ele já saiu.
            (0.6)
  →  H:     I would love to get rid of the suede,
            (1.3)
  →  H:     ((shakes head no)) but until, until the industry starts
     H:     getting rid of it I'm not gonna be the first one=
     H:     =(0.9)=((shaking head no)) to get rid of it.
            (0.7) ((E leaves room))
```

Harry immediately returns his gaze to Roberto and re-cycles his account once more. However, now the account has a slightly different topical direction, as "the industry" becomes the category to which the importers claim membership, and which encapsulates both aspects of the grounds to the account as

[8] These lines appear in the complete transcript in appendix B, pp. 365-367).

presented before (i.e., the catering to "the American people or customer," and his non-membership in the category of designer brands).

As Eduardo leaves the scene again, and no further challenge is coming from Roberto, Harry adds a new account to his misalignment with the manufacturers' proposal, apparently as an attempt to close off the issue, and thus terminate the arguing and bargaining sequences:

5.1/Excerpt 12/DS 17

```
     H:   I would love to get rid of the suede,
          (1.3)
     H:   ((shakes head no)) but until, until the industry starts
     H:   getting rid of it I'm not gonna be the first one=
  →  H:   =(0.9)=((shaking head no)) to get rid of it.
  →       (0.7) ((E leaves room))
  →  H:   especially, (0.4) if in our Romanian line (0.4) we're
     selling a case for sixty dollars, or fifty dollars in suede     (0.3)
how in the world can I sell this case,
```

He compares the present item (for which he has already proposed to pay $45) with another item, which Amage currently imports from Romania and sells for $50 (i.e., *simple* Brazilian attache case with *cheaper material* @ $45 vs. *elaborate* Romanian attache case with more *expensive material* @ $50). This comparison logically implies that it would be difficult to market the new (Brazilian) attache case being discussed, if it is made with the much cheaper material as Roberto proposes, for only $5 less than the present $50-dollar Romanian case, given that the existing case is a much more elaborate item to begin with. However, Harry also ends this additional account with a rhetorical question to which Roberto does provide a substantial answer, giving new life to the arguing sequence:

5.1/Excerpt 13/DS 17

```
     H:   especially, (0.4) if in our Romanian line (0.4) we're
     selling a case for sixty dollars, or fifty dollars in suede
  →       (0.3) how in the world can I sell this case,
          (1.2)
  →  R:   tsk, innovation,
```

Harry's question seems to have been designed primarily to elicit from Roberto the final acknowledgment of the appropriateness of the accounts, and ultimately the reasonableness of Harry and Charles' misalignment with the proposal. It seems that Harry's utterance also advances an implicit challenge to the correctness of Courofatos' prices in general. That is, it implies that if the proposal were implemented, the item would then stand as comparatively overpriced. To sell it, Harry would have to offer his customers an explicitly overpriced item, which he shouldn't. This can be heard, therefore, as an allusion to Courofatos' comparatively high prices in relation to Harry's Czechoslovakian targets, which have been exhaustively discussed prior to the construction of this segment.

Anyhow, in trying to accomplish this, Harry provides Roberto with "a conversational out" of the contextual dead-end of having to agree with the account and backdown from his proposal. Though it is hardly refutable, as a logical conclusion (i.e., that it would be difficult to sell the new item comparatively), the addition of the phrase "in the world" ("how in the world can I sell this case,") advances the utterance an action-step further. Sacks (1992) notes that the insertion of phrases such as "in the world," "(in) the hell," "in God's universe," etc. are ways of turning some question into something else,

> a challenge — or a request for explanation in any event — in which one doubts the correctness of the action being reported; not doubting that it is being done, but doubting that it should be done. ... It doesn't merely request an explanation, but also a justification. So that insertion, "the hell" [in the world for the present data] is relevant. (vol. 2, p. 117).

Harry's turn thus implies doubt about the correction or appropriateness of performing that action, in other words "there is no reason why I should." And it is this, not the comparative logic itself, that results in a chance for Roberto to answer the question substantively without backing down from his bargaining position just yet.

So Roberto takes the chance to formulate, in explicit terms in the turn shown below, the grounds for Harry to act just as Harry had said he wouldn't.

5.1/Excerpt 14/DS 17

```
      H:    especially, (0.4) if in our Romanian line (0.4) we're
      selling a case for sixty dollars, or fifty dollars in suede       (0.3)
how in the world can I sell this case,
            (1.2)
      R:    tsk, innovation,
      H:    (0.4)=((scowls and shakes head no #1)) [((#2, #3))]
  →   R:                                           [I mean everybody=
  →         =does: uh:- pig suede] you gotta tr[y a new type [of °(   =
      H:                                       [I don't-     [I don't=
  →   R:    =       )°]
```

For this Roberto resorts to a far-fetched, but nevertheless coherent point, regarding originality ("innovation") as a merchandising tool. The point is warranted due to its coherence with Roberto's own previous questioning of Harry's account on the grounds that classy designers do what the importer is proposing. But now it also coheres with the category that Harry himself brought forth in his new account in terms of marketing and the industry, in the sense that industrial marketing values originality as a competitive plus.

However, Harry is able to neutralize Roberto's point:

5.1/Excerpt 15/DS 17

```
    R:                                              [I mean everybody=
          =does: uh:- pig suede] you gotta tr[y a new type [of °(  =
 →  H:                                         [I don't-     [I don't=
    R:    =      )°]
 →  H:    =have the] guts.
    R:    (0.4)=((smiles and drops gaze))=
 →  H:    =I'm a coward (0.7)
```

Harry grants Roberto the validity of innovation as a marketing and merchandising tool, but, by alluding to a personal flaw which prevents him from being innovative in this case, Harry leaves little space for Roberto to counter-argue. Harry's "lack of guts" is, in Labov and Fanshel's (1977) terminology, an A-event,[9] that is, something over which Roberto cannot ever claim to know better. It is treated as a non-challengeable. Roberto's agreement actually terminates the arguing sequence and initiates the closing of the bargaining sequence in which it is embedded.

It is noteworthy that Roberto does not disagree with Harry's self-deprecatory statement here. His agreeing could be seen as doubly dispreferred at this juncture following a self-deprecation. This is another piece of evidence to the specificity of preference organization in negotiational discourse. Whereas in ordinary conversation there is strong preference for disagreement following self-deprecations (Pomerantz, 1984a), we don't find it here, where agreement actually amounts to a backdown from a position in whose defense Roberto expended considerable interactional effort.

With Roberto's backdown, as he smiles and drops his gaze from Harry without uttering a word, the arguing sequence terminates. The importers' account for their non-aligning response to the proposed change stands. It now gets constructed as a misaligning reply, closing the bargaining sequence.

5.1/Excerpt 16/DS 17

```
    R:    tsk, innovation,
    H:    (0.4)=((scowls and shakes head no #1)) [((#2, #3))]
    R:                                              [I mean everybody=
          =does: uh:- pig suede] you gotta tr[y a new type [of °(  =
```

---

[9] "A-events are those that typically concern A's emotions, his daily experience in other contexts, elements in his past biography, and so on" (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 100).

```
    H:                                              [I don't-     [I don't=
    R:     =      )°]
    H:     =have the] guts.
→   R:     (0.4)=((smiles and drops gaze))=
    H:     =I'm a coward (0.7)
→   C:     ninety-two we're gonna try a couple of cases=
    H:     =I'm a coward
           (0.7)
→   R:     uhm hm=
→   C:     I'm gonna find the right (  ).
→          (2.3)
→   C:     make thee: pen holders three inches long.
```

Charles proffers the first part ("ninety-two we're gonna try a couple of cases=") of the re-cycle of his remark about intentions to consider the issue in the future, re-affirming the present impediment, the second part of which ("I'm gonna find the right (   )") gets uttered only after Harry repeats his self-deprecation, and Roberto finally concedes to the manufacturers' misaligning reply to his proposal. At this point we have the termination of the bargaining sequence. After silence, Charles initiates a new topic ("make thee: pen holders three inches long."), now beyond the suede substitution bargaining sequence.

Notice the similarity between Charles' turns at two different points in the sequence:

5.1/Excerpt 17/DS 17

```
→   C:                             [IF I GET A
           (0.3)
    R:     [uh:: brand.]
    H:     [((shakes head no #1, #2))=
→   C:     [I'm trying to get] the: right uh:=
           .
           .      – 54 lines omitted –
           .
→   C:     ninety-two we're gonna try a couple of cases=
    H:     =I'm a coward
           (0.7)
    R:     uhm hm=
→   C:     I'm gonna find the right (  ).
```

The re-cycling of Charles' previous turn corroborates the interpretation that he had considered the account to have withstood, and that he believed the arguing sequence was terminating the time the first time he had proffered it.

The arguing sequence analyzed above therefore almost coincides with the bargaining sequence that circumscribes it. It ends with a relinquish of the importers' proposal — the bargaining sequence opener — as Roberto runs out of rational and interactional ammunition to challenge the manufacturers' account supporting their non-aligning response. Ultimately, we can say that in this case arguing resulted in producing alignment between the two parties, the more local bargaining sequence could thus be completed and a course of action decided upon. The more encompassing bargaining sequence dealing with the attache cases, the one still incomplete awaiting for a reply, remains incomplete and has not advanced.

That is why talking about winning or losing an argument in this case is quite irrelevant. Though this sequence does end in resolution, as Schiffrin (1985) points out, arguing sequences "often end without winners and losers" (p. 35). The importers "won" this sequence, and thus prevailed in the more local bargaining sequence, but if they had actually "lost" it, and the proposal had been approved, they would be closer to getting an aligning reply to their own proposal in the more encompassing bargaining sequence.

More importantly, what the participants accomplish through this sequence is the co-construction of a situation which leads to a decision: the proposal is not going to be implemented. Regardless of whether or not it "really" cannot be implemented, or of whether or not the manufacturers believe that it cannot be implemented, it becomes part of the shared and ratified reality *that it cannot*. In remarkable similarity to a sequence analyzed by Firth (1995a), this is achieved through the co-construction of the importers' account deserving acceptance, not "on the basis of avarice, cupidity or personal whim," but on the basis of its "inevitability, as the result of others' actions and thus as the decision of a rational businessman" (p. 208).

Below is a summary of the core actions in this sequence, where M stands for manufacturer party, and I, for importer party:

```
M: proposal (use imitation suede instead of pig suede)
I: non-aligning response + account #1
M: questioning #1A of account #1
I: counter-assertion to questioning #1A
M: questioning #1B of account #1
I: recycle of account #1 + counter to questioning #1B
      frame break (E's telephone call)
M: recycle of account #1 + account #2 (in question format)
I: answer to question with challenge #2A of account #2
M: counter neutralizing challenge #2A
I: relinquish proposal
```

Arguing sequence ending in relinquish of proposal, (i.e., opener of immediately local bargaining sequence) — [BS[AS]]

In ways that will be explicated in the chapters 7 and 8, attention must be drawn to the fact that the arguing sequence develops out of a three-position sequential format: an initial action, here a bargaining sequence opener, followed by a crucial second position which does not align with the first position and accounts for its non-alignment, and then a third, oppositional, disaffiliative or non-aligning action addressing the account. In the sequence analyzed above we have:

```
1st position  M: proposal (use imitation suede instead of pig suede)
2nd position  I: non-aligning response + account #1
3rd position  M: questioning #1A of account #1
```

The third position turn displays a disposition to argue and recasts what came before (i.e., misalignment and its account) as disputable, thus initiating the arguing sequence proper. As we will see in chapters 7 and 8, how the account in second position fares against opposition determines the development of the arguing sequence in terms of its closing outcome. Ultimately, this also determines the fate of a connected bargaining sequence as well, since a revision or relinquish of first or second position means the co-construction of local alignment, and the basis for a bargaining sequence reply.

The interactional sequence found in the transcripts analyzed above is one occurrence of the interactional phenomenon I am calling a negotiational arguing sequence. While this single occurrence as such is sufficient to make it worthy of analytic attention (Psathas, 1995), it is proposed here that such sequences of social actions constitute a particular aspect of the machinery of negotiation talk-in-interaction. The sample of talk above shares structural features with other such interactional segments across the corpus, in the sense that the methodical procedures for their construction follow a common interactional orientation, and thus constitute the same type of phenomena. This means that these sequences occur in relevantly bounded segments of interaction.

The next chapter demonstrates the interactional relevance of the boundedness of the activities in those segments for the participants.

CHAPTER 6

THE INTERACTIONAL UNIT-RELEVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONAL ARGUING SEQUENCES

The previous chapter discussed negotiational arguing discourse and presented an example of a negotiational arguing sequence. The explicated transcript of an occurrence of the phenomenon showed participants to be co-constructing it as a unified sequence of actions around a single major issue. In the present chapter, I discuss the nature of arguing sequences as *interactional units* in order to demonstrate that these sequences constitute discrete interactional phenomena to negotiating participants. These explorations will show how the participants construct relevant boundaries around their negotiational arguing sequences. After a brief re-examination of the arguing sequence explicated in the previous chapter, a microanalysis of the closing of a different sequence — the longest and most complex arguing sequence found in the Amage/Courofatos corpus — will demonstrate that the participants produce these boundaries in collective concerted action both through their spoken and their unspoken observable behavior.

Sequences of Actions in Talk as Interactional Units

Conversation analysts have described sequences of actions composed of a small number of turns based on their structural correlation as pieces in the machinery of conversation. The analysis above showed that this structural correlation is true also of negotiational arguing sequences. Given the complex and extended nature of these sequences, however, showing their interactional relevance requires a broader examination of how negotiating participants bound their arguing activities into segments that the analyst can also identify.

A main concern of the present work is to describe negotiational arguing as occurring in sequences of action which, though patterned, are nevertheless *co-constructed by the participants*. That is to say that they share the responsibility "for the creation of sequential coherence, identities, meaning and events" (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995b, p. 177). As Jacoby and Ochs puts it,

> This means that language, discourse, and their effects cannot be considered deterministically preordained by alleged 'inherent' properties of linguistic structures, by assumed constructs of individual competence and so-called shared knowledge, or by assigning participants to membership categories presumed to be relevant to the occasion. ... [Instead] every interactional moment is potentially an opportunity space for some participant to redirect the unfolding of the discourse such that individual understandings, human relationships, and the social order might be changed. (p. 178)

If we take each interactant as capable of discrete action at every moment, we can see it is crucial for them to construct a joint reality in talk-in-interaction, especially when they are concerned with the establishment of commitment to particular interdependent action in the distal future. Thus we find them to invest great effort in producing patterned and bounded arguing sequences as units of interaction. In other words, phenomena such as negotiational arguing sequences are the result of concerted work by social actors who must constantly calibrate their actions to the actions of others "on-line, in real time, at the same time, at the same speed, and in the same state of half-consciousness through which they give linguistic shape to their spontaneous and often smoothly timed utterances" (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995b, p. 178).

The following analyses show how participants co-construct these sequences as interactional objects that have a form of their own. The intent here is to show that participants in the Courofatos/Amage negotiation — *despite their different socio-cultural and linguistic backgrounds* — construct arguing sequences as bounded units of interaction, and that this boundedness is relevant for them. This also supports the segmentation of the continuous flow of interaction for analysis, to which I now turn briefly.

Segmentation in Ethnographic Microanalysis of Interaction

The segmentation of the continuous flow of interaction into transcribed stretches is in large measure an artificial result of the analytic endeavor. However, as Moerman (1988) puts it, "to impose boundaries for the reasons of extrinsic theory or convenience is to study wildflowers with a lawn-mower" (p. 72). An effort must be made to find emic support to what the analyst sees as relevant boundaries in the interaction. The selection of segments containing arguing sequences is part of an inductive process guided by attention to the fact that social action is composed of "consensually bounded" units as part and parcel of intelligibility among participants and that "the units [that talk and its analysis require] are made by the talkers and found by the analyst" (p. 72).

Indeed, there are significant emic interactional elements that support the segmentation of the Courofatos/Amage into describable arguing sequences as the one analyzed above. In addition to their connection as a sequence of actions which have repeated instances across the four-day interactional event, arguing segments can be identified with reasonable confidence based on a rationale that combines an analysis of discourse topic and bodily ecological organization. As Erickson (1992a) points out, "strips of talk or nonverbal action may be defined by topically connected speech and various kinds of discourse routines, or they may be defined primarily by connected sequences of nonverbal action" (p. 219). In the negotiational arguing sequences identified in the data source, we can find evidence that the participants themselves oriented to the activity as bounded in terms of topic development and interactional ecology. In terms of interactional ecology, as described in chapter 3 (see p. 57), at the boundaries of segments one typically finds frame shifts marked by phenomena such as silence, either as long pauses or lapses, significant changes in postural configurations and f-formations, as well as code-switching on the part of the manufacturers, all of which may produce alterations in participation structure. The following sections explicate instances of that.

Boundaries of Negotiational Arguing Sequence Segments

Sometimes these frame shifts can be observed at the beginning of the bargaining sequence from which arguing immediately developed (which further indicates that negotiational arguing sequences are inserted in, or subordinate to, a bargaining sequence). This is certainly the case of the example sequence discussed in the previous chapter (i.e., data segment 17).

There we see that the proposal that Roberto makes is not only significant as such, but that it also occurs as code-switching behavior. This is in itself an obvious mark that participants are re-defining the ecology of their interaction The excerpt below shows the interaction prior to that redefinition:

6.1/Excerpt 1/DS 17

→ (8.6)=((C*, R and E writing notes, H looks at camera and winks, then looks at his own notes and at E for the remaining 5.0*))
Mr. A: °(esse nacional, não podia [ )°]
→ H: [are you paying att]ention=
=Eduardo?
(0.9)
E: ((*raises head*)) uh?
H: are you paying attention?=
→ E: =yes.=((*drops gaze and lowers head to write notes*))=
→ H: =cause I'm gonna give you a <u>test</u> (0.8)=((*raises wrist and looks at watch*)) in fifteen minutes.=
→ Mr. A: ((*after moving closer to the table, leaning hands on table*))
=(hein ô:: a gente falou em- aquilo de estudar a colocação do forro em:)=
(E:) =imitação de couro, não vão querer.
? °( )°=
→ R: =he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) <u>use</u> imitation suede,=

In the last line above, Roberto, who was being addressed in Portuguese by Mr. Amati, and thus engaging in collusive communication in relation to the importers, now turns his gaze to Harry and addresses him in English. Harry, who had been teasing Eduardo only seconds before, and was disengaged from a negotiational topic (i.e., bargaining over the new attache cases), now becomes an addressed recipient of Roberto's talk, on the negotiational topic at hand:

6.1/Excerpt 2/DS 17
? °( )°=
→ R: =he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) <u>use</u> imitation suede,=
→ H: =(0.5)=((*shakes head no vigorously, with eyes closed: #1*))=
=[((*#2*))]
R: =[rather than (0.5) pig suede]=
→ H: =(1.0)=((*#3, #4*))

Upon Roberto's code-switching utterance addressing Harry, we can see that the participants agree to shift gears considerably to construct a single floor and a single focused interactional space. What goes on upon Roberto's proposal is something decidedly different from what went on interactionally prior to his action, the proposal which opens a new bargaining sequence containing, as we have seen, an embedded sequence of arguing actions.

At the end of the same segment, significant markers again demonstrate, to participants and analysts, that the arguing activity is about to close.

6.2/Excerpt 1/DS 17
→ R: (0.4)=((*smiles and drops gaze*))=
H: =I'm a coward
(0.7)

```
→  C:     ninety-two we're gonna try a couple of cases=
   H:     =I'm a coward
          (0.7)
→  R:     uhm hm=
→  C:     I'm gonna find the right (  ).
→         (2.3)
→  C:     make thee: pen holders three inches long.
```

Roberto smiles and drops his gaze, silently initiating the backdown which his final, flat-intonation "uhm hm" concludes. Harry then upgrades his self-deprecatory assessment ("I don't have the guts" --> "I'm a coward"), and Charles points to the distant future as when they are going to re-consider the issue in the importers' proposal. A lapse of 2.3 seconds separates the closing of the (bargaining and arguing) sequences in this segment from the introduction of a new topic by Charles. Only after Charles' new topic-initiating turn does Roberto return his gaze to the importers' face. We thus have a few elements from the sequence above to show that the participants orient to bargaining sequences as having identifiable beginnings and ends.

Let us now turn to the longest and most complex sequence we find in the Courofatos/Amage corpus in order to examine in further detail how the bounded nature of the phenomena we are describing is accomplished by the participants in a complex combination of verbal as well as nonverbal behaviors in concerted action. This sequence was the first to call my attention as obviously containing arguing of some sort. Moreover, it puzzled me that the participants' persevere on a single primary topic of discourse over such an lengthy interactional stretch. In the course of examining the sequence microethnographically, I began to realize that this was in fact only an extensive occurrence of something typical of other sequences in the corpus: the often necessary joint talk-interactional dealing with an organizational problem in the construction of negotiation talk.

The Microanalysis of a Complex Arguing Sequence Closing

The arguing sequence whose closing is analyzed below lasts for over twenty-three minutes of real-time interaction (For the uninterrupted transcript of the entire data segment, see appendix B, pp. 367-385). In this section, the discussion will not cover the entire sequence nor will it attend closely to the structure of conversational actions as above. Though data from this same sequence will be featured in the analysis of key actions in negotiational arguing in the following chapter, the analysis here will concentrate on the interdigitation of participants' verbal and nonverbal behaviors in the construction of the final moments of the arguing sequence.

The scope of action in this stretch revolves around one single central issue: the reasonableness (or lack thereof) of the price quotation for an item in the new collection (i.e., item 69528, quoted by the manufacturers at $44), in comparison to a similar item in the presently existing collection (i.e., item 1719, priced at $31). Towards its second half, the sequence features a series of escalating re-cyclings of the same arguing discourse units, so that it seems to be heading towards a stand-off closing.[1] At an entry point about 16 minutes into the sequence, the very transcript provides a summary of the positions:

6.3/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
H:     I said that this ((touches new case)) has more value than
this ((old case)) (0.8) this is more expensive to make than=
       =t[his. ↑I] agree. ↑I a[gree with you.
E:       [((nods yes vigorously))] [yeah,]
E:     you agree but you give me: (.) six per cent of difference
between this and this.
       (0.4)
E:     [maximum
H:     [°because that's the price.°=
```

Following this, Charles and Eduardo argue further on specific aspects regarding the cost of components in the two cases. During this exchange, Harry persistently tries to steer the focus of the discussion back to his main challenge (i.e., that the price quoted is not right and must be reviewed), until he finally succeeds:

6.3/Excerpt 2/DS 19

```
     E:     [maximum
     H:     [°because that's the price.°=
     C:     =you have a less expensive zipper,
            (0.4)
  →  H:     I am looking,=
     C:     =it h[as vinyl on the inside,
  →  H:          [Edu[ardo, Eduardo, I am looking]
     E:              [but uh HERE- no zipper,]  you have- ((showing
     zipper on new case))
  →  H:     I am looking [at a price [of about
     E:                  [much-      [here you have only- ((unzipping
     old case))
            (1.3)
```

[1] Chapter 8 (pp. 267-284) describes stand-off-ending negotiational arguing sequences.

→ H: ((*looking down at notes*)) of forty,
C: yeah, but this [is a <u>ny</u>lon zipper and [that's sol]id <u>brass</u>,= E:
[it is- [ah::]
=come o:n,
→ H: forget about [the zipper.
E: [↑no:, ↑it's the same:.=
→ H: =forget about the zipper.
E: [the price is the same
R: [([ )
→ H: [I am <u>still</u> looking at a <u>price</u> of forty-four
dollars and <u>change</u> (0.4) on this <u>case</u>,
E: (1.8)=((*nods yes repeatedly*))

At this point about 18 minutes into the sequence, however, a crucial re-cycling of the challenge and account in the main focus of debate will culminate with Eduardo's backdown, thus settling the issue and terminating the sequence. After Eduardo's backdown, a radically different interactional ecology can be observed. It is marked by the departure from the room of two of the participants (Eduardo and Charles), and, before this, by a fuzzy in-between period, a mostly silent period lasting roughly two minutes, in which the participants gradually move away from their previously joint orientation. They re-arrange the situation from encounter to gathering (Goffman, 1972), as they recuperate from the intensity of the completed sequence.

How do participants get from where the last piece of transcript above left off to the later clear-cut end of the sequence described above, where they cease to argue, then cease to talk, and then cease to share the same interactional space? In order to shed light on this question, a sub-segment of less than two minutes was chosen for microanalysis.[2] A second-by-second microtranscript of this sub-segment was produced to record most observable behavior by all four participants.

This microtranscript centers around a somewhat unexpected turning point. Following this turning point, Eduardo eventually does not refute a rhetorical point made by the importers, and therefore must give in and backdown from his position, thus accepting Harry's claim that the price for the new item is unjustified. In the first twenty minutes of fierce arguing, the sequence was apparently headed for a stand-off- rather than a resolution-ending, that is, the status of the second-position account would not be settled one way or the other. After this turning point, however, the participants must deal with the difficult interactional task of switching gears to somewhat suddenly initiate the closing of the sequence with a distinct ending, where the status of the account is defined as "not standing."

[2] The segment inspected closely below lasts for 1'42" of interaction and is part of data segment 17.

So let us get back to the transcript from where it left off to examine how this interactional point of no return is reached.

6.3/Excerpt 3/DS 19

```
H:                     [I am still looking at a price of forty-four
dollars and change (0.4) on this case,
E:      (1.8)=((nods yes repeatedly))
H:      ((squinting)) °that's not six [per cent.°
E:                                       [yeah, you have twenty per=
        =cent more (↑ ) (0.7)=((turning torso to read note on
table)) °↑how- ↑what is the price? you are speaking?°
        (0.3)
H:      fort[y-four dollars and change
R:          [forty-four opposed to thirty-one:,
        (1.0) ((E looking down at notes))
```

Following Harry's ultimate success in steering the focus of the arguing back to his main challenge, we have a re-cycling of the previous developments in the sequence.[3] Eduardo re-cycles his account for the price being what it is on the basis of additional leather consumption ("yeah, you have <u>twen</u>ty per cent <u>more</u> (↑)"), and requests clarification as to the exact figure referred to ("(0.7)=((*turning torso to read note on table*)) °↑<u>how</u>- ↑what is the <u>price</u>? you are speaking?°"). Harry confirms the quotation at "fort[y-four dollars and <u>change</u>" while Roberto, in overlap, provides the numerical gist of the issue in this sequence ("[forty-<u>four</u> opposed to thirty-<u>one</u>:,").

As the transcript continues below, Harry starts to re-assert his challenge with a questioning-counter to Eduardo's account ("now are you gonna <u>tell</u> me,"). He is interrupted by Eduardo, who seems to have interpreted Harry as having implied Harry would no longer acknowledge even the 6% difference between the two items (inferred from the importers' displayed target price[4]). Harry points out the current prices are not 6% but 25-30% apart (i.e., he claims the problem is not his target; it's the manufacturers' present quotation, which in fact is 36.9% higher than the importers' target). Eduardo counters that the comparatively additional 6% Harry is offering is too little.

6.3/Excerpt 4/DS 19

```
→   H:      now are you gonna tell me,
```

[3] An analysis of these previous developments in their sequential detail is not offered here, but see appendix B for transcript of entire data segment.

[4] The exact price for the "old case" 1719 is $31.37. The closest current offer for the "new" 69528 is the manufacturers' $44.85 against the importers' target of $32.75. Eduardo's reference to 6% is a rough estimate based on round figures of $31 against $33.

```
→   E:     no, ↑you told me now, that you accept six per cent, (.) of
        difference between this (.) and this.
→   H:     ↑but [YOUR PRICE IS- [is- is ↑TWENTY-FIVE [PER CENT.=
    E:          [(no?    )         [(      )
    C:                                               [yeah.
    H:     =↑thirty [per cent.
→   E:              [↑okay Harry, but (.) then °(w- y-)° you cannot=
        =also say me, (.) that you: accept only six per cent of
        difference between thi[s and this.] yes, o- kay- (we) have=
    H:                         [((closes eyes; looks away, down))]
    E:     =(twenty-[five-)
```

As was mentioned above, at this point it seems that the sequence is bound to end in a stand-off, as the two main arguments keep being re-cycled with little change in position. Harry claims the price is comparatively high and unjustified, while Eduardo claims Harry's target is not comparatively realistic. Neither party moves on to a revision of their prices.

Before Eduardo finishes his turn, which ultimately states a stand-off, Harry drops his gaze from him, and looks away and then down, in a display of misalignment which Eduardo does attend to as evidenced in his subsequent disfluency ("yes, o- kay- (we) have"). As the arguing sequence continues, Harry re-issues his challenge once again, only now in a slow but aggravated form, charging that the price Eduardo quoted "makes no sense," and that Eduardo "can't show" his price to be right:

6.3/Excerpt 5/DS 19

```
    E:              [↑okay Harry, but (.) then °(w- y-)° you cannot=
        =also say me, (.) that you: accept only six per cent of
        difference between thi[s and this.] yes, o- kay- (we) have=
→   H:                         [((closes eyes; looks away, down))]
    E:     =(twenty-[five-)
    H:              [I am going on the basis of the price you quoted,=
    C:     =°°(yeah).°°
           (0.9)
→   H:     and on the price you quoted, (0.7) it['s- it- it makes no=
    C:                                          [(     )
→   H:     =sense. (0.4) if I'm buying this for thirty-one and you're
        quoting forty-four, (.) ((hand to chest)) it makes no sense        (0.7)
```

Details in Harry's performance of utterances in these turns reiterating his argument ("I am going on the basis of the price you quoted,/(0.9) and on the price you quoted, (0.7) it['s- it- it makes no sense.") also reveal a marked rhythm[5] that is made even more evident by the

[5] The central role of rhythm in the integration of everyday talk in face-to-face interaction has been demonstrated by interactional sociolinguists (Erickson, 1992b; Erickson & Shultz, 1982; Gumperz, 1982a; Scollon, 1982).

movement of his arm and hand as well as multiple head movements, which can be read in the microtranscript excerpt below (see appendix B, pp. 357-358, for microtranscript conventions):

	17:20	17:21	17:22	17:23
Harry	I am going	on the basis	of the price you	quoted
torso	⎛⎹	=	=	=
gaze		E ''' ---	E	=
head	↑→ ↓	↑↓↑↓	↑→	↓ ---
arm	L hand on table	marking rhythm	=	=
other				

	17:24	17:25	17:26	17:27
Harry		and on the price	you quoted me,	it's- it-
torso	= (⎹)	=	=	=
gaze	= (E)	=	E '''	--- E ---
head	↑↓↑→	↓↑↓↑	↓↑↓ ⌊ ⌋	↑→ ↓↑
arm	=	=	=	L arm → ← →
other	long blink			

This rhythm is slow and emphatic (∪∪∪—; one beat per second). The impression it gives is of fatigued annoyance with the manufacturers' unyielding position even if the sequence is nearing its exhaustion.

To Harry's aggravated re-cycled challenge, Eduardo responds, yet once again, by underscoring the 20% additional leather consumption as an account for the price being what the manufacturers claim it is. Notice that he is referring to cost sheets as evidence of that:

6.3/Excerpt 6/DS 19

```
    H:    you can't show me (0.5) such a difference (.) in in pr[ice:
    E:                                                          [yea.
 →  E:    (here we put) twenty per cent of leather,
    H:    if you quoted-
 →  E:    (then we put here-) (.)=((holds up and points to cost
 sheets)) here is the leather, ↑twenty per cent more than
 this ((touching old case))=
 →  H:    =okay. ((drops case on table; drops gaze))
          (0.9)
```

Interpreted in isolation, Harry's "okay," latched above to Eduardo's recycled account, could perhaps be taken simply as a token of agreement and thus acceptance of Eduardo's account. However, it is proffered with falling intonation and in conjunction with Harry's gesture of dropping the sample he had been holding for a while. Rather than a concession to the validity of Eduardo's account, Harry's turn is a concession to the exhaustion of the sequence, which would then end in a stand-off, as implied by Eduardo a few turns before. Harry's agreement token is designed to be recognized as tendentiously insincere, that is, it is produced to be seen as a display of reluctant agreement to initiate the pre-closing of the sequence, forced by the manufacturers' unreasonableness, not by their convincing evidence that Harry does not have a case in point.

Following a pause, Eduardo adds yet a second aspect to his account (also re-cycled from earlier on in the sequence) about the additional labor that the new case requires in relation to the old style:

6.3/Excerpt 7/DS 19

E: (then we put here-) (.)=((*holds up and points to cost sheets*)) here is the leather, ↑twenty per cent more than this ((*touching old case*))=
H: =okay. ((*drops case on table; drops gaze*))
→ (0.9)
→ E: the labor is- is ((*snaps fingers*)) fifty per cent=
=m[ore,]

It is at this juncture that we find the turning point in the sequence. In a change of heart from the pre-closing tack he seemed to indicate in his previous turn, Harry confronts Eduardo. He elicits information from Eduardo and uses that information to invalidate Eduardo's account that the leather consumption on the new item makes up for the comparative price differential:

6.3/Excerpt 8/DS 19

E: the labor is- is ((*snaps fingers*)) fifty per cent=
=m[ore,]
→ H: [<huhmuch->] how much is the leather?=
→ =((*E drops cost sheets*)) (0.9)

The same rhythm exhibited in Harry's earlier utterance prior to Eduardo's is also featured in this turn a few seconds later as he proffers the information-request that changes the projected closing of the sequence. However, it now has a faster tempo with much less movement of head and arms. It aggressively displays irritation, as if he has been provoked:

	17:48	17:49	17:50	17:51
Harry	<huhmuch-> how much is the	leather?	what's the total cost	of the leather?
torso	)	=	=	=
gaze	--- E	=	=	=
head	--- ↑→	=	=	=
arm	= (R arm →)	=	=	=

By eliciting information from Eduardo's cost sheets about the exact cost of the additional amount of leather in the new item, Harry is able to get Eduardo to be the source of information — "yes, it's twen-

twenty-one dollars, yes" — that will be the premise for Harry's logical and rational conclusion that Eduardo's figures don't add up in Eduardo's own price quotation, making it, therefore, unjustifiably high.

6.3/Excerpt 9/DS 19

```
       E:     the labor is- is ((snaps fingers)) fifty per cent=
              =m[ore,]
       H:       [<huhmuch->] how much is the leather?=
              =((E drops cost sheets)) (0.9)
  →    H:     what's the total cost of the leather? (0.9) twenty dollars?
              (4.2) ((E looking for notes))
       R:     no, it's not °(this).° (.) it's this one.
              (2.3)
  →    H:     how  much  is the [(               )
  →    E:     ((crossing arms))=[yes, it's twen- twenty-one dollars,=
       =yes. okay, [(          leather)
  →    H:                  [so TWENTY PER CENT.
  →    E:     yeah.
  →    H:     ((slapping clap)) that's four dollars.
```

Harry's reasoning is hardly refutable at this point because it is built entirely upon the accounts and information which the manufacturers themselves have put forth. They have asserted that the new item is justifiably much more expensive than the old because of twenty per cent additional leather consumption. Through his question, and with the information Eduardo committedly provided, total consumption of leather in the new item is agreed to be $21. Twenty per cent of 21 dollars is roughly four dollars. Therefore, the added cost of the leather to produce the new item (i.e., $31 + $4) should make it cost 35 dollars; not $44 as in the manufacturers' present quote. So where do the other nine dollars (i.e., $44 - $35 = $9) come from for the price to reach 44 dollars? This is not refuted by Eduardo, who must then accept Harry's assertion that the $44 price is unreasonable.[6] Eduardo displays puzzlement at first, but soon realizes what Harry is getting at, and concedes to Harry's reasoning:

6.3/Excerpt 10/DS 19

```
  →           (1.4) ((E looks puzzled: raises head and eyebrows; blinks))
  →    H:     (tha)t's ↑four dollars
  →           (1.3)
  →    E:     °it's four dollars, (.) yeah.° ((drops gaze abruptly; looks
       down at notes))
              (0.9)
```

[6] See Bilmes (1995, pp. 77-78) for a discussion of how committing to a proposition as true may later constitute a formidable obstacle to some different line of negotiation, as seems to be Eduardo's case in this sequence.

Eduardo assumes a "protective stance" by crossing his arms before he acknowledges this reasoning. Then he confirms acceptance of Harry's argument and concedes to the untenability of his account throughout the sequence. Even though Eduardo has obviously initiated a backdown nonverbally (in ways that will be examined in detail below), Harry elicits a verbal acknowledgment of the correctness of his reasoning:

6.3/Excerpt 11/DS 19

```
            (1.3)
     E:     °it's four dollars, (.) yeah.° ((drops gaze abruptly; looks
     down at notes))
            (0.9)
  →  H:     kay?
  →  E:     yeah.
```

Although arguing backdowns do not have to be "explicitly articulated," there is a preference for "explicit backdowns" so that, as Coulter (1990) has found in his data, here "an interlocutor may be pressed by his co-conversationalist until an Explicit Backdown is achieved, even after a Backdown-Implicative Silence has arisen between them" (p. 190).

After the explicit backdown, and a misleading silent period that is replete with action, Harry makes explicit his conclusion:

6.3/Excerpt 12/DS 19

```
     H:     kay?
     E:     yeah.
  →         (4.0) ((H looks at C, throws hands up; C shakes head no))
  →  H:     now, (with) such a high labor cost (put things up) to forty-
     four dollars? °ah::: (              ),°=
```

The arguing sequence is ready for closing.[7] Eduardo ostensibly disengages from focused interaction. He averts his gaze and code-switches into self-talk.

6.3/Excerpt 13/DS 19

```
     H:     now, (with) such a high labor cost (put things up) to forty-
     four dollars? °ah::: (              ),°=
  →  E:     ((calculating; to himself)) menos,
            (1.1)
  →  E:     °four dollars, okay.°
            (1.0)
  →  E:     ((to R)) °(contra:, (.) trinta e:?)°
  →  R:     trinta e um:,
            (2.0)
     H:     the more you talk, the more you're gonna start agreeing with
     me, (.) that it doesn't make sense,
            (6.6)
```

[7] The second-by-second microtranscript of nonverbal behaviors focused on next ends at this point.

Harry still makes an additional point to upgrade his claim that a lower price must be quoted for this item. The marked nature of his misplaced late point, re-opening the sequence after a 6.6-second gap, is evidenced through the high volume of its initial delivery emphasizing the "AND," which connects it to what came before. These features in fact are typical of re-openings following closings of conversational sequences (Levinson, 1983, p. 322; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) occurrence in the data here corroborate the analysis that the negotiating participants are demonstrably orienting to the boundaries of arguing sequences.

6.3/Excerpt 14/DS 19

```
→   H:   AND, I'M TAK[ING OFF, (0.5) the cost of the leather because=
    R:               [(        )
→   H:   =I'm ↑I'm willing to go with the ↑vinyl, ((approaching
    table and showing gussets on new case))
         (0.3)
→   C:   yea.
→   H:   ((index pointing up)) ↑so it no longer becomes four
    dollars, (0.5) because now I'm saying, ok↑ay give me ↑vinyl        ↑here,
→   E:   yea.
         (1.0)
→   H:   ((index pointing up)) so no long- it's no longer twenty per
    cent °anymore,° (0.9) it's less.
         (0.8)
→   E:   ((nodding yes)) °sure°
         (0.4)
→   H:   now how do we substantia[te forty-four dollars,
    R:                           [NO, °but-°
         (0.7)
→   H:   that's all I'm sa:yi:ng.
→   C:   there's gotta be an error (in it) Eduardo,
         (0.5)
→   H:   ((walking away from table and into corridor)) I am telling
    you th[at the calculation is wrong.]
→   R:        [(                         ) was calculated using=
    =leather.
         (1.4)
→   C:   so take that out.
    R:   ((nods yes hesitatingly, hand covering mouth))=(2.0)
→        (59.9)
         ((H comes back in room and starts laying all new
    collection samples against N wall as C watches map on wall          and then
him; E ad R silently looking at notes))
```

At last, this long arguing sequence is terminated, with the acknowledgment that the importers' account for their price quotation on the item has not withstood the manufacturers' challenge, followed by cessation of verbal interaction for one whole minute.[8]

---

[8] The fact that the manufacturers do not revise their price quotation is significant and will be discussed later in chapter 8 (pp. 267-284).

<u>Gaze Direction as Action in Closing a Negotiational Arguing Sequence</u>

Closings have been shown to be "a delicate matter both technically ... and socially" (Levinson, 1983, p. 316). They require complex concerted work by interactants even in non-adversarial, ordinary conversation (see e.g., Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). In the negotiational arguing sequence closing discussed above, this difficulty is enhanced because the closing that needs to be co-constructed is exceedingly costly to the manufacturers, who must face the consequences of having their price "shown to be" wrong. For their part, the importers risk offending their interlocutors, whose cooperation they cannot ultimately lose if they are to strike a business deal by the following day. Therefore, they too must help construct the closing for the sequence so that it guarantees their accomplished arguing position without jeopardy to the continuance of the encounter and the relationship. Microanalytic evidence points to nonverbal behavior as crucial for striking this difficult balance.

Research on eye gaze in talk-in-interaction has shown it to be crucial in the integration of utterances and unspoken activities (Goodwin, 1981, 1984; Kendon, 1990). These works are only the most theoretically congruent with the present analysis, among the many more studies which have attested to the importance of gaze in co-present interaction. More recently, Egbert (1995, February), for example, reports a tight association between mutual gaze/non-gaze and the organization of repair in German, including the selection of the particular lexical items for initiating other-repair. By examining a feature of nonverbal communication in an interaction that is primarily a verbal duel, the following analysis attempts to describe "precisely <u>where</u> in a sequence of activity synchronous expressions emerge, and at what point they dissolve" (West & Zimmerman, 1982, p. 529).

In the microanalytic examination of this turning point in the arguing sequence, gaze is perhaps the best index of what is going on. By looking at the patterns of the primary speakers' gaze (i.e., Eduardo and Harry), it seems we can have a clue to what could be expected as opposed to what gets actually done during the climax and resolution of the negotiational arguing sequence.

Harry and Eduardo do most of the productive behavioral work and figure prominently as the two primary speakers in the participation structure (Shultz et al., 1982) during the sub-segment excerpted from the sequence for microanalysis. Charles and Roberto are in the background, with limited participation in the production of utterances. Analysis of the microtranscript of the four participants' nonverbal behavior shows that listenership for the secondary participants involves much less movement than it does for the primary ones. Harry and Eduardo produce a much greater amount of nonverbal listenership cues than do Charles or Roberto. Eduardo and Harry are also the only ones to receive the concomitant gaze of all other three participants when they are speaking, whereas Roberto and Charles are seldom the recipients of gaze at all in this sub-segment.

The comparative table below shows the figures for the gaze/non-gaze patterns of both primary participants in the pre-closing sub-segment of this arguing sequence. A second chart shows figures for mutual gaze (i.e., those moments when both participants were gazing at each other).

Table 3. Gaze patterns of primary participants in arguing sequence closing

	Eduardo				**Harry**			
	gaze		non-gaze		gaze		non-gaze	
overall	54.0"	52.9%	48.0"	47.0%	68.0"	74.7%	23.0"	25.27%
16:47-17:47	43.5"	71.3%	17.5"	28.6%	41.5"	68.0%	19.5"	31.96%
17:48-18:18/28	10.5"	25.6%	30.5"	74.3%	26.5"	88.3%	3.5"	11.66%

Mutual gaze		
overall	40"	39.21%
16:47-17:47	30"	49.18%
17:48-18:18	10"	32.25%

Eduardo's Pre-Closing Gaze Patterns

Eduardo's gaze pattern during the 1'42" in which the sequence changes its course from stand-off- to resolution-bound shows us that he spends a little more than half of that time looking at Harry (54"/53% looking; 48"/47% *not* looking). If we turn to different moments in the interaction, we can see that his behavior changes significantly across the segment.

The 1'42"-segment was split into two parts: before and after Harry's request for information ("<huhmuch->] how much is the leather?"). Thus I found that, in the first half, Eduardo spent close to three quarters (71%) of the time looking at Harry (43.5"/61"). In the second half following the crucial information request, however, that rate drops to only one quarter of the time (26%, or 10.5"/41"). What accounts for this sudden drop in Eduardo's gaze/non-gaze ratio seems to be the sense that he is in trouble and that he is about to be contradicted beyond rebuttal.

Looking at Eduardo's gaze pattern in the light of local contextual detail, it is remarkable that in the stretch before that turning point, the longest period he spent not gazing at Harry was only 5 seconds long. After the turning point, not only does he spend most of the time *not looking* at Harry, but he also averts his gaze from Harry for periods of 13 and 17.5 seconds. In addition, the five-second gaze aversion period prior to the turning point is part of a contextual impediment at the time, since Eduardo was then searching for some figure in the cost sheets spread on the table. Eduardo's behaviors in this segment are reproduced below in both transcription formats:

6.4/Excerpt 1/DS 19

E: [yeah, you have <u>twen</u>ty per=
=cent <u>more</u> (↑) (0.7)=((*turning torso to read note on table*)) °↑<u>how</u>- ↑what is the <u>price</u>? you are speaking?°
(0.3)
H: fort[y-four dollars and <u>change</u>

	16:57	16:58	16:59
Eduardo	°↑how- ↑what is the <u>price</u>?	you are speaking?°	
torso	(	=	=
gaze	H '''		
head	↓	=	=
arms	L arm on cases =/R arm ↓	=	=

	17:00	17:01	17:02
Eduardo			
torso	---	)	|
gaze			--- H
head	= (↓)	=	---
arms	= (L arm on cases/R arm ↓)	=	=

The bold-lined cells above show Eduardo's movements as he bends forward over the table and lowers his head, thus dropping his gaze from Harry (16:57), and then his return to an upright posture and the eminent return of his gaze to Harry (17:02).

In contrast to that, in the second part of the sub-segment, Eduardo drops his gaze, as Harry is half-way through the information request which gives the sequence its final turn ("[<huhmuch->] <u>how</u> much is the <u>lea</u>ther?"). Harry starts his turn at 17:48, Eduardo drops his gaze at 17:50, to fix it again on Harry only 13 seconds later (17:50-18:03), when he provides the information requested ("yes, it's twen- <u>twen</u>ty-one <u>do</u>llars"). This is in part contextually motivated by the fact that Eduardo is looking for, and then at, the notes where he will find the information. However, it is also true that, first, he drops the cost sheets and averts his gaze, turning his head away, to the opposite side of where the cost sheets are (17:50) ...

	17:47	17:48	17:49
Harry		<huhmuch-> how much is the	leather?

Eduardo	is fifty per cent	more.	
torso	= (|)	=	=
gaze	= (H)	=	=
head	= (→)	=	=
arms	L hand ↓↑ —— ; R hand on papers	↓L hand on case; R hand =	= L/ R ---
other	snaps fingers		

... and then he takes quite some time looking for and at them (17:50-18:02),

	17:50	17:51
Harry	what's the total cost	of the leather?

Eduardo		
torso	=	= (|)
gaze	"	
head	---⌈↓	⌋↓
arms	= L/ R drops cost sheet	L ---

	17:52	17:53	17:54
Harry		twenty dollars?	

Eduardo			
torso	⌋	⎞⌈⎛	⎛⌈
gaze			
head	=	⌈↓	=
arms	L hand off case	L ---	L↑ to notes

	17:55	17:56	17:57	17:58
Harry				

Eduardo				
torso	--- ⎞⎛	=	=	=
gaze				
head	= (↓)	=	=	=
arms	→ over notes	=	=	=

... so that Harry starts to ask the question a third time (at 18:02; shown in regular transcript below "how much is the [( )"). Notice also that Eduardo crosses his arms as he delivers the turn containing the information requested. He keeps his gaze on Harry for another 8 seconds (18:03-18:11) as he answers Harry's question and takes in the meaning of Harry's reasoning:

6.4/Excerpt 2/DS 19

```
H:      [<huhmuch->] how much is the leather?=
        =((E drops gaze; drops cost sheets)) (0.9)
H:      what's the total cost of the leather? (0.9) twenty dollars?
```

```
          (4.2) ((E looking for notes))
      R:  no, it's not °(this).° (.) it's this one.
          (2.3)
      H:  how  much  is the [(              )
→     E:  ((crossing arms))=[yes, it's twen- twenty-one dollars,=
→         =yes. okay, [(          leather)
→     H:              [so TWENTY PER CENT.
→     E:  yeah.
→     H:  ((slapping clap)) that's four dollars.
→         (1.4) ((E looks puzzled: raises head and eyebrows; blinks))
→     H:  (tha)t's ↑four dollars
→         (1.3)
```

Eduardo then abruptly averts his gaze again from Harry, exactly as he yields to Harry's reasoning which contradicted his own account. Eduardo never returns his gaze to Harry until the end of the sub-segment (18:11-18:28, total = 17.5").

6.4/Excerpt 3/DS 19

```
          (1.4) ((E looks puzzled: raises head and eyebrows; blinks))
      H:  (tha)t's ↑four dollars
          (1.3)
→     E:  °it's four dollars, (.) yeah.° ((drops gaze abruptly; looks
      down at notes))
          (0.9)
      H:  kay?
      E:  yeah.
          (4.0) ((H looks at C, throws hands up; C shakes head no))
      H:  now, (with) such a high labor cost (put things up) to forty-
      four dollars? °ah::: (              ),°=
```

Harry's Pre-Closing Gaze Patterns

Turning now to Harry's gaze pattern, one finds the opposite distribution.[9] Of the 91 seconds of data on his gaze pattern, we find that Harry spent 75% gazing at Eduardo (68"/91"), and 25% gazing at Charles and Roberto or not gazing at anyone (23"/91"). This overall ratio shows Harry looking at Eduardo a great deal more often than Eduardo looking at Harry.

Once we break the segment into two parts, however, a clearer pattern emerges. Before the turning point, both primary speakers have a similar gaze/non-gaze ratio (71% : 29% for Eduardo; 68% : 32% for Harry). After the turning point, however, that balance is broken (26% : 74% for Eduardo against 88% : 12% for Harry). Harry spends 68% of the time before the turning point (17:48) gazing at Eduardo; but after that

[9] Towards the end of the microtranscript, Harry moves out of the camera frame, thus only 91 seconds of data are available on his gaze pattern, whereas 102 seconds of data are available for Eduardo.

moment, the ratio goes up to 88%. If we look at it from the perspective of Harry's non-gaze at Eduardo, the figures are even more impressive: 32% before; 12% after. In other words, Harry's gaze gets fixed upon his interlocutor much more once the turning point in the arguing sequence has occurred.

Again if we look at the development of the pattern throughout the segment, we see that Harry's pattern before 17:48 is punctuated by a sequence of short periods of gaze - some being mere glances - followed by quick gaze-aversion periods. His longest continuous gaze lasts for 6 seconds, while the typical gaze is only two-seconds long. After the turning point, however, Harry gazes at Eduardo for 20.5 seconds continuously. Moreover, most of the time that Harry is not gazing at Eduardo after the turning point (2.5"/3.5") is spent by him gazing at Roberto and Charles during the wrapping-up part of the closing of the sequence. So Harry is actually averting his gaze from Eduardo for a very limited part of the available time (see microtranscript 18:13-18:16 below).

Harry's gaze behavior is a key interactional element in the resolution of the sequence. The following excerpt shows the behavior in the concerted action through which the importers press Eduardo both verbally and nonverbally (18:13), to produce an explicit acknowledgment and backdown:

	18:13	18:14	18:15	18:16
Harry	kay?			
front	E	---	N	=
torso	⏐	---	⌉⏐	⏐⌉
gaze	E ''' R ''' E	E ''' R '''	C '''	R ''' E
head	⌈ ⌋	⌈⌈→	⌉⌈	⌈

Charles				
front	SSE	=	=	=
torso	⌊	=	=	=
gaze	E	''' ---	H	''' E ''' H
head	⌋ ↓	⌊ →	---	⌋⌊ ↓

Roberto				
front	SW	=	=	---
torso	⎛	=	⎛⎞⏐	⏐---
gaze	H '''			
head	↑	=	=	=

Eduardo	yeah.			
front	W	=	=	=
torso	⎛⏐	=	=	=
gaze				
head	↓	=	=	=

Notice that Harry moves his gaze from participant to participant after he elicits Eduardo's explicit backdown. By making sure that Roberto also gets a glance from him, Harry indicates that Roberto as well can be held accountable for the outcome of this sequence in the future. In addition, Harry gazes at Charles, who then gazes at Eduardo. All this action is received with gaze aversion on the manufacturers' side of the table.

Gaze Patterns and the Bounding of Negotiational Activities

The analyses presented above show the primary speakers' gaze patterns to be playing a major role in the participants' concerted action towards producing a joint closing of the arguing sequence. Harry accomplishes the aggressive pursuit of a potentially decisive line of argument in part by keeping his gaze inquisitively on Eduardo's face both longer and more fixedly than prior to the initiation of that pursuit. In concerted contrast, Eduardo's gazing pattern goes in the opposite direction. He averts his gaze at the turning point, initially as a display of recognition that his case is floundering, and then, once the explicit backdown approaches, also as a face-saving strategy.

The segment discussed above therefore features an interactional tug-of-war involving complex face-work on the part of its participants to produce a closing for the arguing sequence, which has an undesirable and face-threatening outcome to one of the parties, but which must nevertheless be jointly produced if the negotiation is to proceed.

In the microanalysis above, it is evident that the turning point, as I call it, is accomplished through subtle changes revealed by attention to the participants' behavior when they are not speaking, but (dis)attending to their interlocutors. As the work of Goodwin (1981) and Erickson (e.g., 1986) shows, it is exactly by monitoring the effects of his/her performance on the listener that the speaker can see how effectively s/he is interacting and where s/he must change according to the continuously emerging context of interaction. Such work underscores the marked meaning of averting gaze in the accomplishment of the interdigitation of performances.

On the functions of gaze in two-person conversations, Kendon (1990, p. 52) states that "direction of gaze serves in part as a signal by which interactants regulate their basic orientations to one another." He adds that "amount of mutual gaze a person will engage in varies with a number of factors, but principally it appears to increase where p [i.e., participant] is drawn to the person he is interacting with, either in an affiliative way or where he is in competition with the other" (p. 77). This is true for the data above where, in addition to the fact that the two primary speakers alter their gaze patterns before and after the turning point, it is after the turning point and during Harry's deliverance of his logical reasoning invalidating Eduardo's account (i.e., Harry's final offensive attack) that the longest mutual gaze in the entire microsegment can be found (8 seconds, 18:03-18:11).

Analyzing male/female dyadic conversations, Kendon (1990) noted that one of the two participants would avert his/her gaze, breaking mutual gaze, when "the conversation [was] getting onto dangerous ground" (p. 81). This seemed to work as a device to limit the level of emotionality caused by sexual arousal in the participants (p. 81). A similar phenomenon, that is, gaze aversion as a device to cool down irritation and aggressiveness, seems to be a primary explanation for the breaks in gaze before the turning point in the arguing sequence excerpts analyzed above. This is especially true of Harry, who is noticeably and increasingly exasperated as the arguing continues.

Goffman (1963) also refers to "the bargaining power of the individual who can convincingly commit himself to a line of action" by strategically avoiding "meeting the other's eyes and thus avoid[ing] cooperative claims" (p. 94f). This seems to be part of Harry's persuasive strength. In insisting that Eduardo's prices are unjustified while avoiding long gazes at his opponent, Harry maintains his obstinate line of action at the same time that he blocks Eduardo's requests for acquiescence with the quoted price.

However, after the turning point, we see Harry fixing his gaze on Eduardo in stark contrast to Eduardo's behavior in relation to Harry (except for that long mutual gaze period referred to above). This also contrasts with Harry's previous pattern. Thus in this case, it does not seem that Eduardo's gaze aversion is solely a device to limit his level of emotionality. In fact, Kendon (1990) also refers to another "expressive function" of gaze direction, namely that which "occurs in association with 'point-granting' signals, as if here p is dropping his gaze to indicate that he is not going to challenge further what the other has just said" (p. 86). This remark is appropriate, in part, in the case of Eduardo's gaze aversion which lasts well after the arguing sequence is entirely over. Yet, another item must be added to Kendon's observations about the expressive functions of gazing to account in full for Eduardo's behavior. It seems that the main expressive function of gaze here is to work as a device to save his face from being shattered after a competitive defeat, this done in a subdued way that still leaves room for collaborating within the rules of politeness and decency in the production of the common ground, with which the sequence can then close.

Taking face to be "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line of others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (Goffman, 1967, p. 5), we see that Eduardo is on the verge of losing it once he realizes he will have to give in, that is, backdown from his position by accepting that his account for the price has been warrantedly dishonored. In other words, the line he has built for himself in the interactional segment is that his price quotation on the new item is justified, but once his account is invalidated, that line is no longer sustainable and his face is seriously threatened. He must do something to save his face (i.e., "to sustain an impression for the others that he has not lost face," p. 9), especially because Harry's fixed gaze on him is, in Goffman's terms, "heartless" (p. 7).

The type of face-work that Eduardo engages in once the arguing sequence reaches its anti-climax can best be understood in the light of Goffman's avoidance process in face-work. In his analysis of avoidance strategies, Goffman (1967) theorizes that "when a person fails to prevent an incident, he can still attempt to maintain the fiction that no threat to face has occurred" (p. 17). Accordingly, the person can *act as if* the "event that contains a threatening expression has not occurred at all," or openly admit that "incident as an event that has happened, but not as an event that contains a threatening expression" (p. 18). It is this need that Eduardo seems to address by means of gaze aversion after realizing his account has been co-constructed as unacceptable. Eduardo averts his gaze from Harry and lowers his head so that Harry cannot catch his eye to accomplish a number things. Eduardo is not going to argue any further. He admits his line cannot be sustained, but also avoids further face-loss, which would be undesirable for all.

Negotiational Arguing Interaction in Real-Time and Space

The microanalysis of the negotiation segment above underscores the importance of looking at interaction as it happens in time and in space, as discussed in chapter 3. A great deal can be accomplished in a few seconds of interaction, while little significant behavioral action may take place in long stretches of time, in which not doing anything significant constitutes the appropriate behavior. The actions in those seconds shown in the microtranscript excerpts above during the climatic moments of the sequence — when all participants would each perform a series of verbal and nonverbal behaviors within fractions of a second — contrast meaningfully with the subsequent interactional minutes following the closing of the sequence, when they would engage in limited nonverbal, and virtually no verbal exchanges at all, for extended periods, lasting dozens of seconds.

These contrasts reveal much of the same phenomenon observed by Pike (1967) in the performance of a church service, namely that "there are SEGMENTS of the sequence during which the purpose of the service is being vigorously forwarded by activity, and separated by moments where one type of significant activity slurs into the next segment of activity" (p. 74, original emphasis). They are meaningful for participants as composite activity-boundary markers and may be seen as comparable to the micro-second phonemic contrasts in a language system. In other words, despite the fuzzy quality of the boundaries between segments, the integrated observation of all aspects of behavior as it is performed in real time usually reveals a hierarchy of levels of activity.

In addition, looking at the real-time development of interaction renders the interdigitation among the actions of participants especially evident. Erickson and Shultz' (1982) description of this aspect of the interaction between counselor and student applies to the interaction between the four businessmen: "This social organization in and across moments of real time is reflexive ... The ways in which each talks and listens from moment to moment becomes an environment for the other party" (pp. 6-7). In the performance of the negotiational arguing sequence above, Harry's and Eduardo's systematic use of direction and aversion of gaze, as a way of jointly agreeing on the balance of the positions at each different stage in the sequence, shows us that this interdigitation is a crucial aspect of the co-construction of social interaction, and that negotiation talk is no exception to that.

Alternatively, using Goffman's (1963) terminology, one could say that the microanalysis of the arguing activity above reveals that "expressive messages" play a crucial role as "embodied information" among interactants just as the more evident "linguistic messages" do (pp. 13-14). That this is true also of the co-construction of an arguing sequence in a negotiation encounter — where by definition the verbal channel is extremely foregrounded as rhetoric — is significant. Moreover, that the participants demonstrably expend a great deal of effort to construct arguing-sequence closings bespeaks the relevance that these bounded sequences have for them.

The following chapters further advance our understanding of negotiational arguing sequences. First I discuss challenges and accounts — the main actions that constitute the core of arguing as a negotiational activity. Then I present the overall action structures of negotiational arguing sequences, and lay the foundation for a typology of the different arguing sequences found in the corpus according to their decision-making patterns.

CHAPTER 7

NEGOTIATIONAL ARGUING ACTIONS

> *... the great row which my grandfather had looked forward to for weeks and weeks was deflected by my father's useful habit of retreating into almost total silence, of never trying to justify any of his crimes, so that it was difficult to argue with him.*
>
> Michael Ondaatje, *Running in the family*, p. 32.

The previous chapters defined negotiational arguing sequences, explicated data segments containing occurrences of the phenomenon, and discussed the bounded nature of these sequences. Participants were shown to be co-constructing a series of connected oppositional actions and to be orienting to them as interactional units. These units have openings and closings and are, therefore, bounded from the activities that come before them as well as from those that follow their completion.

The present chapter expands the discussion of the structural composition of the actions through which participants co-construct these arguing sequences in the Amage/Courofatos negotiation. First, I define and discuss accounts and challenges — the two main types of actions in our corpus of negotiational arguing sequences. The second major section of this chapter presents the main thesis of this dissertation by means of a comprehensive description of the action structures in negotiational arguing sequences. Detailed examination of these structures introduces the typology of arguing sequences found in the negotiation talk data source. This typology as well as explicated transcripts containing example occurrences of the different types are presented in the following chapter.

The Production of Accounts and Challenges

Challenges and accounts are the crucial actions in negotiational arguing. As the narrator of the quotation opening this chapter realized, and his father before him, it is difficult to argue when accounts are not proffered.

Accounts and challenges in fact represent two sides of the same coin. Conceptualizing them as example of "aligning actions," Stokes and Hewitt (1976) write that "in *accounts* the dominant issue involves untoward conduct that is *challenged*" (p. 845, emphasis added). When untoward, unexpected or non-aligning behavior is not an issue, explanations constitute a similar but distinct phenomenon from accounts, as in pedagogic or scientific discourse (cf. Scott & Lyman, 1968).

Sacks (1992) in turn, equates challenges to "'requests for explanation' or 'requests for justification'" (vol. 2, p. 114). Well, accounts are *offerings of explanation or justification* for "unanticipated or untoward behavior" (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 46). Stating the elements in this order would perhaps suggest the two types of actions to form adjacency pairs. But the picture is more complex, for they need not even occur adjacently. In addition, just as challenges may make accounts sequentially relevant, accounts may also be followed by challenges, as typically happens in negotiational arguing.

Moreover, just as the challenged party may be able to turn a challenge around so that the onus of producing an account befalls on the initially challenging party, an account may be produced through the assertion that the other party lacks the grounds to their own position. In such cases it is difficult (for the recipient, and definitely for the analyst) to determine whether an utterance is an account or a challenge. An example of this is in the excerpt below, where Charles displays non-alignment with Eduardo's proposal.

7.1/Excerpt 1/DS 9

```
             (3.0)
      E:     you need he:re, (.) lining here?
             (1.2)
      C:     lining?
      E:     yeah.
             (1.1)
      C:     what would you put in there?
      E:     nothing.
             (0.4)
      C:     oh.
             (0.9)
      E:     nada.
             (2.0)
  →   C:     yeah how much (were) you gon[na save with that
      E:                                 [eah:
      R:     [no, but with ↑LABOR >E- E- E- EVERYTHING counts<
      E:     [no (              )
```

With his question-utterance implying there is no good reason to accept the proposal, Charles may be heard to account for his non-alignment with it. Another possible hearing is that he is challenging the proposal.

To reject a proposal, Charles could be expected to account for such misalignment, but here he rejects the proposal and initiates an accounting practice for the rejection by questioning the extent to which the proposal will advance cost reduction (i.e., save much). Charles is thus implying that the proposal is useless. This would account for his non-alignment with it. At the same time, however, Charles may be heard as challenging the very proposal as such. By soliciting the exact extent to which the proposed modification will reduce the cost of the item, Charles requests an explanation or justification for the proposal. That is to say, he challenges it by claiming not to be able to see for himself what justifies it, thus doubting the status of the importers' assertion as a serious proposal to be considered.

Accounts and challenges are in fact talk-interactional practices that deal with the same substance. Accounts are given as explanations of something felt as "not quite right." They work to preserve the presupposition that the best-case scenario applies and thus control or restrict other possible attributions that can be made (e.g., those that culminate in the attribution of blame). Challenges work against the preservation of that presupposition. They aim at making attributions which the recipient may have reasons to want to avoid. Thus the two types of actions can be seen as *accounting practices*.

In addition, given that interaction is continually emerging, and that being in the position of challenger/account-recipient may be more comfortable than being in the position of challenged/account-giver, participants may sometimes produce actions that blur the distinction. As Sacks (1992) puts it:

> if what you do is offer an answer to the challenge, then what you're setting up is that the other person operates on your answer. You know that they're in a position of being doubtful, and that if you produce an answer they are thereby put in a position of being able to do a critique on your materials. A way to switch the thing around is to attempt to get them to offer such sorts of materials as that then put *you* in the position of commenting on their candidate explanation. That is to say, we have here an occasion of battle for which sequencing considerations are operative, where the position of commenting on the answer is an ideal position to be in, a position one may want to achieve. (vol. 2, p. 124).

When an accounting practice in negotiation talk meets with recipient opposition, chances are an arguing sequence is underway. Accounts and challenges are thus the main actions in negotiational arguing sequences. Let us examine each of these action types in turn. First let us briefly discuss accounts, which have received considerable attention from students of talk-in-interaction. Then we turn to challenges, which have received far less attention, and I explicate some of the methods through which participants perform them in our data corpus.

Accounts[1]

Accountability is a central concern in contemporary social science. Giddens (1984) writes that "to be 'accountable' for one's activities is both to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be 'justified'" (p. 30). These are talk-interactional constructions on which a great deal of research work has been done. Indeed, "accounts are most extraordinary" (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 4).

Accounts are not produced when everything is as expected. Rather, they occur when a participant in talk-in-interaction may be seen or heard as having done something unexpected, unwelcome or dispreferred in any one of numerous possible ways. The work of an account is, first, to maintain that participant's claim to have acted the best way possible even while having performed some "less-than-ideal" action, and, second, to ward off at least some of the attributions that could be made to him/her on the basis of that less-than-ideal action.[2] In a common example from everyday interaction between non-intimates, a rejection of an offer of refreshments will typically be followed by an account:

A: would like some iced tea?
B: no, thanks. I'm not thirsty.

The recipient of the offer may thus display an orientation to avoiding that certain inferences be made about his/her relationship with the person making the offer (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987).

Honoring it (i.e., accepting it) is the preferred next relevant action following an account. In a quantitative analysis of account sequences in ordinary conversation between strangers, McLaughlin, Cody and Rosenstein (1983) indeed found that to be the most common action following accounts proffered after reproaches. These authors observe that

[1] What follows in no way attempts to exhaust the topic of accounts. For more detailed discussion, see, among many others, Scott and Lyman(1968), a seminal work; McLaughlin, Cody and Rosenstein (1983), on accounts in ordinary conversation; Atkinson and Drew (1979) on accounts in courtroom cross-examination; Firth (1995a), on accounts in negotiation talk; as well as Sacks (1992). For a recent comprehensive treatment, see Antaki (1994).
[2] Important further distinctions, such as that Austin makes between excuses and justifications, are not discussed here. On the appropriateness of the term account, see Atkinson and Drew (1979, pp. 138-140).

> The preferred alternative for those who are reproached ought to be to provide compelling excuses and/or justifications as opposed to, say, rejecting the propositional content of the reproach or denying the other the right of reproach. Similarly, the reproacher's preferred alternative in evaluating such response ought to be to honor it. If a dispreferred form of either the account or the evaluation is given, then an argument is likely to ensue. (p. 107).

That indicates that accounts which are not honored (i.e., accepted) are not only dispreferred but also the marked response to accounts in everyday conversation, that is, they are interactionally salient.

Participants in negotiation talk handle accounts somewhat similarly. That is, accepting them is the preferred response, and their non-acceptance will likely develop into an arguing sequence. However, finding fault with an account seems to be less exceptional in negotiation than in other forms of talk. As Firth (1995a) points out, participants in negotiation talk display a particular orientation to accounts "in a *creative*, problem-solving sense: as linguistic objects that seek to effect substantive change" (p. 200).

As was pointed out earlier in this dissertation, accounts are ubiquitous in negotiation talk. As Scott and Lyman (1968) define it, "an account is a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry" (p. 46), and a great deal of the talk in negotiation is built around the evaluation of actions such as proposals and offers through aligning or non-aligning actions with them (i.e., bargaining sequences). Firth (1995a) writes that in negotiation talk, accounts "stand for" rejection. As such, they emphasize the grounds for the rejection; and not the rejection *per se*, "thereby fulfilling important interpersonal and work-related functions" (p. 208). In negotiation talk-in-interaction, these work-related functions are critical. The institutional mandate makes it clear that participants and teams have partly diverging interests and motivations that predispose them to perform less-than-ideal actions based on those selfish motivations. Thus accounts will only be honored if all concerned treat them as universally justifiable upon their local production. All of this makes accounting practices which involve more than account-acceptance exchanges a common occurrence in negotiation talk.

In fact, participants in negotiation talk routinely treat accounts as probable materials, indeed as *negotiable*. Accounts are oriented to by co-participants as objects to be "unpacked" together, or as "discourse materials of change and for change" (Firth, 1995a, p. 221) "Put simply, 'accounts' give the parties something to talk about and challenge as well as providing a topical base from which negotiating activity can proceed" (Firth, 1991, p. 131).

Consider again the example of refreshment offer above. It would be unusual for A to probe into the account with something such as a serious questioning of B's thirst or the offering of counter-evidence to it.[3] In negotiation talk, however, probing into accounts is usual. Accounts "are treated *by both parties* as legitimately and inherently *contestable*, 'probeable' objects" (Firth, 1995a, p. 212, original emphasis). Firth writes that "if a person negotiating a commodity agreement refuses the other party's offer, he [or she] will volunteer, or be called upon, to account for the decision's warrantability of reasonableness" (p. 200). In addition, account-givers in negotiation talk orient to potential "challenge trajectories" (Firth, 1995a) in the following turns. That is, the account-giving negotiator may reasonably expect that "a tendentious and thus strategically motivated" questioning of his/her account may be a legitimate action for the recipients to produce next, as they "seek to manoeuvre the account-giver into a vulnerable negotiating position" (p. 213) which would therefore persuade the account-giver to reconsider his/her non-alignment. This is accomplished through some form of a challenge.

Challenges

When presented with an assertion of a state of affairs with which they are not happy, people will often produce an oppositional turn at talk voicing their differences. According to Vuchinich (1990), "American English provides many different illocutionary structures for accomplishing oppositional turns at talk. These include disagreement, challenge, denial, accusation, threat, insult" (p. 123). Brown and Levinson (1987), writing indiscriminately about contradictions, disagreements, and challenges, maintain that through these slightly different actions "S [the speaker] indicates that [s/]he thinks H [the hearer] is wrong or misguided or unreasonable about some issue, such wrongness being associated with disapproval" (p. 66). All of them occur frequently in the co-construction of arguing sequences in negotiation.[4]

Challenges, however, do more than express differences or opposition to a fellow interactants' previous statements or positions. In challenging someone, we are calling into question the validity of that person's position while at the same time implying that a better version can and should be found. Thus a

[3] It would not be unusual for A not to accept the rejection right away and insist on the offer, but that would not be done by taking issue with the account.
[4] See Mulholland (1991) for a detailed discussion of the practical use of these actions in negotiation talk.

challenge may in itself contain a disagreement, a contradiction, or both, but it also contains a call for the search of a mutually acceptable version of the states of affairs. In other words, challenges are oppositional turns at talk through which people try to disqualify an opposing version of a state of affairs to establish another, usually their own, as (more) universally valid.

This is especially true of challenges in negotiational arguing. These are social actions whereby people doubt, disagree with, or contradict their fellow interactants, not simply to express differences, but to try to constrain them to re-examine their asserted (non-aligning) positions. They are routinely performed in the hopes that the challenged party will respond. Preferably, they will capitulate and subscribe to the challenging view as true or warranted. Alternatively, they may stand by their previously asserted position if they can provide (additional) convincing evidence to support it.

Either response will potentially advance the resolution of misalignment. Even the less preferred response will contain materials for further challenging. So whichever response is given to a challenge, and it is most commonly some accounting practice, more arguing develops towards the determination of the status of the contending positions in the sequence.

The thrust of a challenge is therefore to mistrust the challenged party's version of what things are, or their version of why things are what they are. In challenges I examined in the Courofatos/Amage negotiational arguing sequences, it appears that a challenging party will effect that mistrusting differently according to whether they are treating the challenged assertion as a description of fact, broadly speaking, or as reflecting a decision, a conscious action. The challenging party will address different aspects of the challenged party's assertion according to the way the assertion is treated.[5] The following is a discussion of the different methods for the production of a challenge.

Challenges to an Assertion of Fact[6]

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[5] Alternatively, in his discussion on the discourse of argumentation, Kopperschmidt (1985) points out that, in seeking an argumentative solution to a problem, we may look for it in the "validity resulting from the presentation of knowledge, which we call truth, or in a validity arising from obligations and evaluations, which we call correctness" (p. 161).

[6] I will employ the word *fact* for the sake of convenience to refer to assertions that claim to be descriptions of states of affairs.

When someone makes a "declarative assertion of 'objective' states of affairs" (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609), his/her recipient may challenge that assertion of fact. The challenge may address the *factualness* of the assertion (i.e., is it true/untrue, exact/inexact?), or the *sources or bases* for the assertion (i.e., how can we be sure that it is really there or that it is as you claim?).

In addressing the *factualness* of the assertion, the challenging party may reject the truth value of the challenged assertion without necessarily pointing to any particular problem with it, thus placing on the challenged party most of the burden of ascertaining what the "true" state of affairs is. In contrast, when addressing the challenged party's *sources or bases* for making that claim (i.e., how they can account for their claim), the challenging party shares the burden in the verification of the true state of affairs with the challenged party by soliciting those sources or bases (Pomerantz, 1984b).

Addressing Factualness

The most common way to challenge the assertion of a fact is to doubt and/or negate that fact. The following example illustrates this method. Roberto makes an assertion that the percentage (of freight cost) from Taiwan (will amount to) seven or eight percent (of the FOB price of a product):

7.2/Excerpt 1/DS 3

```
     R:   ↑no, I'm thinking about percentage,
          (.)
     C:   yeah,
          (1.3)
     R:   ((shoulders up and down)) from Taiwa:n,
          (2.9)
     R:   seven, eight per cent,=
 →   H:   =NO:::
     R:   ef oh bee? ((FOB))
          (0.8)
 →   H:   ((shaking head)) °°no.°°
          (0.6)
 →   H:   less
```

Harry challenges Roberto's assertion first through the repeated denial of Roberto's assertion, and then by an elliptic utterance reformulating the challenged assertion (i.e., the percentage of freight cost from Taiwan will amount to less than seven or eight percent of the price).

This method seems to be common in ordinary conversation as well, as in the following example:

```
Paul Drew/PARSS/7.2 [Rahman:1:12:2]
014 Jen       .h Av you seen uhr.
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→       015 Ida       Ye- .h Well she's gon to m: eh: eh: Chestuh:.
→       016                  (0.9)
        017 Ida       Ja[no:,
        018 Jen         [↑Jano hahs.
        019 Ida       ↑Ey?
→       020 Jen       No she hasn't?
        021                  (0.8)
        022 Ida       Ye:s. She's go::ne.
        023                  (0.7)
```

Another variant of the method is what Coulter (1990) calls a "contrastively-matched counter" (p. 195), as in the excerpt below:

7.3/Excerpt 1/DS 1

```
        C:     uh:: I don't think it will increase the cost a great deal if
        you: eliminate the big suede, (   ) okay, (.) and have it one        piece,
(    ) like this
   →    R:     it will increase the cost a great deal.
```

This prototypical challenge method is direct and incisive: it portrays the challenged assertion as objectively untrue by negating it as the appropriate description of the states of affairs. Its strength lies in the fact that it rebuts the prior assertion while also advancing an alternative. However, it might be interactionally costly to confront one's fellow interactant head-on like this due to possible face-threats (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Also, the burden of accounting for the states of affairs may reverse to the challenging party, who might be called to show evidence for the negated assertion.

A second method for challenging a declarative assertion of a fact is to claim failure to confirm it upon inspection or consideration. In doing this, the challenging party is claiming that the evidence for the universal truth of the challenged party's assertion is not inferable, or is not sufficiently convincing, as in the excerpt below. Harry is making a minor concession regarding the existence of additional leather between the two items being compared:

7.4/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
        H:     YES, (.) you have more labor in here. (.) no question
        °°(about it)°°.=
        R:     =nine files. (.) opposed to four files.
   →    H:     wu- I don't see where you have nine files, °but okay°
        R:     one,
        H:     ah:
        R:     two,=
        H:     =I'm t[alking
        R:           [three, four, five, six, (0.6) seven, eight, (0.6)
        ni:ne.
        H:     ((hand inside case)) ↑but look what you're talking in cost
               of ↑material, ↑come on.((frozen squinting smile))
```

Roberto upgrades Harry's concession through an assertion about an objective, physical state of affairs that can easily be ascertained "unproblematically and with certainty" (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 608) through inspection ("there are *nine files* in this case"). Given that the propositional content in Roberto's assertion is easily and immediately verifiable, it would be unlikely that Roberto would venture it if he thought it could be falsified on the grounds of direct experience. To challenge this assertion of fact, then, Harry chooses not to attack its truth value directly, as he could have done with a negation (e.g., "There aren't nine files"). Rather, he re-formulates Roberto's "objective" description of the world ("nine files.") as one among possible *versions*. In other words, he turns what Roberto claims as *fact* into a disputable *version*. Harry does this first by uttering a disagreement token ("wu-"), then by juxtaposing his perspective of direct experience against Roberto's: he does "not see" where "Roberto has" nine files.

On the one hand, claiming failure to find sufficient evidence to confirm the challenged assertion makes less incisive a challenge than negating the assertion. The challenging party may see the challenged party's claimed failure to find sufficient evidence as a groundless refusal to accept what is self-evident or has already been demonstrated. On the other hand, however, this is a more cautious method of making a challenge, one which is fitting when the challenge must be performed under ambivalent circumstances, such as when the challenging party is hesitant to confront a fellow interactant due to issues of face, or as above, because if the challenge is to be done at all, it must be done at that particular moment, in spite of its vacuousness.

Both methods discussed above can be combined. In the next example, we find both a rejection through negation, and a claim of failure to confirm the challenged assertion. They are tied in a critical contextual relationship to the challenged party's previous turns.

7.5/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
→  E:   ((showing Harry the calculator)) ↑here we have twenty per
   cent,
        (0.7)
   E:   in leather.
        (0.6)
   R:   twenty per cent mo:re consumption of leather.
        (0.6)
→  E:   you have to accept this.
        (1.1)
   E:   yes?=
   R:   =and if [you want, we can get- we can take the=
```

```
H:              [((eyebrows up; shakes head no))
R:      =↑p[aper patterns [and measure one by one,
H:         [°no°
E:                            [(look) ((holding calculator))=
E:      =and then (0.2) and then we compare: (.) the labor.=
        =[here AND HERE ((hands on cases on table))
→  H:   =[I don't accept twenty per cent more leather. I don't see
where it's coming,
        (0.6)
R:      ↑listen, (0.4) ↑out of this here. ((hands inside new case))
E:      °yeah.°
R:      this ((showing gussets))
        (1.1)
R:      oppo:sed,
        (0.2)
```

Sequentially, Harry's challenge above is an immediate response to Eduardo's assumption that the previous assertion about "twenty per cent more leather" has been accepted as true. Given Harry's refusal to commit himself to the purported factualness of the claim (see first line of excerpt above), Eduardo makes a last-resort move to establish that factualness as settled and as no longer his duty to demonstrate. Eduardo formulates the action he expects the importers to perform ("you have to accept this"), and then explicitly solicits agreement from them ("yes?"). Harry again responds with silence and with unspoken negations. It is at the point, when Eduardo recognizably assumes he has shown sufficient evidence for his claim, that Harry challenges him (i.e., Eduardo starts a new turn with "and then," thus moving on to the second aspect in price calculation). At this point Harry overlaps Eduardo's turn with the challenge to the twenty-per-cent issue. Harry's oppositional turn must tackle two aspects of Eduardo's argument: the manufacturer's claim about the factualness of the twenty per cent more leather, and his assumption that this factualness had been sufficiently demonstrated.

7.5/Excerpt 2/DS 19

```
→  H:   =[I don't accept twenty per cent more leather. I don't see
   where it's coming,
```

Harry challenges his recipients, first, by rejecting Eduardo's assertion about the action that Harry should be performing, and then by claiming failure, based on his own direct experience, to confirm the basis for the case presented by the manufacturers. Harry effects the rejection through a polar negation of Eduardo's last-resort appeal ("E: you have to accept this" – "H: I don't accept twenty percent more leather"), followed by an account for such rejection based on his failure to see the source or basis for the additional leather ("I don't see where it's coming,").

Thus in the excerpt above we see the combined use of the two strategies. Their effectiveness in the production of a challenge is seen in their uptake. First, Eduardo never gets to complete his turn about the second aspect (i.e., labor), so the assumption that the first point had been accepted is in fact invalidated for all practical purposes. Secondly, the constraint on the challenged party to ascertain the factualness of their claim is taken up by Roberto, who responds by appealing to direct experience (i.e., he tries to show Harry where the additional leather consumption comes from, by comparing the two items visually).

Addressing Sources or Bases

A different sort of challenge to a declarative assertion of fact is one which addresses the challenged party's sources or basis for coming up with their assertion, that is, what evidence they have to show that what they claim is really a fact. "If people ask for evidence, they are asking for grounds for believing that given assertions are true. One sort of evidence that people [can be asked to] give is to tell their sources or bases of their believing their assertions" (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609).

A few different methods may be used to make this type of challenge. When the challenging party is in the possession of appropriate information, s/he may challenge an assertion by reporting an event which presents factual counter-evidence to the assertion, or s/he may doubt or negate the existence of necessary pre-conditions for the assertion to be true, as Roberto does in the excerpt below:

7.6/Excerpt 1/DS 17

```
    H:    but that's what the American people ↑want right now, (.)
    Charlie would love to even use a material,
    C:    yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
 →  R:                                    [ssya-
 →  R:    Seeg[ar uses that]
    H:        [they won't e-]
```

Roberto challenges the importers' account for rejecting his proposal by reporting counter evidence to the asserted account.[7]

When the challenging party does not possess such information, or is hesitant to use it directly, s/he can make an assertion locating some problem with the basis of the challenged assertion, or, alternatively, s/he may question the sources of the assertion itself, or yet question the particular sources of

[7] See the explication of this exchange in chapter 5, pp. 157-175.

the information used as basis for the challenged assertion. These two methods are illustrated by the following two examples.

The challenging party may suggest some unidentified problem exists with the sources of the challengeable material (here, an unacceptable price):

7.7/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
 →     H:         [I am tel̲l̲ling you (.) that so̲[me̲thing is wrong in your=   E:
                                        [(          )
 →     H:      =[calculations.
```

The next example features another challenge using roughly the same method only now by mistrusting particular elements with the price as an assertion of fact:

7.8/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
       E:      =yeah. this- we have here ((holds up old case from table))
       zero point,=
       R:      =zero point seventy-seven. (0.5) s- me- meters,
               (.)
       E:      [square meter.
       R:      [(      )
               (0.7)
       E:      okay?=
 →     H:      =↑how do you know that is correct? who measured the
       leather?
               (0.6)
       E:      °↑oh: the people ↑there.°((jerks head back; drops case;
       turns wrists clockwise and counterclockwise))
 →     H:      maybe they're made a mistake.=
```

Here Harry challenges Eduardo's figures about leather consumption in the price-contended item by invalidating the basis for Eduardo's assertion and by questioning his information sources.[8] Casting doubt on the source of this specific input information (i.e., the measurements on which the price is calculated), means casting doubt on the basis for the manufacturers' price claim while treating it as a product of objective calculations, that is, it implies the price is simply wrong as the result of faulty measurements.

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[8] The same method is used in the example below, only here it is Eduardo who challenges Harry's assertion:

7.fn1/Excerpt 1/DS 13

```
       H:      °(but)° this is- ↓T̲H̲I̲R̲TY-TWO SEVenty-f̲i̲v̲e̲,
               (1.7)
 →     E:      ↑yeah, (b   ) (0.8) from w̲h̲e̲r̲e̲?
               (0.9)
       H:      [from Czechoslovakia, that's from whe̲re,
       E:      [how we can compare?
               (1.0)=((H staring at E))
       H:      ↓I'm not quoting you prices from the s̲k̲y̲:,
               (2.4)
```

This is done through two blunt questions uttered one after the other in a machine-gun fashion (Tannen, 1984a). The first forces Eduardo to consider what he knows directly about the state of affairs he is reporting. This plays on the unlikelyhood that Eduardo himself would have measured the leather, and is designed to undermine Eduardo's authority to claim the figures are correct. Moreover, it locates the source of the ultimate basis for the price claim (measurements → leather consumption estimation→ price calculation → price claim) outside the immediate control of the challenged interactants, that is, outside their immediate verifiable experience. Note that a refutation like in the case of the "nine files" (example 7.4 above) is not possible, since prices cannot be ascertained "unproblematically and with certainty" (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 608) through physical inspection.

The choice of the word correct is also an important reinforcement here. Since Harry's tack is exactly to mistrust the measurements, it is especially effective for him to ask Eduardo how he *knows* he is *correct*. By implication, Harry is claiming that Eduardo cannot rule out the possibility that he may be blindly trusting unreliable sources which ultimately reflect on the final price. The second question furthers the first, exactly by demanding an accountable source for these measurements.

All of these aspects of this challenge seem to be recognized by the manufacturers. Eduardo's response provides an indefinite source for the measurements and a filler answer to Harry's question. In addition, Eduardo makes a formulaic gesture that means "I don't know" as he utters the words. Harry reiterates the challenge as he refers to "the people there" as possibly having made "a mistake." Roberto then responds in earnest by providing detailed information about how the measurements are taken.

An important aspect must be noted from the two examples above. These challenges address the price as an assertion of fact insofar as they are attacking a sub-component of the challenged party's claim, a component that could possibly be mistaken (i.e., make the price wrong). The challenges do not address the price quotation as the result of a price-setting decision, as is the case when the challenge is performed through a generic questioning of the reasons for the price being what it is. Harry is thus reiterating his previous challenge to the price by reformulating his previous assertions (*you can't justify that price*, cf. example below) into a specific suggestion that the source of the problem in the manufactures' price claim is in the intermediary steps of its generation, the way the price was calculated. In doing this, he implies that the price is wrong, but not that it is necessarily unfair.

Challenges to an Action or Decision

A challenge may be an oppositional turn at talk to a previous action or decision of the challenged party, or to a previous assertion of fact which the challenging party *treats as* an action or decision. Unlike facts, decisions are tied to conscious action by responsible actors. Differently from an assertion of fact, then, an assertion recognized as a reflecting the speaker's decision to act in a certain way is accounted for through the reasons that motivated it. A challenge to a decision will therefore address the reasons leading to the challenged party's action by mistrusting their warrant. These challenges call for accounts which Atkinson and Drew (1979) term as "defenses" (p. 139), and are typical in the cross-examination of witnesses in courtroom interaction.

In the next example, Harry asserts the manufacturers lack a warranted reason for their price claim. He uses the word *justify* to refer to the price differential between the two items whose samples are in the center of their f-formation (Kendon, 1990). He is thus claiming the manufacturers' price quotations result from their price-setting decision, since they insist on quoting disparate prices for two nearly identical items.

7.9/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
→          (5.6)=((H sets old case upright on table next to new case
       in front of R))
→    H:    YOU CAN'T JUSTIFY (it)
           (1.6)
→    H:    ((walking back to his seat at NW corner)) the difference in     price
(0.2) such a difference in price
           (1.6)
     E:    you don't think that (we wew) have a:: djiffere- (.)
     ((pointing to cases on table)) that it has difference
```

Harry challenges his recipients' assertion by charging that they lack a universally acceptable reason for their decision to set the price as it stands. This is done through an assertion that formulates his recipients' incapacity to give reasons for their action to quote that price as they have (to *justify*, i.e., to make just). In other words, Harry is affirming that the manufacturers (or anyone else, if we interpret *you* as a generic pronoun) are incapable of providing evidence for the proportion of the price differential between the two items on the table. This builds on the comparison between the two items, inspectable from direct experience, given that the exchange is enacted while all participants are attending to the two (physically similar, but differently priced) cases, set upright on the table before them.

The manufacturers had not yet formulated any grounds for their claim, nor could any grounds be easily inferable. If he was to accept the price as right and fair, Harry had the right to hear such evidence, so he used this prerogative in order to make the challenge. In fact, he goes a step further than simply requesting the grounds to be made explicit, as he could have with an utterance like "Can you justify the difference in price?". His challenge, in treating the price quotation as the result of a decision, and not of objective assessment of the value of the item, implies the price is unfair. This explicitly locates the problem in the *recipients'* claim. In a sense, Harry's challenge asserts it is not he who is exposing the problem with the price differential; it is the manufacturers' lack of warranted reasons that is doing that.

Alternative methods for performing a challenge to what is treated as a decision include explicitly asking for reasons (e.g., "Why this?," "What are your reasons for this?," or "Please justify this."), formulating absurd or unwarranted candidate reasons for dis/confirmation ("Is this because ...?", or "Unless ..."), presenting logical counter-evidence to warranted candidate or presented reason ("If this, then that."), or negating/falsifying presented or candidate reasons (Reason for this = untrue/nonexistent). Different methods should be preferred according to the challenging party's confidence in his/her treatment of the challengeable as a decision, his/her desired degree of caution vs. assertiveness of the challenge, and the context in which the oppositional turn can be inserted (e.g., reasons having been presented or not, candidate reasons having been offered or not).

An Overarching Method - Addressing the Premise of an Assertion as Such

Assertions are usually susceptible to scrutiny once they are proffered. The price quotation of an item offered for sale is a good example of that, since the seller makes the assertion with the intention of having it positively assessed by the buyer. The buyer is nevertheless entitled to judge it so or otherwise. The buyer can accept the price, but s/he can also request reconsideration, or reject it altogether. In any case, some kind of assessment is expected. Warranted reasons motivating an assertion reflecting a decision or action, on the one hand, and evidence from direct experience, or sound bases and sources of information for the assertion of a fact, on the other, serve as deciding criteria for such evaluative examinations. Challenges are oppositional turns performed exactly by exploring and mistrusting one or more of these aspects of an assertion.

In order to perform any of the operations required to respond to a co-participant's assertion as true or reasonable, however, a conversationalist must first of all be able to comprehend that assertion. Based on this, in the following example the challenge is made in a most generic sense of finding fault with the challengeable assertion: claiming that it lacks logic to be considered. Here what is addressed is the basic premise of any assertion (i.e., intelligibility: it must be true in some possible world, cf. (Stalnaker, 1978/1991). What Harry claims is that no judgment can be issued on an assertion that fails to fulfill its basic premise. In their discussion of conversational arguing structure, Jackson and Jacobs (1980) refer to this as "conversationalists deny[ing] that the felicity conditions for the valid performance of ... [arguing turns] are satisfied" (p. 256).

In doing this, the challenging party is not univocally treating the assertion it is challenging as either an assertion of fact or as reflecting a decision. Something that lacks logic cannot begin to be considered for judgment; it must be modified in order to make sense so that it can then be considered.

7.10/Excerpt 1/DS 19

```
            (0.9)
    R:      <(if you go to th[at b-)<
    H:                       [cause it makes no sense at all. ((reaches
            for case on the floor))
            (1.7)
    H:      I'm sorry. ((grabs case))
            (1.6)
→   H:      this makes no sense.
            (4.2)=((H sets new case sample, ie, 69528 upright on table
    in front of R; bends over to get other case on the floor))
    H:      yknow, I'[m in busi]ness also=
    R:               [(↑one thing,)]
    R:      =ri:[ght.
    H:          [so I mean it's not where (0.4) I don't know (0.3) I
    don't know anything about manufacturing
            (5.7)=((H bends over cases on the floor next to N end of
      table in search of old case sample, ie, 1719))
```

Harry challenges the recently quoted price of the new item as he begins to contrast it with the price of another similar item. He claims that the price cannot be understood ("it makes no sense at all;"

"this makes no sense") comparatively, thus lacking the logical premise that price quotations, as assertions, should be intelligible before they can be taken into consideration. The method used here recognizes the manufacturers' price quotation as having been a serious attempt to make an assertion and that he is willing to consider it as soon as it is modified to make sense.

An alternative method still addressing the same basic issue (i.e., that an assertion must necessarily be intelligible to be considered) would be to propose a different frame of interpretation for it (e.g., as a joke). Had he said something like "This is a joke," or "This is ridiculous," Harry would not be recognizing the price quotation as a genuine assertion, but rather as something not to be taken at face value, a statement comprehensible only in jest but not literally. In choosing this method, however, he would not be treating the assertion as necessarily having to undergo modification as a matter of principle. The challenged assertion could stand recognition as a joke and its treatment as a joke could be recognized as a negative evaluation of the price (as if the importers were saying, "We are not going to buy the item"). This method is not advisable in Harry's case, however, if he is sincerely interested in buying the item.

Returning to Harry's actual challenge, we see that it locates the price quotation itself as problematic; not Harry's understanding of it as if he had said instead something like "I don't understand this price," in a format similar to his other challenges. This formulates the problem with the assertion as universal; not due to Harry's personal incapacity to understand it. With this challenge, Harry therefore opposes the price quotation as is, but he does not commit himself to treating it as an assertion of fact or as reflecting a decision. All he does is indicate his perceived need for re-issue of the price claim.

Underscoring the close relation between challenges and accounts, the example above features the same speaker producing a challenge and an account. Harry backs up his challenging position by asserting himself as a co-member in his recipients'/opponents' broad class of "people in the business." He thus claims to have the expertise to be able to point out the lack of logic in the price of the new item. Even if he can't claim to be a manufacturer himself, he manages to claim the next best possible authoritative knowledge about what goes into the making of a leather portfolio case: that of somebody in the business. That is to say, Harry can be heard as claiming to be someone who is much more knowledgeable than a layperson who would not know anything about manufacturing and would therefore have no grounds to challenge what manufacturers say about what goes into the making of an item, and ultimately about the pricing of that item.

The Production of Challenges

The examples discussed above reveal that challenges are oppositional actions requesting change in a challenged party's previous assertion or position. They are accomplished by the mistrusting of that assertion as true or warranted, or more broadly by mistrusting its standing as something that can be considered by others. The examples also suggest that whether the challenged assertion is seen either as describing a state of affairs, or as the result of a decision, is fundamental in terms of which aspect of the assertion gets addressed as faulty. Challenges to decisions address the reasons motivating the responsible actor. Challenges to assertions of facts address the factualness of the assertion or the challenged party's sources or bases for making the assertion.

In addition, the examples examined above demonstrate that while doubting and/or negating the recipients' assertion may suffice for the production of a challenge, more complex methods may be needed in some contexts and situations where the challenging party feels s/he must constrain the challenged party to reconsider his/her position but s/he has limited resources (e.g., information, access to the floor at the relevant moment) to force the challenged party to reconsider his/her position.

The following section describes how accounting practices enter into the co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences.

The Structures of Action in a Negotiational Arguing Sequence

Recalling the arguing sequence analyzed in its entirety in chapter 5, we found that it was immediately embedded within a bargaining sequence. Roberto made a proposal opening the bargaining sequence (1), Harry and Charles proffered first a direct non-aligning response to it (2a), and then an account for the non-alignment (2b). This account was then challenged by Roberto (3), thus initiating the arguing sequence proper. The transcript excerpt where these opening actions occur and the summary of the core actions in the entire sequence are once again reproduced below:

7.11/Excerpt 1/DS 17

```
  1→   R:      =he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) use imitation suede,=
 2a→  H:       =(0.5)=((shakes head no vigorously, with eyes closed: #1))=
               =[((#2))]
  1→   R:      =[rather than (0.5) pig suede]=
       H:      =(1.0)=((#3, #4))
       C:      ((measuring part case console in front of him, other hand
       covering mouth)) °(           get away with it.)°
               (0.7)
 2b→   H:      ((hand on chest)) nothing would give me greater pleasure
       han to get away with that damn suede,
               (0.9)
 2b→   H:      because it's ↑very expensive,
               (1.4)
 2b→   H:      but that's what the American people ↑want right now, (.)
       Charlie would love to even use a material,=
 2b→   C:      yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
  3→   R:                                   [ssya-
  3→   R:      Seeg[ar uses that]
       H:          [they won't e-]
       C:      °yeah.°
       H:      he's in Europe!
               (1.6)
```

Summary of actions (M = manufacturer party; I = importer party)

```
(1)     M: proposal (use imitation suede instead of pig suede)
(2)     I: non-aligning response + account #1
(3)     M: questioning #1A of account #1
        I: counter-assertion to questioning #1A (3)
        M: questioning #1B of account #1
        I: recycle of account #1 + counter to questioning #1B
               frame break
        M: recycle of account #1 + account #2 (in question format)
        I: answer to question with challenge #2A of account #2
        M: counter neutralizing challenge #2A
        I: relinquish proposal (1)
```

A similar set of sequential actions has been found in more than thirty other arguing sequences segmented from the Amage/Courofatos corpus. Most strongly and synthetically, negotiational bargaining sequences deal with unaccepted rejections. As shown in chapter 5, such arguing sequences develop out of a three-position sequential format. An initial action, here a proposal, is followed by a crucial second position which does not align with the first position and initiates some accounting practice related to this non-alignment. In third position, a disaffiliative, oppositional or mis aligning action displays trouble with the accounting practice initiated in second position.

The accounting practice that is initiated in second position usually takes the form of a straightforward account. Sometimes, however, it takes the form of an account-solicit, of the conspicuous absence of an account, or of some other practice. For ease of explanation in this initial section, though, I will refer to all of these as accounts and will only discuss the other accounting practices when they appear in the transcripts explicated in the following chapter. In the sequence analyzed above we have:

```
1st position  M: proposal
2nd position  I: non-aligning response + account #1
3rd position  M: questioning #1A of 2nd position account #1
```

1st position **M: proposal**

7.11/Excerpt 2/DS 17

```
  →   R:     =he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) use imitation suede,=
      H:     =(0.5)=((shakes head no vigorously, with eyes closed: #1))=
             =[((#2))]
  →   R:     =[rather than (0.5) pig suede]=
```

In first position utterances, a participant puts forth some bargaining assertion. Typically that action is a bargaining sequence opener (i.e., a proposal, as in the data above, or a position report). The action may also be a return to a bargaining sequence that had been interrupted (e.g., the recycled or revised version of a bargaining sequence opener, or a challenge to some previous bargaining action). Whichever action that may be, it carves out a response as next relevant action by the other party in second position.

2nd position **I: non-aligning response + account #1**

7.11/Excerpt 3/DS 17

```
      H:     =(1.0)=((#3, #4))
      C:     ((measuring part case console in front of him, other hand
      covering mouth)) °(          get away with it.)°
             (0.7)
  →   H:     ((hand on chest)) nothing would give me greater pleasure
       than to get away with that damn suede,
             (0.9)
  →   H:     because it's ↑very expensive,
             (1.4)
  →   H:     but that's what the American people ↑want right now, (.)
      Charlie would love to even use a material,=
  →   C:     yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic ( )
```

Second-position utterances display non-alignment with the action in first position and account for it. In the typical example above, the proposal is rejected and the grounds for such misalignment are offered. Account-related actions other than straightforward accounts may also occur in this position, such as challenges which solicit accounts and thus place the onus of offering grounds on the recipient party.

Regardless of what accounting practice occurs, in negotiational arguing sequences, it receives a disaffiliative response in third position. That is, the accounting practice is not honored; it is negatively evaluated through some sort of challenging action.

3rd position M: questioning #1A of 2nd position account

7.11/Excerpt 4/DS 17

```
      C:    yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic (  )
  →   R:                                 [ssya-
  →   R:    Seeg[ar uses that]
      H:        [they won't e-]
      C:    °yeah.°
      H:    he's in Europe!
            (1.6)
```

By rejecting the other party's second position accounting practice, in the third position turn a participant displays a disposition to argue, and recasts what came before (i.e., the second-position non-aligning action and/or its account) as disputable, thus initiating an arguing sequence.

Next actions following this three-position structure typically involve further accounting and challenging practices that orient to the determination of the status of the accounting practice initiated in second position. In other words, participants maintain the topic focus of their talk around the issue that the account-giving party claims as grounds for their non-alignment with the action(s) in first position. These actions may take a variable number of turns.

As with third position conversational repair (Schegloff, 1992b), positions and turns may or may not coincide. In its neatest format we find all three opening positions occurring in three subsequent turns, with each position occupying a single turn, or we may find them interspersed with other material and with each position occupying more than one turn. As we shall see below, the negotiational arguing participants in some cases may choose not to go on arguing after a while, but they remain within the bounds of the issue for as long as the sequence is still being co-constructed. While the arguing sequence is underway, they keep orienting retrospectively to the non-alignment in second-position.

In summary, as in the example sequence above, it was found that some first position action by party A occasions the proffering by party B of a non-aligning second-position action followed by an account. Then a next or third position action produced by party A disaffiliates with or displays non-acceptance of the second-position account. Following these third-position actions of doubting, questioning, challenging, or presenting a counter-assertion to the second-position account, the co-construction of an arguing sequence is recognizably underway.

Conversational Arguing and Negotiational Arguing

The structures of action described above are somewhat similar to those which Coulter (1990) found in his analyses of conversational arguing among members of a half-way house. Such "argument sequences," were found to be organized in the form of an initial declarative assertion,[9] followed by a counter-assertion, and then by either (1) a backdown terminating the sequence, (2) a next assertion bringing a topic focus shift of possibly mixed consequences, or (3) a sequentially expansive reassertion.

Notice, however, that a sequence which terminates in third position with actions of the kind of (1) and (2) above — involving three turns represented in Coulter's (1990) terms as

A: declarative assertion
B: disagreement token + counter-assertion
A: backdown or topic focus shift

— does not constitute an arguing sequence as defined here. Such a sequence does not involve the exchange of rational positions with appeal to the grounds in support of their correctness or truth following misalignment. *Argument* sequences, to use Coulter's term, seem to be disagreement sequences. In fact, many bargaining sequences in negotiation talk take this format:

A: declarative assertion → proposal
B: disagreement token + counter-assertion → rejection + account
A: backdown or topic focus shift → acknowledgment (+ topic shift)

But they do not contain arguing. Only with an action such as (3) in third position — a sequentially expansive reassertion in Coulter's scheme — do we have the same type of sequence found in the negotiational arguing sequences being examined here. In other words, only what Coulter describes as an *expanded* argument sequence can be seen as truly similar to what we find in the Courofatos/Amage corpus.

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[9] In contrast to a simple assertion, Coulter proposes, a *declarative assertion* occasions more than just an acknowledgment as a next-position response.

However, even in contrast to these more similar expanded argument sequences in everyday conversation, we still find marked differences in our negotiational arguing participants' general orientation to what they are constructing through arguing. These differences point to important issues in the overall description of negotiational arguing I am attempting here.

As the previous discussion pointed out, negotiational arguing seems to be different than, or a special case of, conversational arguing in at least two respects. First, the respective participants orient differently to the determination of the status of their positions. While in other forms of talk, more than one arguing position may end up standing side by side, this is strongly dispreferred in negotiation talk, where the determination of a single standing position is pursued vigorously.[10] The second aspect is that these different orientations result in distinct patterns of topic development and sequential implications. The fact that negotiational arguing relates to some suspended bargaining sequence implies that the scope of its topic is restricted to a specific, usually quite narrow, problematic issue until the sequence is terminated. The co-construction of the ultimate status of the positions then has implications that recast previous actions differently and narrow down the range of possible posterior actions.

First, let us discuss the participants' degree of preference for determining the status of their positions. In her description of conversational arguing, Schiffrin (1990) found that "individuals can defend themselves against another's challenge by redefining an assertion as an opinion, and by then defending their right to that opinion — simply because they can count on their opponent's willingness to grant them that right to an opinion" (p. 248). This, however, is not borne out in the corpus of negotiational arguing under investigation here. Moreover, Bilmes (1995) has shown negotiational arguing strongly favors the issuing of rational and impersonal grounds in support of a position (rather than emotional or personal ones). In other words, while *arguing conversationalists* may stick to their non-aligning positions by claiming their right to that position *as an opinion* (i.e., an expression of personal thought/belief/etc.), *arguing negotiators* cannot resort to opinions quite the same way. Rather, they must *account for* their non-alignment with the

[10] Note that, while in negotiational arguing such outcome could be referred to as a stand-off, that would not usually be the case for conversational arguing.

other party (or show the other party to be unable to account for theirs), and this must be done in universal rather personal terms if it is to be validated.

Moreover, an important sequential difference exists. All participants in arguing of any sort ultimately want their position to prevail. However, participants in everyday conversational arguing as described by Coulter (1990) and Schiffrin (1985, 1990) do not typically orient to the eventual prevalence of one of the contending positions as having definite retrospective sequential implications (i.e., reconsideration of first or second position actions) nor as having prospective implications in terms of commitment. Negotiational arguing participants, however, do orient to these implications. That is, topic development in a negotiational arguing sequence is tied back to the non-alignment and accounting practices initiated in second position. It is also prospectively tied to what follows, at least potentially, because resolution of the misaligned issue makes relevant the re-examination of first (and/) or second positions as next actions, as we will see below. In contrast, arguing participants in everyday conversation[11] will shift topic direction while still holding on to their different *opinions* in ways that do not seem to be possible for their negotiational arguing counterparts.

In other words, unlike their negotiating counterparts, ordinary conversational arguing participants may be satisfied in *establishing* their positions solidly against opposing ones. They will thus shift topics (or walk away from the interaction) without a strong orientation to resolving their non-alignment regarding the issue being argued over. Indeed, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) maintain that, once what they term argumentation has started, after "the language users can then see that they have a dispute about an expressed opinion," they may simply leave it at *identifying the dispute*" (p. 85, original emphasis). This is rare in negotiational arguing.

Given that they are usually not talking to accomplish some co-dependent end-goal, ordinary conversationalists will accept their position to be rejected by another party who does not adopt it so long as their own position can be maintained side-by-side the opposing one(s), much as opinions may. Arguing negotiators, on the contrary, will orient to the necessity of reaching alignment over the issue. Standing

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[11] Some arguing sequences in our corpus also develop this way for reasons that will be discussed in the closing section of the next chapter (see pp. 308-309).

opposing positions are of little value if they preclude the advancement of the institutional mandate. Therefore, negotiational arguing participants strive to co-construct demonstrable closings to their arguing sequences. This strong orientation is evident in the continuing relevance of the topic introduced in first and second position prior to the initiation of arguing proper.

This brings us to the second important difference between conversational and negotiational arguing sequences, that is, the patterns of topic development and the sequential implications of determining the ultimate status of arguing positions in negotiation talk.

The crucial factor here is that negotiational arguing differs from arguing in other forms of talk because it is implicated sequentially, directly or indirectly, by a bargaining sequence opener. Because a bargaining reply is needed for the implementation of the institutional mandate of joint committed action in the future, participants in negotiational arguing are primarily concerned with constructing a slot for the reply to be proffered, and therefore display an orientation to resolving the misalignment which precludes it.

Misalignment takes concrete interactional shape in the third-position rejection of the post-non-alignment accounting practice in second-position. Given that rational grounds must be offered in support of a negotiating position (in the face of an opposing position by the other party), and that these grounds are often proffered as accounts following some statement of the other party's position, establishing the truth or correctness status of the account becomes an interactional problem which the participants must resolve so that the constructed obstacle can be removed, and so that, in turn, a bargaining reply can be proffered or revised, and commitment to co-dependent actions can be established (i.e., a deal struck).

In generic terms, this organization supports Jackson and Jacobs' (1980) claims that the structure of conversational argument results from the occurrence of disagreement in a rule system built to prefer agreement" (p. 252). More specifically, however, it contrasts with what Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) and others have described in terms of the orientation towards resolution in conversational disputes. They write that "an argument's ability to encompass a succession of topics raises the possibility that even in cases where termination does include resolution, the issue that is resolved may not be the issue that began the argument" (p. 98). Though negotiational arguing may indeed terminate without resolution, participants will close the arguing sequence before they move beyond the topical scope of the issue being contended.

When negotiational arguing sequences in our data corpus do end in resolution, the issue resolved is necessarily the issue that began the sequence.

Negotiational Arguing and the Institutional Mandate

Negotiating participants orient to an institutional mandate. They have "selfish" end-goals,[12] both at the individual and team levels. These end-goals depend on the execution of complex tasks and require cooperative integrated action by both parties in the future. The institutional mandate necessitates the establishment of (and commitment to) what specifically these cooperative, integrated actions in the future are. And that is what bargaining sequences are co-constructed for.

Committing to such future action implies having the ability and the willingness to carry them out — much in the way that the speech act "promise" entails a series of pragmatic pre-suppositions and perlocutionary expectations. This and the selfish element of the institutional mandate mean that a negotiating participant must reject a bargaining move if s/he is unable or unwilling to commit to any particular action in the future which is being proposed to or presupposed of him/her. This naturally produces non-alignment between the parties. In many cases, the other party accepts the rejection as reasonable and aligns with it.

However, in many other cases the rejection is not accepted, and non-alignment is upgraded to misalignment between the parties.

```
A    1st position
B    2nd position non-alignment (rejection of 1st position)
A    3rd position misalignment (rejection of rejection)
```

The same institutional mandate works in two reinforcing ways to make the party whose first-position action was not aligned with to have reasons to invest in misalignment. If, for example, the rejected first position is a proposal, the proposing party has institutionally mandated reasons to want to salvage it for reconsideration and acceptance, and it also has institutionally mandated reasons to believe that the other party may have

[12] Naturally, every natural language user has goals in some sense (cf. Grice, 1975/1991). Unlike ordinary conversationalists, however, negotiating participants have specifiable goals which bring them together and guide their actions in the negotiation. These are the ones I am referring to as end-goals.

selfish (also institutionally mandated) reasons not to accept what is being proposed.[13] Establishing objective grounds for a rejection in these problematic situations is what negotiational arguing sequences are co-constructed for.

They are designed to resolve a particular problem and are thus tied retrospectively to a bargaining sequence opener and prospectively to its reply and to the eventual doing of something, not in the interactional realm, but as service or product that will advance the institutional mandate. It is this orientation that drives participants in negotiation to co-construct arguing sequences which are often much more topic-restrictive and sequentially bounded than what we find in ordinary conversation.

In other words, like other institutional discourse activities, bargaining sequences tackle a particular problem in the world but, as interactional constructions, they too run into trouble. The co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences deals with such interactional trouble.

Stokes and Hewitt (1976) maintain that people routinely do this in interaction everytime they perceive that their alignment is in jeopardy. According to them, "when the problematic arises in ongoing conduct, people direct their attention toward it and organize their conduct, individually and jointly, to get 'back on the track' along which it was proceeding" (p. 842). The track along which negotiation talk-in-interaction proceeds is that of bargaining sequences. Misalignment between the parties is a problematic situation. Stokes and Hewitt point out that, among other ways, to deal with the problematic, "people attempt to determine why and how things have not worked out as planned" (p. 842), as in negotiational arguing sequences. They are negotiational devices through which co-participants respond to problematic situations in "an effort to restore alignment among the acts of those involved, so that interaction may proceed toward a social object" (p. 843).

Negotiational Arguing Sequences and Conversational Repair

In the sense that it deals with interactional trouble, negotiational arguing seems to be analogous to the phenomenon of conversational repair. Indeed, Jackson and Jacobs (1980) posit that having an argument

[13] In sharp contrast to this, patients in medical consultations are reluctant to misalign with the physician's proposals for post-diagnostic disposals even if s/he explicitly designs them as negotiable (cf. ten Have, 1995).

in conversation "is a special instance of the repair organization to accepting a[n action in a] turn ... occurr[ing] in a context of disagreement" (p. 253). Though we are talking about two different interactional levels here, it seems that both work as devices through which participants achieve intersubjectivity among themselves. As the discussion above indicated, a bargaining sequence in negotiation talk ultimately aims at the co-construction of clear commitment to distal future action, and so it is crucial that participants know as clearly as possible what the other side understands them to be committing to.

Writing about intersubjectivity and repair in talk-in-interaction, Schegloff (1992b) stresses that intersubjectivity is not "merely convergence between multiple interpreters of the world ... but potentially convergence between the 'doers' of an action or bit of conduct and its recipients, as coproducers of an increment of interactional and social reality" (p. 1299). That is to say that interactional participants show themselves to be striving to produce a mutual sense that what they are doing is indeed *one thing being done together*.[14] Negotiational participants must take that a step further if they wish their actions to be mutually binding beyond the present interactional realm and on into the co-dependent non-interactional world in the future, that is, they must also entertain "distal future considerations" (Firth, 1991, p. 65). For example, a conditional sentence — "if we shipped it in March, that would be okay" — must be recognizably *heard as* either a hypothetical speculation accounting for some state of affairs, *or* as a commitment for action dependent on a concession; not as both. In Scott and Lyman's (1968) words, these are "significant matters—that is, matters that have a proactive life beyond the engagement itself" (p. 55).

It is therefore not surprising that we find negotiational arguing to develop out of a third-position turn, mirroring the organization of repair in third position — "the last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation" (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1295). Schegloff describes third-position repair "as the last systematically provided opportunity to catch (among other troubles) ... breakdowns of intersubjectivity — that is, trouble in the socially shared grasp *of the talk and the other conduct in the interaction*" (p. 1301, original emphasis).

Though the analogy between negotiational arguing and conversational repair must be taken as only suggestive here, it is remarkable that we find negotiational arguing sequences to initiate in a sequential

[14] Questions of sincerity will affect but not invalidate this (Grice, 1975/1991).

and illocutionary context providing next speaker with a crucial option of either backing down from, or standing by their first position. On the one hand, the first/third position (A) speaker may align with the accounting practice initiated in second position. In this case, s/he is therefore expected, first, to have understood the retrospective consequences of that aligning action to the bargaining sequence underway, and, second, to be complying with its prospective implications in terms of carrying out tasks in the future.[15] If this is indeed the case, no negotiational arguing develops. On the other hand, s/he may disaffiliate with the account in second position. This action of *not honoring the account for misalignment* displays trouble with it, which the account-producing party (B) assumed not to exist.

In other words, the option to argue or not is also the option to deal or not to deal with trouble in the non-alignment and accounting practices. Not dealing with the account means accepting the other party's non-alignment and backing down from one's position in a bargaining action. Alternatively, once (A) disaffiliates with (B)'s account, and shows trouble to exist, arguing is initiated because then the second-position account-giver (B) must do counter-accounting work, or else it will be sequentially difficult for him/her to claim not to adhere to the consequences of his/her accounting practice not to stand. Establishing the status of the problematic aspect in the assertions in second-position becomes the interactional focus of negotiational arguing. The ultimate status of the second-position actions may (and preferably will) have forward and backward sequential implications after the arguing sequence is completed. Once the status of the accounting practice in second position has been settled, one of the two initial positions are again re-instated as up for revision. That revision then usually re-instates the conditional relevance of the reply to the opener of a previously suspended bargaining sequence.

The discussion above lays the foundation for presentation of a typology of the negotiational arguing sequences found in the Courofatos/Amage corpus. This is the focus of the next chapter, which features explicated transcripts of occurrences of each major type.

[15] This would be equivalent to Coulter's (1990) non-expanded conversational argument sequences (see pp. 235-237 above).

CHAPTER 8

TYPES OF NEGOTIATIONAL ARGUING SEQUENCES

The previous chapter discussed accounting practices and presented an overall sense of the action structure in negotiational arguing sequences. This chapter presents a typology of the various negotiational arguing sequences found in the corpus. It also explicates in detail transcript excerpts containing different types of negotiational arguing sequences featured in the typology.

A Typology of Negotiational Arguing Sequences

As was indicated in the previous chapter, participants engaged in the co-construction of a negotiational arguing sequence orient to an accounting practice in second position as the main issue being locally addressed. Whether or not the accounting practice withstands the opposition it receives determines the closing of the sequence. After a variable number of turns, the developments in the arguing actions may permit the participants to assess whether the account does or does not stand. The figure below presents a schematic typology of 33 negotiational arguing sequences found in the Courofatos/Amage corpus according to their decision-making patterns and observable closings in relation to the status of the accounting practice initiated in second position.

If the accounting practice initiated in second position does stand up, we find party A, who performed the action in first position, to either relinquish it entirely, or to revise it somehow so that it may qualify as a new bargaining action that takes party B's account into consideration. Sequences of this type are represented in the top section of the typology figure below.

In the cases in which the action put forth in first position is revised, we generally find the re-initiation of the previous bargaining sequence with a slightly different focus. If the action in first position was a proposal, then we have a revised proposal issued here. In the cases where the first position is relinquished, we find the end of the bargaining sequence and the beginning of another, through party A's issuing of an entirely different proposal, for example, even if addressing the same problem.

Figure 2. Typology of negotiational arguing sequences in the corpus



The bottom node of the figure shows sequences in which the second position accounting practice is found lacking, and does not stand. If it is either revised or relinquished, no impediment remains, and the first position is re-constructed as acceptable (unconditionally if it is relinquished; with some restriction or caveat if it is revised). However, we also find in the corpus a number of sequences where party B, whose account does not stand, still manages not to revise or relinquish it. In these cases, a stalemate develops. All four instances of such type revolve around the same issue and are, in a sense, the same sequence. The long sequence whose closing was analyzed in chapter 6 (pp. 181-200) is the second in this series of four.

Finally, between the nodes discussed above, we find sequences reaching their closing without a displayed assessment by the participants as to whether the second position definitely stands or not. These terminate either with a clear-cut decision to stop the arguing, along with some loose disposition that it will be continued at a more appropriate time later, or with some major shift in the character of the interaction. In the latter cases, in one occurrence the participants tendentiously shift the topic, in another they ostensibly tune out and disengage from the interaction, and in three others they produce a stand-off closing in jest.

Three other arguing sequences are not included in the above typology. These are sequences that start out of an aggravated complaint or accusation and develop only in distant connection to a previous bargaining sequence. They seem to be a different phenomenon than the negotiational arguing sequences contemplated in the above typology. In effect, they seem to be typical developments of complaints and accusations in talk-in-interaction. These will be discussed briefly in the end of this chapter. For now, let us examine closely some transcript excerpts which contain occurrences of the different types of negotiational arguing sequences found in the corpus.

Account STANDS: 1st Position Relinquished

An example of the first type of arguing sequence in the figure above was presented and explicated throughout chapter 5 (pp. 157-175) as well as in the discussion of the actions in arguing sequence openings in chapter 6 (pp. 179-181). We found that the importers accounted for why they would not align with the manufacturers' proposal (for a change in materials in the production of an item), and that the importers' accounting practices withstood Roberto's challenges. Roberto therefore closed the sequence by relinquishing his proposal entirely (i.e., by accepting that they would not implement the technical modification he had proposed).

At least seven other sequences with this same overall structure appear in the corpus. Some of the segments in which they are found are less straightforward than the one reviewed above, and may involve complicating factors such as blaming, complaints and accusations, or more than one arguing sequence within the same bargaining sequence. However, they all follow the same structure presented above.

Account STANDS: 1st Position Revised

Here we have a slightly different type of sequence from the one referred to above. The result of arguing in occurrences of this type is the *continuation of talks along a course set by the aftermath of the accounting practice in second position having withstood opposition*.

Our example comes from the last session of meetings (Saturday, Oct. 20), after the deal on the main items has been finally negotiated and settled. As for all other data segments, see appendix A for detailed contextual information regarding the transcribed interaction. For the uninterrupted transcript of the data segment, see appendix B.

In this data segment, the participants return to a bargaining sequence that had been interrupted before, the scope of which is the price for the writing portfolio, a small secondary item in the new line. As shown below, this arguing sequence has the following overall structure of actions:

```
                              M:     offer
                         ...
1st position             I:     partial alignment on condition
2nd position             M:     challenging of condition + account
3rd position             I:     questioning of account
                         ...    M/I    arguing - account stands
1st position revised     I:     unconditional alignment
```

Before the arguing sequence proper starts, the transcript below shows the participants to carefully co-construct a return to a suspended bargaining sequence. Mr. Amati, Roberto and Eduardo had been discussing the results of previous talks on the writing portfolio in Portuguese, while Harry and Charles examined a sample of the item. In the end of the manufacturers' intra-team conference, Eduardo asserts his interest in producing the item, but his father says they should wait and "let him" (i.e., Harry) "lower it a little" (i.e., probably a performance error where he meant "raise it a little):

8.1/Excerpt 1/DS 29[1]

```
     E:     (pod' ser) que isso aí valha a pena °(pe[gar).°
  Mr.A:                                          [deixa ele baixar=
            =um pou(co)=
```

[1] A content-oriented translation of the exchange in Portuguese:

```
     E:     (maybe) this would be worth °(do[ing).°
  Mr.A:                                 [let him lower it a little=
```

Latching a code-switching utterance to Mr. Amati's comment above, Roberto then addresses Harry (and no longer his fellow team members). Roberto starts the return to the bargaining sequence on the writing portfolio by requesting confirmation on the importers' latest offer:

8.1/Excerpt 2/DS 29

```
 →   R:     =you mentioned something like uh fourteen dollars for this,
     right,
     H:     °uhmhum.°
            (2.2)
```

Roberto's arrowed turn above seems to be designed to do more than elicit a confirmation. As it formulates the importers' current position regarding the item, it displays a willingness to discuss the matter and, especially, to entertain a new offer. Harry confirms his own previous offer, and a pause of 2.2 seconds ensues where Roberto does not take the turn, as if waiting for something else to come from the importers' side of the table. Nothing does.

Roberto then puts forth a position report with the manufacturers' current best offer:

8.1/Excerpt 3/DS 29

```
     H:     °uhmhum.°
            (2.2)
 →   R:     we are around fifteen per cent, (0.5) off.
            (2.4) ((E starts walking towards door))
```

Notice that the design of Roberto's utterance displays a typically negotiational orientation to the resolution of non-alignment. Instead of stating what the actual figure is, Roberto chooses to formulate it in terms of percentage of difference, which highlights what needs to be resolved. In that again we see a display of readiness to hear a revised offer. Harry then formulates the calculation of the specific figure that the percentage amounts to:

8.1/Excerpt 4/DS 29

```
     H:     °sah you're talking aro:und a dollar forty:, (0.6) it's
     two dollars and °(ten a (.) total of) sixteen ten.°°
```

Harry's turn above formulates Roberto's previous utterance as an offer, finishing with the figure which represents the manufacturers' current quotation ($16.10). This is not simply an understanding check, but a receipt token. As a receipt token, it withholds alignment with the offer, without rejecting it. Thus Harry here joins Roberto in returning to the bargaining sequence on the writing portfolio and displays his disposition to consider the manufacturers' offer.

An extremely long gap follows the completion of the return. Harry is expected to reply to the offer that re-opened the bargaining sequence:

8.1/Excerpt 5/DS 29

```
    H:      °sah you're talking aro:und a dollar forty:, (0.6) it's
    two dollars and °(ten a (.) total of) sixteen ten.°°
→           (18.4)
→           ((E left room; C looking at and writing notes; Mr. A and R looking at H; H
            looks at them, then pulls chair forward and starts looking through notes and
            writing things down))
```

Both Roberto and Mr. Amati display that expectation by silently fixing their gaze on Harry. While he does not yet proffer the reply, Harry demonstrates he is considering it seriously. He displays a receipt of the manufacturers' expectation through mutual gaze, and then pulls his chair forward decisively closer to the table to examine his notes. The manufacturers wait. The primary participants' unspoken activities (i.e., Harry's and Roberto's) thus make it recognizable that the issue at hand has not been dismissed; it is on hold.

Further evidence that the offer is being considered can be seen in a side sequence developing out of a confirmation check regarding whether or not the quoted offer includes the usual packaging in section of the segment (20 lines) not shown here.[2] Once this is ascertained, Harry provides a reply to the offer which hints at alignment, but only conditionally:

8.1/Excerpt 6/DS 29

```
            (3.1)
    H:      ((looks at R; nods yes quickly; then turns gaze to C)) if it      goes
ocean freight we may be able to live with this, (0.4)          °sixteen
°ten°°
```

Harry's turn has an ambiguous design. He patently addresses Roberto by gazing at him, but then he turns to Charles as in team movement to deliver the utterance with the conditional acceptance of the manufacturers' $16.10 offer.

The syntax and the wording of the uttered sentence also display hedged alignment. This is a two-part conditional formulation — "if ocean freight, then $16.10 acceptable." However, even if the condition is satisfied, alignment is still not certain — "we *may* be able to live with this." In addition, the wording equates acceptance to "living with this," and displays reluctant alignment as the best-case

[2] Sideplay talk between Mr. Amati and Eduardo has also been deleted from the transcript presented here. Appendix B, pp. 385-388, includes the complete transcript of this data segment.

scenario. Harry thus puts on the floor a direct response to the importers' offer, suggesting a disposition towards a possible alignment trajectory, coupled with a current misaligning stance, a condition.

Harry locates the impediment to his full alignment in the type of freight involved. This condition is not trivial at all. It involves a controversial and unsettled issue across the talks (cf. chapter 2, pp. 36-38, and narrative account in appendix A, pp. 337, 346). If the condition remains, alignment cannot be achieved locally within this sequence.

Roberto's next action is, therefore, to challenge the condition, in an attempt to remove the impediment to the importers' full, local alignment with his offer:

8.1/Excerpt 7/DS 29

```
             (1.6)
  →  R:      but ↑even (.) ↑air freight, what I'm thinking iss:
             (0.4)=((takes hand off forehead and gestures "compact"))
     this is compact.
```

Roberto does not disagree with Harry's assertion (that they may live with $16.10); his tack is to enlarge the scope of what the importers "can live with" to remove the impediment. His turn starts with two pragmatic operators swiftly casting Harry's condition as non-applicable *to this case*. The adversative but introduces additional information in opposition to what came before, and even cancels the implicature that the importers could only live with the offer if the merchandise went *ocean* freight. It enlarges the scope of what the importers may accept from $16.10 + *ocean* freight to $16.10 + *air* freight — air freight being more expensive, but currently the only dependable shipping procedure that has been secured. Here an account is due, and Roberto provides it by verbally and nonverbally alluding to the compact nature (i.e., small volume and light weight) of the item, which makes air freight a reasonable option.

Thus in this case the importers (A) issue a first-position turn containing an alignment-withholding bargaining action, to which the manufacturers (B) issue a second-position turn containing an oppositional action and an account given in its support. In third position, the importers (A) then question the account, and the participants thus decide to co-construct an arguing sequence. The third-position action is due to Harry this time.

A 1.6-second pause follows Roberto's challenge and account. Harry counters Roberto's challenge, and Roberto then challenges Harry once again:

8.1/Excerpt 8/DS 29

```
        (1.6)
H:      ((shaking head "no")) °(yeah but uh)° still thee thee
seventeen fourteen (0.8) still runs us two dollars (an::
some odd-) do[llars (              )]
R:                [((gesturing "slice")) it's gonna be ha]lf=
=that.
```

Harry's counter-assertion to Roberto's challenge questions the implications of the action; not the informational content of the account itself. That is, Harry does not disagree that the item is compact, but he rejects Roberto's scope enlargement of what the importers may live with. This is accomplished through the partial agreement token "yeah but." In addition, Harry employs the pragmatic operator <u>still</u> twice, in an oppositional design to Roberto's <u>even</u> in the challenge. Harry points out that item number 1714, a slim portfolio, is currently being air-freighted for two dollars. The implication is that the air freight for the writing portfolio being negotiated now is similarly prohibitive, and that, therefore, the impediment to the importers' full alignment with Roberto's offer "still" applies. The item would be too expensive if another two dollars was added to it.

Roberto's next action is to undercut that similarity and upgrade the implications of his account by asserting that the cost of air freight for the writing portfolio, which is compact, would be "half that" of the 1714. Once again Roberto's position must face the importers' opposition:

8.1/Excerpt 9/DS 29

```
    H:      ((shaking head "no")) °(yeah but uh)° still thee thee
    seventeen fourteen (0.8) still runs us two dollars (an::
    some odd-) do[llars (              )]
    R:                [((gesturing "slice")) it's gonna be ha]lf=
    =that.
→   H:      ((squints while gazing at R))=(0.9)
→   C:      =no::,
→   H:      ((about to light cigarette)) <come on,> ((gets up; grabs
    different sample))
            (1.4)
    C:      we got a pa:d and everything,
            (0.8)
    C:      the weight will be about the same,
            (1.2)
    C:      how we going to °(pick) air frei-° ((turns head to look at H
    back at table))
```

First Harry doubts Roberto's assertion by making a face-gesture of skepticism while gazing at him. Then Charles verbally negates Roberto's assertion, with particular emphasis ("no::,"). Harry's "come on", delivered in a fast, clipped manner, then invites Roberto to see what Harry proposes as "obviously *not* the case." Harry then decides to go get a 1714 sample in the other room. Charles fills the gap by formulating the details of his team's (op)position. He mentions the pad inside the portfolio and the fact that "the weight will be the same,". Charles thus re-formulates Harry's full-alignment-withholding condition, in a new counter-assertion to Roberto's challenge: air-freight is not something that the importers can live with ("how we going to °(pick) <u>air</u> frei-°"). Throughout Charles' talk, Roberto withholds any verbal action.

Harry comes back with the 1714 sample, and places it next to the writing portfolio sample in front of Roberto. He then tendentiously requests evidence that the state of affairs is as Roberto stated in his second-position account:

8.1/Excerpt 10/DS 29

```
→ H:     (2.1)=((brings new sample and sets it next to writing portfolio sample on
         table, showing them to R; unlit cigarette in mouth)) (how is [that half?)
→ R:                                                        [no just-
         (1.6)=((R points to portfolio sample; H moves two samples))
  R:     e- eliminate, (.) the- (.) no, I'm talking about the weight
         (1.9)=((H sets two samples flat in front of R))
→ R:     but if you eliminate this (1.5)=((removes paper pad)) for
         sea shipment (.)=((shakes head)) fo[:r (.) air shi]pment.
```

An awkward exchange of nonverbal moves takes place where Roberto tries to repair and reformulate his own account, which the transcript captures only in part. Harry places both samples in front of him across the table, and then Roberto clarifies his point nonverbally. He removes the paper pad from inside the writing portfolio and formulates his account on the basis of weight. Harry then concedes to Roberto's point:

8.1/Excerpt 11/DS 29

```
→ R:    but if you eliminate this (1.5)=((removes paper pad)) for
        sea shipment (.)=((shakes head)) fo[:r (.) air shi]pment.
→ H:                          ((sitting down)) [that's that's true]
→ H:    that's true.
        (0.5)
```

Roberto is thus able to convincingly support his challenge because his account now stands. He is able to show the importers at this point in the sequence that the item being discussed will be a lot lighter than the 1714, once the actual pad of writing paper inside the sample is removed. Since the paper pad can and will be bought and inserted to the leather portfolio by Amage in the U.S., the weight and volume of the pad can be discounted when figuring shipping rates for the portfolio.

Both importers then proffer explicit backdowns from their opposition to Roberto's account:

8.1/Excerpt 12/DS 29

```
→ C:    yeah, that wo[uld (b  )
→ R:                 [that's gonna be around half °of,°
→ H:    tha[t's true. ((nods yes))
→ R:       [the ↑weight °of this°,
  C:    yeah.
        (0.8)
```

Roberto then re-asserts his challenge to Harry's condition for full alignment with the manufacturers' $16.10 offer, thus closing the arguing sequence and returning to the bargaining sequence that had been suspended. Roberto is thus orienting, in a typical negotiational sense, to the arguing sequence as having resolved the problem it addressed, that is, the removal of an impediment to alignment. Since his account has withstood questioning and has successfully justified his challenge, the impediment to the importers' full alignment with the manufacturers $16.10 offer has been removed, and thus a modified reformulation of the previous reply is again conditionally relevant.

Roberto presses for that:

8.1/Excerpt 13/DS 29

```
  R:    so even if [you ship by air]
  H:               [let me let me jus:t-]
        (2.1)
```

Harry overlaps with Roberto's turn to display an understanding of that conditional relevance and to request extra time to produce a reply:

8.1/Excerpt 14/DS 29

```
R:      so even if [you ship by air]
H:                 [let me let me jus:t-]
        (2.1)
```

Following that, Harry ostensibly shows himself to be engaged in the examination of the offer once again, as he checks his notes and calculates. The importers then talk amongst themselves about another feature of the writing portfolio and about the other small item in the new collection. In this intra-team exchange, Roberto formulates his expectation to Mr. Amati:

8.1/Excerpt 15/DS 29 [3]

```
       H:                 [let me let me jus:t-]
               (2.1)
               .
               . — 20 lines omitted —
               .
       R:      bem, (.) esse aqui então eu falei dezesseis dez agora, vamo
       ver o que que ele vai dizer.
               (0.6)
    Mr. A:     hein?
       R:      eu falei dezesseis dez, ele tá achando que pode (.) que
       talvez (dê)
```

After the excerpt above, the manufacturers talk some more, while the importers quietly calculate, until Harry raises his head and looks at Eduardo:

8.1/Excerpt 16/DS 29

```
       R:      eu falei dezesseis dez, ele tá achando que pode (.) que
       talvez (dê)
               .
               . — 17 lines omitted —
               .
       E:      =[mas depois tira fora o[:: solatex.
     → H:                              [Eduardo, can you make it for=
       =fifteen and a half?
               (0.8)
```

As Eduardo keeps on talking, Harry overlaps his turn with a summons and proffers a new proposal, which revises his previous response to the manufacturers' $16.10 offer. The condition has been eliminated, and the bargaining sequence re-initiates on a course that is indelibly marked by the intervening arguing sequence.

---

[3] A content-oriented translation of the exchange in Portuguese:

```
       R:      well, (.) this one here then I said sixteen ten now, let's
       see what he's gonna say.
               (0.6)
    Mr. A:     uhm?
       R:      I said sixteen ten, he thinks that's okay (.) that perhaps
       it'll work out
```

While the arguing sequence has entirely terminated at this juncture, the bargaining sequence then rapidly closes with full alignment between the parties (see complete transcript of data segment in appendix B, pp. 385-388). In other words, once the condition in Harry's partially aligning reply is jointly removed through the arguing sequence, the suspended bargaining sequence is again set on its preferred alignment trajectory, and the deal is struck.

Account does NOT STAND: 2nd Position Revised or Relinquished

In some sequences in the corpus, the account-giver (B) — the party issuing a misaligning position in relation to some previous action — cannot defend it against the challenges to it advanced by the account-recipient (A) — the party whose action was misaligned with. In such cases, there is no longer a good reason standing in the way of alignment between the parties. As one would expect, the misaligning party, whose account for not aligning fails to stand its ground, should then relinquish it and align with the action in first position. This does happen in three of four such sequences in our corpus.

In the fourth occurrence, we do not have an absolute relinquish of the second position. Rather, the sequence closes with conditional alignment with the action in first position, and points to a delay of the final bargaining sequence reply. This particular sequence, therefore, is a hybrid occurrence of two different types of negotiational sequences. Charles requests a final reply to the importers' offer on two items. Eduardo misaligns and accounts for his misalignment by saying he cannot give a final reply then because he needs to confer with his suppliers. Charles successfully challenges Eduardo's account, and Roberto re-issues some previously given price quotations as acceptable, but yet "to be confirmed one hundred per cent." Thus the manufacturers do revise their non-alignment in second position, but still hold on to a condition. At one level, their account in second position does not stand and is revised, that is, they do offer a reply as Charles solicited it. However, at another level, they all delay the proffering of the final reply instead of arguing any further.

The sequence chosen as an example of this type, however, is one of the three more straightforward occurrences. It comes from the morning of the third day of meetings (Friday, Oct. 19, a.m.). After the price has been quoted on item 69535, and the importers find it to be distant from the their target, the participants are making attempts to reduce the price by modifying some of its component materials and features.[4]

We enter the scene at the opening of a bargaining sequence. Eduardo asks a question of Charles which amounts to proposing a modification:

8.2/Excerpt 1/DS 9

```
          (3.0)
→  E:     you need he:re, (.) lining here?
          (1.2)
   C:     lining?
   E:     yeah.
          (1.1)
```

Charles withholds alignment with the proposal by delaying any direct response to it through a long silence, and then by initiating a repair sequence. In fact Jefferson's (1972) description of "misapprehension sequences" fits this data segment quite appropriately. Detailed explication of it in this regard is beyond the scope of the present explication, but notice, that Charles' questioning repeat ("lining?") displays non-alignment with Eduardo's proposal. Jefferson predicts the device "characteristically signals that there is a problem in its product-item, and its work is to generate further talk directed to remedying the problem" (p. 299).

For Charles' purposes, Eduardo's minimal confirmation in response to his questioning repeat is not sufficient, so Charles directly asks what the proposal entails, and Eduardo answers him. Charles' "oh." displays his change of information status and Eduardo re-states his answer in Portuguese ("nada").

8.2/Excerpt 2/DS 9

```
→  C:     what would you put in there?
   E:     nothing.
          (0.4)
   C:     oh.
          (0.9)
   E:     nada.
          (2.0)
```

It is clear to the participants that there was a mismatch in their understanding of what was being proposed. Whereas Eduardo intended the elimination of the lining; Charles understood its substitution. At this point

[4] This particular item ends up being the only major item to be dropped from considerations later, and is not part of the final deal.

the issue is resolved and the bargaining sequence proper is re-initiated, after some considerable silence (i.e., two full seconds) follows the inserted repair sequence.

Charles is now addressing, not the previous turn, but Eduardo's bargaining sequence opener, the first position in our scheme. Having withheld alignment with the idea of substituting the lining, Charles now addresses the more radical suggestion of eliminating it entirely. He responds to this with a question that displays non-alignment with the proposal again and that implicitly accounts for such withholding of alignment:

8.2/Excerpt 3/DS 9

```
→ C:    yeah how much (were) you gon[na save with that
  E:                                 [eah:
  R:    [no, but with ↑LABOR >E- E- E- EVERYTHING counts<
  E:    [no (                )
```

By asking how much the modification will save, that is, reduce the current price, Charles implicates that it is not worth it, and that this accounts for why it should not be done.

This is the interpretation that Roberto and Eduardo make of his second-position turn. Simultaneously and without delay, both manufacturers start an oppositional turn to Charles' second-position accounting practice, starting with "no." Clearly, they do not orient to Charles' turn as an information question. Rather, their turns address the implied account, grounding Charles' non-alignment. Roberto speaks louder and seems to be the one that is attended to first. He challenges Charles' account by pointing out that it is not simply the elimination of the material, but the labor involved in producing the lining, that is at stake in reducing the cost for the item through the modification:

8.2/Excerpt 4/DS 9

```
R:    [no, but with ↑LABOR >E- E- E- EVERYTHING counts<
E:    [no (                )
E:    okay Charlie, we're speaking ih::- three dollars, (.) three
dollars twenty,
      (0.2)
C:    ye[a:h.
E:      [it's (the) o:ur difference, (.) [this iss:
C:                                        [they want to take the=
      =lin[ing out of the inside of] the pocket
E:        [(maybe) twenty cents thirty cents]
```

Eduardo then joins in and adds the exact amount of difference between the target price and the present quotation, suggesting that the elimination is a *step towards* reaching a significant reduction. At this point

Charles goes into team-movement to address Harry, while Eduardo is able to state what he expects the reduction to be, thus answering the information question in Charles' second position turn.[5]

Harry does not address Charles' team movement statement, but chooses instead to address Eduardo in order to challenge the idea that the proposed change significantly contributes to reducing the price.

8.2/Excerpt 5/DS 9

```
    E:      [it's (the) o:ur difference, (.) [this iss:
    C:                                         [they want to take the=
            =lin[ing out of the inside of] the pocket
    E:          [(maybe) twenty cents thirty cents]
→   H:      yeah but E- Eduardo (.) it's more than three dollars for me
            simply because (.) from our landed cost it becomes more
    (0.4) because of the difference in freight from
    Czechos¶lovakia ¶and here.=
```

Up until here we have the following scheme of actions, excluding the misapprehension sequence:

```
    M:      1st position - proposal to eliminate lining
    I:      2nd position - non-aligning account
    M1:     Roberto's challenge to account
    M2:     Eduardo's challenge to account
    I:                          challenge of Eduardo's challenge
```

At this point we have an interruption in the sequence because Harry and Charles do not agree as to what is being said. Harry is able to further elaborate his challenge. This exchange between the two importers is a side sequence to the arguing sequence being described here and is not explicated in detail. Notice, however, that both upshots of Eduardo's turn are possibly correct. As I have tried to show elsewhere (Garcez, 1991, 1992, 1993), the two importers' culturally preferable point-making style is suggestive, inviting the addressee to help construct it dialogically. If one expects points to be fully and explicitly stated as directly as possible, their points seem hard to comprehend:

8.2/Excerpt 6/DS 9

```
    C:      =no but what he's saying is[: that
```

[5] In that it stresses the gap between target and current price, Eduardo's point here may be heard as counter-productive to his team's position (i.e., that the modification is worth implementing). Given that Eduardo volunteered information, during informal conversations at the time of the recordings, to the effect that the manufacturers were not eager to produce all of the items and increase volumes too drastically, I hear his point here as displaying a willingness to reduce prices only to a certain extent, in the sense that the difference is great, and he is willing to go only so far in his efforts to reduce it. In addition, this attitude would fit the Brazilian point-making style and Eduardo's sense of "the right way to do business," which favors a cumulative, trial-and-error problem-solving approach (Garcez, 1991, 1993). The two possible hearings seem to be connected to the importers' subsequent disagreement as to what Eduardo is saying.

```
H:                                       [I KNOW WHAT HE'S S[AYING but my=
E:                                                              [no, Harry,
H:      =bottom line is is (.) what is it gonna cost me to land in
the United States=
C:      =well yeah, but ih what he's saying is if (you) t[ake out=
E:                                                                  [(
C:      =tha]t piece of vinyl he's gonna save in the front of the-
inside of the pocket,
        (1.3)
H:      you're not hearing what he's saying and I'm hearing (him).
C:      a'right, what('re) you say(ing)?
H:      he is hearing if he could save three- three four dollars
(that then) equals Czechoslovakia, then he's okay,=
C:      =yeah,
→ H:    and I'm trying to say, (.) that the landed cost is not gonna
be the same.
C:      yeap.
        (0.7)
H:      the ef oh bee: ((FOB)) might twoou- might uh:ah turn out to
be the same but not the ↑landed cost,
C:      that's correct.
→ H:    unless he can get a decent ocean freight rate (.) that is
reasonable (.) we're always gonna be in trouble,
        (1.3)
H:      I'm paying thirty two hundred dollars a ↑container from
Czechoslovakia,
```

At this point the two importers are in agreement. Harry has formulated quite clearly what in effect is a pre-challenge to an implication in Eduardo's point, namely that eliminating the gap with the Czechoslovakian target price is still not the ideal scenario, as Eduardo's turn may be heard to suggest. Harry's challenge of Eduardo's reasoning is foregrounded again at the end, so that Eduardo gets back to the arguing sequence by countering it with a disclaimer of responsibility for the freight, at least at this point, by appealing to his strict responsibilities, given his identity as manufacturer.

8.2/Excerpt 7/DS 9

```
→ E:    Harry, but our obligation is to make the: the product,
H:      absolu[tely.
E:            [(     )
E:      we're (.) speaking about ef oh bee ((FOB)) price (0.4) after
we: (0.9) you know,
        (2.7)
H:      ((cigarette in mouth)) we can go along with that.
        (0.7)
C:      okay.
```

The importers agree with Eduardo. By validating Eduardo's disclaimer, Harry and Charles are also suspending the challenge to the manufacturers' arguing position (against Charles' second-position non-alignment and account).

The result of this is that at this point the importers' grounds for not aligning with Eduardo's proposal in first position can again be relevantly questioned. One could expect a return to the previous stage of arguing, or an aligning reply from the importers, to follow. In an interesting strategic tack, however, Roberto chooses not to return immediately and press for a reply, but to initiate a new bargaining sequence with a new proposal for a similar modification somewhere else on the item:

8.2/Excerpt 8/DS 9

```
          (2.6)
→ R:      what about- (0.3) well, (0.6) in this (0.6) in this pocket
  here,
          (3.2)
  R:      if we eliminate this: (.) imitation,
          (2.0)
  H:      I think you're gonna destroy the whole case.
  C:      this is what's beginning d' happen, it's gonna lose its
  shape to an extent also. it won['t have a body to it.=
```

Roberto's proposal, and the importers' misalignment and account follow swiftly here. No arguing ensues because Roberto does not question the importers' account for misalignment. Rather, he performs two actions in the same turn starting in overlap with the importers' misaligning account in this quick bargaining sequence:

8.2/Excerpt 9/DS 9

```
  C:      this is what's beginning d' happen, it's gonna lose its
  shape to an extent also. it won['t have a body to it.=
→ R:                                 [okay, so-
→ R:      =so just (.) eliminate this one here,
          (0.6)
  R:      that
```

Roberto agrees with Charles' account for the rejection of this new proposal, and then he optimistically formulates the upshot of the previous sequence as having concluded in alignment favoring his proposal. In other words, Roberto tendentiously hears the status of Charles' account for misaligning with the importers' initial proposal as "not standing," and offers his understanding that Eduardo's initial proposal is thus acceptable.

8.2/Excerpt 10/DS 9

```
  R:                                 [okay, so-
→ R:      =so just (.) eliminate this one here,
          (0.6)
  R:      that
→ H:      that I would go along with.
          (1.3)
→ E:      (            ) this (.) can we do?
```

```
        (0.5)
C:      kay.
```

Harry aligns with the formulation and, after Eduardo re-states Roberto's upshot through a question. Charles also aligns with it, thus relinquishing his previous misalignment in second position.

Following this, the bargaining sequence can then be terminated, with a confirmation of what exactly the agreed activity in the distal future will consist of. After this, a gap is "heard" before the next interactional unit starts.

8.2/Excerpt 11/DS 9

```
R:      >SO ELIMINATE,<
        (1.6)
R:      uh::
        (1.4)
H:      no li:ning,
        (2.8)
R:      the smaller:,
        (1.1)
R:      O[UTER ZIPPER po[cket
H:       [back of-       [back of
H:      (full) zipper (compartment).
        (1.4)
C:      °out°=
H:      =°on outside° ((lighting cigarette))
        (2.5)
C:      that's it.
→       (18.0)
```

So in this sequence we witness a revision of a second-position misaligning action, given that the account-recipients successfully challenge the grounds offered in its support. That is to say participants co-construct the account for misalignment as "not standing." Below is a synopsis of the main actions in this sequence:

```
M:      1st position - proposal to eliminate lining
I:      2nd position - non-aligning account (not worth it)
M1:     Roberto's challenge to account (material + labor)
M2:     Eduardo's challenge to account (10% of total)
I:      challenge of Eduardo's challenge (less than 10% - freight)
M:      disclaimer of responsibility for freight
I:      acceptance of disclaimer (i.e., challenge stands; 2nd
position account stands challenged)
M:              new bargaining sequence opener
I:              misaligning reply + account
M:              relinquish of new bargaining sequence opener +
        optimistic formulation of (initial bargaining sequence) 2nd
position non-aligning response and account as no longer
standing and to be relinquished
I:      alignment
```

Account Does NOT STAND: 2nd Position Unchanged

The four sequences in the data source which are occurrences of this type are all re-cycled versions of the initial sequence discussed below. The sequence whose closing was chosen for microanalysis in chapter 6 is one of these re-cycled versions. Recall that, in that segment, the participants co-construct an arguing sequence whose ending shows that the account (in support of the countering of a challenge) does not stand. Since the account does not stand, the challenge is therefore valid, and one would expect the second-position account-giving party to revise or relinquish it, or else perform both of those actions by aligning with the other party's first position. However, that is not what happens here. In these four sequences, the manufacturer party, whose accounts in second position are co-constructed as untenable, manages not to perform any such further aligning action. The only recourse the opposing party has is to return yet again to the issue to re-initiate the arguing sequence.

Here we will look at how that first instance comes about. It took place on the afternoon of the third day of meetings (Friday, Oct. 19, p.m.). The sample of this new item, 69528, had been brought in. The importers had examined it, and they were entirely satisfied with the craftsmanship. The manufacturers, however, had already indicated a lack of enthusiasm for the item. They considered it too elaborate and overly demanding on their production line. They also thought it was too similar to an existing item. The transcript shown below starts at the beginning of the price bargaining sequence on this item.

We will see that the importers misalign with the price quoted by the manufacturers, and Eduardo will then account for the high price on the basis of its high consumption of leather (in contrast with the similar existing item). Once this account is questioned until it no longer stands, we see the end of the arguing sequence, without, however, an expected return to the bargaining sequence through a revision of the account or of the price. This results in stalemate and, later, in renewed arguing.

The bargaining sequence starts with Harry soliciting its opener:

8.3/Excerpt 1/DS 13

```
            (0.8)
→  H:       what's the price?
            (1.0)
→  E:       ((looking down at notes)) Argentina: is forty-four eighty-
   five,
```

→ H: °( )° ((*drops pen noisily, turns torso and head;*
draws right hand over head))
→ C: °Jesus Christ°

Eduardo provides the two-part opener's first part by giving the cheaper price quotation based on Argentinian leather: $44.85. Harry had previously stated that his target price would be between $31.00 and $32.75. Eduardo's price quotation is heard as not accommodating to the importers' expectations, and so both of them respond to Eduardo's turn with extreme displays of misalignment. Harry's nonverbal behavior can be seen as not only misaligning with Eduardo's price proposal, but also as displaying an abrupt disengagement from the interaction. He drops his pen, thus signaling he will not even note down the figure in the offer; he moves away from his baseline body position facing Eduardo, and literally misaligns with him. Finally, Harry draws his hand over his head in a sign of exasperation. Charles follows suit by issuing a verbal display of surprised dis pleasure ("°Jesus Christ°").

A quick interruption occurs as an outside source[6] asks a question of Eduardo. He answers the question without disengaging from the negotiation:

8.3/Excerpt 2/DS 13
→ E: pode ser madeira ou metal. ((*shifting gaze to C/H*)) °tanto
faz°=
→ C: =Brazil is gonna be higher.
→ H: °we can't ( )°

As Eduardo finishes his turn, Charles addresses Harry referring to the second part of the price quotation as being even higher (i.e., price figure based on use of Brazilian leather). Harry responds to that with yet another indication of his misalignment with the manufacturers' price proposal. At this point then Eduardo offers an account for the price proposal being what it is:

8.3/Excerpt 3/DS 13
C: =Brazil is gonna be higher.
H: °we can't ( )°
→ E: °wha-° (.) for example the s:<eventeen nineteen,> (.) (you)
have a price of thirty-one thirty-two (.) this ((*touches new* *69528*
sample)) has too much- (.) leather °(moo- m'ch)° more leather (than)=

[6] The interrupting turn was my own. I answered the phone and somebody from the model shop asked me to relay a question to Eduardo about the material to be used in a sample they were preparing, so I asked Eduardo. The turn appears in the complete transcript of this data segment in appendix B, p. 362.

Eduardo's turn opens with a false start. It is possible that he was going to ask what the manufacturers expected to pay, and then he realized they had already given him that information. He stops abruptly, pauses for a microsecond, and re-starts with what will be a full-fledged account introduced as an "example."

Eduardo's account is given in the form of a comparison with the similar existing item 1719.[7] He formulates the price of that item, and then touches the new item sample (69528), saying it has much more leather. Eduardo presents this as an account that would justify the higher price for the new item, and would undermine the importers' $31.00-$32.75 target price as unreasonable. In the typical style I have described elsewhere (Garcez, 1991, 1992, 1993), Eduardo builds supporting evidence for point-making but does not state the point explicitly, so the implications are indefinite but maximized. The account, however, is clearly given as "more leather."

And that is what Charles will question in third position, thus initiating the arguing sequence:

8.3/Excerpt 4/DS 13

```
     E:   °wha-° (.) for example the s:&lt;eventeen nineteen,&gt; (.) (you)
          have a price of thirty-one thirty-two (.) this ((touches new 69528
sample)) has too much- (.) leather °(moo- m'ch)° more leather (than)=
  →  C:   =where's more leather?
  →  E:   where is?
  →  E:   (1.4)=((slides fingers along case edges)) °↑he[re°,
  →  C:                                              [you mean the=
     C:   =gusset?
     E:   gusset, ↑here, ((touches narrow side of case))
          (0.4)
```

Charles takes issue with Eduardo's account by challenging Eduardo to show where the additional leather is, that is, by denying the factualness of an objective state of affairs in the world as asserted in Eduardo's account. Eduardo responds to Charles's challenge with a questioning repeat, that is, he treats the question as a something that should be obvious. Jefferson (1972) describes questioning repeats as indicative of disbelief or surprise with the previous turn which they mirror, which is indeed the case here. Eduardo then indexes where the additional leather is ("°↑here°,"). In overlap, Charles formulates it for confirmation

[7] The price for the "old" item (i.e., existing style 1719) is $31.37 (see analysis of the closing of the complex arguing sequence in chapter 6).

("you mean the <u>gu</u>sset?"), and Eduardo confirms and upgrades where the more leather is ("gusset, ↑here,/ (and) ↑here,").

While Charles may be offering through the candidate answer "a model of what would satisfy" him (Pomerantz, 1988, p. 360), namely that the additional leather would be in the gussets, they all know that the gussets would not, in and of themselves, use so much more leather as to justify it all. Here, the participants presuppose technical knowledge which outsiders will not have. If we think of the geometrical form of a portfolio case, we realize it has six sides: two large panels of leather are used for the broad sides; a narrow strip can be used for the bottom; then we have a zippered top and the two narrow sides, which are the gussets. All of these parts are mirrored on the inside with some sort of material which may or may not be leather. The two cases being compared here are similar in all these respects, except that, whereas the existing style 1719 has one internal division, the new style being considered has many, and that makes it wider. Additional consumption of raw materials can therefore be expected for the making of the many files as well as for the wider gussets. Thus Eduardo confirms Charles' candidate answer but adds two other places where one can find "more leather."

8.3/Excerpt 5/DS 13

```
  →  E:    (1.4)=((slides fingers along case edges)) °↑he[re°,
     C:                                               [you mean the=
     C:    =gusset?
  →  E:    gusset, ↑here, ((touches narrow side of case))
           (0.4)
     H:    [(not) the inside
  →  E:    [(and) ↑here, ((shows side panel))
           (0.4)
```

Eduardo's showing where additional leather satisfies the sequential relevance placed on such next action by Charles' challenge, but the information he provides is not precise. This gives Harry a chance to object to it. Eduardo points to the edges, the narrow side, and the side panel of the case. Eduardo's third turn, showing the final "more leather" location, is uttered in overlap with Harry's objection that there is no additional leather on the inside of the case, which Eduardo attends to and confirms:

8.3/Excerpt 6/DS 13

```
     E:    gusset, ↑here, ((touches narrow side of case))
           (0.4)
  →  H:    [(not) the inside
     E:    [(and) ↑here, ((shows side panel))
```

(0.4)
→ E: yeah, inside is o<u>kay</u> but- (.) you can: ((*searches for cost sheets*))
(0.4)=((*R brings 1719 sample to the table top*))
E: measure here ((*i.e., cost sheets*))

At this point, whether or not Eduardo's account stands has not yet been determined. He has shown where more leather is, but rather generically. The two cases being compared have roughly the same length and breadth dimensions. What makes them different is the compartments inside, which therefore make the new item wider. It is thus unclear from Eduardo's showing how the additional leather can be seen on the side panel and the edges. Once Eduardo agrees that the inside does not have additional leather, the only thing left is the gussets on the narrow sides of the case.

Both manufacturers seem to understand that they need to make the difference more precise. Eduardo announces his intention to resort to the cost sheets as additional, more precise evidence of what he is claiming. He searches for them, and offers them for the importers to "measure." At the same time Roberto reaches for the 1719 sample case, and brings it up to the table top:

8.3/Excerpt 7/DS 13
→ E: yeah, inside is o<u>kay</u> but- (.) you can: ((*searches for cost sheets*))
→ (0.4)=((*R brings 1719 sample to table top*))
→ E: measure here ((*i.e., cost sheets*))

It is not clear from the data whether Roberto misunderstood Eduardo's action, but the fact is that the physical appearance of the comparable item on the table top next to the new item being negotiated competes for and wins the importers' attention over the more abstract figures for leather consumption in Eduardo's cost sheets. Harry and Charles attend to and encourage the physical comparison between the two items in search of the additional leather that is central to Eduardo's account:

8.3/Excerpt 8/DS 13
→ H: yeah, go ahead, (.) go ahead, spread it out.
(0.9)
→ H: go ahead=
E: =ah,=
→ C: =look at the <u>bot</u>tom,
(0.8)=((*R handling the two samples on table*))
E: °(but but-)°=
→ H: =go ahead go ahead,
(4.0) ((*R feeling inside of both sample; others watch him*))

Notice that Eduardo's proposed course of action is disattended to. His attempts to dismiss the new focus are to no avail, as all the other three participants' actions are sequentially tied to the new focus of attention on the samples that Roberto is now handling.

8.3/Excerpt 9/DS 13

```
      H:    go ahead=
  →   E:    =ah,=
      C:    =look at the bottom,
  →         (0.8)=((R handling the two samples on table))
  →   E:    °(but but-)°=
      H:    =go ahead go ahead,
  →         (4.0) ((R feeling inside of both sample; others watch him))
```

As Roberto keeps fiddling with the samples on the table, his action comes to be seen as preparatory before he can "spread it out" and show what the "more leather" amounts to. This is evident both in Eduardo's yielding to the new focus and in Harry's request for the second part of the price quotation as they wait:

8.3/Excerpt 10/DS 13

```
  →         (4.0) ((R feeling inside of both sample; others watch him))
  →   E:    °(put there)°
  →         (6.1) ((R still examining samples; gets up from chair))
  →   H:    give me the Brazil price.
            (1.6)
  →   E:    ((looks down at notes)) forty-seven, (.) thirty.
            (2.0)=((H shakes head "no" as he notes it down))
```

As Harry performs the expected misalignment once Eduardo quotes the price for the new item based on Brazilian leather, Roberto announces he is ready to offer the precise physical evidence of "more leather:"

8.3/Excerpt 11/DS 13

```
  →   R:    ↑okay,
  →         (2.9) ((all looking at R))
      R:    ((gazes briefly at H)) you could say that (.) (          ) in
      excess, (.) all of this gusset, (.) two gussets, (2.2) in a       sense
are in excess to what we have here,
            (4.4)
```

It still takes Roberto almost three seconds before he can summarize and substantiate what the claimed additional leather stands for. All wait patiently, though. When Roberto issues the clarification, the additional leather consumption can be heard to reside only in the gussets, and nowhere else. Roberto does not refer to the other two areas that Eduardo had mentioned before. This weakens the account. The manufacturers have shown more leather, but not *much* more leather.

That is what Harry alludes to as he responds, with great delay, to Roberto's turn:

8.3/Excerpt 12/DS 13

```
→       (4.4)
→ H:    you're talking about thirteen dollars more, °nuh::° it makes
no sense ((shakes head "no"))
        (0.6) ((maid comes in with six glasses of refreshments on a      tray))
```

In this turn, Harry not only discounts and downgrades the manufacturers' account as justifying the price, but he also re-asserts his misalignment with their price proposal.

Roberto now disengages from the arguing interaction and starts serving the refreshments that the maid brought in. Eduardo thus gets a turn to re-introduce his argument, which had been diverted by the physical comparison between the two samples:

8.3/Excerpt 13/DS 13

```
          (0.6) ((maid comes in with six glasses of refreshments))
→  E:     ah but we- we're spe- we are comparing this with
          th[e: uh uh: the normal l[ine, (.) it costs thirty-one=
   C:       [that's not water.
   R:                              [kind of.
→  E:     =dollars, you know that cost thir- thirty-one dollars, (0.4)
   for example, ((starts flipping through pages of a notebook))
          (0.8) ((R serves refreshments))
   R:     cê aceita uma Coca?
   P:     anrm
   R:     (vai?) Almir?=
   H:     =is this diet coke?
 maid:    é:. ((nods yes))
   H:     ((nodding yes)) diet coke,=
   R:     diet [coke, ((R's further talk to maid not transcribed))
→  E:          [seventeen nineteen, (.) cost (.) today, (0.7) thirty-
   one thirty-seven.
   H:     (0.7)=((drinking; nods yes))
→  E:     ef oh bee ((FOB)) price.
```

As the serving of refreshments continues, Eduardo gets back to figures, trying to assert what he had implied in his account, namely that whatever additional leather consumption there is on the item is enough to make Harry's offer of $31.00-$32.75 unreasonable, given that the old item currently sells for $31.37. Before Eduardo is able to assert his conclusion — "you can't/ how you can compare?" — more definitely, however, Harry reverses the comparison away from Eduardo's focus on the importers' target/offer. Harry is trying to concentrate once again on the manufacturers' price quotation, which he is misaligning with:

8.3/Excerpt 14/DS 13

```
   E:          [seventeen nineteen, (.) cost (.) today, (0.7) thirty-
   one thirty-seven.
   H:     (0.7)=((drinking; nods yes))
```

E: ef oh bee ((*FOB*)) price.
→ H: okay and [should that be thirteen dollars more?=
E: [and you can't-
E: =how you can compare this?=
→ H: =should that be thirteen dollars more?
        (0.8)

The two speak in complete overlap for an entire two-second stretch until Harry drops out, and Eduardo comes out in the clear with the figure he is trying to concentrate on, which is Harry's "unreasonable" $31.00/$32.75 offer:

8.3/Excerpt 15/DS 13

H: =should that be thirteen dollars more?
        (0.8)
→ H: come on, [(((*2.0 in complete overlap*)))
→ E: [(((*2.0 in complete overlap*))) but you=
→ E: =want- you are giving us a price of thirty-two, (.) thirty,
thirty-two ((*gestures "crazy"*))
H: °(but)° this is- ↓<u>THIR</u>TY-TWO SEVenty-<u>five</u>,
        (1.7)

Here we can see that Eduardo is trying to get some concession, an improved offer, from the importers, without concluding the arguing sequence or improving his own proposal, while Harry seems to expect Eduardo to make a concession by relinquishing his second-position account, which the importers do not hear as enough to justify the price the manufacturers are proposing.

After the long overlapping talk segment, Harry starts a fresh oppositional turn but then stops in mid-sentence to correct Eduardo's reference to the importers' target/offer. Harry is orienting to the indefiniteness in Eduardo's formulation of the figure. Notice that Eduardo mentions the higher price ("thirty-two") then repeats it indefinitely as "thirty, thirty-two," implying Harry's target/offer is something vague and unqualified. Harry reacts to that implication in Eduardo's turn. His re-start is marked by a significant change in pitch and volume:

8.3/Excerpt 16/DS 13

E: =want- you are giving us a price of thirty-two, (.) thirty,
thirty-two ((*gestures "crazy"*))
→ H: °(but)° this is- ↓<u>THIR</u>TY-TWO SEVenty-<u>five</u>,
        (1.7)
E: ↑yeah, (b   ) (0.8) from <u>where</u>?
        (0.9)
H: [from Czechoslovakia, that's from wh<u>e</u>re,
E: [how we can compare?
        (1.0)=((*H staring at E*))
H: ↓I'm not quoting you prices from the <u>sky</u>:,

(2.4)

The implication in Eduardo's previous turn might be secondary to Eduardo's position, but it is heard as crucial by Harry. This is evident in the next turns shown above where, after Harry states the specific higher target/offer figure, Eduardo hesitates but then questions its origin:

8.3/Excerpt 17/DS 13

```
      H:    °(but)° this is- ↓THIRTY-TWO SEVenty-five,
            (1.7)
  →   E:    ↑yeah, (b   ) (0.8) from where?
```

Harry, who at other moments in the talks went to great lengths to establish the dependability of the Czechoslovakian manufacturers and their prices, reacts strongly to Eduardo's question implicating that his target price of (now specifically) $32.75 is no better than a guess:

8.3/Excerpt 18/DS 13

```
            (0.9)
  →   H:    [from Czechoslovakia, that's from where
      E:    [how we can compare?
            (1.0)=((H staring at E))
  →   H:    ↓I'm not quoting you prices from the sky:
            (2.4)
```

Eduardo hears the 0.9-second silence following his question as a non-response by Harry. Eduardo initiates another turn with yet another question, this time concluding his point that a comparison between the two samples with the current target is not feasible. However, Harry does offer a delayed answer, in overlap with Eduardo's question-formatted conclusion to his point. Harry answers the previous question in its most literal sense by providing the origin of his target. Then, as Eduardo is done with his utterance, Harry's turn ends in the clear with the emphasis on the firm, known origin of his target price. He stares angrily at Eduardo for an entire second and adds a counter-assertion to the implication in Eduardo's question "from where?" — he is "not quoting you prices from the sky:."

Competing topical foci are relevantly being entertained at this stage in the sequence. Having started out with arguing over the additional leather consumption account for the price quotation proposal being what it is, the sequence has steered away from it slightly, as a result of Eduardo's attempt to make the importers' target price problematic, and not his own quotation. Harry attends to Eduardo's steering by re-asserting the target price as grounded and by displaying his unwillingness to consider a concession. We have a stand-off between the two unyielding positions.

After a long silent pause, Charles, self-selects and re-establishes the arguing sequence on its previous course by re-asserting his party's misalignment with the proposed price for the item:

8.3/Excerpt 19/DS 13

```
            (2.4)
  →  C:     you're figuring something wrong,
     H:     you- you're not making se[nse if you compare it.
     C:                              [there's something,
```

Charles assertion here upgrades the previous non-alignment with the proposed price to a full-fledged challenge. It assumes the price is unaccounted for and suggests a safe locus for the origin of the problem, away from ill-intentions, by asserting that the costing calculations are flawed somewhere. Harry takes the challenge a step further by accusing the importers of not making sense in their comparison.

8.3/Excerpt 20/DS 13

```
  →  H:     you- you're not making se[nse if you compare it.
     C:                              [there's something,
     C:     you kn[ow,
     H:            [you're not talking about leather on the inside,
     ((pointing to new case))
```

Charles overlaps a repetition of his previous utterance onto Harry's turn, stops, and then continues in the clear, only to be overlapped by Harry's utterance, which is a full return to the challenging of Eduardo's second position account. Harry again points to the core of the issue: where is the additional leather that would justify a price of forty-four dollars (against $31.37 of the 1719, and against $32.75 in Harry's Czechoslovakia-based target)? Harry formulates a position, ambiguously hearable as Eduardo's or generic to the effect that there is no additional leather on the inside of the new case.

8.3/Excerpt 21/DS 13

```
     C:     you kn[ow,
  →  H:            [you're not talking about leather on the inside,
     ((pointing to new case))
            (1.1)=((E opens up case that's sitting upright on table))
  →  E:     [inside (.) and here also, ((shows bottom of case))
     C:     [(          ) (.) he's showing us the gussets
```

Eduardo accepts the importers' return to the arguing over the status of his account and joins them by opening up the case sample and then by addressing Harry's assertion. However, Eduardo does talk about the inside as an area containing additional leather:

8.3/Excerpt 22/DS 13

```
                (1.1)=((E opens up case that's sitting upright on table))
  →   E:        [inside (.) and here also, ((shows bottom of case))
      C:        [(            ) (.) he's showing us the gussets
```

However, the importers display an understanding that what Eduardo is talking about is the gussets which, they have agreed, amounts to *some* additional leather consumption, but not enough to account for the proposed price. No repair is initiated in this apparent break of intersubjectivity.

Eduardo goes on to re-assert the other areas of additional leather consumption, this time in much more explanatory detail. He shows the narrow side of the case as being made out of a single piece of leather (which precludes the use of scrap). This once again concentrates on the additional leather consumption, which Eduardo has mentioned as an account for the price quoted, on the gussets, and distracts any reference to other areas.

Harry then starts a loud utterance, in overlap with Eduardo's, which crucially addresses the gussets as the locus of the problem:

8.3/Excerpt 23/DS 13

```
      E:        also here, ((shows side of case)) this is all [one piece of=
  →   H:                                                      [FINE,  MAKE=
      C:                                                      [but uh:::
      E:        =[leather, (.) one ((gestures "1" with index)) piece of-]
  →   H:        =[ME LEATHER- MAKE ME THE GU]SSETS VINYL((pointing to case))
                (1.1)
      H:        make me vinyl gussets.
      C:        yeah
                (0.5)
```

Harry's loud overlapping turn obliterates Eduardo's explanations, which become almost inaudible by contrast. Harry starts out by conceding entirely to the gussets as adding to the item's leather consumption ("FINE,"). Then he goes on to propose the substitution of leather by a cheaper material. The request for substitution starts with a performance error, and Harry self-repairs, which delays the crucial word vinyl to come out in the clear. By that time, Eduardo's gaze has shifted from the case he was showing Harry. A rather long silence ensues, and Harry repeats the request in normal loudness and in the clear:

8.3/Excerpt 24/DS 13

```
                (1.1)
  →   H:        make me vinyl gussets.
      C:        yeah
                (0.5)
      E:        ((pinches narrow side of case)) here?=
```

```
H:      =y[eah.
C:        [yeah.
E:      okay.
```

Eduardo requests clarification as to what Harry is requesting. He asks a question with a candidate answer by pinching the narrow side of the case. Both importers offer decisively emphatic confirmations. Harry latches his "yeah" to Eduardo's "here?," and then Charles joins him. In overlap with each other, both importers confirm the specific area for material substitution, with the same falling intonation.

Eduardo aligns with their request. He then turns the case around and requests confirmation yet again in the same format as before:

8.3/Excerpt 25/DS 13

```
→          (3.0)=((E grabs case and turns it around with narrow side
facing H/C))
→  E:      here?
   H:      ((shaking head no)) no, (.) I- I said vinyl gussets.=
   C:      =(after shaking head no while drinking)) insi:de,
   E:      inside.
           (0.4)
   H:      where the files are.
   E:      ((nods yes)) okay.
```

This time the understanding-check is disconfirmed and repaired. In other words, the request applies to the lining of the case, not to the outside gussets, which are to remain in leather.

At this point the account issued in second position by Eduardo — "additional leather consumption justifies proposed price" — has suffered severe damage. Whereas partial agreement was established, that the wider gussets do add to leather consumption, no other area of the case was accepted as having the same effect. With the provision requested and aligned with for the making of the inside gussets in vinyl, the second position no longer stands, and thus its relinquish or revision is conditionally relevant.

A revision would be heard in the proffering of an entirely different account, and the continuation of the arguing sequence, which is not forthcoming. Thus the expectation is that the manufacturers will eventually issue a new price proposal, acknowledging that the account for the challenged proposal was co-constructed as no longer standing, as having been relinquished. This would then re-initiate the suspended bargaining sequence. Naturally, some time is allowed for the manufacturers to perform that action, given that calculations and the production of a new figure require some material time-off.

This is what we seem to get next:

8.3/Excerpt 26/DS 13

H: where the files are.
→ E: ((*nods yes*)) okay.
(3.3) ((*E gets rid of cigarette ash; looks for cost sheets*))

Eduardo displays a readiness to engage in the production of the figures necessary to revising his proposal. Harry and Charles re-assert all of the objections they had previously made to misalign with the manufacturers' price proposal and to argue against their account for it.

This is done over a period of about fifty seconds in the excerpt below:

8.3/Excerpt 27/DS 13

E: ((*nods yes*)) okay.
(3.3) ((*E gets rid of cigarette ash; looks for cost sheets*))
H: but even if it didn't have vinyl gussets eh- Eduardo, you can't substantiate (.) fourteen thirteen [dollars more,
C: [( )
→ E: (.)=((*without gazing at C or H, nods yes and hand gestures "stop"*))
H: than the seventeen fourteen. (0.7) <seventeen nineteen,>
(1.4)
H: makes no sense.
(0.9)
H: we're going backwards, (not where I wanna go)
(14.8)
((*E looking at cost sheets and calculating; C and H watch him attentively, the H starts looking at sample standing upright on table*))
H: <and you don't even have a shoulder strap on that yet,> ((*pointing to sample*))
E: (1.0)=((*raises head and looks at H then at sample; then lowers head as H starts next turn*))
H: where's the shoulder strap?=
C: =and the pa:ds, [everything else,] (.) °that takes leather°
E: [((*raises head gazes at C; lowers head*))]
(0.9)
C: the [dee ring- the uh: ah: [the: uh: the (da]) clips?
→ [((*with head down looking at notes; raises four right-hand fingers in "stop" gesture*))]
H: [come on it makes no sense.]
(1.2)
H: it makes no sense at all.

This excerpt is not explicated in detail here, but note that Eduardo can be seen to be engaged in getting ready to address the results of the previous arguing sequence. The only listenership tokens Eduardo puts out are quick glances at the importers. More important, he makes a hand-gesture indicating "stop" or "wait." Throughout the whole excerpt, but especially during the 14.8-second gap between the two bursts of talk coming from the importers, we see them gazing at Eduardo without doing much else, in a waiting stance.

However, no new proposal is forthcoming from Eduardo. Following the last utterance in the excerpt above, we have a long period of more than one and a half minutes with no focused interaction between the two parties.

8.3/Excerpt 28/DS 13

```
      H:     it makes no sense at all.
  →          (93.7)
  →          ((C and H occasionally whisper a conversation; E's secretary comes in and talks to him and then leaves; R comes back to the table and starts talking to E in Portuguese))
```

Following this period, Roberto is back at the table, and the discussion over the item continues. The manufacturers stand by their price quotation and do not offer a new one until much later in the talks on the next day. Between the end of the segment above and the new proposal, the same issue is brought up again a number of times, three of them developing into arguing sequences.

The anomaly in this type of arguing sequence found in the Amage/Courofatos negotiation talk corpus lies in the fact that the party whose account was co-constructed as "not standing" managed not to produce a next turn relinquishing or revising the (non)-accountable object (i.e., the price proposal). The anomaly is also evident in the continuous return to the arguing sequence itself. No occurrence of an arguing sequence of the other types in which the status of the account was determined was returned to after its completion. That is, once the participants co-constructed the account and its "accountable" as standing or not, they did not return to the issue for further arguing. By way of contrast, occurrences of the types discussed next, where the account status is unclear, were also returned to later. Those are different from the ones discussed in this section, however, in that neither party displays in the end — as they do in the sequence explicated above — a clear sense that the account status had been determined one way or another.

A Note about Account-Status-UNCLEAR Types

The occurrences of the types of negotiational arguing sequence discussed so far featured participants co-constructing an intersubjective view defining that the account presented in second position either did or did not withstand challenges posed against it. The occurrences to be discussed now show participants co-constructing sequences which end in a common disposition not to argue any further even if the status of the account has not yet been unequivocally determined. In one type, the first to be presented below, dubbed "stop & delay," participants exchange explicit conversational actions to co-construct an understanding that the determination of the status of the account will no longer be pursued locally, and they usually establish a provision as to what is needed for the sequence to be returned to in their interactional future. In the other type, participants shift frames and use metamessages to co-construct a tacit understanding that no further arguing will ensue for the time being, with no provision as to if or when they might return to it.

If we take the four days of meetings as a whole, an interesting ethnographic remark about occurrences of both sequence types ending with an UNCLEAR account-standing status is that they occur either during the early or the late stages of the event. That is to say they do not occur in the more heated middle sections, when the core items in the new collection are negotiated. They do occur either when secondary issues are being discussed, or in the very early stages of discussion of the new collection items. This is reminiscent of Maynard's (1984) observation that "initial bargaining sequences must be preceded by relevant discussion or by solicits and announcements that allow such discussion to happen if needed" (p. 88). It seems that a decision *not to continue arguing at this point* is made most appropriately once it transpires that not enough relevant discussion has preceded. It also points to the varying relevance of different issues in terms of the institutional mandate, so that participants treat some issues as secondary and accordingly they give these issues less interactional attention.

We now turn to an examination of what instances of each of these two negotiational arguing sequence types look like. First we will examine a "stop & delay" and then a "focus shift" occurrence.

Account Status UNCLEAR: Stop & Delay

The segment which illustrates the type of negotiational arguing sequence in which participants agree to stop arguing and delay the determination of their status of the account in second position comes from early on in the negotiation (Thursday, Oct. 18, a.m.). The participants were discussing alternative sources of raw materials. More specifically, they were comparing the prices that Courofatos currently pays to its suppliers against prices offered by potential Taiwanese suppliers that the U.S. importers would introduce the Brazilian manufacturers to. They have all agreed that there is mutual interest in pursuing deals on the items found to be cheaper in Taiwan. A conclusion that an item is a lot cheaper, therefore, is hearable as a position report initiating a bargaining sequence.

As the excerpt below starts, they have just agreed that two different kinds of Taiwanese metal handles cost 13 and 14 cents each. Charles elicits from Roberto the price Courofatos is currently paying, 20 cents. Charles then evaluates the difference, thus issuing a position report:

8.4/Excerpt 1/DS 3

```
→ C:    so (.) what is your metal handles cost?
        (3.1) ((R looking at notes))
  R:    around twenty cents.
        (2.0)
→ C:    wow,
        (2.3)
→ C:    that's a big difference.
```

Immediately prior to the exchange above, Charles had moved from calculation of the price (not shown) to the comparison that precedes the consideration of whether or not the Taiwanese pursuit is worthwhile. This is marked by his "so" above, followed by a micropause. Following this transitional marker, Charles asks the information question which elicits the price of "around twenty cents." After Roberto takes time to go through his notes (3.1 seconds), he provides the information, which Charles then evaluates in slow emphasis and in two parts separated by long pauses.

Before we look at the transcript any further, a parenthetical remark is in order about the long silences in this segment. Since these comparisons between materials involve a great deal of calculation to convert different units of currency and measurement, the participants here have calculators, notes and samples to handle, in addition to other usual fixtures of their interactional environment. This seems to be a straightforward explanation to the pauses being as long as they are throughout the segment.

8.4/Excerpt 2/DS 3

R: around <u>twen</u>ty cents.
(2.0)
→ C: wow,
(2.3)
→ C: that's a <u>big</u> difference.

Charles' evaluation thus amounts to a position report whereby he puts forth a disposition to pursue the investigation on the Taiwanese handles with the expectation that Courofatos may eventually start importing them. It opens a bargaining sequence and carves out the sequential relevance for Roberto to respond to it. However, where some response becomes relevant, we have an extremely long pause which would normally be seen as a gap.

8.4/Excerpt 3/DS 3

C: that's a <u>big</u> difference.
→ (15.3) ((*R looking at notes; C looking at his notes and samples and mumbling to himself what he reads from notes; Mr. A and H watch*))
R: ((*punching numbers on calculator*)) now, one <u>thing</u>, (0.8) when I made this:: (0.8) <u>cost</u>, I based it (.) on the exchange rate of ninety-one cruzeiros.
(1.0)

While the 15.3-second pause following Charles position report is extremely long, given the participants' added interactional burden here, of having to calculate and compare samples, it is only relatively longer than the other pauses before it. These pauses do not seem to be oriented to as interruptions but simply as delays which are necessary for the participants to deal with these input activities. Notice that the secondary participants, Mr. Amati and Harry, who are not directly involved in the calculations, both watch in anticipation of the next relevant action by Roberto.

Roberto then provides a direct response to Charles' report. Roberto's utterance is indeed addressing the issue and responding to the position report, though Charles may have some difficulty seeing that.

8.4/Excerpt 4/DS 3

→ R: ((*punching numbers on calculator*)) now, one <u>thing</u>, (0.8) when I made this:: (0.8) <u>cost</u>, I based it (.) on the exchange rate of ninety-one cruzeiros.
(1.0)
C: >ninety-one,<
R: ninety-one.
C: and it's up to ninety-<u>five</u>,
(1.1)
R: ninety-<u>three</u>,

```
        (1.2)
C:      >ninety-three,<
R:      I mean in the commercial i- i:t's a little di- it's a little
lower than (.) the black market.
C:      uhm hm.
        (1.1)
```

As was referred to above, the Brazilian importers have been shown to make points in a style that requires their interlocutors to inquire for information until the point is fully stated. In the excerpt above, whose explication will gloss over some important details, Charles displays trouble with Roberto's turn through a questioning repeat and an understanding check which is minimally repaired until Roberto elaborates his point:

8.4/Excerpt 5/DS 3

```
        (1.1)
R:      so:,
        (2.4)
R:      it'll be a little cheaper, (.) you know some- (0.5)=((mouth
gesturing "doubt"; hand in mid air))=
C:      =well: ( [    )
R:               [two or three per cent cheaper right now.
C:      what? these handles?
H:      <what are you talking about?!>
        (0.8)
C:      it's much cheaper.
        (0.7)
```

Roberto means to say, as will become clear to all as the transcript continues, that, after he calculated the cost at twenty cents, the exchange rate has fluctuated, making his local price for handles slightly cheaper. The implication of this, which has not yet come across to Roberto's interlocutor, is that the Taiwanese handles compare less favorably than the twenty-cent price reflects. However, Harry and Charles hear Roberto to be saying that the Taiwanese handles are only "two or three percent cheaper right now."

Roberto lets the importers know that their hearing of his utterance is problematic, initiating additional repair work which involves all English-speaking participants. Repair culminates with Roberto canceling the importers' inference ("no,"), after which Roberto re-asserts his previous non-aligning response to Charles' position report in a more explicit formulation:

8.4/Excerpt 6/DS 3

```
→ R:      no, (0.5)=((looks at notes)) what I'm saying is (.) that the
twenty cents that I calculated a week ago, (1.2) today:
would represent a little less than [twenty cents
```

```
C:                                    [oh, it'd be: just=
=slightly less than twenty cents, but it still be a big
savings out of uh:- Taiwan,
        (2.3)
```

Ultimately then, intersubjectivity is re-established, and Roberto's point is understood after repair, expansion, additional repair and re-assertion. It can be seen as having been designed as a non-aligning response to Charles' position report.

Charles displays the understanding of the repaired version of Roberto's point through the change of information status token "oh," and by re-formulating it. Charles' contribution also clearly orients to the non-alignment contained in Roberto's response. He downgrades the difference that the new exchange rate represents, from Roberto's "a little less than twenty per cent" to "just slightly less than twenty cents." Charles then adds a counter-assertion to the implication in Roberto's non-aligning response — "but it still be a big savings out of uh:- Taiwan," — which in effect is a re-assertion of Charles' own initial position report.

8.4/Excerpt 7/DS 3

```
   R:     no, (0.5)=((looks at notes)) what I'm saying is (.) that the
   twenty cents that I calculated a week ago, (1.2) today:
   would represent a little less than [twenty cents
→  C:                                    [oh, it'd be: just=
   =slightly less than twenty cents, but it still be a big
savings out of uh:- Taiwan,
          (2.3)
```

Roberto still does not align with the importers' position. He delays a next turn in different ways. He waits 2.3 seconds, then starts an utterance which never materializes ("uh:::"), pauses again, starts an utterance referring to the handles that Courofatos is using, and then re-examines the Taiwanese samples on the table — all of this apparently in search of a renewed account to maintain non-alignment with Charles' position report:

8.4/Excerpt 8/DS 3

```
          (2.3)
→  R:     uh::: ((looking at notes and punching numbers on
calculator))
          (1.0)
→  R:     okay, the handle that we are using,
          (2.4) ((R examines samples on desk))
```

Charles seems to offer a candidate answer as to what Roberto may be objecting to. We cannot be certain from the data, but it seems that Charles hears Roberto to be suggesting that the neither of the two samples corresponds exactly to the size or model that Courofatos currently uses.

8.4/Excerpt 9/DS 3

```
C:      (        ) between these two (perhaps)
        (1.6)
```

Roberto does not address Charles' turns and instead he requests confirmation that the Taiwanese price is indeed 14 cents:

8.4/Excerpt 10/DS 3

```
R:      they're all fourteen cents.
C:      yeah.
        (3.8)
```

After Charles confirms the price, Roberto starts a new utterance with a concluding marker. After a long pause, Roberto introduces a new tack of accounting to his non-alignment with Charles' position report:

8.4/Excerpt 11/DS 3

```
R:      so °then,°
        (1.0)
R:      the freight for thi:s:,
        (2.0)
```

Roberto now talks about the cost of freight that needs to be added to the Taiwanese price (and which, in contrast, would not add to his local cost of "less than twenty per cent"). Roberto's turn is designed, again, suggestively, expecting collaboration. Rather than as a complete assertion, Roberto delivers only part of a sentence, "the freight for thi:s:," which is uttered with a question intonation. This and the stress on the last word, whose sounds are elongated, invite the addressed recipient to guess what the predicate is and implicate that it is significant enough to be considered against (i.e., as support for non-alignment with) Charles' position report.

A long pause follows and, this time, as his next turn shows, Charles does not have as much trouble understanding what Roberto is doing. Charles again counters Roberto's point by asserting that whatever the freight cost may be, it "can't be" enough to offset the advantage of buying the handles from Taiwan. But notice that Charles assumes that the predicate of the sentence in Roberto's utterance involves an absolute price-figure in cents; not a percentage of difference:

8.4/Excerpt 12/DS 3

```
       R:     the freight for thi:s:,
              (2.0)
   →   C:     it can't be (higher than     cents)
       R:     ↑no, I'm thinking about percentage,
              (.)
       C:     yeah,
              (1.3)
```

Roberto responds to Charles' counter-assertion by initiating repair on his own previous turn, given Charles's mention of absolute figures as X number of cents. The work that Roberto's turn ("↑no, I'm thinking about percentage,") is doing is to claim that Charles has problematically interpreted Roberto's previous assertion. He starts to do that by a token of negation which denies, not Charles' assertion itself, but the appropriateness of what Charles assumes to have been the exact predicate of Roberto's previous utterance.[8]

Whether or not Roberto really was thinking of percentages and not of actual figures when he mentioned the freight is not the question. The important aspect of it is that his claim is sequentially warranted. In initiating the repair, Roberto is able to discount Charles' counter-assertion as inappropriate in the sense that it recasts Charles' previous turn as having misinterpreted his meaning.

A micropause after Roberto's repair turn, Charles produces a single-word next utterance that does a great deal of work:

8.4/Excerpt 13/DS 3

```
       R:     ↑no, I'm thinking about percentage,
              (.)
   →   C:     yeah,
              (1.3)
```

Charles' rising intonation "yeah," is both a token of receipt of Roberto's repair as well as a continuer. As a continuer, it makes recognizable that Charles expects Roberto to now complete his assertion, and that Charles himself is declining to guess a second time. Roberto takes a while to produce that second predicate part of his previous sentence, and he does it with hedges:

8.4/Excerpt 14/DS 3

```
   →          (1.3)
   →   R:     ((shoulders up and down)) from Taiwa:n,
   →          (2.9)
   →   R:     seven, eight per cent,=
```

[8] This is a case of third-position repair (Schegloff, 1992b; cf. p. 244 above).

```
H:      =NO:::
R:      ef oh bee? ((FOB))
        (0.8)
H:      ((shaking head)) °°no.°°
        (0.6)
H:      less
        (2.0)
```

As soon as Roberto finishes uttering the percentage figures by which he estimates the freight will increase the cost of the Taiwanese handles ("seven, eight per cent,"), Harry latches on to it an emphatic denial, with a single loud "NO:::" pronounced with great vowel elongation. Roberto still adds the type of price he means (i.e., FOB). Roberto's add-on utterance ("FOB?") casts Harry's denial as an interruption, but it also takes account of it in the sense that the intonation here is distinctively that of a question, more so than the first part, and thus adds another hedge to his own assertion.

Harry re-issues his denial three more times, without offering any grounds for it. In other words, Harry can be heard to be point-blank rejecting Roberto's account for non-alignment with the importers' position report.

Since Roberto does produce a next turn after two seconds, Charles takes it upon himself to offer those grounds for rejecting the importer's reasoning:

8.4/Excerpt 15/DS 3

```
            (2.0)
  →   C:    if you figured a penny a piece °(Roberto)°
            (1.9)
  →   C:    which is ten per cent, (0.3) ah: I mean it's about eight per
      cent,
            (4.7)
```

Charles formulates the rational operation which runs counter to Roberto's accounting for non-alignment. He does that operation in the most favorable light to what Roberto had claimed and concludes that, even so, the result does not account for non-alignment. In other words, if one takes the cost of the freight to be Roberto's higher estimate of eight per cent (which Harry counter-asserts is less), that would still represent only "a penny a piece." This would raise the cost of each Taiwanese handle to 15-16 cents. That is still 25% less than the current local cost of 20 cents. Therefore, it is still worth pursuing the Taiwanese importation of these raw materials.

Notice, however, that Roberto is virtually static as the importers reject his account for non-alignment. The long pauses between the importers' turns can be "heard as" Roberto's non-action. Neither does he put forth new elements in support of his position nor does he backdown and align with the importers' position report:

8.4/Excerpt 16/DS 3

```
        R:     ef oh bee? ((FOB))
               (0.8)
        H:     ((shaking head)) °°no.°°
  →            (0.6)
        H:     less
  →            (2.0)
        C:     if you figured a penny a piece °(Roberto)°
  →            (1.9)
        C:     which is ten per cent, (0.3) ah: I mean it's about eight per
        cent,
  →            (4.7)
```

Roberto's non-action can be seen as indication of his lack of a rational counter to ward off the importers discrediting of his account. However, the issue being discussed is preliminary and, unlike most others featured in the examples discussed here so far, it is less directly pressing on the interests of the importers. In other words, whereas elsewhere issues like the price of an item or the features of its design have an immediate impact on the importers' end-goals, here whatever impact, if any, the manufacturers' decision to start using cheaper metal handles will have on the importers' end-goals will be limited and they will certainly not be immediate. Therefore, given that Roberto does not backdown and align, his non-action in this particular type of negotiational context can be seen as an invitation to stop arguing and delay the decision until later on.

This seems to be Harry's analysis. Instead of pressing for a reply to Charles' bargaining sequence opener, Harry proposes to stop and delay it:

8.4/Excerpt 17/DS 3

```
     →  H:     well, that's his decision to make. show im the other raw
        materials
     →         (6.1) ((R collects handle samples from desktop))
        R:     so: here, ((writes notes))
               (2.5)
        H:     cause these are not final negotiations,
        R:     ↑no, ↑right, °right.°
               (1.2)
```

Harry starts his utterance with a disagreement token directed at Charles, pressing against Roberto's position. The whole turn singles out Charles as the addressed recipient by reference to Roberto as a third person ("<u>his</u> decision; show im"). As a team-movement, then, Harry displays his willingness to let Roberto make the decision alone, and to move on to another activity, beyond this arguing sequence and without return to the bargaining sequence within which it is inserted. Roberto aligns with Harry's suggestion as he removes the sample from the table, and thus from consideration. After a long silence, Roberto's next turn is, again, not direct, but suggestive, another incomplete sentence. It nevertheless displays his understanding that the issue is being abandoned. Neither of the importers ventures to complete Roberto's sentence.

After 2.5 seconds of silence, however, Harry adds to his own previous turn an account for his suggestion to stop arguing:

8.4/Excerpt 18/DS 3

```
     R:    so: here, ((writes notes))
           (2.5)
  →  H:    cause these are not final negotiations,
  →  R:    ↑no, ↑right, °right.°
           (1.2)
```

This type of accounting, as Firth (1995a) suggests, may be specific to negotiation talk. Harry accounts for a concession he is making, something that otherwise would not have to be accounted for. However, negotiating participants seem to be expected to account for their concessionary actions when these may be seen as "organizationally or economically untoward" (p. 216) to their own selves. In other words, given that the position report was issued, and alignment with it vigorously procured, the importers had therefore shown commitment to pursuing the Taiwanese connection for metal handles. It would thus seem suspicious that they would suddenly not be interested in it anymore. So Harry accounts for his action on the basis of what Maynard (1984) points out, that is, these are not final negotiations, implicating that there is time for further investigation and discussion of the issue before a decision is made (i.e., before a reply to the position report is issued by the manufacturers). Roberto's emphatic affiliative response to Harry's account seems to orient to these implications.

Before they move on to another topic, Harry still adds one further reason for stopping the arguing sequence and delaying the decision:

8.4/Excerpt 19/DS 3

	H:	cause these are not <u>fi</u>nal negotiations,
	R:	↑no, ↑right, °right.°
		(1.2)
→	H:	I'm <u>sure</u> I can get them down another five six per cent.
		(8.4)
→	R:	okay, fabric.
		(0.9)
	C:	fabric.
		(3.2)
	C:	these ...

Harry's additional point above reinforces the co-construction of the closing of this arguing sequence as beneficial to all, by pointing to an upgrading of the benefits of the action in the position report with the passing of time. Harry asserts his confidence that, after he talks to the Taiwanese, the price for the handles will be even more attractive. Roberto does respond to that, and the issue is closed. After a long gap, Roberto proposes the new topic, Charles acknowledges it, and a new speech activity gets under way.

Participants in arguing sequences of the type exemplified above thus come to a joint decision to stop arguing and delay the conclusion of their bargaining sequence. A slightly different sort of phenomenon takes place in occurrences of the last type of negotiational arguing sequences to be discussed here, to which we now turn.

<u>Account Status UNCLEAR: Focus Shift</u>

In the arguing sequences of the type introduced below, participants shift frames and use metamessages to co-construct a tacit understanding of a common disposition to stop arguing for the time being. After they complete the frame shift, their interaction continues with a different topical scope, typically following a major re-arrangement of the participants' ecological configuration in the setting. Behavior such as conspicuous moving away from the table and drastic posture changes marks this re-configuration. This seems to be a related phenomenon to that which Blom and Gumperz (1972/1986) called *situational switching*, the participants' "[re-]definition of each other's rights and obligations" (p. 424) effected through linguistic markers coupled with changes in the spatial relationship between speakers (cf. Erickson, 1975).

Indeed, Lee and Peck (1995) discuss "the vulnerability of argumentative frames" (p. 33), in the light of previous analyses of conversational arguing by Schiffrin (1984). A participant's move to signal "the foreclosing disagreement as non-serious," they argue, may be a deliberate attempt to "break out of an argument that was essentially serious, and is threatening to become more so" (p. 47). They suggest such frame breaks are more "particularly characteristic of serious rather than sociable argument" (p. 47).

The five occurrences of this type in the corpus are not identical as to what frame shift occurs. In one of them, one party effects a tendentious topic shift which is corroborated by the other party. In a second occurrence, participants in one party display a clear disposition to disengage from focused interaction. They tune-out, as it were, without the other party doing anything to prevent this from happening. In the three remaining occurrences, however, the same frame-shifting phenomenon takes place. In these sequences, arguing participants (of both parties) shift to a "jesting frame" where their misalignment is co-constructed as unserious and the sequence is abandoned for the time being.

This more frequent sub-type is illustrated below with the transcript of a data segment from the last session of talks (Saturday, Oct. 20). It took place after the participants had already settled the main deal for the more important items in the new collection, and after considerable discussion had already taken place about the small organizer, the item they are negotiating at this point. As in other segments explicated above, a comparison between two items is at the core of the arguing sequence. This time the comparison is between the small organizer and a wallet which was originally intended to be a component of one of the main items (the large tote, item 69524).

The excerpt below begins as the participants are interacting in two team-specific floors. These two separate floors are clearly evident because each one develops in a different linguistic code. Harry and Charles are carrying on a conversation in English, while Eduardo, Roberto and Mr. Amati are discussing the item in Portuguese.[9]

---

[9] A content-oriented translation of the exchange in Portuguese:

R: can I say three fifty here?
Mr. A: (I: don't know) ((*shaking head "no"*))
E: (I think we should do it)

8.5/Excerpt 1/DS 30A

```
            (0.9)
      R:    posso falar três e cinqüenta aqui?
      H:    ((to C)) (                    )
  Mr. A:    (               sei não       ) ((shaking head "no"))
      C:    yeah.
      E:    (eu acho que deve fazer)
  Mr. A:    (                             [              )
      R:                                  [three fifty. ((holding sample and
      nodding yes))
  Mr. A:    (nuh,)
```

Roberto is about ready to re-establish a single interactional focus as he asks the other two manufacturers whether he can propose $3.50 as a price for the small organizer:

8.5/Excerpt 2/DS 30A

```
  →   R:    posso falar três e cinqüenta aqui?
  → Mr. A:  (               sei não       ) ((shaking head "no"))
  →   E:    (eu acho que deve fazer)
  Mr. A:    (                             [              )
      R:                                  [three fifty. ((holding sample and
      nodding yes))
  Mr. A:    (nuh,)
```

With Harry and Charles' exchange excluded from the excerpt above, we can examine more clearly the utterances in the manufacturers floor. While Mr. Amati doubts that the proposal is to be issued as Roberto intends it,[10] Eduardo aligns with Roberto. Ignoring Mr. Amati's next utterance, Roberto code-switches to address the importers with a bargaining sequence opener:

8.5/Excerpt 3/DS 30A

```
  Mr. A:    (                             [              )
  →   R:                                  [three fifty. ((holding sample and
      nodding yes))
  Mr. A:    (nuh,)
            (1.2)
      H:    how do you substantiate [(it)?
      C:                            [come on:,
```

In overlap with Mr. Amati's utterance, which he obviously disregards, Roberto holds the item with one hand and states the price proposal. Mr. Amati still issues an unclear word but all eyes are on the importers, from whom a reply is now conditionally relevant.

```
  Mr. A:    (                             [              )
      R:                                  [three fifty. ((holding sample and
      nodding yes))
Mr. A: (nuh,)
```

[10] Mr. Amati's diction makes transcription of his utterances rather difficult. In this segment, he sits with his back to the camera, so his words are hardly intelligible.

Rather than issuing a straightforward reply, however, Harry withholds alignment with Roberto's proposal, first indirectly, by delaying a response, then directly, by soliciting an account for the price:

8.5/Excerpt 4/DS 30A

```
   →          (1.2)
   →  H:      how do you substantiate [(it)?
      C:                              [come on:,
  Mr. A:      (      )
      H:      how do you substantiate it. ((gets up and reaches for wallet
      sample on table))
```

Harry thus delivers a second position turn which misaligns and initiates accounting practices by soliciting an account from the first-position speaker.

That is to say, as Charles did in example 8.2 above, the claim that there is no justification for the price proposal is designed to ground Harry's misalignment, thus placing the burden of accounting on the importers (cf. Sacks' remarks, p. 210 above). Harry's word choice is precise in implicating that the manufacturers' proposal is vacuous. By asking Roberto how he/they substantiate it, Harry is claiming that the substance in the proposal is not readily seen and this constitutes grounds for misaligning with it. Charles latches a "come on:," in support of Harry's point, underscoring the importers' claim that the manufacturers are being unreasonable.

Harry repeats his question now as a statement. At the same time, his unspoken activities display reference to the wallet he had previously brought to the table, and which is comparable in terms of cost to the small organizer being negotiated:

8.5/Excerpt 5/DS 30A

```
   →  H:      how do you substantiate it ((gets up and reaches for wallet
   sample on table))
   →  R:      because we have- ↑well, if you were gonna buy leather for
      this, ((reaches for cost sheets))
      E:      no, don't- you cannot buy leather
              (0.7)
      C:      you can use scra:p on this.
      R:      no, ↑right.
  Mr. A:      (come on,                       )
              (1.1)
```

Roberto starts giving an account with the most typical accounting conjunction because, but he stops abruptly and re-starts with the first part of another sentence in a significantly higher pitch and with a hypothetical propositional content which even his own teammate rejects. Notice that the second part projected by the dependent if-clause is never uttered. Roberto starts looking for the cost sheets, apparently the source for some figure which would appear in this second part. But, before he delivers any second part, both Eduardo and Charles take the contents of his if-clause literally (i.e., not hypothetically) and reject it. Roberto now drops the cost sheets and deals with what once again he claims is the misinterpretation of his words.

He agrees with them on what would be the case if he had indeed meant what the others believe he did, and tries to initiate third-position repair (Schegloff, 1992b) to clarify what he claims he really meant, as in excerpt 12 of example 8.4 explicated above.

8.5/Excerpt 6/DS 30A

```
     C:    you can use scra:p on this.
  →  R:    no, right.
```

With his "no, ↑right." Roberto points to Eduardo's and Charles' comments as not having interpreted his previous utterance correctly, while agreeing with the fact that leather will not in fact be bought and that scrap will be used instead. In other words, he indicates they have not understood the hypothetical nature of his mention of "buying leather." However, he does not complete the repair because the crucial part of it, the re-assertion of what it is he meant is not proffered.

Roberto's intentions aside, what is clear is that his account, weak as it may seem, derails the sequential implications of Harry's displayed intention to compare the two small items. The topic has shifted slightly to the amount of leather in the new item as accounting for its price, away from comparison with the wallet. Though Eduardo and Charles reject Roberto's hypothetical need to buy leather to produce the item, Harry addresses the issue as he steers the sequence back to the comparison between organizer and wallet:

8.5/Excerpt 7/DS 30A

```
           (1.1)
  →  H:    you know there is more consumption of leather [(here than=
     R:                                                  [Harry, I =
     H:    =[there)
     R:    =[told you, whe- when you asked what was the cost for this,
     I told you- ((looks for cost sheets))
           (0.8)
```

Harry formulates Roberto's position as necessarily admitting that the wallet consumes more leather than the item being discussed (i.e., "there is more consumption of leather here" and "you know" it). He thus counters Roberto's claims that the price proposed for the new item can be substantiated on the basis of leather consumption alone.

Harry is clearly seen here as alluding to the previous discussions when the manufacturers had costed the wallet at less than three dollars. Roberto overlaps Harry's utterance with a plea of attention, and formulates his own previous telling of the cost of the wallet at the time when it was solicited as *not precise* and not to be taken as the comparative basis:

8.5/Excerpt 8/DS 30A

```
→ R:                                                    [Harry, I=
H: =[there)
→ R:     =[told you, whe- when you asked what was the cost for this,
I told you- ((looks for cost sheets))
         (0.8)
→ H:     two [ninety six (($2.96))
  R:         [the cost (      )
  R:     the cost sheet was made, ((holds up cost sheets))=(0.4) uh:
  including (0.7) this wallet
         (1.0)
  R:     and we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations=
```

While Roberto looks for the cost sheets to continue with his incomplete sentence projecting a disconfirmation of Harry's claim, Harry himself finds the figure and volunteers the information before Roberto is able to, and in exact dollars and cents (i.e., $2.96). Roberto starts the second part of his sentence a moment after Harry volunteered the price.

Roberto then re-starts in the clear to counter-assert that the costing for the wallet had not been done in its own right, but had instead been calculated together with the entire case with which it was supposed to go initially:

8.5/Excerpt 9/DS 30A

```
→ R:     the cost sheet was made, ((holds up cost sheets))=(0.4) uh:
including (0.7) this wallet
         (1.0)
→ R:     and we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations=
```

Cost sheets were available for each of the five main items in the new collection, but not for the wallet. Roberto holds up the cost sheet for the tote bag, as he completes the assertion that counters Harry's attempt to use the cost of the wallet as the comparative basis exposing the claimed vacuousness of the manufacturers' price proposal.

8.5/Excerpt 10/DS 30A

```
    R:                                                   [Harry, I =
    R:     =[told you, whe- when you asked what was the cost for this,   →
 I told you- ((looks for cost sheets))
           (0.8)
    H:     two [ninety six (($2.96))
    R:         [the cost (       )
 →  R:     the cost sheet was made, ((holds up cost sheets))=(0.4) uh:
 including (0.7) this wallet
           (1.0)
    R:     and we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations=
```

If we look at Roberto's utterances in isolation, it is easier to see what he is trying to claim. Against Harry's claim — that the price proposed of $3.50 cannot be substantiated because it is more expensive than a similar item that uses less leather and which was costed by the manufacturers themselves at $2.96 — Roberto counter-asserts that the $2.96 wallet price does not correspond to a real costing of the item's production, but that it is only an estimate based on deducting it from the overall costing of the tote bag.

Roberto utters this counter-assertion hesitatingly, and the final part of it comes after a full-second pause. Harry latches an utterance denying it flatly:

8.5/Excerpt 11/DS 30A

```
           (1.0)
    R:     and we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations=
 →  H:     =↓oh Roberto, you gave exactly what it cost [from Argentina=
    C:                                                 [two ninety-six
    H:     =and what it cost from Brazil. ↑cu[t the bullshit.]
    R:                                       [we ↑estim]ated,
```

Against Roberto's "we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations," Harry's utterance juxtaposes "you gave me exactly what it cost," where almost every term in the sentence is a polar semantic contrast to one in Roberto's. Harry mentions the two sources of leather with parallel syntactic constructions, repeating the information emphatically ("what it cost from Argentina and what it cost from Brazil."), rather than elliptically. He then ends the utterance with the falling intonation of a definitive statement. Charles adds again what the exact figure is, in overlap with Harry's mention of the lower-price source it ("H: from Argentina/C: two ninety-six").

Notice, however, that as he finishes the assertion, Harry adds the colloquial and potentially offensive imperative form "↑cut the bullshit" in higher pitch. This feature of its design sets the sentence apart from the rest of the utterance and seems to be heard as a signal that the utterance is not serious, but that a frame break is being proposed, that is, that the utterance is humorous rather than serious. The higher pitch is mirrored by Roberto's overlapping utterance which re-asserts Roberto's own previous account and counters Harry's rejection of it ("we ↑estim]ated,").

8.5/Excerpt 12/DS 30A

```
→ H:   =and what it cost from Brazil. ↑cu[t the bullshit.]
→ R:                                   [we ↑estim]ated,
  H:   ((squinting; walking away from table and towards door)) cut the
bullshit, ↑will ya? (.) ↓I: gotta go to the bathroom.=
```

As Roberto finishes his utterance, Harry repeats the statement and adds the tag question "↑will ya?" in even higher pitch. This is done as he squints and definitely starts moving away from the table. After a micropause, Harry continues with the announcement, in lower pitch, that he needs to go to the bathroom. This reinforces the frame shift since both the unspoken activity and the commentary which accounts for the activity shift are disjunctive of what came before. At the same time, as jesting, this reinforce the importers' misalignment with the proposed price. It treats the price as so unsubstantiated that "going to the bathroom" takes precedence over arguing against it.

Charles's subsequent laugh corroborates the shift to the new frame, and Eduardo joins him. Harry then adds an utterance in overlap with their laugh:

8.5/Excerpt 13/DS 30A

```
  H:   ((squinting; walking away from table and towards door)) cut the
bullshit, ↑will ya? (.) ↓I: gotta go to the bathroom.=
→ C:   =[uk(h)uk(h)uk(h)u(h).
→ E:   =[ak(h)mf(h)uhmfk(h)
  H:   =[I can't [deal with this.
  R:             [enjo:y it.=
  E:   =(h)enj(h)oy it.
       ((H crosses through door; out of room))
```

Roberto then overlaps the other three participants' utterance materials with a jesting commentary "enjo:y it.," which builds on Harry's "I gotta go to the bathroom." This is followed by Eduardo's next turn, through which he accepts Roberto's invitation to laugh some more. Eduardo thus laughs with Roberto, as he repeats Roberto's jesting commentary on Harry's trip to the bathroom.

Here all of the participants have agreed to reshape the nature of their interaction from "serious" business negotiational arguing to humorous teasing. Harry leaves the room, and the arguing sequence ends without the clear determination of the status of the respective accounting efforts. Indeed, Jefferson (1972) writes that such laugh tokens alternating with syllables of a repeat "are regularly associated with termination of talk" (p. 300).

Though it may seem clear to us that the manufacturers have in fact been unable to counter Harry's claim that their price proposal lacks substance, the importers opted for ending the sequence before making that "lack of substance" definitive by returning to the bargaining sequence in the expectation that a new proposal would be made. Rather, as it stands, the sequence ended in what could be seen as a *jesting stand-off*.

If it is clear that the parties remain misaligned, it is not clear whether the importers' second-position accounting solicit and its implication definitely stand in the eyes of the manufacturers. As Harry leaves, the manufacturers code-switch back to Portuguese and continue the discussion they were having prior to Roberto's price proposal, about whether they could subcontract and have the small item made somewhere else:

8.5/Excerpt 14/DS 30A[11]

```
       E:      =(h)enj(h)oy it.
               ((H crosses through door; out of room))
    Mr. A:     ah, eu acho que se fizesse acho que três e meio já é mais
       caro que aqui.
```

Mr. Amati re-starts this exchange assuming that they will not be able to get more than $3.50 for the item, which already precludes the option of profitably subcontracting the production of this item. However, he does not display an understanding that they will necessarily sell the item for less than that, his uncertainty thus showing that the deal on this item is still unsettled at the end of the sequence. Later on, a new bargaining sequence settles the issue.

Non-Negotiational Arguing Sequences in Negotiation Talk

[11] A content-oriented translation of the utterance in Portuguese:

```
    Mr. A:     hey, I think that if we made it I think that three and a
       half is already more expensive than here.
```

The examples of the different types of negotiational arguing sequences explicated above show the range of variation of the phenomenon in the Amage/Courofatos corpus. They also confirm the main analytic assertions made in chapter 5, 6 and 7 about the nature of negotiational arguing.

As was previously mentioned, three other arguing sequences are not included in the typology above and are not seen here as *negotiational* arguing sequences. Like the sequences featured in the typology discussed above, these non-negotiational arguing sequences involve disaffiliation with accounting practices, and the defense of logical positions. However, they differ from the others in two respects. First of all, they are not ostensibly connected to a bargaining sequence. Second and most importantly, they are not nearly as topically constrained as the negotiational arguing sequences in the typology. That is, whereas negotiational arguing typically occurs in sequences whose topics are tied until they are closed off to the accounting practice in second position, or at least are confined to the scope of the bargaining sequence issue, these other discrepant arguing sequences display no apparent topic-restriction. In fact, their topical development moves entirely and definitively away from the topic focus of the accounting practice, and beyond the scope of one single bargaining issue, without demonstrable closings.

In addition, all three of these occurrences develop out of accounts offered after complaints or accusations, an environment where ordinary conversational arguing typically develops, and where it might best be avoided for the settling of disputes in small claims courts (Garcia, 1991). M. H. Goodwin's (1980) description of gossip disputes among children may also be a related phenomenon. She points out these sequences start from accusations, and, in the end, "neither compromise nor a clear form of settlement occurs" (p. 676), "provid[ing] for the possibility for an extended drama, a puzzle without any clear resolution" (p. 683).

Indeed, lecturing about "complaint sequences" in conversation in the Fall of 1968, Sacks (1992) says that:

> Sequences which turn on the fact of a complaint are, in their way, overwhelmingly frequent. I leave aside the issue of what sorts of imports they have for where the conversation goes beyond the complaint sequence, noting only that *one can clearly get into, specifically, an argument*. (vol. 2, p. 49, emphasis added)

Moreover, lecturing on a similar topic again three years later, Sacks says:

> There's a way in which the production of a complaint can free the talk from what the talk has priorly been. ... It's a characteristically known thing that talk on any topic can 'end up in an argument,' and one of the ways that that's a formal possibility for conversation has to do with there being places in it where some kinds of interactional events can be freed from whatever they were about, and themselves multiply. So a complaint can be met by a counter-complaint and the counter-complaint can be met by another complaint, and *one can kind of rapidly get into an argument that — intendedly or not — loses the course of talk out of which it seemed to come*. (vol. 2, p. 433, emphasis added)

This description is quite appropriate of the three arguing sequences found in the Amage/Courofatos corpus which are not included in the typology of negotiational arguing sequences (see figure 1, p. 247 above). They are discrepant from the others in terms of overall structural organization, and they seem to constitute a phenomenon other than negotiational arguing. Thus non-negotiational arguing may also occur in negotiation talk. Though I do not explicate it, a transcribed segment (DS 26) containing an occurrence of this type of arguing sequence appears in the end of appendix B.

This closes the analysis of negotiational arguing sequences in this dissertation. The following chapter offers concluding remarks and implications of this research.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

At its outset, the present study had as its objective to investigate and describe aspects of the co-construction of arguing in naturally occurring negotiation talk while also attending to how the participants' sociolinguistic behavior was tied to their relevant linguistic and socio-culturally dissimilar status. The previous chapters have fulfilled these objectives by uncovering some findings and by raising issues for further research. In this final chapter, I summarize the main findings reported in this dissertation and re-examine its main assertions.

Arguing and the Overall Structural Organization of Negotiation Talk

This study provides evidence that arguing sequences constitute an important element in the *overall structural organization* (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 43) of business negotiation talk. The analyses presented above have privileged the participants' recognizable perspectives on their own situated talk-in-interaction, and thus they advance, first, an emic understanding of the particular structures of action in negotiation talk, and second, our incipient knowledge about the nature of institutional forms of discourse. This study also offers insight about cross-cultural communication. It explicates how members of discrete societies co-construct a complex talk-interactional activity that is essential to the achievement of their institutional goal of doing business in the contemporary global economy.

One limitation of this study is that the analyses I have offered are the result of my inevitably incomplete understanding of the participants' doings, and may be tinged with my own non-native-English-speaker status. The appendices that follow this chapter therefore provide ample contextual information as well as running transcripts of the main data segments discussed in this work so that others may have the chance to re-examine the data independently, and perhaps elaborate on, refine, or disconfirm my interpretive analyses. Given the often cited paucity of studies of naturally occurring negotiation discourse, additional research is in order. New analyses of this and other negotiation talk data should re-inspect the findings I report here, especially those regarding the structure of negotiational arguing sequences and their differentiation from other types of arguing activities.

If strong on the particular, this research is nevertheless also limited in terms of the generalizability of its findings. The corpus of negotiational arguing that this dissertation describes — though it allows a singular view of real-world, real-time, situated experience in practice — reflects but a single negotiation event and the activities of the same participants in the same setting. In other words, the case-study nature of this microethnography does not warrant claims about the universal prevalence of the observed phenomena. In spite of that, the findings of my investigations of the Amage/Courofatos data source are generally congruent with what Maynard (1984), Firth (1991, 1995a) as well as other students of negotiation talk have reported in analyses of similar data.

Indeed, this study corroborates a number of the findings described in the handful of previous studies that have examined negotiation talk as a social interactional activity (reviewed in chapter 4, with illustrative analyses of transcript data from the Amage/Courofatos negotiation talk corpus). First of all, this dissertation presents further evidence to support Francis' (1986) suggestion that negotiation talk is co-constructed by interactants whose displayed identities expand beyond their individual selves. That is, they talk as teams, and organize their participation accordingly, in turns displaying a peculiar preference organization regarding the production of repair and disagreement as well as the handling of formulations (Walker, 1995). Moreover, they organize their talk in sequences of action which orient to "the production of results," that is, the accomplishment of the institutional end-goals that brought them together (Maynard, 1984).

In the Amage/Courofatos data source I also found that participants "do negotiating" through *bargaining sequences* (Maynard, 1984), which sometimes produce institutionally relevant misalignment, prompting the construction of *negotiating activity* (Firth, 1995d). In these cases, the bargaining sequence is suspended and, as the analyses above have shown, a *negotiational arguing sequence* is initiated with the aim of establishing common ground so that the bargaining sequence can be re-instated. These integrated findings strongly suggest that participants co-construct *a negotiation* within the constraints of a form of talk-in-interaction having its own organizational features. We thus have mounting empirical evidence that *negotiation talk* is a form of institutional discourse with its own structural idiosyncrasies in subtle but significant contrast with other forms of talk.

Negotiational Arguing Sequences

The main discourse-analytic thrust of this study has been the investigation of how participants in a cross-cultural international business negotiation deal with explicit misalignment to co-construct the core of their activity together — the achievement of a mutually acceptable set of commitments for *interdependent activities* in the future which will allow each of the parties to attain *institutional goals* beyond their current interactional co-presence. Initial analysis of the data source corroborated Maynard's (1984) finding that negotiation talk proceeds through bargaining sequences. Microethnographic analysis of the complete data source identified segments in which participants exchange continuous series of turns advancing and/or maintaining claims to extant misaligned bargaining positions by means of issuing challenges and accounts addressing the grounds or evidence in support of those claims to positions. Following the close microanalysis (reported in chapter 6) of the segment that first called my attention to such continuous arguing exchanges, I identified more than thirty other data segments containing such series of turns in the initial data source. Upon further investigation of this corpus, I noticed participants co-construct the overwhelming majority of these series of turns in an orderly fashion across the corpus, in what I have termed negotiational arguing sequences.

In subsequently reviewing these interactional segments, as well as in the process of transcribing them, and finally in examinations of these transcripts, I observed that when parties misalign with a bargaining position, they initiate accounting practices, which the recipient party may or may not honor. When the accounting practice is not honored, that is, when misalignment meets misalignment, participants open a negotiational arguing sequence — an interactional unit enacted to establish the intersubjective status of that accounting practice so that the negotiation may proceed.

Negotiational arguing sequences commonly occur in the corpus as extended versions of what conversation analysts identified as side-sequences (Jefferson, 1972). They are inserted into encompassing bargaining sequences, that is, they somehow constitute "a break in the [bargaining] activity — specifically, a 'break' in contrast to a 'termination'; that is, the on-going activity will resume" (p. 294). Further transcript analyses revealed that the overall structural organization of arguing sequences in business negotiation talk develops within the topical scope of a bargaining sequence, and out of a three-position sequential environment. Initially, one of the parties produces a first-position turn containing or alluding to a bargaining sequence opener. This is met with a second-position turn (produced by the other party) containing a display of non-alignment with the first-position action, and an account for such non-alignment. When participants do not honor the accounting practice in second position, but take issue with the conversational materials offered by members of the misaligning, account-giver party, the co-construction of a negotiational arguing sequence is recognizably underway.

Transcript analyses of such sequences also revealed that the participants produce recognizable interactional closings to their negotiational arguing sequences, sealing them off from subsequent activities. Moreover, how the second-position accounting practice withstands opposition determines the type of closing of a negotiational arguing sequence. The typology of the decision-making process and closings presented in chapter 8 showed the range of variation of negotiational arguing sequences across the Amage/Courofatos corpus. The analyses of example occurrences of the different types in various data segments further substantiated the previously reported finding, namely that the negotiating participants orient to the accounting practice in second position as the central topical and positional issue being addressed in the co-construction of a negotiational arguing sequence, up until they co-construct its closing.

Most of the sequences in the corpus do produce results in terms of either removing or warranting misalignment, thus establishing a slot for a bargaining reply or a modified bargaining sequence opener to be issued. However, the analyses of "Account-status-UNCLEAR" types in chapter 8 (pp. 284-308) also showed that the participants sometimes co-construct sequences ending in a recognizable joint decision *not to* argue any further on the issue for the time being.

In addition, the participants treat the few sequences in which the warrant for misalignment is removed, but a revised reply is not proffered, as requiring additional arguing on the same issue. In other words, when the participants close an arguing sequence through which they have jointly and recognizably determined the status of the accounting practice in second position as standing or not, the issuing of a (revised) reply to the suspended bargaining sequence becomes conditionally relevant as the next action due. When that reply is not produced by the appropriate party, the other party treats this as grounds for re-initiating other arguing sequences on the same issue. This underscores the participants' institutional orientation to arguing sequences as efforts in the pursuit of co-constructed, intersubjective, and thus binding, states of affairs that feed the bargaining process.

To recapitulate, the main findings of this study have to do with the discourse production and processing of negotiational arguing sequences. Participants in the Courofatos/Amage negotiation co-construct sequences of concerted arguing actions forming bounded interactional units. In these sequences, this study posits, negotiating participants attempt to deal with and solve a particular problem in the organization of negotiation talk: establishing common ground regarding an issue, raised in some previous bargaining action, following which the parties have expressed explicitly non-aligning positions. Participants co-construct negotiational arguing sequences to remove an impediment to alignment raised in a preceding bargaining sequence. (Either this previous bargaining sequence had been suspended before a reply was proffered, or it had been re-instated to deal with the non-alignment so that a revised reply could eventually be proffered.) Negotiational arguing participants thus share an orientation to co-construct a commonly acceptable, or intersubjective, sense of the states of affairs on which they differ, so that a bargaining reply can eventually be proffered, and so that, in turn, the parties may rely on each other as committed to a particular course of action in the post-negotiational future of their business dealings.

Negotiational Arguing and the Institutional Mandate

Negotiational arguing sequences result from the participants' joint efforts to reach intersubjective alignment on crucial aspects supporting their *interdependent institutional relationship*. This task as such and the particular talk-interactional ways participants employ to accomplish it are shaped by the resources and constraints available to them in the organization of negotiation as an institutional form of talk-in-interaction. Negotiating participants thus co-construct sequences of arguing actions which are demonstrably topic-restrictive and interactionally bounded, unlike those found in arguing sequences in ordinary conversation. In demonstrating these observational findings, the present research provides additional empirical evidence that institutional genres of talk like business negotiation may offer participants a specific structural organization and special constraints and possibilities which differ from those of other forms of talk.

Microanalysis of the closings of arguing sequences in the data corpus presented in chapters 6 and 8 showed that the Amage/Courofatos interactants orient to negotiational arguing sequences as relevant interactional units. In ways similar to what Pike (1967) describes of participants in a church service, Charles, Eduardo, Harry, and Roberto construct recognizable boundaries around these sequences in collective, concerted action both through their spoken and unspoken observable behavior. Such microanalysis reveals the emic relevance of negotiational arguing sequences as interactional units which may have fairly elaborate end-boundaries or closings.

Descriptions of arguing in non-negotiational forms of talk report no recognizable closing features other than the topic shifts abruptly, or steers away from the issue that triggered misalignment, without resolution of it. In contrast to this, negotiational arguing participants strive to co-construct closings, establishing at least some disposition to resume arguing later. More often, they pursue a standing decision regarding the issue of misalignment that is currently blocking advancement to a bargaining resolution.

The analyses of example occurrences of different types of negotiational arguing sequences in chapter 8 further emphasized the participants' orientation to reaching binding results. Their contributions consistently adhere to the same issue as they advance towards the joint determination of whether the accounts that are offered by the non-aligning party warrant misalignment or not. The joint determination of the warrant for misalignment is necessary, I have maintained, not for its own sake, but for the specifiable sake of eventually producing a bargaining reply that will advance the end-goal of striking a deal regulating interdependent, distal future, mutually beneficial commercial activities.

Following Maynard (1984) and Firth (1991), this study therefore posits that the participants' co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences is oriented by a business negotiation *institutional mandate*, which provides them with end-goals of a fairly specifiable nature. Whether the bargaining activity is resumed immediately after the termination of an arguing sequence or much later, it is clear that arguing sequences are an intimate part of the overall structural organization of negotiation talk. Participants share an orientation to negotiational arguing as a break in the main activity of bargaining. This break that can be constructed *legitimately* and relevantly at almost any time as "doing negotiating," through what Firth (1995a) calls the "unpacking, contesting or probing into" accounting practices.

An additional point which I observed but did not discuss in this dissertation is that sequences late in the event involved pleas as significant arguing actions, while earlier on in the event this was not the case. Further research should investigate whether that holds for negotiation talk in other events and, in case it does, explain why that is.

It is important to note once again the existence in the corpus of three discrepant occurrences of arguing sequences that did not conform to the overall structure reviewed above. They are not ostensibly connected to a bargaining sequence, nor are they as topically constrained as the other arguing sequences identified in the data source. Topical development in these discrepant cases moves entirely and definitively away from the focus of the accounting practice in second position, and beyond the scope of a unified bargaining issue. Therefore these sequences do not exhibit recognizable closings or re-appraisals of the issue that originally triggered arguing. However, they do fit the description of arguing sequences following complaints and accusations in non-negotiational talk, as described in the conversation analytic literature. So I have dubbed them non-negotiational arguing sequences.

The occurrence of such arguing sequences in negotiation talk points to the fact that institutional mandates are not absolute, and that, even if institutional forms of talk may prove to constitute distinct speech-exchange systems, they are only adaptations of the bedrock of conversation to particular institutional-interactional ends. In any case, it is remarkable that only a small fraction of the arguing in the data source is typically conversational, whereas the overwhelming bulk of arguing activity in it takes a fairly uniform shape that is characteristically consistent with the institutional mandate and its constraints. These findings indicate more research and debate is called for among students of language and social interaction about distinctions between institutional forms of talk and ordinary conversation as discrete speech-exchange systems.

On a practical note, these findings about non-negotiational arguing sequences in negotiation talk suggest that complaints and accusations lead topics astray and do not advance negotiation issues towards resolution. The implication then is that negotiators should therefore avoid producing complaints and accusations as negotiating actions. However — regardless of whether such avoidance is at all possible — it seems that such arguing sequences developing out of complaints and accusations may also have positive consequences to the negotiation process in that they permit freer topic flow into areas that would otherwise not be covered. In this, they may create sequential space for clarification and the issuing of new proposals. Studies contrasting occurrences of negotiational and non-negotiational arguing sequences should re-examine these suggested connections in further empirical detail.

Learning from Negotiation Talk Research

As far as educational implications are concerned, what this study has to offer is baseline, ground-level information regarding how real-life language use in talk-in-interaction takes place in a business setting. The microethnographic account of observational data presented here is a small but decisive contribution towards the description of situated global economy business interaction, and of English-as-a-foreign-language (EFL) communicative performance in a Brazilian business setting in particular.

An inevitable question is how the present work can inform EFL learning and teaching, and the training of business professionals. In the course of this inquiry and of my professional experience as a teacher of foreign languages for business students, I have become increasingly skeptical that any recommendations can be made directly to practitioners, be they EFL speakers or business negotiators, on the basis of research on language and social interaction — at least not in a way both that the researcher believes does justice to his/her work and that the practitioners perceive as useful.

It seems to me that a more insightful question that may bring to surface substantive educational applications of this research asks how those of us involved in EFL or professional education and training may be able to learn from descriptions of the practitioners' situated practice. Before we are able to help them as experts on language and interaction, I believe we must find out what it is practitioners actually do, and how. Currently, however, we must resort to intuition, or at best to simulations and self-reports of what happens to guide our own educational practice (cf. Johns & Dudley-Evans, 1991). Throughout this research report, I have tried to offer situated descriptions of the practitioners' naturally occurring practices. I hope the educator involved in professional development and training or in foreign-language learning and teaching will find them informative, and that these descriptions may allow us to learn from the practitioners about how best to help them learn. It seems clear from these descriptions that their practice is contingent on how local contextual issues play out in the interdigitation of their concerted action, and not as much on their tactic and strategic awareness or linguistic accuracy.

Ethnographic Methods and the Analysis of Institutional Talk

The present study provides "a detailed record of behavior in [a] typical event," and describes "underlying principles of organization in the conduct of speaking" as well as "discrepancies from the typical patterns that emerged from the broad gauge descriptive evidence found." On these terms, it has achieved the aims of "sociolinguistic microanalysis of machine recordings" (Erickson, 1988, p. 1089). To the extent of its success, this research effort thus recommends the procedures in ethnographic microanalysis of interaction (Erickson, 1992a, p. 217) as an appropriate methodology for the study of institutional talk-in-interaction through the analysis of video recordings of key events situated in ethnographic perspective.

On this methodological note, the present research project proves that "rare data" (Ehlich & Wagner, 1995) such as audiovisual records of naturally occurring business negotiation can indeed be collected if we conceptualize it less as data per se, and more as the activities of real people in a competitive world. Data collection must be viewed as part and parcel of the research process; and not simply a means to an end. Regardless of whether or not ethnographic data should enter into the analysis of talk-in-interaction, the fact is that researchers interested in the everyday talk-interactional practices of participants in institutional settings need to realistically recognize that, for the participants especially, these practices are more than research data. Business interactants in particular may have reasons to believe that outsiders have material interest in the information contained in records of their institutional or work practices.

Therefore, only as a strike of luck will a researcher obtain permission to videorecord an event such as a business negotiation simply by approaching unacquainted participants with (what the researcher believes are) candid requests for cooperation. In fact, the discourse-analyst who expects the business interactants to solely carry the burden of making sense of what the researcher is trying to accomplish in recording their interaction is actually co-constructing a rejection. In other words, this project makes clear that, if we really want to tap into genuine sources of data containing the phenomena we are interested in describing, such data can indeed be collected if discourse analysts use ethnographic methods as an integral part of their research endeavor. The natural history of this study reported in chapter 2 may help others learn about potential pitfalls along the way.

On a more substantive methodological note, the analyses reported in this dissertation devoted attention to the listening activities of social interactants as well as to their more commonly foregrounded spoken activities. This *simultaneous* analytic attention reveals relevant aspects of the participants' talk that would remain otherwise largely ignored. The analysis of gaze direction and aversion in the closing of an arguing sequence presented in chapter 6 demonstrates these unspoken activities to be integral to the organization of social interaction in this negotiation. Indeed, throughout the entire analytic process, attention to the unspoken activities (that audiotapes alone do not record) proved essential in recovering the participants' meaning and action perspectives.

This is especially evident in the Courofatos/Amage negotiation, which often is, literally, embodied interaction, where even objects (e.g., the merchandise samples) acquire a constant indexical presence. Analysis of this interaction from audiotapes would hardly be possible at all. This underscores the analytic mistake of ruling out unspoken activities as secondary or dispensable to the analysis of talk in interaction. To describe situated language use in social interaction, the analyst must consider, initially at least, all interactional behavior that participants demonstrably attend to as action-relevant.

In addition to situating the practitioners' language use in social interaction in terms of immediate time and space, this research situates their communicative activities as local enactments in the constitution of historical experience (Giddens, 1984). The overview of the social situation in which the Brazilian manufacturers and the U.S. importers interacted (chapter 2) showed the talk-in-interaction put under microanalysis here to be a local, flesh-and-bones manifestation of what we have been experiencing historically as the emergence of a global economy. In addition to framing the data corpus within its institutional and interactional flow, reporting the natural history of this inquiry as well as the macro context of the microanalyzed interaction permits us to make connections between micro and macro aspects of interactional context (cf. Erickson, 1992a, pp. 222-223).

These linkages suggest that micro analysis can often be quite macro. The discussion in chapter 2, for example, formulated interconnections between international sources of raw materials (e.g., leather), manufacturing of leather goods in a regional industrial cluster, and U.S. consumption of finished manufactured leather goods on the basis of interactional data (cf. Korzeniewicz, 1992). The transcripts analyzed in chapters 4-8 certainly reflect these interconnections as the participants enacted them in face-to-face interaction. Re-composing the gestalt of the whole event therefore both informs and is informed by the content and analyses of transcripts. It permits an integrated view and description of discourse as the concerted action of individuals that is also constitutive of social and historical experience. It is this methodological pursuit of a comprehensive point of view on social interaction that makes ethnographic microanalysis of interaction an especially apt qualitative method to examine interactional sociolinguistic phenomena and establish their connection to more encompassing processes.

Of course, before s/he is able to establish any conceptual connections between situated social interaction and historical experience, the researcher must engage in rigorous analysis of the messy details of talk-in-interaction to be able to describe relevant interactional phenomena. On this final methodological note, the interactional sociolinguistic analysis of negotiation talk presented in this dissertation must acknowledge a great deal of intellectual debt to the theoretical views and previous research findings of conversation analysts (e.g., Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Pomerantz, 1984b; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Schegloff, 1995). It is my belief that what separates the various strands of research on language and social interaction, important as these may be, do not constitute an impediment to fruitful cross-fertilization among them. By going to such sources for their original insight, this study often crosses paradigm boundaries, and hopefully points out how much they share in their fundamental conception of language in social interaction as the participants' constantly emerging situated achievement.

Accountability and Co-Construction

In addition to the specific findings regarding the overall structure of negotiation talk, this study also offers evidence that *talk-in-interaction is co-constructed* by participants as they coordinate their actions according to universal human social organizational constraints, and within particular cultural conventions, as social inter-action unfolds sequentially in time and space. Moreover, the analyses above show interactants as capable of individual agency which is constrained, but not pre-determined, by the cultural, societal, economic, and linguistic systems they find themselves immersed in, and which they are constantly and actively re-shaping.

The structural composition of the main actions through which participants co-construct negotiational arguing in the negotiation talk corpus further underscores the central role of accountability in the conduct of everyday interaction, as proposed by ethnomethodologists. The main constitutive types of accounting practices — accounts and challenges — were examined in the corpus data to provide a glimpse at the core activities of negotiational arguing, showing it to be a prime site for the explicit formulation of accountability, the ubiquitous form of "practical sociological reasoning" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1).

In this sense, it is remarkable that, for all practical purposes, the four participants were able to truly co-construct intersubjective accountability for their actions in the business negotiation. They managed to assemble various surface features of talk in interaction and make them recognizable to one another as social actions. The analyses presented in this dissertation found that the participants in the Amage/Courofatos negotiation co-constructed complex sequences of actions dealing with substantial matters to their lives and involving a significant degree of conflict. This is no trivial matter in any social interaction. If we consider the participants' different linguistic and socio-cultural backgrounds, especially the fact that two of them are foreign-language speakers of the linguistic code used in the interaction, such accomplishment is a significant socio-interactional feat in and of itself.

Cross-Cultural Negotiation and Communication

Just as Firth (1991) found in his analysis of international business negotiation talk conducted over the telephone between socio-culturally dissimilar interactants, the participants in our negotiation-talk data corpus worked past their differences in terms of linguistic and cultural patterning of communicative behavior to successfully achieve a level of intersubjectivity, which, for all practical purposes, allowed them to competently communicate.[1] Among other things, these findings point to the fragility of clear-cut connections between the concepts of culture and nationality; and the use of either as fully explanatory of cross-cultural communication difficulties.

In contrast to Firth's study, however, this dissertation research was motivated in large measure by a concern with issues of cross-cultural communication and communicative competence in foreign language use. Therefore, this work also attended to how the participants' sociolinguistic behavior related to their relevant socio-culturally dissimilar identities as native-English-speaking U.S. importers, and native-Portuguese/EFL-speaking Brazilian manufacturers interacting in an international business negotiation. The present report thus offers an uncommon perspective on cross-cultural communication by wondering how these participants managed to communicate successfully across their socio-cultural borders, given the interactional sociolinguistic evidence that crucial encounters between socio-culturally dissimilar interactants often develop into miscommunication.

In the sketch of the interactional sociolinguistic perspective on *face-to-face interaction* (chapter 3), I proposed that miscommunication is not pre-ordained, but always co-constructed by participants in interaction. This study did not find significant miscommunication in the participants' co-construction of negotiational arguing sequences in the Courofatos/Amage corpus. I therefore postulate that quite a different interactional ecology may exist in cross-cultural talk-interactional activities of the kind we find in this event, and the cross-cultural interactions previously described by interactional sociolinguists (e.g., Erickson & Shultz, 1982; Gumperz, 1982a, 1982b, 1992b; McDermott & Gospodinoff, 1981).

The negotiation event analyzed here features cross-cultural communication among members of different societies who come together for concentrated periods of time and are oriented to the

[1] Note, however, that I make no claim about the participants' persuasive skills or about their effectiveness as negotiators.

accomplishment of joint decision-making tasks geared towards the attainment of a fairly evident *interdependent end-goal*. Aggravated conflict is highly detrimental to the accomplishment of such tasks, and therefore hinders the participants' advancement towards their institutional end-goals. This differs from the ecology existing in intra-societal cross-cultural or interethnic communication among interactants who come together intermittently and who do not display an orientation to the accomplishment of an interdependent end-goal in the same way.[2]

This suggests that speaking of cross-cultural communication as a generic process may prove to be a moot point, and that further research and debate is needed on this question. Nevertheless, I do believe we must heed Gumperz' (1986) warnings that, "to understand the role of language in education and in social processes in general, we need to begin with a closer understanding of how linguistic signs interact with social aspects of the communicative processes" (p. 29), but also that "not all problems of interethnic contact are communicative in nature. Economic factors, *differences in goals and aspirations*, as well as other historical and cultural factors may be at issue" (1982a, p. 210, emphasis added). This research offers a contribution in this respect by alerting that, as was said above, economic factors, *similarities and interdependence in goals and aspirations*, may be crucially at issue to counteract sociocultural mismatches in communicative conventions.

In the focused interactions examined here, interactants are members of different societies and are engaged in interactional activities related to a mutually interdependent end-goal that will potentially maximize their separate economic gains. The interactional dynamics observable in this ecology may make it easier for participants to realize that the immediately local pay-off of doing "border work" can make the co-construction of their present interactional task more difficult, and jeopardize the accomplishment of their end-goals. In other words, it is possible that, in contacts between members of different societies who come together occasionally to work intensively on a fairly discrete mutual-profit-generating project, the participants' categorical identities may be less prominently useful as interactional resources. In this case we

[2] Of course, functional miscommunication is arguably an interdependent goal, but aggravated conflict is sought as a means to its achievement, in stark contrast to negotiational arguing interaction, where aggravated conflict is detrimental to the accomplishment of local talk-interactional tasks and, therefore, of distal future end-goals.

might be observing borders being turned into boundaries, that is, the process described by McDermott and Gospodinoff (1981), only in reverse.

In fact, an alternative view is that social interaction in the Amage/Courofatos negotiation may not even constitute cross-cultural communication. According to this perspective, the participants share enough "global-capitalism cultural traits" that, once their activity is framed overwhelmingly as business negotiation, their institutional identities as business professionals may overlap to such an extent that this comembership supersedes their otherwise diverging conventions for the cultural patterning of communicative behavior.

This view is quite certainly one element of the ecology of this interaction. Yet, it remains a fact that the participants' differences in patterns of communicative behavior do conflict in this negotiation (Garcez, 1991, 1993). However, the participants deal with and repair such problems within the scope of negotiational arguing sequences, but not within other talk activities in the event. Given that participants display a distinct end-goal orientation in their co-construction of bargaining and arguing sequences in negotiation talk, this locally-relevant orientation seems at least partly determinant of the lack of serious miscommunication during their co-construction in our data source. Additional research is certainly welcome to expand and clarify this issue.

In that it found successful cross-cultural communication, the present study contributes to the interactional sociolinguistic and microethnographic literature which has been found lacking in analyses of cross-cultural encounters between individuals from power-dominant groups. In this sense, it presents specific empirical evidence that these participants do routinely gloss over major communicative differences when it is to their advantage, just as second language acquisition research shows that native/non-native speakers are capable of accommodation and divergence from their interactants' language and interactional style (Ellis, 1985, pp. 255-259).

Finally, I must emphasize the exploratory nature of the postulated difference in interactional dynamics operating in *intra-societal* cross-cultural communication and *inter-societal* cross-cultural communication among participants sharing interdependent end-goals. Though unlikely, it might be just a fortuitous occurrence that the participants' arguing interaction analyzed here did not develop into significant miscommunication. In any case, more research is needed on additional cases of successful communication involving different types of institutional discourse in different settings. Once we have more analyses of such data, establishing what the common thread is among the different cases may be a positive next step for research on the organization of cross-cultural social interaction.

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APPENDIX A

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE AMAGE/COUROFATOS NEGOTIATION EVENT

17 October, p.m.

Business talks started as soon as the two U.S. importers arrived from the airport at the Courofatos offices on Wednesday, October 17, around 5 p.m.. The first encounter lasted until 6:30. Eduardo was not present. Most of the talk involved technical matters. In addition to the eight new designs that the importers had requested samples of in advance, they now introduced a request for samples and costing for two low-price attache cases. Roberto, Charles and Harry then spent the first half hour after their arrival at the office trying to find existing Courofatos attache styles that could be adapted and sampled for the importers' consideration. After they settled on the two styles and the dimensions of the cases, Roberto arranged for rough samples to be made for the next day. Harry then requested to visit the model shop and the production area in the factory to inspect the previously requested samples being made. They spent another half hour looking at samples being made and discussing technical details such as corrections on colors, materials and lining of cases.

On the way back to the office, they stopped to say hello to the production manager, Mr. Eli, at his small office tower overlooking the shop floor. As soon as they walked in, Mr. Eli pulled out reports and commented in Portuguese to Roberto that he had just been checking those reports to see how much money Courofatos was losing by customizing production to suit the importers instead of selling the regular merchandise in the domestic Brazilian market. Roberto relayed the gist of that comment to the importers in English, and they responded, in jest, by saying good-bye, pretending they had not understood it. Upon returning to the main office, Harry and Charles talked at length about their discomfort with those comments and about the prospects for their business relationship in the future. Before being taken to their hotel, the importers said hello to Eduardo and chatted for a while.

18 October, a.m.

The next day, Thursday, October 18, the two U.S. participants and Roberto were at the office at 7:45 a.m.. Samples for the two small new styles were ready. Roberto divided his attention among different parallel activities. He discussed changes to the sampled items with Charles, responded to Harry's intermittent questions as Harry checked the schedule of shipments of back orders, and attended to other issues pertaining to the ordinary routine of a working day in the office. After agreeing on the changes to be made on the two sampled items, all three left the office again to look at samples being made in the factory. Harry and Charles expressed concern that the samples were taking too long to be made and requested that more workers be shifted from production to modeling to expedite the process. While Roberto arranged for that with the model shop supervisor and with Mr. Eli, the importers checked on a current order of cases being produced for them and requested adjustments.

Since it was clear that no new samples would be ready for revision any time soon, Harry and Charles suggested they returned to the main office to discuss possibilities for alternative sources of supply. Harry and Charles had brought back samples and costs of various raw materials from Taiwan in the hopes that Courofatos would eventually start importing such materials in order to reduce production costs.

Back in the office, Charles and Roberto compared the costs of a series of components and raw materials in terms of current prices from Courofatos' suppliers versus price quotations from Taiwan. They examined each item separately and spent a great deal of time calculating the conversions across different measurements and exchange rates before they could get a sense of whether it was worth investigating further into those possibilities. Thread, glue, handles, nylon fabric, nylon and cotton fabric bags, magnetic buttons, imitation suede, foam, and texon were discussed. The two parties agreed that two items, and maybe a third, would be worth importing from Taiwan and that two others needed to be further clarified in terms of prices and dimensions. There were no definitive conclusions, since these talks were, as Roberto and Harry put it, "a preliminary discussion; not final negotiations." Roberto then quoted his domestic cost for hardware items so that Harry and Charles would eventually be able to compare them with prices from a potential U.S. supplier.

Harry complained bitterly, to Charles — "I don't know why they had us come here. They're full of shit," — and then directly to Roberto, about samples and prices not being ready and the problems this would create. Roberto tried to account of why that was, and offered evidence of Courofatos' effort to expedite the process. He then suggested they should visit the factory once again. There they saw the latest progress in sample-making and discussed the implementation of changes in the two small item samples reviewed in the early morning. After a stop back in the office, they interrupted talks at 12:00 a.m., and left for lunch at a nearby restaurant which they all referred to as "the clock place," for the collection of antique clocks displayed on the walls.

It should be pointed out that these interactions were intermittent rather than continuous. During the entire morning, there were many interruptions: telephone calls, office people coming in and out, visits from outsiders who wanted either to talk to Roberto or to ask favors from the importers, tea and refreshments being served, and so on.

At 1:20 p.m. we returned to the office, only so that the importers could pick up their belongings. Since further business talks were contingent on the availability of samples and prices for the new styles in the new collection — the primary reason for the importers visit — and with secondary issues having already been dealt with, Harry and Charles decided to go to their hotel. I offered to drive them there. They would only come back on the next day, when — after bitter complaints from Harry — samples were promised to be available.

19 October, a.m.

The next encounter started at 7:40 a.m. on Friday, October 19. Samples were still not completely ready. Roberto and Harry again reviewed shipping and production schedules for previous orders on the existing line and discussed what could be done to expedite production of a few of those existing styles for which demand (as projected by Harry) would soon outnumber scheduled production and stock. Courofatos would not be able to catch up with it any time soon due to various problems in its leather supply. After Harry and Charles refused to even look at some leather that could be used (but which Roberto was doubtful they would approve), Roberto made phone calls to his main local leather supplier to try and find a short-term solution to this immediate problem (leather supply is a major issue for manufacturers in the region; cf. Korzeniewicz, 1992)

At 8:10, Eduardo joined the gathering, but the samples were not yet ready. At this point, the Brazilian party was complete, and they all moved from the export department room where they had been meeting until that moment to the domestic sales room, which was right next to it (see floor plan in chapter 2, p. 40). At first this move was quite awkward both for them and for me, but the advantage of using this other room was that it had a large table in the center. It took them a few minutes to get settled in the new room. Meanwhile, they joked around and Harry and Charles spent quite some time talking about how difficult it was to do business with Brazilians and about how Brazilians compared with the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans. It was also at this stage that the participants took their seats in an arrangement that would remain fixed from then on until the end of the event.

Once settled, they started discussing a potential secondary deal in which the U.S. importing company, Amage, would act as an agent for Courofatos to import, from Romania or China, a few styles which they could not produce as cheaply in Brazil. Harry showed them a catalog of his Romanian line, emphasizing the strengths and reporting on U.S. sales of selected items, thus explaining his rationale for suggestions of items and for the implementation of the deal. Eduardo and Roberto inquired about other styles not suggested by Harry, about shipping costs from Romania to Brazil, and about alternative style features. Eduardo also inquired about the possibilities of a similar scheme for Chinese portfolios. Harry said he would be glad to work on it or even have specific Courofatos styles sampled and costed there in the future, but added that at that point he could not stand by their quality nor quote specific prices.

Around 8:50 a.m., Harry began getting restless again about the samples not being there. While Roberto and Eduardo were still writing notes and calculating exchange rate conversions for the Romanian information they had been given, Harry said, in jest and winking at me: "In the meantime we're not here to sell you merchandise; we're here to buy merchandise from you. Can we see the fucking samples already? God damn it!" This invited smiles and laughter from all. The Romanian products would remain as the topic, though.

Roberto and Eduardo tried to come up with price comparisons between their own domestic styles versus similar Romanian styles. They then brought in other European styled samples, and inquired about the possibility of having those sampled and costed in Romania. They all agreed this would not be feasible.

They then discussed which styles in Amage's Romanian line Courofatos would like to receive samples of and in which colors. How these samples were to be shipped became an issue due to their wish to avoid difficulties with Brazilian Customs. Around 9:15 a.m., as he finished writing a note to be faxed to his company in order to get the Romanian samples out, Harry interjected "When can we start doing some work? Is it possible?"

Finally, around 9:20 a.m., the first main new collection item samples arrived (items #69536, #69524 and #69535). Harry and Charles spent some time examining them, while Eduardo and Roberto walked in and out taking care of other things until they were all ready to sit down and start discussing prices. Roberto and Eduardo handed out detailed cost sheets with a breakdown of the cost of specific components. They wanted to start from that and then get to the final price quotations. Harry and Charles refused to look at the cost sheets (in Portuguese, with figures in the Brazilian currency); they wanted to work from price quotations to eventual adjustments and modifications.

Proto-typical bargaining (Gulliver, 1979; Maynard, 1984) started at this point, with samples and prices presented for three items by 10:00 a.m. (for a summary of styles and prices, see chart below). Courofatos prices were higher than Harry's targets, which were the prices quoted by his new potential Czechoslovakian suppliers on the same items. Courofatos would have to present prices similar to those to beat the "competition from Czechoslovakia." In fact, as Harry insisted throughout the day, Courofatos' prices had to be cheaper than those quoted by the Czechoslovakians, since the importers had to figure C&F New York prices (i.e., cost and freight to New York), the freight from Europe being less expensive than the freight from Brazil.

Roberto and Eduardo suggested, as they would a number of times again later, that maybe Amage would simply have to import the new styles in the collection from Czechoslovakia, since those prices were so much lower than Courofatos'. Harry and Charles repeatedly stressed that their goal was to have the whole collection made in one place, as otherwise the leather would not match and they would have a hard time marketing it as a unitary collection. At this point, Eduardo introduced — in passing — an idea that would become quite significant later and throughout their talks. They would figure out prices based on Argentinian leather, even though these would depend on Courofatos striking a deal with an Argentinian tannery with which they had never dealt before. Evident here is the "global commodity network" trend, set by the local footwear industry and reported on by Korzeniewicz (1992) (i.e., the integration of Argentinian leather production, shoe and leather goods production in the *Vale do Sinos* in Brazil, and North-American consumption).

This led to a discussion of what could be done to secure a constant supply of leather at stable prices. Other issues were also dealt with within this discussion. Among these, the four businessmen agreed in general terms on a possible payment advance from Amage so that Courofatos would be able to buy leather and put it in inventory for six months. Misunderstandings concerning instructions for the making of samples and what price quotations included or excluded (e.g., hardware, with or without locks, handles) were also clarified.

After 11:15, the four businessmen started discussing specific possibilities of technical adjustments and modifications in order to reduce costs in the production of two of the three items examined. This took mostly the form of information checks and bargaining sequences based on substitution of materials or elimination of details in the new styles. The third item (#69536), which they referred to as "the seegar case," was at this point considered "too far out" to be bothered with (though it would be re-introduced in later discussions). At 12:00 a.m. they adjourned the talks, and we all left for lunch.

Considerable tension developed in this morning session, as Harry and Charles got restless about the gloomy prospects for striking a deal on the new collection, given the high prices of the three styles discussed and the delay in the availability of samples and costs for the remaining styles. In their intra-team conferences, they would toss in comments such as "you can't grow in this country," and "they're trying to change the subject because they don't have the samples ready yet." However, there were also quite a few segments of small talk — some directed at me and often not entirely unrelated to the topic at hand — which were constructed as humorous. They did evoke laughter from all participants and seemed to work as escape valves for the pressure building up.

Again, several other activities took place between the central developments narrated above. These subsidiary activities ranged from some which were connected to the four primary participants' interaction, to interruptions from outsiders which were entirely unrelated to the business negotiations. For instance, they dealt with a fax, which initially was missing one of its pages, from Amage headquarters informing about the shipment of Romanian samples to Courofatos, and reconfirmed the schedule for future shipments of orders from the old line. Roberto's assistant, João, would come in every now and then to report to Roberto on what he was doing, and to Harry and Charles on his attempts to upgrade their air ticket to Europe from business to first class. João's wedding happened to be scheduled for that very day, and later he came in to say good-bye and explain why he was leaving early. Eduardo's cousin came in to ask Harry and Charles how much an airplane ticket from New York to Buffalo would cost, and a friend of Roberto's called to ask if Harry wanted to exchange dollars.

<u>19 October, p.m.</u>

At 1:10 p.m. we were all back to the factory. Only at around 1:40, after a trip to the model shop, overseas phone calls, etc., did any further talk on the main deal occur. A new sample came in, item #69534, "the flap case." The importers were impressed with the quality of the craftsmanship. Costing for that sample, however, was not yet ready. Once again, while Eduardo and Roberto proposed to discuss changes to reduce price prior to quoting the price itself, Harry and Charles wanted to discuss corrections or modifications only after they had a price quotation to start with.

In the meantime, Eduardo suggested that the Czechoslovakian target prices were unbeatable. Some arguing ensued in which Harry made it clear that he would be willing to agree on prices slightly higher than the Czechoslovakian targets because he wanted "to have the entire collection from one place." Since costing figures were not forthcoming, Roberto and Eduardo asked questions about potential modifications, as model shop workers were in the room trying to collect further information regarding alterations the importers had requested on the samples. Harry also requested clarification from Roberto regarding the double quotations in Argentinian and Brazilian leather, demonstrating not to have comprehended what the two parallel prices being quoted really meant.

Since the prices for the new samples had not been presented until then, at around 2:15 p.m. Harry and Charles rested their heads on the table and tried to take a nap. When Roberto came back into the room, Harry started joking around, saying there should be some couches in the office. Roberto requested my help to bring in a couch to the export room. With blinds down and lights off in the room, Harry and Charles slept up until 4 p.m., by which time some additional prices and samples were ready.

By 4:20 p.m., the four main participants were all back to the negotiating table. "Now that you are relaxed, show time!" said Roberto before a yawning audience. The importers first examined and discussed corrections to a problem in the newly arrived portfolio sample (item #69528), which would prove to be the main bone of contention for the remainder of these talks. It was a treasured item by the importers: a portfolio with nine (in the manufacturers' count) different compartments. However, it was also very similar to an existing style in the old collection. The difference was that the new one had many additional files or internal divisions. Harry and Charles argued this feature made a big merchandising difference, but Roberto and Eduardo argued it only meant useless complication for assembly. The price presented by Courofatos was 40% higher than Amage's target. Harry and Charles insisted such huge discrepancy could only be explained by some error in costing the item. This would be the main focus of negotiation until they agreed on the deal the next morning (see data segments 13, pp. 362-365, and 19, pp. 367-385).

Another sample — "the canvas bag" — was also brought in but it still lacked a price quotation. Since the importers considered it a marginal item and, given the "big problems" with more important items, Harry decided to give up on it and that item was ignored from then on. Around 5:00 p.m., the five prices that had been previously quoted were reviewed for clarification and both sides seemed to think things "didn't make sense," though only the importers would (repeatedly) put it in so many words. They gave long position reports on why they believed the Czechoslovakian prices were a sound and truthful target and on why they felt they had to buy the new items for the collection from Courofatos and not from the Czechoslovakians. The manufacturers speculated about what possible special position the Czechoslovakians might have been in to be able to quote such attractive prices. Roberto suggested that perhaps the Czechoslovakians were interlocking business with their own tannery, thus getting leather for a cost way below market prices and making an added-value profit on the final product.

Meanwhile, Eduardo calculated new prices on two of the previously quoted items and was ready to give new quotations on items #69535 and #69524, and he would later also review the price of item #69536. This was followed by the manufacturers' elicitation of volume projections for the following year in terms of items per style and color, both for the old line as well as for potential items in the new line being negotiated. This was interspersed in a series of interruptions from external interference, once again having to do with issues both immediately connected with, or totally extraneous to their business deal.

Later around 5:40 p.m., Roberto brought in samples of the two new attache cases (the ones that Harry and Charles had requested upon arrival on Wednesday). These two items had no Czechoslovakian counterparts and, therefore, no specific target prices had been announced.

Before they started discussing prices for the attache cases, however, a peculiar exchange took place, creating one of the most uncomfortable moments in the entire event. Eduardo had been out of the room for some time while Harry and Charles were examining the attache samples. He opened the door and asked Harry whether he would be able to get better prices on the Romanian items that had been discussed the day before. Harry took that as implicitly questioning the sincerity of the prices he had quoted for those items, which he had framed as strictly a cooperation — "I'm not making any money on this." So Harry got demonstrably upset and made it a point to show the manufacturers his own raw notes with the prices from Romania. It was clear, from that and other questions Roberto and Eduardo asked later, that the prices on the Romanian items could not be lowered for an eventual logrolling scheme combining the new collection deal with another deal where the manufacturers would buy merchandise via Amage's agency.

Following this, they discussed the two attache cases. After Roberto elicited the importers' target prices ($38-40 and $40-42) and persuaded Harry that those targets were unrealistic in comparison to very similar existing items priced at $46.23, Harry offered $43 and $45 for those cases and agreed to a few changes that would simplify manufacturing. This was around the time when the regular business day was over, and so Mr. Amati, Sr. came in the room. The manufacturers did not immediately commit to Harry's offer either way, however. Instead, Roberto, Eduardo and Mr. Amati discussed the offer, and thought it had to be considered carefully until the next day.

After this lull in cross-team focused interaction, around 6:30 p.m., Mr. Amati had left the room, and Harry held the floor for a long time, expressing his frustration with the prospects for the future, given Courofatos' prices. He once again recycled the comparison with the Czechoslovakian manufacturers, which in turn got Roberto to respond with accounts and justifications. Harry then stated that "manufacturers will sometimes do things for reasons other than just money" but will instead quote prices which just allow them to break even, when they want to build a strong market presence or avoid laying off people. Roberto highlighted the break-even feature of that scenario, and the topic sidestepped to a comparison of the new partitioned portfolio (#69528, quoted at $44.85, with Argentinian leather) versus the simpler existing attache (#1719, currently being sold for $31.37, roughly the same as Harry's estimated target price; cf. table below). This developed into a fierce dispute regarding the grounds for that difference, a sequence which lasted for more than half and hour (data segment 19, which is focused on analytically in chapters 6 and 7). From this arguing sequence, it seemed clear that the manufacturers could not substantiate the price they were quoting for the item. However, since they did not offer to reconsider the price quotation, Harry insisted that the costing calculations must be wrong and should be reviewed.

A visitor came in and Eduardo left the room. Roberto then tried to get the importers to consider adopting only some and not all items, but the importers would not do that. He then tried to review with them which would be the most important items and then proceeded to stacked the selected samples against a wall facing Roberto and Charles' end of the table.

By 7:30 p.m., the three started to organize the room and clean up the table until Eduardo came back with his visitor and they all talked for a while about the visitor's business exporting belts and wallets to the U.S.. After the visitor left, Roberto recapped what they had discussed in Eduardo's absence, and Eduardo used an extended turn to express his current overall position. The manufacturers could not offer anything better than the prices they were quoting based on the use of Argentinian leather, which he thought was boldly generous on their part, since it could put them in serious risk of losing money. Harry then reviewed the quoted prices in optimistic terms, concluding they were in trouble on two items only, and that one was a problem due to faulty costing calculations.

A long period followed in which the two teams did not interact intensively with each other. Rather, Roberto and Eduardo discussed the possibility of buying six-month inventory of leather from their traditional local supplier, requesting a substantial discount and getting advancement from Amage to pay for it. They proposed that scheme to Harry, and he agreed with it, but on the condition that they should be able to "finalize" by the next morning, before the importers would leave for the airport.

Eduardo then tried to contact the supplier over the phone, but this was a Friday evening, following a couple of days of hot weather. Chances of locating the tannery's export manager were slim. In fact, even if they did contact him, it was not clear that the export manager would be able to contact his boss to make a firm commitment by the next (Saturday) morning. So by 8:10 p.m., we all left for the factory cantina, where a group of office employees and skilled workers were to offer the importers a special *churrasco* , the traditional Southern Brazilian skewered barbecued meats meal. People other than Roberto and Eduardo entertained the two importers during most of the evening.

Negotiations resumed at 11:37 p.m., and lasted until 12:50 a.m.. Harry re-affirmed his price offers on some items, and they all reviewed prices and concluded that two items were especially problematic (#69528 and #69536). Harry recycled his charge that there had to be a mistake in cost calculations for those items. The manufacturers attempted to come up with a few suggestions for eliminating or substituting materials and technical details on the #69536 to reduce the price, without much success, so the importers decided to drop the item from consideration altogether.

Harry insisted time and time again that something was wrong with the costing of the 69528. The manufacturers then took time to discuss, between the two of them, what could be done about it. At this point Harry temporarily reversed his position of not even considering buying some items in Brazil and some in Czechoslovakia. In a tone of finality, he proposed that they should stop discussing the problematic items and that the manufacturers should instead examine his offers for the other three items. The manufacturers then went back to trying to find alternative materials and technical manufacturing solutions to reduce the price on the three less problematic items.

Around 12:30 a.m., Charles suggested they should adjourn and resume talks in the morning, while Harry recycled his point about the calculations being wrong once again. Roberto then finally took up the issue and proposed that the manufacturers would run a test in the factory to cost the item more thoroughly so they would be able to prove the calculations were accurate. Harry responded by saying they didn't have the time for that, and added that if the manufacturers wouldn't admit the price was unreasonable, there was no point in discussing the issue. Given that the manufacturers doubted his Czechoslovakian price quotations, Harry made it a point to show them raw notes with the Czechoslovakians' original quotations, his offers and the final prices accepted by these European manufacturers. "I may try to negotiate but one thing you'll never find in me: I'll never lie," he concluded. Eduardo then re-affirmed the manufacturers' willingness to make a study to check their costing and their current inability to reduce prices on those two items to approach the importers' target prices right there and then.

Harry pointed out that they had not agreed even on the less problematic items and that he could perhaps be more flexible if the importers were able to guarantee him a reasonable ocean freight rate. So they discussed ocean freight costs based on what Eduardo had found out during the previous afternoon. He had spoken to non-conference freighters, which offered better rates but could not guarantee a steady schedule for shipments. Eduardo then again re-affirmed his position, according to which they could not rush to finalize the deal because the manufacturers had to inquire about a number of questions regarding freight and supplies of raw materials. Harry then got upset and said they should send him a fax in New York when they were ready to talk again and requested to be taken to the hotel for the night.

Before they left, however, the same positions regarding the problematic 69528 item were recycled yet again. The manufacturers' insisted they needed to take time to make inquiries regarding alternative suppliers and freighters and to double check their costing. The importers' underscored their own need to have a definitive commitment from the manufacturers to proceed with their marketing program. Around 12:40 a.m., we all left Courofatos.

Unlike the previous sessions, these interactions late at night and in the following morning had little outside interference and were solidly devoted to negotiating a deal for the new collection. The last session on Saturday morning began only seven hours after the end of the previous meeting. There was a set time to end talks. At 11:30 a.m., Harry and Charles had to leave to make the 12:30 p.m. flight to Rio, and then to Frankfurt, on their way to Czechoslovakia.[1]

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[1] While the manufacturers did not display any expectation that these talks must reach a definitive resolution prior to the importers' departure, the importers had a clearly pre-set time to leave, and assumed a definitive resolution would take place before that. Neu (1986) reports a similar contrast during U.S./North-Vietnam peace talks in Paris where the U.S. participants checked into a fancy hotel while the Vietnamese rented an apartment for a year. Citing U.S. Department of Commerce sources, the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce *1995 Business Review/Directory*'s advises U.S. businesspeople on "business conditions specific to Brazil:"

> Compared to the United States, the pace of negotiation is slower and is based much more on personal contact. ... Many Brazilian executives do not react favorably to quick and infrequent visits

20 October, a.m.

Talks resumed at 7:30 a.m., picking up from the same issues discussed the night before, though on a quieter note. Harry rested his head on the table, while Charles took extended turns to express his "disappointment" with the way things had gone in previous sessions. He sought clarification on a number of issues that had been bothering him. Alleging to have stayed up all night thinking about it, he urged the manufacturers to account for their inability to quote definitive prices on the two attache cases. Eduardo explained that, due to his current uncertainty regarding leather supply, he was not in a position to quote prices that would both approach the importers' target and remain stable for a year. Eduardo and Roberto then agreed to the importers' price offers from the previous day, on the condition that their deal with the Argentinian leather supplier the following week would come through successfully.

Charles then turned again to the 69528 portfolio and recycled the importers' previously proffered argument. Eduardo argued that the item was complicated to make (e.g., double-stitching). Even though it was similar to the existing 1719 (which was single-stitched), it would take twice as long to produce and would involve further engineering to resolve predictable glitches in the assembly lines. A crucial piece of information was revealed in this discussion: Charles did not know that Courofatos did not own a machine with an automatic double-stitching device.

On both issues, some progress resulted from Charles' effort. Charles said that those things had not been explained to them the night before and that he understood things better at that point, and was thus able to suggest a corrective measure to speed up the production of the item (e.g., eliminate double-stitching on the 69528). These clarification exchanges were important also because they relieved the tension considerably. The manufacturers finally made a few points they had not made until that moment.

After this, Harry pointed out that they had not settled on any items for the new collection, and that he needed an answer even if it meant that Courofatos would not produce any of the items they had discussed. The importers talked in long extended turns about their time constraints for putting together the

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by foreign sales representatives. They prefer a more continuous working relationship" (Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce, 1995, p. 76).

new collection, given their reputation for reliability in the U.S. market built on a mode of operation emphasizing customer satisfaction and prompt, dependable deliveries across the year, of items presented in pre-season shows and through price-indexed printed catalogues.

Meanwhile Eduardo became less and less engaged in the conversation and started putting together a proposal he would announce about an hour later. For almost an hour, between 8:30 and 9:20 a.m., Eduardo would only occasionally request information from Harry to feed his calculations while Harry and Charles talked to Roberto about what they thought Courofatos should be doing to improve business, especially in terms of looking for alternative sources of supplies, and then to Roberto and to me about their business travels all over the world doing just that.

Around 9:15 a.m., Eduardo called on them to "speak serious now." The resolution of the problem began to take shape when Eduardo announced a proposal lumping together prices for all items in the collection based on restricted quotas. He proposed that Amage should buy a pre-specified number of pieces per style for the following year, providing advance payment to Courofatos for buying leather and putting it in inventory. The importers would thus pay a single price based on the average of the prices of four of the items discussed. This would enable Courofatos to ask their traditional leather supplier for an extra 15% discount on a one-shot, down payment for a six-month inventory order of leather that would cover all of Amage's order.

Harry agreed that this was a fair proposal, but contended he could not be restricted to a set number of items with no ground rules for orders that exceeded it. So he himself proposed a 5% increase for orders beyond that set number of items. The manufacturers rejected this on the basis that, even if 5% made sense over the generic average for the four items, a 5% increase was not acceptable for individual styles, given the larger difference between target and quoted prices on some of the items. For example, on the 69528, there was a 33% difference between the importers' target price and the manufacturers' price quotation. A 5%-increase in subsequent orders would be a tremendous disadvantage for the manufacturers, even though on the 69534, where the difference was 7.32%, the same 5% increase would roughly solve the problem.

Following this, Harry and Charles recycled their account of why they must have a formula so that they could know how to act if one style sold more than another. They pointed out, as an example, that they could not predict whether one color would sell more, but Eduardo persuaded them that was not a problem. Roberto then suggested that they use the average percentage difference between target and quoted prices as a basis. However, that amounted to 15%, too wide a margin for it to be acceptable to the importers.

It thus looked as if Eduardo's proposal was not going to solve the problem after all, when Harry said around 9:50 a.m. "I say we should leave it the way it is. This is no way to buy." But then Eduardo added a suggestion that they should all review the more problematic items 69528 and 69536 once again. Harry then said he could raise his price a little.

Finally, after some more arguing from both sides, Harry proposed specific added prices for each additional exceeding order on the selected items he thought Amage would sell well (exactly the two that were 30 to 40% higher than his target price). For additional orders of 2,500 pieces each, beyond the initial 2,500, specific 5%-price increases would kick in with each new batch. After the manufacturers discussed the proposal amongst themselves, and after the two parties adjusted some minor details, they moved on to discussing the two smaller items, without, however, yet reaching a firm decision on the scheme for the selected four major items in the new collection.

They bargained over the writing pad and in little more than 10 minutes agreed on prices, modifications and volume of orders. They then initiated bargaining over the small organizer. At this point the atmosphere in the room had changed significantly. They laughed and joked around for a while.

Still, the small organizer compared similarly to the wallet that initially was supposed to be a feature of one of the four major items. The wallet had been dropped to reduce the price by $2.96, and yet the manufacturers mentioned $5 for the small organizer. Each member paired and talked within the team for some time and then took breaks for refreshments.

With only one hour left before it would be time to leave for the airport, Harry requested that they agree and take notes of technical corrections on the major items before resuming talks on the small organizer. So for the next half hour Charles and Roberto went over each item to make sure they agreed on what had to be done for the re-making of final samples that would be shipped to Amage for final approval the following week. Meanwhile Eduardo discussed the deal with his father, eventually checking information with Harry. The final half hour was devoted to final bargaining over the small organizer and to confirming prices and procedures regarding the deal.

At 11:35 a.m. on Saturday, October 20, the event was over. Roberto took the importers to the airport, and I left with Eduardo. According to Roberto, they had reached a satisfactory outcome to these long stressful hours of talk, though "for a few moments, it almost..." The importers walked away with a program of orders for the following year, with four new additions to their Brazilian line (of six proposed) at prices 15% above their displayed targets, in addition to the two smaller items. They also managed to find two attache case styles with which to beat a competitor in another section of the market — for 10% above their original target. The bulk of these initial orders would reach roughly one million dollars FOB ("free on board," i.e., shipment, insurance or other additional costs not included). Courofatos would sell the items at prices well below its first quotations, but within a controllable bulk of orders. The main concern with not jeopardizing the company's balance of domestic/export production ratio had been secured. The business connection was thus kept within the safety boundaries the manufacturers had set for themselves.

APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIPTS

Transcription Conventions

Play-Transcript Conventions

Adapted from the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson in listings in Atkinson and Heritage (1984, pp. ix-xvi) and in Psathas (1995, pp. 70-78).

I. Simultaneous, overlapping and contiguous utterances and other behavior

1. **[** Left-hand brackets indicate simultaneity between utterances or other behavior

```
H:  fort[y-four dollars and change
R:      [forty-four opposed to thirty-one:,
```

2. **]** Right-hand brackets indicate end of overlap, when utterances or other behavior that started simultaneously or in overlap do not end graphically at the same point

```
E:  =eah if ih- ih- it is [(a difference in cos]t), why you are=
H:                         [<there's no question about that.>]
```

3. **=** Equal signs indicate contiguous utterances or other behavior with no perceived interval between them, ...

a. ... evidencing latching between different speakers' turns, ...

```
C:  because that's all the value there is in it.=
R:  =it's a different ↑customer.
```

b. ... or simply linking different parts of a single speaker's separated as a result of transcript design

```
H:  I'm telling you you sit [down and l[ook at the  =
```

```
E:                                  [(          )
R:                                                [(               )
H:  =calculations you'll see that there's a mistake somewheres.
    (1.1)
```

4. to¶day The "paragraph" symbol indicates sonorous pounding of table as next syllable was enunciated

```
H:  but to¶day, if you ¶show the A¶merican ¶customer, anything
but ¶suede, they will ¶not buy it.
```

II. Nonverbal behavior and contextual information

1. **((info))** Double parentheses enclose description of:

a. conspicuous nonverbal behavior, ...

```
H:  ((squinting)) °that's not six [per cent.°
```

b. ... contextual information needed to make sense of utterance, ...

```
C:  yeah.
H:  I would suggest t- (.) to go over the calculations (again)
    (1.3)
E:  ((on the phone)) ah, tá:, ( [              )
H:                               [I just think (that th[ere's=
C:                                                      [there's=
    =[some mistake)
```

c. ... or other information, conversational details, vocalizations or characterizations of talk otherwise awkwardly transcribed

```
        (4.3)
phone:  ((rings twice))
    E:  alô?
```

III. Intervals within and between utterances

1. **(0.7)** Numbers in parentheses indicate (in seconds and tenths of seconds) the length of timed intervals in the stream of talk

H: especially, (0.4) if in our Romanian line (0.4) we're
selling a case for sixty dollars, or fifty dollars in suede
(0.3) how in the world can I sell this case,
(1.2)
R: tsk, innovation,

2. **(.)** A dot within single parentheses indicates noticeable intervals in the stream of talk of less than two tenths of a second

H: =believe me, (.) ↓Roberto, (.) nothing would give me
greater pleasure than to get rid of the suede,

3. **(0.8)=((info))** Intervals in the stream of talk (in single parentheses) connected by equal signs to description of nonverbal behavior (in double parentheses) indicate timed interval was filled by the nonverbal behavior described

H: =cause I'm gonna give you a test (0.8)=((*raises wrist and looks at watch*)) in fifteen minutes.=

4. **(0.8) ((info))** Intervals in the stream of talk adjacent to description of nonverbal behavior in double parentheses indicate the conspicuous nonverbal behavior described occurred within the interval, but did not fill it entirely

E: yeah.
(4.0) ((*H looks at C, throws hands up; C shakes head no*))
H: now, (with) such a high labor cost (put things up) to forty-
four dollars? °ah::: ( ),°=

IV. Characteristics of speech production

1. **he-** A single dash indicates sudden or abrupt cut-off

R: Seeg[ar uses that]
H: [they won't e-]

2. **basis** Underlining indicates particular emphasis

H: [I am going on the basis of the price you quoted,=

3. **thee:** Colons indicate elongation of preceding sound. Repeated colons indicate lengthy elongation.

```
C: make thee: pen holders three inches long.
```

4. – ¯ Upward or downward pointing arrows indicate conspicuously higher or lower pitch

```
E: no, ↑you told me now, that you accept six per cent, (.) of
difference between this (.) and this.
```

5. **°soft°** Degree signs enclose speech uttered more quietly than surrounding talk

```
R: °(I'n't know),° but [Seegar is a classy:,
```

6. **LOUD** Capitalized words were uttered more loudly than surrounding talk

```
H: ↑but [YOUR PRICE IS- [is- is ↑TWENTY-FIVE [PER CENT.=
E:      [(no?    )      [(        )
```

7. **<pace>** "Less than" and "more than" signs indicate the words they enclose were delivered at a

conspicuously faster (<word>) or slower (>word<) pace than surrounding talk

```
H: =will want this type of a ↑thing because they visualize
gee, (.) <I had an attache case I had to put a lot o- a lot
of papers °in there,°> look what I have in a portfolio, (.)
```

8. **(h)you** Parenthetical h's indicate audible laughter-like aspirations and inhalations

```
R: (cê tá invocado por causa da alça, [eu acho.)
H:                                    [(h)you're my friend but=
=(h)som(h)etimes ya(h)- (h)you're not m(h)aking sen(h)se(h).
```

9. **,** Commas indicate continuing intonation

10. **.** Periods indicate falling intonation

11. **?** Question marks indicate rising intonation

12. **!** Exclamation points indicate animated tone

V. Transcriptionist doubt

1. **(will)** Words within single parentheses indicate doubtful transcription

```
H:  ((walking)) °(I'll) teach you (a few things.)°
```

2. **(   )** Empty single parentheses indicate transcription impossible

```
H:  there's a customer [that will carry a lot of papers in a=
C:                     [(        )
```

VI. Presentation marks

1. ® Right-pointing arrow on left margin indicates analytic attention is placed on that line

```
   C:  i[t's- a different customer.
®  H:   [it all depends on the individual.
```

2. Vertical ellipses indicate that intervening lines were omitted

```
C:  =organize his [stuff,
     .
     .
     .
C:  [and there's other customers that just put all in together
```

Microtranscript Conventions

1. Conventions used for various body parts

® ¯ – ®	indicate direction of movement of head, hand or arm
ù û ē é	indicate circular movement of the head, hand, arm or torso
---	indicate movement has begun
=	indicates continuation of movement/position
?	indicates information is not available on screen

2. Conventions for front of body

N	letters stand for points in the compass and indicate

direction of lower part of the body

3. Conventions for torso

ó	indicates torso is bent forward
½	indicates upright torso
æ	indicates torso moving forward
ō	indicates torso moving backward

4. Convention for head

»	indicates nod

5. Conventions for gaze

H, E, R, C	letters stand for initial of gaze recipient (i.e., Harry, Eduardo, Roberto, or Charles)
'''	indicate dropping of gaze
	blank indicates lack of interpersonal eye contact

6. Conventions for arm (including hand movement)

L	indicates left hand/arm
R	indicates right hand/arm
	blank indicates arms hanging down

Complete Data-Segment Transcripts

Data Segment 3

Explicated in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account Status UNCLEAR: Stop & Delay." Explicated excerpts of this segment also appear in chapter 7.

Original meeting date: Oct. 18, Thursday.

(3.1)
C: so (.) what is your metal handles cost?
(3.1) ((*R looking at notes*))
R: around twenty cents.
(2.0)
C: wow,
(2.3)
C: that's a big difference.
(15.3) ((*R looking at notes; C looking at his notes and samples and mumbling to himself what he reads from notes; Mr. A and H watch*))
R: ((*punching numbers on calculator*)) now, one thing, (0.8) when I made this:: (0.8) cost, I based it (.) on the exchange rate of ninety-one cruzeiros.
(1.0)
C: >ninety-one,<
R: ninety-one.
C: and it's up to ninety-five,
(1.1)
R: ninety-three,
(1.2)
C: >ninety-three,<
R: I mean in the commercial i- i:t's a little di- it's a little lower than (.) the black market.
C: uhm hm.
(1.1)
R: so:,
(2.4)
R: it'll be a little cheaper, (.) you know some- (0.5)=((*mouth gesturing "doubt"; hand in mid air*))=
C: =well: ([ )
R: [two or three per cent cheaper right now.
C: what? these handles?
H: <what are you talking about?!>
(0.8)
C: it's much cheaper.
(0.7)
R: no, (0.5)=((*looks at notes*)) what I'm saying is (.) that the twenty cents that I calculated a week ago, (1.2) today: would represent a little less than [twenty cents
C: [oh, it'd be: just=
=slightly less than twenty cents, but it'd still be a big savings out of uh:- Taiwan,
(2.3)
R: uh::: ((*looking at notes and punching numbers on calculator*))
(1.0)
R: okay, the handle that we are using,
(2.4) ((*R examines samples on desk*))
C: ( ) between these two (perhaps)
(1.6)
R: they're all fourteen cents.
C: yeah.
(3.8)
R: so °then,°
(1.0)
R: the freight for thi:s:,

(2.0)
C: it can't be (higher than cents)
R: ↑no, I'm thinking about per<u>cen</u>tage,
(.)
C: yeah,
(1.3)
R: ((*shoulders up and down*)) from Taiwa:n,
(2.9)
R: seven, eight per cent,=
H: =NO:::
R: ef oh bee? ((*FOB*))
(0.8)
H: ((*shaking head*)) °°no.°°
(0.6)
H: less
(2.0)
C: if you figured a penny a <u>piece</u> °(Roberto)°
(1.9)
C: which is <u>ten</u> per cent, (0.3) ah: I mean it's about <u>eight</u> per cent,
(4.7)
H: well, that's <u>his</u> decision to make. show im the other raw materials
(6.1) ((*R collects handle samples from desktop*))
R: so: here, ((*writes notes*))
(2.5)
H: cause these are not <u>fi</u>nal negotiations,
R: ↑no, ↑right, °right.°
(1.2)
H: I'm <u>sure</u> I can get them down another five six per cent.
(8.4)
R: okay, fabric.
(0.9)
C: fabric.
(3.2)
C: these ...

<u>Data Segment 9</u>

Explicated in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account does NOT STAND: 2nd Position Revised or Relinquished." Explicated excerpts of this segment also appear in chapters 4 and 7.

Original meeting date: Oct. 19, Friday, a.m.

(3.0)
E: you need he:re, (.) lining here?
(1.2)
C: l<u>i</u>ning?
E: yeah.
(1.1)
C: what would you <u>put</u> in there?
E: nothing.
(0.4)
C: oh.
(0.9)
E: nada.
(2.0)
C: yeah how much (were) you gon[na <u>save</u> with that

E: [eah:
R: [no, but with ↑LABOR >E- E- E- EVERYTHING counts<
E: [no ( )
E: okay Charlie, we're speaking ih::- three dollars, (.) three dollars twenty,
(0.2)
C: ye[a:h.
E: [it's (the) o:ur difference, (.) [this iss:
C: [they want to take the=
=lin[ing out of the inside of] the pocket
E: [(maybe) twenty cents thirty cents]
H: yeah but E- Eduardo (.) it's more than three dollars for me simply because (.) from our landed cost it becomes more
(0.4) because of the difference in freight from
Czechos¶lovakia ¶and here.=
C: =no but what he's saying is[: that
H: [I KNOW WHAT HE'S S[AYING but my=
E: [no, Harry,
H: =bottom line is is (.) what is it gonna cost me to land in the United States=
C: =well yeah, but ih what he's saying is if (you) t[ake out=
E: [(
C: =tha]t piece of vinyl he's gonna save in the front of the- inside of the pocket,
(1.3)
H: you're not hearing what he's saying and I'm hearing (him).
C: a'right, what('re) you say(ing)?
H: he is hearing if he could save three- three four dollars (that then) equals Czechoslovakia, (.) then he's okay,=
C: =yeah,
H: and I'm trying to say, (.) that the landed cost is not gonna be the same.
C: yeap.
(0.7)
H: the ef oh bee ((*FOB*)) might twoou- might uh:ah turn out to be the same but not the ↑landed cost,
C: that's correct.
H: unless he can get a decent ocean freight rate (.) that is reasonable (.) we're always gonna be in trouble,
(1.3)
H: I'm paying thirty two hundred dollars a ↑container from Czechoslovakia,
E: Harry, but our obligation is to make the: the product,
H: absolu[tely.
E: [( )
E: we're (.) speaking about ef oh bee ((*FOB*)) price (0.4) after we: (0.9) you know,
(2.7)
H: ((*cigarette in mouth*)) we can go along with that.
(0.7)
C: okay.
(2.6)
R: what about- (0.3) well, (0.6) in this (0.6) in this pocket here,
(3.2)
R: if we eliminate this: (.) imitation,
(2.0)
H: I think you're gonna destroy the whole case.
C: this is what's beginning d' happen, it's gonna lose its shape to an extent also. it won['t have a body to it.=
R: [okay, so-
R: =so just (.) eliminate this one here,
(0.6)
R: that

H: that I would go along with.
(1.3)
E: ( ) <u>this</u> (.) can we do?
(0.5)
C: kay.
R: >SO E<u>LIMINA</u>TE,<
(1.6)
R: uh::
(1.4)
H: no li:ning,
(2.8)
R: the smaller:,
(1.1)
R: O[UTER ZIPPER po[cket
H: [back of- [back of
H: (full) zipper (compartment).
(1.4)
C: °out°=
H: =°on <u>out</u>side° ((*lighting cigarette*))
(2.5)
C: that's it.
(18.0)

Data Segment 13

Explicated in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account Does NOT STAND: 2nd Position Unchanged."

Original meeting date: Oct. 19, Friday, p.m.

(0.8)
H: what's the price?
(1.0)
E: ((*looking down at notes*)) Argentina: is forty-four eighty-<u>five</u>,
H: °( )° ((*drops pen noisily, turns torso and head; draws right hand over head*))
C: °Jesus Christ°
P: Eduardo, a pasta que tu queres é com armação de metal ou de madeira?
E: pode ser madeira ou metal. ((*shifting gaze to C/H*)) °tanto faz°=
C: =Brazil is gonna be higher.
H: °we can't ( )°
E: °wha-° (.) for example the s:<eventeen nineteen,> (.) (you) have a price of thirty-one thirty-two (.) this ((*touches new* 69528 *sample*)) has too much- (.) <u>lea</u>ther °(moo- m'ch)° <u>more</u> leather (than)=
C: =where's <u>more</u> leather?
E: <u>where</u> is?
E: (1.4)=((*slides fingers along case edges*)) °↑he[re°,
C: [you mean the=
C: =<u>gu</u>sset?
E: gusset, ↑here, ((*touches narrow side of case*))
(0.4)
H: [(not) th[e <u>in</u>side
E: [(and) ↑here, ((*shows side panel*))
(0.4)

E: yeah, inside is o<u>kay</u> but- (.) you can: ((*searches for cost sheets*))
(0.4)=((*R brings 1719 sample to the table top*))
E: measure here
H: yeah, go ahead, (.) go ahead, spread it out.
(0.9)
H: go ahead=
E: =ah,=
C: =look at the <u>bot</u>tom,
(0.8)=((*R handling the two samples on table*))
E: °(but but-)°=
H: =go ahead go ahead,
(4.0) ((*R feeling inside of both sample; others watch him*))
E: °(put there)°
(6.1) ((*R still examining samples; gets up from chair*))
H: give me the Brazil price.
(1.6)
E: ((*looks down at notes*)) forty-seven, (.) thirty.
(2.0)=((*H shakes head "no" as he notes it down*))
R: ↑okay,
(2.9) ((*all looking at R*))
R: ((*gazes briefly at H*)) you could say that (.) ( ) in <u>ex</u>cess, (.) all of this gusset, (.) two gussets, (2.2) in a sense are in <u>ex</u>cess to what we have here,
(4.4)
H: you're talking about thirteen dollars more, °nuh::° it makes no sense ((*shakes head "no"*))
(0.6) ((*maid comes in with six glasses of refreshments on a tray*))
E: ah but we- we're spe- we are comparing this with
th[e: uh uh: the <u>nor</u>mal l[ine, (.) it costs thirty-one=
C: [that's not water.
R: [kind of.
E: =dollars, you know that cost thir- <u>thir</u>ty-<u>one</u> <u>do</u>llars, (0.4) for example, ((*starts flipping through pages of a notebook*))
(0.8) ((*R serves refreshments*))
R: cê aceita uma Coca?
P: anrm
R: (vai?) Almir?=
H: =is this diet Coke?
maid: é:. ((*nods yes*))
H: ((*nodding yes*)) <u>diet</u> coke,=
R: diet [coke, ((*R's further talk to maid not transcribed*))
E: [seventeen nineteen, (.) cost (.) today, (0.7) thirty-one thirty-seven.
H: (0.7)=((*drinking; nods yes*))
E: ef oh bee ((*FOB*)) price.
H: okay and [should that be thirteen dollars more?=
E: [and you can't-
E: =how you can compare this?=
H: =should that be thirteen dollars more?
(0.8)
H: come on, [(((*2.0 in complete overlap*)))
E: [(((*2.0 in complete overlap*))) but you=
E: =want- you are giving us a price of thirty-two, (.) thirty, thirty-two ((*gestures "crazy"*))
H: °(but)° this is- ↓<u>THIR</u>TY-TWO SEVenty-<u>five</u>,
(1.7)
E: ↑yeah, (b) (0.8) from <u>where</u>?
(0.9)
H: [from Czechoslovakia, that's from wh<u>e</u>re
E: [how we can compare?
(1.0)=((*H staring at E*))

H: ↓I'm not quoting you prices from the sky:,
(2.4)
C: you're figuring something wrong,
H: you- you're not making se[nse if you compare it.
C: [there's something,
C: you kn[ow,
H: [you're not talking about leather on the inside,
((*pointing to new case*))
(1.1)=((*E opens up case that's sitting upright on table*))
E: [inside (.) and here also, ((*shows bottom of case*))
C: [( ) (.) he's showing us the gussets
E: also here, ((*shows side of case*)) this is all [one piece of=
H: [FINE, MAKE=
C: [but uh:::
E: =[leather, (.) one ((*gestures "1" with index*)) piece of-]
H: =[ME LEATHER- MAKE ME THE GU]SSETS VINYL((*pointing to case*))
(1.1)
H: make me vinyl gussets.
C: yeah
(0.5)
E: ((*pinches narrow side of case*)) here?=
H: =y[eah.
C: [yeah.
E: okay.
(3.0)=((*E grabs case and turns it around with narrow side facing H/C*))
E: here?
H: ((*shaking head no*)) no, (.) I- I said vinyl gussets.=
C: =(*after shaking head no while drinking*)) insi:de,
E: inside.
(0.4)
H: where the files are.
E: ((*nods yes*)) okay.
(3.3) ((*E gets rid of cigarette ash; looks for cost sheets*))
H: but even if it didn't have vinyl gussets eh- Eduardo, you can't substantiate (.) fourteen thirteen [dollars more,
C: [( )
E: (.)=((*without gazing at C or H, nods yes and hand gestures "stop"*))
H: than the seventeen fourteen. (0.7) <seventeen nineteen,>
(1.4)
H: makes no sense.
(0.9)
H: we're going backwards, (not where I wanna go)
(14.8)
((*E looking at cost sheets and calculating; C and H watch him attentively, the H starts looking at sample standing upright on table*))
H: <and you don't even have a shoulder strap on that yet,>
((*pointing to sample*))
E: (1.0)=((*raises head and looks at H then at sample; then lowers head as H starts next turn*))
H: where's the shoulder strap?=
C: =and the pa:ds, [everything else,] (.) °that takes leather°
E: [((*raises head gazes at C; lowers head*))]
(0.9)
C: the [dee ring- the uh: ah: [the: uh: the (da]) clips?
[((*with head down looking at notes; raises four right-hand fingers in "stop" gesture*))]
H: [come on it makes no sense.]
(1.2)
H: it makes no sense at all.
(93.7)

((*C and H occasionally whisper a conversation; E's secretary comes in and talks to him and then leaves; R comes back to the table and starts talking to E in Portuguese*))

Data Segment 17

Explicated in chapter 5 as example of negotiational arguing sequence; Referred to in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account STANDS: 1st Position Relinquished." Explicated excerpts of this segment also appear in chapters 6 and 7.

Original meeting date: Oct. 19, Friday, p.m.

```
          (8.6)=((C, R and E writing notes, H looks at camera and
     winks, then looks at his own notes and at E for the
     remaining 5.0))
 Mr. A:   °(esse nacional, não podia [                 )°]
     H:                                  [are you paying att]ention=
     =Eduardo?
          (0.9)
     E:   ((raises head)) uh?
     H:   are you paying attention?=
     E:   =yes.=((drops gaze and lowers head to write notes))=
     H:   =cause I'm gonna give you a test (0.8)=((raises wrist and
     looks at watch)) in fifteen minutes.=
 Mr. A:   ((after moving closer to the table, leaning hands on table))
          =(hein ô:: a gente falou em- aquilo de estudar a colocação
     do forro em:)=
   (E:)   =imitação de couro, não vão querer.
     ?    °(                         )°=
     R:   =he's askin (.) if we could uh:: (0.5) use imitation suede,=
     H:   =(0.5)=((shakes head no vigorously, with eyes closed: #1))=
          =[((#2))]
     R:   =[rather than (0.5) pig suede]=
     H:   =(1.0)=((#3, #4))
     C:   ((measuring part case console in front of him, other hand
     covering mouth)) °(        get away with it.)°
          (0.7)
     H:   ((hand on chest)) nothing would give me greater pleasure
     than to get away with that damn suede,
          (0.9)
     H:   because it's ↑very expensive
          (1.4)
     H:   but that's what the American people ↑want right now, (.)
     Charlie would love to even use a material,
     C:   yeah, I'd love to use a fabr[ic (  )
     R:                               [ssya-
     R:   Seeg[ar uses that]
     H:       [they won't e-]
     C:   °yeah.°
     H:   he's in Europe!
          (1.6)
     R:   °(I'n't know),° but [Seegar is a classy:,
     C:                       [IF I GET A
          (0.3)
     R:   [uh:: brand.]
     H:   [((shakes head no #1, #2))=
```

C: [I'm trying to get] the: right uh:=
H: =be<u>lieve</u> me, (.) ↓Roberto, (.) nothing would give me <u>grea</u>ter pleasure than to get rid of the suede,
(0.8)
R: uhm hum
H: but to¶<u>day</u>, if you ¶<u>show</u> the A¶<u>me</u>rican ¶<u>cus</u>tomer, anything but ¶<u>suede</u>, they will ¶<u>not</u> buy it. ((*pounding table as if slicing pie; alternates gaze from R to Mr. A*))
(1.3)
H: yeah, <u>when</u> you have a Lacrosse (.) or <u>a:</u> Lowbew or- (.) they can do anything they want, (0.5) because the <u>type</u> of person that goes into that <u>store</u> ((0.8)=(*hand in mid air*)) wants the idea that he bought that from <u>La</u>crosse=
Mr. A: =pegou? ((*to E in other room*))
H: °that's not our buyer° ((*squints and shakes head no*))
(0.8)
H: cause [they're-
Mr. A: [PEGOU (EDUARDO)?
(2.0)=((*Mr. A is holding phone over hook; R stretches his arm to press a button as Mr. A drops phone*))
Mr. A: ([ )
R: [não não, <u>não</u> não.
H: (what did you do?)
(0.7)
Mr. A: ( )
R: ( )
R: PEGOU? ((*to E in other room*))
E: nã, só queria saber se o ( ) tava ali.
(0.5)
R: ah, ( )
(3.0)=((*E walks over to table and pick up the phone*))
E: alô?
(0.4)
E: olha ele já saiu.
(0.6)
H: I would <u>love</u> to get rid of the suede,
(1.3)
H: ((*shakes head no*)) [but un<u>til</u>,] until [the industry starts=
E: ((*on the phone*)) [( )] [(=
H: =[getting rid of it] I'm not gonna be the first <u>one</u>=
E: =[( )]
H: =(0.9)=((*shaking head no*)) to get rid of it.
(0.7) ((*E leaves room*))
H: especially, (0.4) if in our Ro<u>ma</u>nian line (0.4) we're selling a case for <u>six</u>ty dollars, or <u>fif</u>ty dollars in suede (0.3) how in the world can I sell this case,
(1.2)
R: tsk, inno<u>va</u>tion,
H: (0.4)=((*scowls and shakes head no #1*))=[((*#2, #3*))]
R: =[I mean everybody=
=does: uh:- pig suede] you gotta tr[y a new type [of °(=
H: [I don't- [I don't=
R: =)°]
H: =have the] guts.
R: (0.4)=((*smiles and drops gaze*))=
H: =I'm a coward (0.7)
C: ninety-two we're gonna try a couple of cases=
H: =I'm a coward
(0.7)
R: uhm hm=
C: I'm gonna find the right ( ).
(2.3)
C: make thee: pen holders three inches long.

Data Segment 19

Excerpts of this segment are explicated in chapter 6 as example of closing of negotiational arguing sequence. Part of this data segment is microtranscribed as well. The segment is referred to in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account Does NOT STAND: 2nd Position Unchanged." Additional explicated excerpts of this segment also appear in chapters 7.

Original meeting date: Oct. 19, Friday, p.m.

(5.1) ((*H walks to N end of table looking at cases on the floor*))
R: °now,°
(1.0)
R: there's one thing (0.2) if you go (to the) basis that the=
=[seventeen nineteen]
H: =[YES YOU BETTER BELIEVE I]'M GONNA GO to that basis.
((*points to case on the floor*))
(0.9)
R: <(if you go to th[at b-)<
H: [cause it makes no sense at all. ((*reaches for case on the floor*))
(1.7)
H: I'm sorry. ((*grabs case*))
(1.6)
H: this makes no sense.
(4.2)=((*H sets new case sample, ie, 69528 upright on table in front of R; bends over to get other case on the floor*))
H: yknow, I'[m in busi]ness also=
R: [(↑one thing,)]
R: =ri:[ght.
H: [so I mean it's not where (0.4) I don't know (0.3) I don't know anything about manufacturing
(5.7)=((*H bends over cases on the floor next to N end of table in search of old case sample, ie, 1719*))
H: (I set the other off)
(3.5)=((*H walks to SW end of table*))
H: here.
(2.1)
R: the selling price of the seventeen nineteen doesn't mean it was calculated as:
H: ↑but you got an increase, (.) ↑come on,
(2.0)=((*H walking back to N end of table with old case*))
R: ↑remember the increase we asked for, at that time?
(1.3)
R: ( )
(5.6)=((*H sets old case upright on table next to new case in front of R*))
H: YOU CAN'T JUSTIFY (it)
(1.6)
H: ((*walking back to his seat at NW corner*)) the difference in price (0.2) such a difference in price
(1.6)
E: you don't think that (we wew) have a:: djiffere- (.) ((*pointing to cases on table*)) that it has difference between this price and another one?=

H: =YE:s! (0.7)=((*glowers at Eduardo; steps forward and points to cases*)) <u>this</u> should be more expensive than that, su:re.=
E: =(wh), this?=
R: =no, this [should be more expensive. ((*touches new case*))
H: [<u>this</u> (.)=((*points to new case*)) should be.
(.)
H: oh:, yes.
E: oh yes?
H: ((*gaze at Eduardo; eyebrows raised; pointing at cases*)) but not the inc- not the <u>di</u>[fference that <u>you're</u> talking about.
C: [not the amount that you put <u>dow:n</u>.
(0.7)
H: I mean, (0.5) come on,
(0.4)
C: you [got <u>thir</u>ty six] percent,
H: [<what are we talking about?>] ((*puts glasses on*))
C: thirty seven p[ercent
H: [<u>just</u> a minute.
(0.8)
C: forty four eighty five,
(0.3)
H: nah, that's that's against this. ((*pointing to notes*))=(0.2) but let's talk about the seventeen (.) nineteen.
(1.1)
C: seventeen <u>ni</u>neteen,=
H: =seventeen fourteen.=
E: =que (preço é esse)?
R: °é o[:° dezessete dezenove essa.
H: [the seventeen fourteen,
E: nã nã.
R: ah, <u>e</u>ssa,
H: you <u>ca</u>:n't in a <u>mi</u>llion years justify the differential in price.
(0.6)
H: there is <u>no</u> w[ay.
E: [(s)
C: (is that thirty) [three dollars? or something,
R: [(° °)
H: it's thirty one dollar[s and change.
C: [thirty <u>one</u> dollars.
(2.1)
H: there's <u>no</u> way you can justify it.
(1.2)
R: (<° °>), could you read that reference number, °please°? ((*pointing to something across table, in front of Charles*))
C: ((*holds up notepad*))
R: no
(1.0)
C: which?=
R: =this (.) the reference number of this. ((*touches case in front*))=
C: =oh,=
H: =THE REFERENCE NUMBER [IS
C: [of that is (.) six nine f[ive two=
H: [five=
C: =[eight.
H: =[twenny eight
(1.8)
H: there is <u>no</u> way you can jus°tify <u>that</u> price°
(1.7)
C: °it's off the wall.°
(5.1) ((*H walking to NE corner of table where cases are*))
H: I mean you tell me about this <u>gu</u>sset (0.4) okay,

(2.3)
H: ((*standing at NE table corner of looking at the two cases set with gusset sides up*)) if you compare <u>this</u> gusset (0.7) to <u>this</u> gusset,
(1.0) ((*C stands up and walks to NE corner of table*))
R: it's basicly the <u>sa</u>me,=((*stands up*))=
C: =yea.=
C: ((*moves over to NE table corner*))
H: =it's pretty damn close.
(0.4) ((*E stands up*))
R: °(yes it [is.)°
H: [now we go to the second thing, the <u>on</u>ly difference is (0.5) is let's talk about the interior.
(0.9)
H: okay?
(0.4)=((*H opens case zipper*))
H: YES, (.) you have more labor in here. (.) no question °°(about it)°°.=
R: =<u>nine</u> files. (.) opposed to <u>four</u> files.
H: wu- I don't see where you have nine files, °but <u>o</u>kay°
R: one,
H: ah:
R: two,=
H: =I'm t[alking
R: [three, four, five, six, (0.6) seven, eight, (0.6) ni:ne.
H: ((*hand inside case*)) ↑but look what you're talking in cost of ↑material, ↑come on.((*frozen squinting smile*))
E: °no, it's okay.° no, (.) what is the:=
C: =look [at the zipper on that] case.((*hand pointing to case*))
E: [how much we have of leather here?] ((*holding up case; gazing at Roberto*))
(2.0)
R: uh::[( )
H: [I am <u>tel</u>ling you (.) that <u>so</u>[<u>me</u>thing is wrong in your=
E: [( )
H: =[calculations. ((*both hands in the air, palms down, going up and down, then drops gaze; turns away from table*))
[[
E: =[( ) ((*looking down at notes on table; hand-gestures "wait"*))
(1.2)
H: ((*facing wall*)) I don't care what you gonna tell me.
R: com quebra a um?
E: nã não. sem quebra.
C: °look° look at the cost of this [zipper alone.
H: [ISN'T IT STRANGE THAT YOUR= =CALCULATIONS ON THIS ((*holds up case in room corner*)) is very close to Czechoslovakia? (0.4) very ↑clo?se.
E: ((*moving torso in search of Harry's gaze*)) no, we have a: (0.6) a differency:: of uh: about fifteen per cent.
(0.4)
E: =on:[ly ((*arm extended over table, hand palm down showing case under table in SW corner*))
H: [NOT ON THA:?AT.((*extended arm; index pointing to case in NE room corner*))=
E: =in <u>this</u> one ((*points to case on SW corner floor*))
(1.1)
E: that I think that we h[ave (we we have)
H: [<u>that's</u>=((*hand-gestures "forget it"*))= =[°completely out.°
C: =[that is <u>way</u> out.=

H: =[that's crazy.
E: =[(this)
E: this, I want to buy.
       (0.9)
E: by- ((*pointing to floor*)) by fourteen dollars, I can buy.=
H: =that- that you're completely off.
       (0.5)
H: but <u>this</u> - ((*index pointing to case on table*)) you <u>de</u>finitely wrong calculations. ((*sits down*; *Eduardo drops gaze*))
       (1.0)
R: ((*reading from notes on table*)) zero ponto setenta e sete=
E: =yeah. this- we have here ((*holds up old case from table*)) zero point,=
R: =zero point seventy-seven. (0.5) s- me- meters,
       (.)
E: [square meter.
R: [(   )
       (0.7)
E: okay?=
H: =↑how do you know that is correct? who measured the leather?
       (0.6)
E: °↑oh: the people ↑there.°((*jerks head back; drops case; turns wrists clockwise and counterclockwise*))
H: maybe they're made a mistake.=
R: =↑they t[ake
E: [nuh:=
R: =one paper pattern ((*gestures "measuring"*)) one by one, and- and measure.
       (0.6)
R: alright?
E: this we (measure) (0.5)=((*snaps fingers #1* [*#2, #3*)) a=
R: [here,
       =thousand times.
R: let me show you how we we:-
       (5.1)=((*R gets stapled sheets from table; looking for correct page*))
R: °here,°
       (1.3)=((*R sets sheets on table in front of H*))
R: ((*leaning over table pointing to items on sheet*)) we get the <u>pa</u>per patterns (0.4) and measure
       (0.9)
R: <u>one</u> pocket (0.3) two of (.) of- for this, (0.3) <u>three:</u> (.) of th[is, two of this]
E: [((*leans over table; points to sheet*)) look here how]=
E: =much (this)
       (0.6)
E: °zero point,° (0.6) ninety:,=
R: =no nuh, let's see (0.2) is thi:s:?
       (1.1)=((*both E and R go back to upright standing position*))
R: ((*reading cost sheets*)) yeah, that's twenty-eight (0.5) zero point <u>ninet</u>- ninety two eight
       (1.2)=((*R flipping pages*))
R: nine two eight.
E: nine two ei:ght, (.) to? (0.3) seventy seven? ((*punching numbers on calculator*))
R: poin- yeah.
       (2.7)
E: ((*showing Harry the calculator*)) ↑here we have twenty per cent,
       (0.7)

E: in leather.
(0.6)
R: twenty per cent mo:re consumption of leather.
(0.6)
E: you have to accept this.
(1.1)
E: yes?=
R: =and if [you want, we can get- we can take the=
H: [((*eyebrows up; shakes head no*))
R: =↑p[aper patterns [and measure one by one,
H: [°no°
E: [(look) ((*holding calculator*))=
E: =and then (0.2) and then we compare: (.) the labor.=
=[here AND HERE ((*hands on cases on table*))
H: =[I don't accept twenty per cent more leather. I don't see where it's coming,
(0.6)
R: ↑listen, (0.4) ↑out of this here. ((*hands inside new case*))
E: °yeah.°
R: this ((*showing gussets*))
(1.1)
R: oppo:sed,
(0.2)
H: ↑BUT I TO[LD YOU WHAT WE CAN DO WITH THAT.=
R: [opposed to this,
C: =change that to the vinyl.
(0.3)
H: ↑I TOLD YOU TO CHANGE (IT TO) THE VINYL.
E: yeah, but the:n. °uh:° wu::: we- I spoke to you, (.) how much we can save here, (.) two dollars?
(0.8)
H: wull that's what you said.
E: I saw- uh:: I I said (.) two dollars.
H: two dollars is is is insignificant.
(1.1)
E: but it's two dollars. (.) °okay,°
(2.7)
R: maybe here, ((*shows inner division in new case*)) instead of vinyl, if we used [nylon.
H: [look,
H: look, (0.5) let's call it the way it is. (0.5) if you s- went into a store,
(1.5)
H: =[and you saw this,((*grabs old case*))=
E: =[( )
E: =yes,=
H: =n you saw this.((*points to new case*))=
E: =yeah, this is what I spoke to you. (.) if you see the sa[me, (.) OKAY,
H: [WHICH WOULD YOU BUY?
(1.4)
E: this o[ne.((*pointing to new case*))
R: [(th)eah- (.) I would buy that one.((*points to old case*))=
H: =of ↑cour:se.=
E: =ah, wi[th this price.
R: [with this price,
E: okay, (0.3) ih- butzi:- is what- I I told you. (.) ((*grabs new case*)) this is- (.) too expensive to put it=
E: =in in in produ-
H: ((*shakes head no three times*))
(0.3)
E: (no,)

(0.5)
E: yeah, if I see this in a shop, (0.5) the both, (.) yes, I buy this, with (.) this price and this (0.5) causs, (0.7) nobody will see (.) i:f: here,
R: all the features that the case has.
C: a lot of people [li:ke that feature.
E: [VERY NICE article.
E: ve[ry nice, Charlie.
C: [people like it.
E: but you cannot compare [(the) price with this one.=
C: [they'll pay,
C: =they'll pay a li:ttle bit more.
E: a [li:ttle bit m[ore
C: [but not too m[uch.=
R: [what=
E: =[a little bit more,
R: =[wha:t what mor:e y::ou:'d you'd assume (.) reasonable?
H: <they'll pay ten or fifteen dollars> more in the retail.=
C: =yeah.
(2.0)
R: this would me[:an two dollars, (0.2) two and a half dollars,
C: [that's it.
H: approximately
C: °yeah.°
R: ef oh bee ((*FOB*))=
H: =°proximately°
(4.1)=((*all standing, silent and motionless*))
H: °↑(it's) exactly right.°
E: (°quanto?°)
C: yep.
R: dois dólares e meio a mais,=
H: =it's ↑exactly ↑right.=
C: =we're not saying it doesn't look like more value, (0.4) it_ does. (0.6) but not that much.
E: do you know what we can do?
H: THIS IS THE ONLY THING THAT MAKES IT LOOK MORE VALUABLE? ↑THI:S? ((*points to side of new case*))=
C: =sure.
(0.8)
H: ↑nothing e[lse.]=
R: [but is it-]
H: =if you don't have that, you have that case.=
R: =[(s)
H: =[it's identical.
R: =[is it- is it is it gonna be displayed like this, ((*sets case showing gussets*)) so that [people (.) ca[n see:?
H: [yes.
C: [wull (me:-)=
H: =(yes)
(1.0)
H: °vcourse,°
(0.8)
H: otherwise you can't sell it.
(1.3)
C: they'll put it in a window like that.
(0.3)
C: they'll put fi:les [in it to show
H: [they'll put files, they'll they'll= =display, [huhmuch- how much the thing can hold.
C: [sure.
C: some places will put two in, (.) one closed and one open, so they can see [how it works
H: [now let- let's say another thing,

(1.0)
H: first of all, (1.1)=((*grabs new case*)) you're not necessarily using a full sheet of leather here ((*slides hand over side of new case*))
(1.5)
H: as you <u>are</u> <u>he</u>re.((*points to side of old case*))
(1.1)
H: so you have- you can use a certain amount of waste here ((*new case*)) that you <u>can't</u> u[se here. ((*old case*))
E: [(nuh)
E: °([ )°
H: [you're full of sh[it.
C: [NO:W,
C: now it doesn't <u>me</u>[<u>an</u> anything
H: [you're full of shit.=
E: =no, we're speaking about Argent[inian leather,
C: [be<u>fore</u>,
E: we're comparing with Argentinian, (0.4) then ih- this problem of- waste (0.7)=((*hand-gestures "out"*)) forget it.
(0.4)=((*H's face-gestures "doubt"*))
E: yes, we're ((*looking down at notes*)) spea:king: a[bout= H: [you still= E: =[Argentinian leather]
H: =[have- W]AIT.
H: when Argentina is quoting [you a price, (0.3) they're=
E: [((*hand-gestures "no difference"*=
H: =[quoting you a price] with a certain percentage of <u>waste</u>,=
E: =[((*shakes head no*))]
E: =twenty per cent.
(1.5)=((*H brings new case forward; points to side panel*))
H: bu[t it becomes <u>less</u> than twenty percent, when you h- (.)=
E: [°(and,)°
H: =when you'[re using smaller <u>p</u>]<u>a</u>nels of leather, (0.3) <u>co</u>me=
E: [((*squints*)) ah: Ha:rry, ((*drops gaze*))]
H: =on. ((*sets case on table*))
(0.9)
H: what d[o you think (-)
E: [°(ah:)° you think that they yoo yi yi uh will give us a better price in the leather, (0.3) if we put this here, ((*hand on side of new case; gaze at H*)) (0.9) it's what you're: telli- uh saying?=
H: =I am saying [that Arg-] Argentina will be able to use less=
E: [((*face-gestures "doubt"*))]
H: =uh have less waste, (0.3) absolutely.
(0.5)
E: <u>this</u> ((*hand on new case*)) we- we will have: uh le:ss uh waste and another one we have (.) ((*gesture-drawing a* E: *square*)) [<<u>more</u> waste, ((*shoulders & face-gestures "doubt"*))
H: [°<u>that's</u> possible.°
H: but I'm <u>say</u>ing, there's <u>less</u> waste on <u>this</u> ((*touches new*)) case than there is on <u>this</u>. ((*hand on old case*))
(1.3)
H: ((*grabbing old case*)) bcause here you have full <u>pa</u>nels ((*slides hand on side panel*))
E: ((*nodding* yes)) °yeah° (.) you have more labor, °(also)° ((*hand on new case*))
(1.0)=((*H smiling and squinting*))
H: °°<u>come</u> on.°°
E: ((*smiling*)) come <u>on</u>, no
H: come on.((*wave-gestures "forget it"; turns back*))=
E: yah: <u>Ha</u>rry,
(1.0)
H: ( )

(0.3)
H: *sometimes the labor has no factor (0.6) when you wanna reduce something, it's no- it's not a [big factor,*
C: [yeah.
(0.4)
H: [when you wanna add something,] labor becomes a big factor=
C: [((*laughs soundlessly*))]
E: =we're speaking a[bout Argentinian] leather, and uh the=
H: [(f) ((*wave-gestures "forget =*
E: =people there will not] give us (.) a better price because = H: *=it"; drops gaze*)) °oh come on°]
E: =we have this ((*shows side panel of new case*))
(1.1) ((*E looks for H's gaze; H looking down at notes*))
E: serious.
(0.8)
C: yeah, but you're gonna average it OUT between that one and this one, ((*pointing to each case*))
(1.2)
E: okay, [(so,) we're speaking six per cent more (0.6) or=
C: [so, I mean,
E: =seven per cent more in this price to sell this, (0.6)=((*hand on new case; gazes at C*)) and seven per cent more ((*looks at H; hand on new case*)) i::s ↑impossible
(0.8)
E: (you know,) (.) ((*hand on chest*)) uhkh I think, (.) if (you) w- (0.5) have this price, we send the: the cuttings of the leather to: Czechoslovakia and you do there,
C: hukh. ((*smiles; drops gaze*))
(1.3) ((*H starts to walk away from table toward door*))
E: ((*smiles; sticks tongue out*)) co:me on:, (.) eah: I don't understand Harry. ((*turns back to table*))
(2.6)
H: ((*coming back in from corridor*)) °(we're) making a big mistake.°
C: sure (we) are, cause they're letting Czechoslovakia get in,=
H: =no, forget about Czechoslovakia. you got to add (.) you got to add styles in order to increase business
(4.9) ((*H lights cigarette*))
E: Harry,=
H: =in a million ye[ars, you can't convi[nce me
E: [Harry, [you know what wi-=
H: =THAT IF I PAY THIRTY DOLLARS or thirty-one dollars for this, (.) ((*touches old case*)) (en) you want ((*touches new case*)) forty-four dollars ((*looks at notes*))=
E: =if I have this (.) ((*grabs & holds up new case*)) by six per cent more than this, (.) you will buy (.) in three months only this and will take this ((*grabs old case and holds it away from body*)) from [(the produ-)
C: [no[: way ((*shakes head no*))
H: [stop [being ( )
E: [YES [SU:RE, H[ARRY.
C: [no: wa:y,
H: [oh:, [ple:ase
E: [ah:=
=Harry:,
E: you are more: [( )
H: [I'LL TELL YOU WHAT, I'LL GIVE YOU A GUARANTEE
C: [( )
H: I'LL TELL [YOU WHAT,] I'LL GIVE YOU A GUARANTEE ON AN ORDER=
E: [( )]
=ON AN ORDER
(0.7)
E: ((*smiling*)) that you'll make (.) five [thousand of this a-

H: [that I'll buy the=
H: =same-, I'll buy the <u>same</u> quantity of <u>each:</u>.
C: on <u>both</u>.=
E: =Harry, if I- (.) Harry,=
H: =[JUST A <u>MO</u>MENT,]
E: =[(if you)] to the show, (.) you have here, ((*touches new case*)) six per cent <u>more</u> in the price,
H: I just said, [I will give you a guarantee, (0.3) if I buy=
E: [( )
H: =<u>five</u> thousand of <u>these</u>, I'll buy <u>five</u> thousand of those (.) and that I <u>can't</u> buy more of those than I buy of this. (.) how's that? (0.6) ((*pointing to himself*)) I GIVE YOU MY GUARAN<u>TEE</u>, (0.6) I'LL PUT IT IN WRITING.
(1.4)
C: °°khuh°° ((*shoulders up*; *soundless chuckle*))
H: ((*index up*)) you're making a big mistake, (0.6) that you don't <u>un</u>derstand the American <u>mar</u>ket. (0.4) there a lot of people that just want ((*touching old case*)) a <u>ba</u>sic portfolio, (0.5) and then there's a gro[up of people-
E: [(but) this is a=
<u>basic,</u> (0.4) por[tfolio,
H: [that is <u>n</u>[<u>ot</u> a basic portfolio]
C: [no:. no. [no.]
E: [(with)=
H: =no, sir.
E: ( )=
C: ↑no[:.
H: [no sir.
R: <u>with</u> the files.=
H: =Eduardo, you're wrong. I'm <u>te</u>lling you you're <u>wrong</u>.
(0.6)
H: ((*hand to chest*)) <u>lis</u>ten to me, (.) have a little confidence that I know what I'm talking about,
E: what of the- uh this- two- two bah uh:- styles- you woo-ould buy, (0.4) if you have six per cent more in this one?
H: ((*shakes head no*))=(.)
E: what you, you please, ((*pointing to H*))
H: ↑don't go by <u>me:</u>,=
E: you:, Charlie,=
C: °↑why [( )?
H: [<u>no</u>, it's <u>dif</u>ferent.=
E: =what (-)=
C: i[t's- a different customer.
H: [it all depends on the indi<u>vi</u>dual.
C: there are <u>both</u> types of <u>cus</u>tomers
H: there's a customer [that will carry a lot of <u>pa</u>pers in a=
C: [( )
H: =portfolio, and there's a g- a lot of customers that wanna very slee:k po[rtfolio.
C: [there- there's a c[ustomer who wants to= H:
[there's a lot of customers
C: =<u>or</u>ganize his [stuff,
H: [WAIT A MINUTE, wait a minute.
H: [let me give you a ( ) ((*leaves for other room*))
C: [and there's other customers that just put all in together
(1.2)
C: really.
( )=((*H out in other room, comes back in, holding a very thin portfolio*))
H: <u>I</u> WOULD TRAVEL WITH <u>THIS</u>
(1.1)=(E nods yes)
H: why? (.) I don't ( ) travel with a lot of papers=
E: but people <u>like</u> this. ((*pointing to thin portfolio*))

H: why:?
E: this is different.=
H: =[(w- if) they can buy thi:s, [look how much mo:::=
E: =[totally different.   [no:, (   )
E: =(no), we are comparing this only. ((*touches old&new cases*))
H: [you're wro:ng,] you're so wrong, [THAT'S MERCHandizing,=
E: [ah: thi- this, no:]   [(nuh:)
H: =ah, please Eduardo,=
E: =Harry, no, you are comparing with this one, it's totally
different=
H: =[Eduardo, why should somebody buy (.) a fo- a tree-and-a=
E: =[(   )
H: =half-inch attache (.) instead of a four-inch °attache°?
       (0.4)
C: because they carry- carry less (0.5) some people carry less,
other people carry more.
E: (1.2)=((*nods yes*))
H: [the BUYER of this is not the same buyer of this,=
E: [(but here- ( )
H: = >it's a different (.) buyer.<
       (0.6)
H: the buyer of this ((*touches new case*)) is somebody who puts
a lot of papers into a portfolio, (.) the buyer of this (.)
doesn't put as many
E: the amount of paper is the s↑ame here and ↑here
H: but [he has i[t partitioned. ((*turns away and smiles*))
C: [>this is [t o   o rgan[ize<]
E: [this is the- [yies], okay,=
C: =this person is a[n organized person,=
E: [yies (   )
C: =[this person isn't.=
E: =[yeah Charlie,
E: =if you have (.) only two files here and have five kuh- uh
files here,=
C: =yeah.=
E: =put- in each-,
C: [(   )] get everything (.) o[rganized.
E: [<I prefer this one- >]   [<but not because in= E:
=[this you can carry more than here,=
H: =[°(but the guy-)°
       (0.4)
H: I don't wanna be rude, but when it comes to being a
merchant, (.) you don- you're not in my- my league, (.) I'm   a
better merchant °than you are° and I [am telling you and =   E:
                              [yeah, sure uh (=   H: =[I'm not trying to
be a wise guy
E: =[,)
E: no problem, [(   ) we are discussing about=
H: [I am telling you-
E: =the price, [six per cent more here,((*face-gestures doubt*))=
H: [I am t-
H: =I am telling you, (.) >it is not the same customer (0.3) it
is a totally different customer.
       (2.2)
H: it is not the same,
       (1.2)
H: just like it's not the same customer that buys this.
       (5.2)=((*H walks over to get 1719 sample on the floor*))
H: there's no difference between this and that,
       (2.0)
H: no difference, (0.3) it'll hold about the same=
E: =the model is different
       (0.6)
H: °ah[:, so the° [model is different.]

C:	[yeah:.	[
E:	[the <u>mo</u>del is different,] the de<u>sign</u> is=
=different, (.) °kay°
H:	okay,
	(1.0)
E:	[(	)
H:	[but it holds about the <u>sa:me</u>, (0.5) <u>this</u>, (.) and <u>that</u>,
will hold about the <u>same</u>,
E:	((*nodding yes*)) °yeah.°
H:	but there are people that buy <u>this</u> (.) °and there° are
people that buy <u>tha:t</u>,
E:	sure ((*nods yes*))
H:	and there are people that buy <u>this</u> one.=
E:	=°(	) it's totally different° [(the design),
H:	[it's <u>TASTE</u>.
E:	dif[ferent (design)
H:	[it's <u>TASTE</u>.
E:	↑design is <u>di</u>fferent.
C:	↑right.
H:	it['s taste, Ed[uardo.
C:	[the the	[the design is different <u>on this</u>.
	(1.3)=((*H smiling; puts 1719 sample on table*))
H:	Eduardo, be<u>lieve</u> me you're <u>wrong</u>. (.) why (is it-) <u>why</u> would
somebody wanna buy <u>this</u>? ((*grabs 69536 sample from floor*))
	(3.9)=((*H walks to other end of room*))
H:	<u>this</u>, (.) will hold less than <u>that</u> ((*points to cases on
table*))
	(0.8)
C:	yea.
	(1.1)
H:	but <u>this</u> will cost a lot <u>more</u>.
	(1.0)
H:	why? (.) WHY would <u>some</u>body spend more money to this than
<u>tha:t</u>? (1.2) when <u>that</u> holds more papers than <u>this</u>. (1.1)
°it's a ↑matter of <u>fa:</u>shion.°
	(0.8)
E:	yeah, this is more fashionable, I <u>know</u>.=
C:	=right.
E:	<u>that</u> is a- <u>right</u>.
H:	so <u>each</u> case has its own feature, Eduardo, be<u>lieve</u> me,
	(0.6)
H:	↑and that applies to <u>your</u> cases:,
	(0.5) ((*H drops 69536 sample*))
H:	look, ((*starts walking to opposite end of room*))
	(2.8)=((*H walking*))
H:	((*walking*)) °(I'll) teach you (a few things.)°
R:	hkfkhuh ((*shoulders up and down*))
C:	ukheh.
H:	((*grabs Courofatos case from display*)) you have a case
↑<u>here</u>,
	(0.7)
E:	yeah,
	(0.3)
H:	((*grabs another case from display*)) you have a case ↑<u>here</u>,
E:	yeah,
	(2.9)
H:	((*holding both cases from Courofatos display*)) same buyer?
	(1.4)
E:	no,
H:	why?
	(0.6)
H:	why,

(1.3)
H: they'll probably hold about the same thing.
(0.4)
E: °(but)° this is different design.
C: ah.
H: NO:[:W you're talking,
C: [the::re you go,
C: no:[w (you're hearing)
H: [<now we have a different design,>=
E: =and also the price here [is very important
H: [<is this a different design,>=
=(.)=((*touches new case*)) than that? ((*hand over new case*))=
E: =((*shakes head no*))
C: no.=
H: =it's NOT?
C: ↑↑I don't believe it.
H: ah, [Eduardo, (h)come o(h)n,((*smiling; puts case on rack*))
E: [(no,)
(1.8)=((*E stands up and holds up old and new cases*))
R: (cê tá invocado por causa da alça, [eu acho.)
H: [(h)you're my friend but=
=(h)som(h)etimes ya(h)- (h)you're not m(h)aking sen(h)se(h).
E: no, please, no, the sense- is is the following, we're speaking a- about the [price
H: [the minute,
E: and then,
H: Edu[ardo, my friend,
E: [you're saying me is that the following, with six per=
=cent more here,
H: ((*grabs case from E*)) the minute, the minute, (.) they (.) they show this (1.2)=((*begins unzipping new case*)) in the store (2.9)=((*unzipping case wide open*)) like this,
(0.6)
E: yeah, ((*nods yes*))
H: they're going to reach (.) one type of customer, (0.6) but not every ↑customer wants to have ↑so many of the[se partitions]
E: [((*nods yes repeatedly; lipsays* yes))]=(0.9)=
H: somebody who carries a lot of papers,=
E: =(0.9)=((*nods yes*)) °uhm hm°=
H: =will want this type of a ↑thing because they visualize gee, (.) <I had an attache case I had to put a lot o- a lot of papers °in there,°> look what I have in a portfolio, (.) but somebody like me:, (.) forgetting about when I travel overseas, but domestically, (0.6) I carry ↑this ((*holds up thin portfolio*))
(2.0)
H: cuz I don't carry a lot of papers,
E: ((*nods yes*))=(1.4)=
H: =so it all depends on the individual customer's needs,=
E: =((*nods yes*))=(0.5)=
H: =and this, (.) the same customer (0.4) will not but this (.) as this,
E: ((*nods yes*))
H: it's a different (.) customer.
(0.4)
E: [((*nods yes*))
H: [I am telling you.=
E: =eah if ih- ih- it is [(a difference in cos]t), why you are=
H: [<there's no question about that.>]
E: =uh making this difference only of six per cent in this one, (.) against this one? (0.3) of increase °( )°,
(1.1)
H: why?

E:	yes.
C:	because that's all the <u>value</u> there is in it.=
R:	=it's a different ↑customer.
E:	yeah, different customer.
	(2.1) ((*H looks down at side of new case*))
H:	I said that this ((*touches new case*)) has more <u>va</u>lue than this ((*old case*)) (0.8) this is <u>more</u> expensive to make than=
	=t[his. ↑I] agree. ↑I a[gree with you.
E:	 [((*nods yes vigorously*))] [yeah,]
E:	you agree but you give me: (.) <u>six</u> per cent of difference between <u>this</u> and <u>this</u>.
	(0.4)
E:	[<u>maximum</u>
H:	[°because that's the price.°=
C:	=you have a less expensive zipper,
	(0.4)
H:	<u>I</u> am looking,=
C:	=it h[as vinyl on the inside,
H:	 [Edu[ardo, Eduardo, I am looking]
E:	 [but uh <u>HERE</u>- no zipper,] you have- ((*showing zipper on new case*))
H:	I am looking [at a price [of about
E:	 [much- [here you have <u>only</u>- ((*unzipping old case*))
	(1.3)
H:	((*looking down at notes*)) of forty,
C:	yeah, but this [is a <u>ny</u>lon zipper and [that's sol]id <u>brass</u>,=
E:	 [it is- [ah::]
	=come o:n,
H:	forget about [the zipper.
E:	 [↑no:, ↑it's the same:.=
H:	=forget about the zipper.
E:	[the price is the same
R:	[([ )
H:	 [I am <u>still</u> looking at a <u>price</u> of forty-four dollars and <u>change</u> (0.4) on this <u>case</u>,
E:	(1.8)=((*nods yes repeatedly*))
H:	((*squinting*)) °that's not six [per cent.°
E:	 [yeah, you have <u>twen</u>ty per=
	=cent <u>more</u> (↑) (0.7)=((*turning torso to read note on table*)) °↑<u>how</u>- ↑what is the <u>price</u>? you are speaking?°
	(0.3)
H:	fort[y-four dollars and <u>change</u>
R:	 [forty-<u>four</u> opposed to thirty-<u>one</u>:,
	(1.0) ((*E looking down at notes*))
H:	now are you gonna <u>tell</u> me,
E:	no, ↑<u>you</u> <u>told</u> me now, that you accept six per <u>cent</u>, (.) of <u>di</u>fference between <u>this</u> (.) and <u>this</u>.
H:	↑but [<u>YOUR</u> <u>PRICE</u> IS- [is- is ↑TWENTY-<u>FIVE</u> [PER CENT.=
E:	 [(no?) [( )
C:	 [yeah.
H:	=↑<u>thirty</u> [per cent.
E:	 [↑o<u>kay</u> Harry, but (.) <u>then</u> °(w- y-)° you can<u>not</u>=
	=<u>al</u>so <u>say</u> me, (.) that you: accept <u>on</u>ly six per cent of <u>di</u>fference between <u>thi[s</u> and <u>this</u>.] <u>yes</u>, o- kay- (we) have=
H:	 [((*closes eyes; looks away, down*))]
E:	=(twenty-[<u>five</u>-)
H:	 [I am <u>go</u>ing on the <u>ba</u>sis of the <u>price</u> you <u>quo</u>ted,=
C:	=°°(yeah).°°
	(0.9)
H:	and on the <u>price</u> you <u>quo</u>ted, (0.7) it['s- it- it makes no=
C:	 [( )

H: =sense. (0.4) if I'm buying this for thirty-one and you're quoting forty-four, (.) ((*hand to chest*)) it makes no sense (0.7)
H: you can't show me (0.5) such a difference (.) in in pr[ice:
E: [yea.
E: (here we put) twenty per cent of leather,
H: if you quoted-
E: (then we put here-) (.)=((*holds up and points to cost sheets*)) here is the leather, ↑twenty per cent more than this ((*touching old case*))=
H: =okay. ((*drops case on table; drops gaze*))
(0.9)
E: the labor is- is ((*snaps fingers*)) fifty per cent=
=m[ore,]
H: [<huhmuch->] how much is the leather?=
=((*E drops cost sheets*)) (0.9)
H: what's the total cost of the leather? (0.9) twenty dollars?
(4.2) ((*E looking for notes*))
R: no, it's not °(this).° (.) it's this one.
(2.3)
H: how much is the [( )
E: ((crossing arms))=[yes, it's twen- twenty-one dollars, yes.=
=okay,[(leather)
H: [so TWENTY PER CENT.
E: yeah.
H: ((*slapping clap*)) that's four dollars.
(1.4) ((*E looks puzzled: raises head and eyebrows; blinks*))
H: (tha)t's ↑four dollars
(1.3)
E: °it's four dollars, (.) yeah.° ((*drops gaze abruptly; looks down at notes*))
(0.9)
H: kay?
E: yeah.
(4.0) ((*H looks at C, throws hands up; C shakes head no*))
H: now, (with) such a high labor cost (put things up) to forty-four dollars? °ah::: ( ),°=
E: ((*calculating; to himself*)) menos,
(1.1)
E: °four dollars, okay.°
(1.0)
E: ((*to R*)) °(contra:, (.) trinta e:?)°
R: trinta e um:,
(2.0)
H: the more you talk, the more you're gonna start agreeing with me, (.) that it doesn't make sense,
(6.6)
H: AND, I'M TAK[ING OFF, (0.5) the cost of the leather because=
R: [( )
H: =I'm ↑I'm willing to go with the ↑vinyl, ((*approaching table and showing gussets on new case*))
(0.3)
C: yea.
H: ((*index pointing up*)) ↑so it no longer becomes four dollars, (0.5) because now I'm saying, ok↑ay give me ↑vinyl ↑here,
E: yea.
(1.0)
H: ((*index pointing up*)) so no long- it's no longer twenty per cent °anymore,° (0.9) it's less.
(0.8)
E: ((*nodding yes*)) °sure°
(0.4)
H: now how do we substantia[te forty-four dollars,

R: [NO, °but-°
(0.7)
H: that's all I'm <u>sa:y</u>i:ng.
C: there's gotta be an <u>er</u>ror (in it) Eduardo,
(0.5)
H: ((*walking away from table and into corridor*)) I am <u>te</u>lling you th[at the calculation is wrong.]
R: [( ) was <u>cal</u>culated using=
=leather.
(1.4)
C: so take that <u>out</u>.
R: ((*nods yes hesitatingly, hand covering mouth*))=(2.0)
(59.9)
((*H comes back in room and starts laying all new collection samples against N wall as C watches map on wall and then him; E ad R silently looking at notes*))
E: ((*to R*)) ( )
(0.9)
H: I'm telling you <u>you</u> sit [down and l[ook at the =
E: [( )
R: [( )
H: =calculations you'll see that there's a mistake somewheres.
(1.1)
C: ((*handing H a case*)) [°(here there's another one)°
H: [I'm telling you right now.
(18.2)
((*E looks at his watch, smiles at camera, stretches and lights up a cigarette; H and R organizing display of collection samples against the wall; R calculating*))
R: um metro e sessenta,
(6.2)
C: forgot the:
(0.6)
H: fla:p,=
C: =°(yep)° ((as *both C and H reach for case*))
(16.2)
((*E sits down; R stops calculating; R and E watch C and H organize display*))
H: ((*pointing to display*)) ( ) got a fan- fantastic collection
C: °sure, ( )°
(2.5)
E: °( ) <u>think</u> so.°
(7.2)
C: ((*to H*)) °great ( )°
H: ((*nods yes*))=(3.2)
(32.4)
H: then you have the two attaches.
C: yeah. they are here.
(5.2)
H: definitely we got to supply the black hardware (to them).=
C: =oh yeah. (.) yep.
H: and the burgundy and saddle, [that's when we use just the=
C: [yeah.
H: =[regular] brass=
C: =[the regular]
C: =that's correct
H: not gold.
(2.0)
C: yeah.
(4.3)
phone: ((*rings twice*))
E: [alô?
H: [I would suggest t- (.) to go over the calculations (again)
(1.3)

E: ((*on the phone*)) ah, tá:, ([ )
H: [I just think (that th[ere's=
C: [there's=
=[some mistake)
C: =[gotta be something wrong.
E: =não, [pode vim aqui, de<u>pois</u>, (.) diz prele: entrar.
H: [it <u>makes</u> no sense.
(0.6)
E: ((*on the phone*)) °okay.°=
H: =<u>some</u>thing is <u>de</u>finitely wrong.
C: yeah.
E: ((*hangs up phone*))
(12.8)
((*C leaves room to go to the restroom; E leaves the building to meet visitor; H and R sit silently, looking at samples displayed against the wall*))

<u>Data Segment 29</u>

Explicated in chapter 8 as example of as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account STANDS: 1st Position Revised."

Original meeting date: Oct. 20, Saturday.

E: (pod' ser) que isso aí valha a pena °(pe[gar).°
Mr.A: [deixa ele baixar =
=um pou(co)=
R: =you mentioned something like uh four<u>teen</u> dollars for this, right,
H: °uhmhum.°
(2.2)
R: we are around fif<u>teen</u> per cent, (0.5) off.
(2.4) ((*E starts walking towards door*))
H: °sah you're talking aro:und a dollar <u>for</u>ty:, (0.6) it's two dollars and °(ten a (.) total of) sixteen ten.°°
(18.4)
((*E left room; C looking at and writing notes; Mr. A and R looking at H; H looks at them, then pulls chair forward and starts looking through notes and writing things down*))
H: is that <u>with</u> the fabric bag or with<u>out</u> the fabric bag?
R: no, without.
H: WI<u>THOUT</u>?
R: you want this <u>with</u> the <u>fa</u>br[ic bag?
C: [oh: [yeah,
H: [<u>ev</u>erything has to have
H: [a fabric bag.
C: [everything has to have a fabric <u>bag</u>,=
H: =that's without question. ((*eyebrows up; hands up showing palms in left to right lateral movement*))
(0.7)
C: (ri[ght), the who:le,]=
[the line is]=
H: =you know that (w[e do our merchandi]se alike).
C: [(the whole thing.)]

(3.8)
H: bo:x,
(1.2)
H: ((*to self; eyebrows up and down; looking down and writing notes*)) °°(twenty-four hundred)°°
(3.1)
H: ((*looks at R; nods yes quickly; then turns gaze to C*)) if it goes ocean freight we may be able to live with this, (0.4) °sixteen °ten°°
(1.6) ((*E walks back into the room*))
R: but ↑even (.) ↑air freight, what I'm thinking iss: (0.4)=((*takes hand off forehead and gestures "compact"*)) this is compact.
(1.6)
H: ((*shaking head "no"*)) °(yeah but uh)° still thee thee seventeen fourteen (0.8) still runs us two dollars (an:: some odd-) do[llars ( )]
R: [((*gesturing "slice"*)) it's gonna be ha]lf=
=that.
H: ((*squints while gazing at R*))=(0.9)
E: ((*sits down again; talking to Mr. A*)) esse ali tá bom.=
C: =n[o::,
Mr. A: [(pois é né,)
((*further talk between Mr. A and E not transcribed*))
H: ((*about to light cigarette*)) <come on,> ((*gets up; grabs sample from table, then drops it; leaves table to look for a different sample*))
(1.4)
C: we got a pa:d and everything,
(0.8)
C: the weight will be about the same,
(1.2)
C: how we going to °(pick) air frei-° ((*turns head to look at H back at table*))
H: (2.1)=((*brings new sample and sets it next to writing portfolio sample on table, showing them to R; unlit cigarette in mouth*)) (how is [that half?)
R: [no just-
(1.6)=((*R points to portfolio sample; H moves two samples*))
R: e- eliminate, (.) the- (.) no, I'm talking about the weight
(1.9)=((*H sets two samples flat in front of R*))
R: but if you eliminate this (1.5)=((*removes paper pad*)) for sea shipment (.)=((*shakes head*)) fo[:r (.) air shi]pment.
H: ((*sitting down*)) [that's that's true]
H: that's true.
(0.5)
C: yeah, that wo[uld (b)
R: [that's gonna be around half °of,°
H: tha[t's true. ((*nods yes*))
R: [the ↑weight °of this°,
C: yeah.
(0.8)
R: so even if [you ship by air]
H: [let me let me jus:t-]
(2.1)
E: ((*grabs sample from R and, facing C*)) you cannot make ih here, ((*shows spine of writing portfolio*))
?: (uhm?)
R: ((*shows him it's stitched already*))
E: ah tá,
Mr. A: ah, tá aqui já, (.) tá emendado.
R: ((*smiles*))

(2.8)
Mr. A: (que é peça pequena também, pra nós)
R: nã- pois é, tem essa daqui (2.3)=((*looking for item on table*)) que nós fizemos (2.6)=((*R pointing to item as Mr. A examines it*)) que também acho que no máximo dois e cinqüenta que a gente (consegue °nesse aqui.°)
(4.3) ((*R gets up; goes looks for another sample of small organizer*))
E: (porque na realidade seria uma boa)=
Mr. A: =pois é,
E: (faze[mo por] fora. <°não precisa fazer aqui)°>
R: [aqui ó ((*hands small organizer sample to Mr. A*))]
(1.2)
R: bem, (.) esse aqui então eu falei dezesseis dez agora, vamo ver o que que ele vai dizer.
(0.6)
Mr. A: hein?
R: eu falei dezesseis dez, ele tá achando que pode (.) que talvez (dê)
Mr. A: (que quantidade é,)
R: cinco mil peças.
E: essa aqui vale a pena.
Mr. A: °anran°
R: .hhh, ah, só tem um detalhe, (.) que essa amostra não foi feita com, (.) ela tem que se(r):: (1.2)=((*reaching and grabbing sample*)) rígida (1.4)=((*opening up writing portfolio for E to see*)) essa parte aqui ó, (0.3) tem que ser rígida.
Mr. A: (aí tem) que botar texon.
R: te[xon.
E: [(botar texon).=
R: é.
(1.0)=((*E fingers side of portfolio sample R is holding*))
R: sim, mas- (.) [é (.) só que- é aqui vai fica(r)- (.) sólido=
Mr. A: [i-
R: =[( )
E: =[mas depois tira fora o[:: solatex.
H: [Eduardo, can you make it for= =fifteen and a half?
(0.8)
H: fifteen fifty,
E: ((*without ever gazing at H, turns to Mr. A*)) quinze e cinqüenta (dá [prá [,)
H: [fift[een fifty ( )=
R: [ah:,
R: =incluindo: o:- saco de tecido °(aí que ele falou)°=
Mr. A: =(mais o saco)=
E: =e esse saco daria:, [<(quanto,)>
R: [o saco dá::
(1.0)
R: um dólar, pouco menos de um dólar.
Mr. A: (média, faz a média, dá uns:) (.) quinze e oitenta (prá ele) (.) e fecha agora ( )
R: k(h)u(h) ((*smiles, points to Mr. A*))
Mr. A: ( )
R: fifteen eighty and that's it.
C: ((*shakes head "yes," looks down and starts writing*))
Mr. A: ( )
((*further talk between Mr. A and E not transcribed*))
(1.0)
H: what's the style number? (we) gave a number to it.
(0.3)

Mr. A: ukukhm ((*clearing throat; further talk between Mr. A and E not transcribed*))
(0.4)
R: (did you?)
C: yeah, it's ins[i:de there.
H: [it's in there.
(0.5)
C: (oh that) ma[ybe. ( )
R: [s:ix nine.
R: six nine (.) oh oh one.
(2.0)
H: six nine,
R: oh oh one.
(0.7)
R: so that's (.) fifteen eighty,
(1.2)
R: including fabric bag (0.3) ef oh bee ((*FOB*))
(0.4)
H: °everything °includes a fabric bag.°°
(.)
R: uhn?
H: ↑everything includes (a) fabric bag.
(2.1)
H: what's the pri:ce, (0.3) fifteen eighty?=
R: =fifteen eighty
C: fifteen eighty
(32.0)
((*H and C writes notes and occasionally whisper something to one another; R is writing notes; E and Mr. A are still having a conversation on a different floor*))

Data Segment 30A

Explicated in chapter 8 as example of negotiational arguing sequence type "Account Status UNCLEAR: Focus Shift."

Original meeting date: Oct. 20, Saturday.

(0.9)
R: posso falar três e cinqüenta aqui?
H: ((*to C*)) ( )
Mr. A: (sei não) ((*shaking head "no"*))
C: yeah.
E: (eu acho que deve fazer)
Mr. A: ([ )
R: [three fifty. ((*holding sample and nodding yes*))
Mr. A: (nuh,)
(1.2)
H: how do you substantiate [(it)?
C: [come on:,
Mr. A: ( )
H: how do you substantiate it. ((*gets up and reaches for wallet sample on table*))
R: because we have- ↑well, if you were gonna buy leather for this, ((*reaches for cost sheets*))
E: no, don't- you cannot buy leather
(0.7)

C: you can use <u>scra:p</u> on this.
R: no, ↑right.
Mr. A: (come on,)
(1.1)
H: you know there is more consumption of leather [(here than=
R: [Harry, I =
H: =[there)
R: =[told you, whe- when you asked what was the cost for <u>this</u>, I told you-
(0.8)
H: two [ninety six ((*$2.96*))
R: [the cost ( )
R: the cost sheet was <u>made</u>, ((*holds up cost sheets*))=(0.4) uh: including (0.7) <u>this</u> wallet
(1.0)
R: and we jus:t (.) made some rough calculations=
H: =↓oh Roberto, you gave exactly what it cost [from Argentina=
C: [two <u>ni</u>nety-six
H: =and what it cost from Brazil. cu[t the bullshit.]
R: [we <u>es</u>tim]ated,
H: ((*walking away from table and towards door*)) cut the bullshit, will ya? (.) I gotta go to the bathroom.=
C: =[uk(h)uk(h)uk(h)u(h).
E: =[ak(h)mf(h)uhmfk(h)
H: =[I can't [deal with this.
R: [enjo:y it.=
E: =(h)enj(h)oy it.
((*H crosses through door; out of room*))
Mr. A: ah, eu acho que se fizesses acho que três e meio já é mais caro que aqui.

<u>Data Segment 26</u>

Referred to in chapter 8 as example of non-negotiational arguing sequence.

Original meeting date: Oct. 20, Saturday.

(4.8)
H: ((*turning to face C*)) y'know ho'long it'll take to get in- to get into stock on the new collection? if it goes ocean freight,
(1.4)
H: it'll take them th[ree to four weeks just to get into]=
C: [((*nodding yes*))]
H: =stock=
C: =((*lipsays "yep"*))=
H: =now you got another thr[ee t' four weeks to ship]
C: [((*nodding yes*)) ( ) on=
=the water]
H: you got two months
C: °yeahp.°
(0.4)
H: before y[ou even start]
C: [you won't have it] <u>u</u>h: (0.3) <↑you won't have it in time>
(2.5)=((*H shakes head "no"; shrugs; lights cigarette*))
C: ye- (0.7) we [have those m<u>ee</u>tings bef<u>ore</u> the show,
H: [((*rests head on arms on table*))

(1.0)
C: what you gonna use for tha:t?
(2.2)
H: [((*raising head from table*)) ↑(you gotta do the=
C: [if they wanna put] it-
H: =presentations)]
C: (we-) that's what I'm talking ab[out
H: [(you gotta do Dylon's you=
=gotta do David's you gotta [do ( )
C: [but it isn't only the=
=presen↑tations it's the stores that wanna go into this new stuff early,
(0.4)
H: ((*facing opposite direction*)) (c'mon we're) ((*rests head on arms on table again*))
C: ((*still facing H*)) you know before the show
(1.6)=((*0.9) + C strikes table twice, making loud noise*))
C: ((*facing R and E*)) we were planning on using some ads (from) key stores
E: yes.=
C: some very key stores in the United States
H: ((*raises head; facing away from others*)) [(° °)]
C: [AT THE SHOW
C: so that (.) y'know you use this as a se:lling tool (0.3) that (.) these stores (0.3) have it in stock there=
E: =uhn h[um
C: [know a:nd uh: <this is the thing> (.) we won't be able to get the sto:ck (.) into our place if we ship it by water (0.4) to uh: (1.2) to get it up there to get sta:rted with the thing °(°) to get in to stock on it
(1.0)
C: °and° (0.5) it's like ((*hand toward E*)) you wanna have stuff before ((*points to shelves behind self*)) your show so that if a guy places an order ((*slamming table with fisted hand*)) BINGO=
E: =([ )
C: [you get it out right away.
(0.6)
C: same type of philosophy
(1.8)
C: but,
(3.1)
C: why can't we get a firm, uh: rate? on (a) ship,
(0.9)
C: ((*turning head to H and then back to E*)) what ↑the hell is the problem with tha:t?
(3.2)
H: °(the) ship is not (the answer)°
(1.0)
E: the ship you: °you: uh:° <you're speaking about the freight?>
C: yeah.
(3.3)
E: °°then uh:°° we- we gave you idea of- yesterday
(0.5)
E: [the two containers
C: [yeah but uh I mean but this is your idea no?
R: ((*shaking head*)) nuh, no.
C: a[right.
R: ((nodding "yes")) [Is[enberg.
E: [no:: °nuh nuh no°
C: Isenberg
E: Isenberg=
H: =Isenberg is full of shit.

(1.0)
H: cause <u>I</u>senberg guaranteed you for an entire year (0.6) where did he live up to his guarantee,
(0.6)
C: on the <u>air</u> pr[ice
H: [he guaranteed you an entire year ((*finger hammering table*))
R: [I WAS SITTING] THERE WHEN he [guaranteed that
R: [( ] [(in]ternational=
=uh:: t<u>a</u>riffs ((*shrugs*))
(0.5)
R: uh: [( )
H: [eh LET ME TELL YOU something I gua¶rantee to my customer a whole year whether I get an ¶<u>in</u>crease or I ¶<u>don't</u> get an increase.
(0.7)
C: and we stick to it.=
H: =and I stick to it.
(1.3)=((*staring at R*))
R: (I [still)
H: [and IF I DON'T GET THEE: if I don't- if I get an increase (.)=((*points to self*)) I gotta eat it.
(1.2)
R: (beca[use well)
H: [I CAN'T CALL up my c[ustomer and say-
R: [that's what <u>we:</u> are d<u>o:</u>ing=
=((*raises eyebrows*)) (0.3) wi- with <u>air</u> freight.
H: ((*left hand and arm held sideways in the air*)) I- I underst[and it but <u>I</u>senberg <u>isn't</u>
R: [(but it's different) ((*right hand and arm held sideways in the air and the moving till end of turn*))
R: YOU CANNOT YOU CANNOT, (0.6) you eve- y- you sometimes fly out of Romania correct,
(0.3)
H: ((*nods yes; cigarette in mouth*)) °uhum.°
(0.7)
R: if (.) Lufthansa, if you f- (.) let's say if you fly Lufthansa (1.0) if they: (.) incr<u>ea</u>se uh by a certain percentage, if IATA (0.5) stipulates a certain percentage inc<u>rea</u>se, (0.7) it's no:t Mastrich who's gonna: (.)=((*retracts hand held in midair*)) absorb that incr<u>ea</u>se
H: °↓ey let me tell you something=
C: =uk heh
H: I've been dealing with Mastrich for <u>five</u> years
(0.6)
C: [( )
H: [we haven't had an increase in thr<u>ee</u> years from Mastrich
(0.6)
H: °and his fre[ight(ing) rates have gone up°°
R: [ah: on <u>sea</u>, alright I'm talking about <u>air</u>
H: ((*conspicuous rounding of lips; shaking head no*)) ↓o::h:: sea doesn't have increases right, ((*frowning; arms stretched out, palms showing*))
C: what's the difference?
(1.0)
H: ((*moves head and torso forward over table*)) there were no <u>oi</u>l (.) oil increases because of (.) of the oil embargo in in Kuwait right, (1.1) ((*torso and head leaning forward; shaking head "no"; raised eyebrows*)) °we didn't get an increase from (.) from Mastrich°
(1.4)

H: ((*back to upright torso position*)) so please ((*hand-gestures "stop"*)) don't tell me about IATA ((*fast downward hand movement from stop gesture*))
(1.3)
C: and they have w[ays o[f working
H: [forwa[rders (do-)
R: [I thought about IATA [because that's=
C: [(both)
R: =<u>a</u>ir=
H: =let me <u>tell</u> you s[omething=
C: [yeah, but they have ways of working
H: ((*grabs C by the arm, facing R*)) c<u>a</u>rgo forwarders don't go by IATA rate (0.3)=((*raises eyebrows; leans forward*)) just for your own information. (0.7) and if <u>Isen</u>berg tells you th<u>a</u>t <u>he's</u> based by IATA rates he's full of shit (0.3) if <u>I</u> want to ship di:rectly <u>wi</u>th an airline, (0.4) ((*pointing to himself; nodding yes*)) I have to abide by IATA (0.4) <u>not</u> a forwarder <because a forwarder gu<u>a</u>rantees> (.) X amount of pounds (.) °or kilos per ye[ar°
C: [he gets a <u>dis</u>count=
H: =he gets a discount so d<u>o</u>n't let uh Isenberg bullshit you ((*left arm held extended in midair, with all fingers pointing to R*))
(0.5)
H: I fly- I fly ocean- (.) I'll give you an exa:mple (0.5) I am flying <u>two</u> forty-foot containers from (.) H<u>a</u>mburg Germany (0.5)
H: <u>o</u>[kay,
R: [uhn hm.
H: I am paying a dollar a kilo (0.6) ↓okay, (0.8) uh: no'm sorry- (.) ((*shaking head "no" vigorously; eyes closed*)) a dollar f<u>i</u>fty a kilo (0.5) ↑<u>NOW</u> I'M paying- converted to: (0.6) ((*leaning forward*)) <u>two</u> forty-foot containers at sixty cents a pound
(1.5)
H: ((*leaning forward; eyebrows raised*)) ><u>six</u>ty cents a pound< (.) where's <u>I</u>ATA? (1.2)=((*staring at R*)) uh?
R: nuh (.) s' con[vert this-
H: [s' don't tell me ( )
R: convert this in kilos ((*starts punching numbers on calculator*))
(0.6)
H: it was- it was (norm-) (.) i- it reflected almost a dollar a pound (0.6) (so) it was over two dollars a k<u>i</u>lo. (.) I <u>ca</u>lled up Mastrich I said I need <u>two</u>- the equivalent of <u>two</u> <u>fo</u>rty-foot containers (0.8) ((*squinting*)) by <u>air</u>
(0.9)=((*staring at R*)) he said I need a week (.) he c<u>a</u>lled me back bef<u>ore</u> I l<u>e</u>ft (.) ((*leaning forward*)) <u>six</u>ty cents a pound (.) that's h<u>ow</u> much. (0.9) about a dollar thirty a kilo:?
R: is he gonna hold this for a year? °(long?)°
C: wa: ih- it's this <u>ship</u>ment!
H: I'M TRYING TO SHOW YOU THAT IATA IS BULLSHIT
(0.9)
C: ([ )]
H: [he's <u>not</u> go]nna hold it for a year
R: [nuhnuh,] ((*shakes head "no"*))
R: IATA ↓IATA r<u>a:</u>te (.) even for (0.5) what <u>we</u> ship to you (0.5)=((*looks up in the air*)) >it wa:s: uh: o:ne, (.) what?< ↑it was close to two dollars and we're paying one fifty- ↑<u>nine</u> (0.5) ((*head tilted slightly; shrugs*)) ↑I kn<u>o</u>w- I know what you['re talking about
H: [so (why you telling me-) ↓because a forwarder has the ability to negotiate with the airline (0.3)

((*pointing at R*)) you couldn't get it for that price but
Isenberg °can.° (0.9) because he must guarantee (1.4) a
certain amount of of-=
C: =f[reight
H: [of freight
(0.9)
H: so IATA only prevails (0.7) okay, (.) when when something is
on a ((*gestures with right hand as if chopping something in the air*))
R: I on't kno:w ((*squirming on chair*)) I just think t[hat-
H: [<look>
(.)
H: you can be sure (0.5) that the shoe people wouldn't be
shipping by plane (0.5) if they didn't have a ↓very very
low rate
R: ((*shaking head "no"*)) they're not shipping by plane that
mu[ch
H: [they're not shipping anything right now
R: only when (.) no (.) only when uh: you know=
=goo[ds are late]=
H: [<when they're in trouble>]=
R: =is when=
H: =<when they're in t[rouble>
R: [↑yeah
H: yeah. ((*nodding yes; looks down at table; frowning*))
R: only in some three or four months a year
H: ((*turning head to face C*)) look (.) that's neither here nor
there (0.5) before you even talk freight (1.9) you- you
haven't settled on one (.) item
(2.4)
H: (-) I have come up I gave them my o:ffer, (0.8) I've come
up from the original pri:ces,
(0.6)
R: ok[ay ((*starts moving notes on table*))
H: [and we're not getting any answers
(3.6)
H: now if the collection can't be made (.) ↑fi:ne I'll accept that
(1.0) but I ca:n't (.) I can't fuss around anymore (0.5) I have a
business to run and I have to make a commitment to my to my uh
people my suppliers
(0.8)
H: if it's not you it's gonna be somebody else (0.3) but the point is
we deve:loped the collection the sa:mples are very pre:tty (0.5)
there is no question that you have the ability to produce anything
that we show you (0.7) but I ca:n't leave this country (.) not
knowing where I stand (.) telex or no telex (0.4) ((*shaking head "no"*))
we talked about it last night till two in the morning
(1.1)
H: I can:'t go: (.) and and try to be honorable (.) with the
Czechoslovakians when I don't have the answers here (0.3) if you
tell me no you can't produce it ¶here (.) ↑fine (.) ↓that's oka:y
(0.4) at least I know how to- how to talk to the Cze:chs (0.5) but I
can't talk to the Czechs (.) ((*pointing to own head*)) with honesty
(0.6) not knowing where I stand with you (0.4) I ↑can't ↓it doesn't
make sense.=
R: (0.5)=((*nods yes; looks down*))
H: I gotta bullshit them (0.6) ((*squinting and shaking head "no"*)) and I'm
not gonna bullshit them ...

RESUMO DE TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO DEFENDIDA NA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, FILADÉLFIA, EUA, 1996

FABRICANTES BRASILEIROS E IMPORTADORES NORTE-AMERICANOS FAZENDO NEGÓCIOS: A CO-CONSTRUÇÃO DE SEQÜÊNCIAS ARGUMENTATIVAS EM NEGOCIAÇÃO

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Este estudo descreve a produção e processamento discursivo de seqüências argumentativas em uma negociação comercial espontânea entre fabricantes brasileiros e importadores norte-americanos. Os capítulos iniciais discutem esta fonte inicial de dados audiovisuais e o processamento da mesma. Seguem-se resenhas, ilustradas com dados de transcrições, das literaturas que fundamentam este trabalho como uma microanálise sociolingüística interacional da fala de negociação em interação social.

As análises nos capítulos centrais descrevem seqüências argumentativas negociacionais. Tais seqüências se desenvolvem entre as duas partes negociadoras A e B dentro de um tópico de escopo restrito e a partir de um contexto seqüencial de três posições. Tipicamente, quando B rejeita uma posição de barganha de A, B presta contas de tal ação de não-alinhamento (a rejeição). Quando A não honra a justificativa, a argumentação entre as partes tem início. A eficácia das tentativas de prestação de contas proferidas por B perante a oposição e resistência de A determina o tipo de encerramento de uma seqüência.

A microanálise etnográfica dos dados revela que os participantes tratam tais seqüências argumentativas na negociação como unidades interacionais e que estas possuem aberturas e encerramentos reconhecíveis. As principais ações

constitutivas de seqüências argumentativas negociacionais — prestações de contas e contestações — são então examinadas. A análise de exemplos de diversos tipos de seqüências argumentativas negociacionais ilustra a gama de variação do fenômeno no *corpus*.

Os participantes em fala de negociação co-constróem estas seqüências de ações argumentativas primordialmente por meio de turnos conversacionais que são conectados quanto ao seu tópico entre si e com alguma seqüência de barganha anterior. Ao contrário de seus equivalentes não-negociacionais, esta argumentação em negociação restringe a expansão de tópicos e apresenta marcas divisórias em relação à interação que segue e precede. Estas características resultam da orientação — institucionalmente motivada — que os participantes em negociação exibem no sentido de buscarem *conjuntamente* o estabelecimento de um certo grau de consenso em relação a questões sobre as quais as partes antes expressaram posições explicitamente opostas. Isto se faz necessário para permitir (re-)alinhamento entre as partes, se possível para que uma resposta à uma ação de barganha anterior (ex.: uma proposta) possa ser proferida, e para que assim as partes fiquem comprometidas a efetuar certas ações comerciais para benefício mútuo após o final da negociação.

Apesar das diferenças entre os participantes — falantes nativos de línguas maternas diversas e membros de sociedades distintas — e apesar da complexidade da tarefa interacional com que se deparam, problemas sérios de comunicação não foram observados na co-construção de seqüências argumentativas negociacionais. Isto contrasta com descrições de interação em encontros entre membros de diferentes grupos étnicos numa mesma sociedade. Este estudo postula, portanto, que participantes em negociação comercial inter-societária interagem orientados para a busca de objetivos institucionais interdependentes e que esse mandato institucional pode ser um fator que minimiza a ocorrência de problemas sérios de comunicação intercultural.